Napoleon I.

August Fournier

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NAPOLEON I.

J. J. Masquerier. pinx.

Walter L. Colls. Sc.

Napoleone Buonaparte
First Consul of France.

NAPOLEON I.

A BIOGRAPHY

BY

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WITH A FRONTISPIECE AND THREE MAPS

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INTRODUCTION.

THERE are many lives of Napoleon in many languages and of many lengths. One of the very best known to me is written by an Austrian Professor whose name has long been a household word among those students whose special concern is the literature of the Napoleonic age. Dr. August Fournier of Vienna, first published his Life of Napoleon in 1885 and achieved an immediate and striking success, and this not only in Austria and Germany but outside the limits of German speech as well, for his work was translated into French and found admirers on both sides of the Channel.

It is not surprising that re-issues were called for, nor yet that Dr. Fournier's revised edition was delayed till 1904, for the onward march of Napoleonic scholarship had been very swift since the first appearance of the biography, and the task of revision and completion was rendered proportionally delicate and difficult. At last Dr. Fournier bowed to the storm, and it is from his second and fuller issue in 1904-1906, that Miss Adams has made her excellent English version.

H. A. L. FISHER.

OXFORD, *March*, 1911.

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PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION.*

More than ten years ago the publishers requested me to prepare a new edition of this book. It had met with a favourable reception, it had been read and studied, and what was no small gratification to me, it had been translated into the language of the nation from whose history it was taken. I would fain have complied with this request, knowing as I did that much in my book was incomplete, that there was no lack of defects and errors, and that at times the subject matter demanded a fuller treatment than I had bestowed upon it. Nevertheless I declined. For in France just then, political circumstances had awakened fresh interest in the subject and an enormous mass of publications had appeared bearing on Napoleon I, in which the trivial predominated over what was important, and legend over history, till the task of sifting and revision seemed well-nigh impossible. At the same time new questions were raised as to the conception of the great Imperator's character and policy, and these were not easy of decision for one who had to form his judgment far from the authoritative sources. Hence I resolved to wait, in the hope that the French would seek by patient research to protect what was of permanent value, and

* Published at Vienna in three volumes, 1904, '05, '06.

by fresh work, to deepen and broaden the foundations. In this hope I was not disappointed. The last decade has brought forth works of indisputable value. During the closing years of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the present one, thousands of hitherto unknown letters of Napoleon have come to light. Many new documents of great value were discovered in the rich storehouse of the Paris archives. Research, by investigating the economic problems which play such an important part in this period, opened up a wide field which had hitherto lain practically fallow. Military history threw off its Chauvinistic cloak, and guided by dispassionate criticism, contributed much that was vital. Finally, some of the most distinguished historians in France made this subject their theme. Sorel, Chuquet, Vandal, Aulard, and others are now devoting their well-attested skill to the times of the great Napoleon. And as the interest in him is not confined to France but reaches far beyond her frontiers, much valuable research is now being done at the sources of the foreign archives. The Germans have long been labouring diligently in this way, but now, British, Italians, Russians, and Americans have entered the field. It is a significant trait of this movement that in Rome, the ideal capital of the world, there is a "Revue Napoléonienne" which publishes contributions in all languages and from all parts of the world dealing with this remarkable man and the remarkable events of his epoch.

Now, therefore, I ventured to bring out a second edition of my book. I began with the honest intention of enriching it and supplementing it by the

results of recent research, so that it should not cut too poor a figure in the brilliant circle of historical works on this period. But I have only succeeded to a very limited extent in realizing this intention. Much of the new material may have escaped me, and I could do little more than glance through many of the excellent special studies over which I would willingly have lingered. Then, too, the book had considerably increased in bulk, yet its brevity had previously been one of its merits; hence the danger, seeing I found it necessary to increase the notes, of detracting from its readableness. The bibliographical notes have been largely supplemented, and a number of unedited letters of Napoleon included in the Appendix, adding still further to the "learned apparatus," and I was doubtful how far this would be considered an advantage seeing the very absence of such accessory matter had been commended. In view of these conflicting considerations, I resolved to sacrifice nothing important for the sake of popular brevity, and in disputed points where research was especially valuable, not to give my judgment without briefly stating my reasons. Hence, I beg indulgent consideration for the increased size of the work and for the additional "apparatus". I have victoriously resisted much that was very tempting!

As to the question of how far the new material has influenced the contents of my work, I may say that while I have come across much that required correction in detail, on the whole, I have felt no cause for altering my conception of Napoleon and his work. My estimate of both remains as firmly established to-day as when I first ventured upon this

vast subject—then a chaos of materials ranging from extravagant panegyric to annihilating criticism. Of recent years it has seemed to me that the violent fluctuations which have too long obscured the image of the great Corsican were perceptibly diminishing; but long time must yet elapse before they cease.

A. FOURNIER.

VIENNA, *December*, 1903.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.*

The aim of the following pages is to supply my readers with a brief and simple narrative of the rise, ventures, and achievements of a man of incomparable historical significance. I am well aware that even recently those competent to judge have declared that the time has not yet come for writing the history of Napoleon. In spite of this I have undertaken the task because I believe that even although the historian be unable to present anything absolutely final, it is none the less his duty to offer to those living remote from the laboratories of historical science such information as he has won, and that they are justified in expecting to be informed by him of the existing knowledge on the subject. To dig for ore—to do nothing but that—cannot be the aim of any life's work. The world requires both ornaments and implements, and it does not behove those who fashion them to be idle.

For the historian of Napoleon it is not a mere matter of recording the present results of historical research and clothing them in appropriate language. These results are often contradictory, and frequently not sufficiently authenticated to be finally accepted.

* Published at Vienna in three volumes, 1885, '86, '87.

Only consider the changes that have come over the memory of the Great Corsican in France itself—from Béranger's hymns to Barbier's satires, from Thiers' brilliant narrative to Lanfrey's damaging critique. The latter work, published in 1867, destroyed for ever the legend of Napoleon's immaculate glory, and since that date the general verdict on the first Emperor of the French has become even more severe. Two causes have contributed towards this. In the first place the publication of authentic reminiscences of that period — such as Madame de Rémusat's Memoirs—has brought to light new faults and weaknesses in the greatest Parvenu of all time. These revelations have so influenced the historical estimate of the man that the tendency nowadays is to lose sight of his greatness in the contemplation of much that is mean and petty. In the second place the reign of his nephew, Napoleon III, founded upon the hitherto unshaken Bonapartist tradition, was in 1870 replaced by the Republic, i.e. the form of Government which the first Napoleon had overthrown with such arbitrary violence. France having again declared herself a republic, historians opposed to that form of government fell into discredit, as it were, for reasons of State, while the events and achievements of the great Revolution were brought forward into a more favourable light than they deserved. It is only of recent years that earnest French scholars, incited possibly by the researches of the Germans, have recognized that there is not merely a Napoleonic legend but also a Revolutionary one which must be discarded and replaced by the unflinching truth. So far the efforts in this direction have not achieved

results of indisputable value, and the process of investigating the history of the last hundred years in France is still incomplete. But already it is evident that a more just estimate of the first Republic—from 1792 till 1799—is paving the way to a surer understanding of Napoleon's historical significance. It must be borne in mind that he was both the product and the consummation of the Revolution, and that he was following in its wake even when he was boldly aspiring to grasp the Crown of France.

This is the point of view from which Napoleon's biographer must nowadays approach his subject, and from which I have attempted in a very moderate measure, in so far as the limits imposed by circumstances would allow me, to offer my contribution to the task. But my work is nothing more than an outline. The extent of my indebtedness to earlier works it is impossible for me to acknowledge in detail; to historical experts it will be obvious at once. Occasionally, however, I have followed a line of my own which I trust has enabled me to avoid political bias on the one hand and the moralizing of a mere caviller on the other, and to present a portrait which, though imperfect and indefinite in its lines, is yet in its essential features a not unfaithful picture of the character and work of one who more than any other man has influenced the destinies of the world.

Appended to this volume are some bibliographical notes which are necessarily incomplete, even in essential points. Neither they nor the footnotes are in any way intended to corroborate the narrative, they are offered rather with the intention of indicating the works which will prove most reliable to such students

as may be led by this book to wider reading and deeper research. Only by stimulating such a desire can my book achieve the result at which I have aimed.

A. FOURNIER.

VIENNA, *December*, 1885.

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FRONTISPIECE.

NAPOLEONE BUONAPARTE, FIRST CONSUL OF FRANCE.

From an engraving by Charles Turner after a painting from life by I. J. Masquerier, Paris. By kind permission, from a print in the Hope Collection, Oxford.

CHAPTER I.

THE BONAPARTES IN CORSICA. NAPOLEON'S EARLY LIFE.

"THERE is still one country in Europe capable of legislation, the island of Corsica. The courage and constancy shown by this brave people in regaining and defending their liberty well deserve that some wise man should teach them how to maintain it. I have a presentiment that this little island will some day astonish Europe." So wrote Jean Jacques Rousseau in 1762 in his "Contrat Social". A few years later the philosopher's prediction was fulfilled, and the little island became the birthplace of a man whose genius was destined to convulse the world.

Rousseau was not alone in his sympathy for Corsica. The eyes of all Europe had been attracted to this patriotic little nation which, since 1729, had been waging a war of independence against Genoa, under whose sovereignty it had groaned for centuries. The first minds of the day were interested in its fate. Frederick the Great, Voltaire and Montesquieu, speak with respect and sympathy of these energetic mountaineers and their heroic leader Pasquale Paoli. The latter, who had been declared regent of the "Kingdom" by his compatriots, had won back the whole of the island from the Genoese, with the exception of the seaport towns, and had founded a wise and progressive government while carefully safeguarding the liberties of the people. Paoli had thus realized within narrow limits the ideal which the apostles of political progress of that day were never weary of proclaiming, and he would certainly have succeeded in driving the enemy from their last strongholds and in securing the complete independence of his native land, had not France intervened and swept both combatants from the path. This was during the

Seven Years' War when Genoa had thrown in her lot with France, and Louis XV, in return for her support, had promised to aid her against the rebel Corsicans. For three years, from 1756 to 1759, France held the ports of San Fiorenzo, Calvi, and Ajaccio, and sought to mediate between the belligerents. Soon, however, she seized the desirable island for herself. In 1764 negotiations with the Doge of Genoa resulted in a treaty by which the King of France pledged himself to occupy five Corsican seaport towns for four years, in the interests of the Republic. In 1768 this treaty expired and the contracting parties then agreed that Genoa should receive payment of her debt and an annual subvention from France, in return for which she was to grant the latter Power the sovereignty of Corsica "as security". In spite of this restricting clause it was generally recognized to be a question of annexation. Who was to prevent it? The great Powers were busy with other matters, and Louis XV had only one enemy to deal with, the Corsicans. But to them it was every whit as galling to lose their independence to France as to Genoa. Again Paoli roused his countrymen to arms. But the conflict was too unequal. After a few successful engagements he was defeated in a decisive battle in May, 1769, on the banks of the Golo, and forced to flee. In July he left the island and found a hospitable refuge in England, whither he was accompanied by a few of his most devoted followers. The others withdrew to Monte Rotondo where they were forced to offer their submission to the French. The seaport towns followed suit, and France remained mistress of the island.

Among the members of the deputation who came to pay their respects to the victors was Napoleon's father, Carlo Bonaparte, a leading Corsican, an intimate friend of Paoli, and the representative of a family which had long been highly esteemed in Ajaccio. In after years, when "*le petit Corse*" had become a great man, some adepts in the art of flattery professed to derive his descent from a Byzantine Emperor in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless it can only be traced with any degree of accuracy to San Miniato and Sarzana in

Tuscany. There, as early as the thirteenth century, the name Bonaparte appears as that of a patrician family of Florence, whence in the sixteenth century a certain Francis Bonaparte migrated to Ajaccio. The family was of noble origin, their coat of arms a shield, in three divisions, with two stars and the letters B. P. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold of Austria, did not hesitate to confirm the nobility of Napoleon's grandfather in 1757, and it was again confirmed during the lifetime of Napoleon's father by the Heralds' College of France. The Buonapartes—so they spelt their name and so Napoleon wrote his till 1796—like the majority of the inhabitants of the sea-board towns, had remained loyal to Genoa until no longer able to withstand the patriotic movement. When the struggle with France began, Carlo Bonaparte joined the national party and led his peasantry from Bastelica and Bocognano against the enemy, on which account he was shown marked favour by Paoli. After the triumph of the French, however, he became a zealous adherent of the new regime, and his house at Ajaccio, over which his beautiful young wife Laetitia Ramolino presided with charming hospitality, was always open to the foreigners, Count Marboeuf, the French Commandant, being a frequent guest.

Carlo Bonaparte was a man of considerable culture but not of outstanding ability. He was ambitious, frivolous, pleasure-loving, a bit of a spendthrift, and somewhat given to boastfulness, tempered, however, by a certain natural eloquence. His head was always full of plans and he was constantly making urgent representations to the Government offices at Paris on behalf of his various schemes. He was a lawyer by profession and his own client. The case of all others which interested him most keenly was a law-suit about a valuable estate bequeathed by a pious relative of his to the Jesuits, a sect whom he accordingly abhorred, although he himself could never be counted a zealous Catholic. This law-suit, which after the annexation had to be maintained against the French Government as the legal successors of the banished monks, cost a great deal of time and money and entailed frequent journeys to Versailles, whither he went also as deputy

of the Corsican nobility, a post he owed to his knowledge of French and to the favour of the governor, whom he had once defended when justly accused of corruption. While engaged on one of these expeditions he died suddenly at Montpellier at the early age of thirty-eight, leaving to his family scant means of subsistence, and the disputed law-suit.

Carlo and Laetitia Bonaparte had thirteen children, eight of whom were alive at the time of their father's death, the youngest, Jerome, being only three months old. It was no easy task to bring up this large family and keep house on such limited means; but this Laetitia did. She was a woman of shrewd common sense, rapid insight, and that tenacious energy which conquers difficulties; vivacious yet sober-minded, fearless and yet wary—a true Corsican. High intellectual gifts she did not possess, nor had she been well educated, but she had plenty of practical common sense and was not without a certain nobility of mind. During the war with France when her husband was fighting under Paoli, she followed him bravely to the mountains and cheerfully bore all the fatigues of the campaign, returning to Ajaccio only two months before the birth of Napoleon. Now, left a widow, she ruled her household firmly and managed her slender income wisely and thriftily. Carlo Bonaparte's unreserved adherence to France and Count Marboeuf's friendship had already proved of practical value. Napoleon and his sister Elise were being educated in French schools at the King's expense, while Joseph had received a free place at the school of Autun, whose Bishop was a relative of Count Marboeuf. On the father's death Joseph returned to Corsica to help his mother; and in the same year (1785) Napoleon, the second son, left the Military Academy at Paris with the rank of Lieutenant, equally desirous to help those at home to the best of his ability. Who could then foresee that in the days to come, under the shadow of this young officer, the whole family was to rise to power, honour and royal rank?

Napoleon was born at Ajaccio on August 15th, 1769. The accuracy of this date was disputed during his life-time though on insufficient grounds, but it has now been established

beyond doubt.[1] As a child he resembled his mother and had her energetic ways, while his brothers took after their father. Napoleon was headstrong and obstinate, a difficult boy to manage. Towards the end of his life, speaking of himself, he says: "I was self-willed and stubborn; nothing could daunt or disconcert me. I feared nobody. I beat one and scratched another; they were all afraid of me. I came most in contact with my brother Joseph. He was beaten, bitten, and scolded, and I often lamented that he did not recover fast enough." The mother sought to hold the wayward boy in check by severe measures, but the father often took his part.[2]

Napoleon's early training therefore was not of the best. When four years old he was sent to the town school to learn the alphabet and the rudiments of Italian, his mother tongue. Later on, along with Joseph and Uncle Fesch (Laetitia's half-brother), he went to the Abbé Recco, where he was taught reading, writing and arithmetic, for which, according to his mother, he showed special aptitude. Probably, however, the tales he overheard of Paoli and of the war of independ-

[1] Marcaggi, "La Genèse de Napoléon," p. 78, quotes the following from a list of expenses kept by Carlo Bonaparte, "My son Napoleon who is in France at the Military Academy was born at Ajaccio on August 15th, 1769". *Vide* notes in the appendix. Masson, "Napoléon inconnu," I. p. 17, mentions my book among those which give 1768 as the date of Napoleon's birth, but he has overlooked a subsequent passage in which I give reasons against this date. *Vide* Vol. I. p. 236, 1st edition.

[2] Masson, op. cit., vol. I. 37, lays great stress on a story of Napoleon's that he and his sister Pauline had once been making fun of their grandmother and that his mother had thrashed him for it; but as Pauline was not born till after Napoleon had gone to France, that would mean that the latter must have been an officer when he got his whipping, which with due respect to Laetitia's energy, is distinctly incredible! An artillery officer, who was moreover exceptionally mature for his years, does not look upon an old lady as a "*vieille fée*" who brings him "*bonbons*," and is not greatly "elated at dining with the officers". If we are to credit this tale which Napoleon narrated one day at dinner at Elba in 1814, during the visit of the Countess Walewska and her little boy then six years old, we must regard it as a slip of memory and substitute for Pauline's name that of his sister Marianne (born 1771, died 1776) whom Masson in his "Napoléon et sa famille," I. p. 25, declares was her brother's favourite playmate.

ence made a far deeper impression on his mind and furnished it with the materials out of which he formed his ideals of patriotism. In 1774 the French had punished with great harshness over a hundred rebel peasants and bandits, the description of whose sufferings may possibly account for the boy's early hatred of the foreigners, a feeling which did not abate even afterwards when he went to France.

Carlo Bonaparte had recognized in his boy's turbulent nature the makings of a soldier. He applied for and obtained a free place in one of the Royal Schools where the sons of French nobility were trained for the Army, and in December, 1778, he left home with his two eldest boys to take them to the College of Autun, where Napoleon was to learn the needful French and then pass on to the Military School at Brienne, while Joseph, who was destined for the Church, was to finish his classical studies. In three months Napoleon had acquired considerable facility in French, and on April 23rd, 1779, "Napoleone de Buonaparte" was enrolled among the cadets at Brienne.

The five years he spent there were not happy ones for the young Corsican. Transferred from the radiant South to the dreary northern plains of Champagne, from the sea to the most monotonous of inland provinces, from unfettered freedom to strict monastic discipline, unrelieved by any taste of the sweets of home-life (for there were no holidays), it was little wonder that the boy's impressionable temperament grew sullen and embittered. Added to this his was not a nature to form close friendships. He took to heart the teasing which no new boy escapes at school and repaid it with bitter scorn. His obstinate and overbearing disposition all too soon found resolute opponents in the young scions of the French nobility whose haughtiness and whose contempt for his Corsican nationality only intensified the boy's ardent attachment to his native island.[1] So unpopular was he that on one occasion, when entrusted by the principal with the command

[1] Napoleon was not the only Corsican then at the Military Academy. Chuquet's diligent researches, "La Jeunesse de Napoléon I," have brought to light quite a number of others, yet we learn nothing of conflicts

of a company of his school-fellows, the latter sent in a formal protest. Napoleon thereupon sullenly withdrew from them all. Some of his comrades have left trustworthy records of the time he spent in the Military School and of his unsociable behaviour. "Gloomy, even savage," says one, "and almost always absorbed in thought, he seemed as if he had just come from the back-woods and was now, surprised and suspicious, forming his first impressions of his fellow-men. He was invariably alone, and disliked all games, especially little boyish amusements. He studied and brooded in a part of the garden reserved for himself, which he rendered as inaccessible as possible, and woe to whoever entered there unbidden! One evening while the other boys were sending off fireworks, a small barrel of gunpowder exploded. The terrified boys fled in all directions and some of them trespassed on Napoleon's preserve, whereupon he flew at them in a passion and belaboured them with his spade." In winter he was forced to be more sociable. Then in the deep snow he would teach the others how to build all kinds of fortifications and how these were to be attacked and defended. But the first fine spring day saw him back again in his own corner of the garden, lonely and thoughtful. He consequently made no friends among his school companions, and indeed all his life long he never possessed many.[1] One almost doubts if he ever was young. None of that gladness of life at its spring-tide such as brightens the lot of most men, seems to have smiled

between them and their French school-fellows such as those in which the youthful Napoleon was immediately involved, and which were probably due to his intractable disposition.

[1] Laugier de Bellecour seems to have been the only boy with whom he was on intimate terms at Brienne, and Napoleon himself broke off the intimacy later at the Military Academy at Paris. The reminiscences quoted in the "Histoire de Bonaparte" (Paris, 1802, I. 15) possibly originated with Laugier. Much is there related of the intimacy of the two boys. Further research and more accurate information of the conditions of life at Brienne have thrown doubt upon the genuineness of a letter of April, 1781, in which Napoleon complains to his father of being put back. This letter is no longer to be found in the Paris archives, where Jung ("Bonaparte et son temps," I. 84) is supposed to have perused it. *Vide* Chuquet, "La Jeunesse de Napoléon I," 114.

on this early blighted soul. And yet in after days he looked back with pleasure to his later years at Brienne when he had grown somewhat more sociable, and after he became Emperor many were the favours bestowed on his old masters and school-fellows.

As a scholar Napoleon was neither conspicuous for his zeal nor his attainments. When he left school after having been there five years, his spelling was still very defective and he never succeeded in writing correct French. His pronunciation to the last retained a foreign accent. On the other hand, it was at school that he became familiar with the works of Boileau, Racine, and Corneille (who remained throughout life his favourite poet), and the wide reading he zealously prosecuted in his solitary hours undoubtedly developed his powers of style. Greek was not taught, and in Latin he was so backward that finally they did not trouble to examine him in it. The classics he therefore only knew through translations. Of Plutarch he was an enthusiastic admirer, and in after years he frequently made effective use of the images with which the great biographer had captivated his boyish imagination. He was fond of history and geography, and especially of mathematics, "the first of sciences," as he called it in a letter to Laplace in 1812. In after days he used to tell how they said, "This boy is good for nothing but geometry". It was precisely this remarkable aptitude for all branches of mathematics that placed him towards the close of his school career among the best pupils at Brienne, and led to his being one of the five selected for admission to the "École Militaire" at Paris. Everything considered, he developed early. The letters which he wrote from school are remarkably thoughtful, clear, and logical. He knew how to estimate the value of things, how to compare and judge. Listen to the fourteen-year-old Napoleon criticizing his elder brother, who at that time wanted to go into the Army instead of the Church. "He is wrong for several reasons," wrote Napoleon in June, 1784, to his Uncle Paravicini at Ajaccio, "(1) As my father says, he has not sufficient nerve to brave the dangers of a battle. His feeble health would not with-

stand the hardships of a campaign. My brother looks at military life entirely from the garrison point of view; and certainly with his handsome figure, ready wit, and consequent facility in paying idle compliments, he would make an excellent garrison officer and cut a very good figure in society, but how about a battle? That is what my father is doubtful of.

"Qu'importe a des guerrié ces frivoles avantages,
Que sont tous ces trésors sans celui du courage?
A ce prix fuciez (fussiez)-vous aussi beau qu'Adonis
Du Dieu même du peau (beau) eusiez-vous l'élocance (éloquence)
Que son (sont) tous ces dons? sans celui de l'avallance (la vaillance).

(2) "He has been trained for the Church; it is too late now to change harness. The Bishop of Autun would have given him a rich living and he would certainly have become a Bishop. What an advantage for the rest of the family! My Lord Bishop of Autun did his utmost to induce him to persevere, assuring him he would never regret it. But it was of no use, he remained unshaken. I would admire him, if his was an unmistakable bent for the finest of all professions; if, as in my case, the great Controller of human affairs had endowed him with a distinct capacity for soldiering. (3) He wishes to enter the Army, all very fine; but what branch? The infantry, most probably. Quite so, I understand, and he will spend the whole day doing nothing, promenading the streets. After all, what is an infantry officer? A scapegrace most of the time and that neither father nor mother nor you, nor my uncle the Archdeacon would like; for he has already shown a tendency to be frivolous and extravagant," etc.

In the intervals of study Napoleon gave his imagination free play. He pictured to himself his happy childhood in his native island with its high mountains, its beautiful, cloudless sky, its romantic coast and deep blue sea. These musings formed his one recreation, his sole comfort during his cheerless solitude abroad. Such thoughts fanned his love of his homeland into the brightest patriotism. For were not those who scoffed at him and humiliated him here, the despotic

conquerors of his native country? Enshrined in his memory was the heroic figure of Paoli, and he himself hoped to become such an one. "Paoli will return," he maintained, "and if he cannot break our fetters, I shall hasten to help him as soon as I have the strength. Perhaps we two shall then be able to free Corsica from the disgraceful yoke that weighs upon her." Another time he even talks of undertaking the whole enterprise himself. "I hope some day," he exclaimed, "to be in a position to restore the independence of Corsica. Who knows? The fate of a country often depends on one man." That he was preparing himself for this task at France's expense never seems to have troubled him. His first care was to make himself thoroughly conversant with the history of his own people, and so he wrote home asking for the loan of Boswell and other books on the subject. Probably he had now formed the intention of writing the history of his native land some day. He was an out-and-out Corsican and hated the French. Most of all he hated those who arrogantly boasted of their inherited privileges of birth and wealth, and thought slightingly of those who were not their equals in rank. And so there grew up in this lonely, brooding mind, biased by strong personal emotions, those revolutionary views which were then beginning to agitate France. Once he encountered them elsewhere, all their strangeness would vanish.[1]

On Marboeuf's advice and in accordance with the boy's wishes, it was decided to enter Napoleon for the navy, in which Keralio, then head inspector of schools and a friend of the Bonapartes, hoped to be able to secure him rapid promotion. But when Keralio resigned and his successor insisted on Napoleon remaining another year at Brienne on account of his youth, Laetitia protested against a career which was doubly dangerous. It was then arranged without further delay that Napoleon should enter the artillery, a branch of the service usually avoided by young men of position on

[1] In the afore-mentioned "Histoire de Bonaparte," I. 15, Laugier is represented as saying: "I should like to know what has become of my school-fellow Bonaparte. He must be thoroughly pleased at the Revolution."

account of the hard work it entailed. In September, 1784, he passed a brilliant examination, and a month later he joined a corps of cadets of noble family in Paris, whither he went on October 23rd. This change had little influence on his mental development. Here, as at Brienne, there was the same gulf fixed between the descendants of the great families and the sons of the lesser nobility—dependents on the King's bounty. The same impassable barrier which had separated him at Brienne from the de Comminges and the de Castries marked him off here from the Rohans, Montmorencys, and Puységurs, and mortified anew his boundless self-consciousness. In the scrimmages between the two social groups he fought passionately and with such contempt of physical pain that he was nicknamed "The Spartan". At that time the École Militaire was run on extravagant lines, better adapted for training young officers in fashionable habits than for making them efficient soldiers.[1] The curriculum included almost the same subjects as were taught in the provincial schools, except that there was no Latin, its place being taken by the study of fortifications and a course on public law. Military history and the science of war were not among the subjects studied. For those like Napoleon, who were preparing for the artillery, there were excellent teachers—Monge was one of them—while Bézout's work on applied mathematics was in itself an admirable training. Discipline was strictly maintained and, as at Brienne, no holidays were allowed. There was a good deal of religious ceremonial, which proved powerless, however, to counteract the sceptical tendencies of the time. From such observances Napoleon held aloof, as indeed he did all his life long. Once, on a father confessor reproving him for his openly expressed hatred of the French rule in Corsica, he curtly rebuked the priest and left the confessional. He was no longer so unapproachable as at Brienne, although, under the pretext of not being well, he still shut himself up

[1] Doubt has justly been thrown on an unfavourable description of these matters, written by Napoleon while a cadet there and sent by him to one of the masters at Brienne. At the same time there is clear evidence that he afterwards disapproved of the state of affairs then prevalent.

occasionally for two or three days and spent them in reading or reverie. For a considerable time he remained on intimate terms with two comrades, Alexandre des Mazis and Pierre de Champeaux, but all his affections were centred in the dear ones in Corsica. The death of his father, for whom his grief was both sincere and deep, proved a fresh incentive to constant industry; and now his chief desire was to get his commission as soon as possible. For this he was eligible despite his sixteen years, provided he had the necessary qualifications. In September, 1785, after one year's preparation (two or three were usually required), he passed his examination before the celebrated Laplace, and was appointed second lieutenant in the La Fère artillery then stationed at Valence, whither he proceeded in October accompanied by des Mazis.

L'Esguille, history master at the École Militaire, remarked of his late pupil: "He is a Corsican by birth and sentiment, and if circumstances favour him he should go far".[1] This criticism was well founded. At Paris, Napoleon remained as passionately patriotic as at Brienne. He still cherished his old fanatical attachment to his native island and the hope to win fame in her service. His hatred of the French conquerors and his enthusiasm for Paoli had not abated one whit, and all these emotions were now crystallizing into definite convictions and purposes. His character was silently maturing, preparing for action when the time came. Temperament certainly counted far more with Napoleon than with many, and the national characteristics he inherited formed an integral part of his being. In Corsica, where there was neither great wealth nor sharp distinction of rank, the people were animated by a certain republican spirit that gave a sense of importance to the humblest and fostered in all a strong self-consciousness. Even as a boy Napoleon would allow no one to trifle with his name, rank, and position. The Corsicans were suspicious, crafty, self-centred,

[1] This remark is attested by Las Cases, "Mémorial de St. Hélène," I. 134, and by Ségur, "Histoire et Mémoires," I. 74. The official notes on Napoleon are missing in the registers of the École Militaire at Paris, which was suppressed in 1787; cp. Masson, I. 100.

pursuing their ends by devious paths, but with a strong sense of justice that neither forgot a kindness nor an injury; they were obstinate, lacking in amiability, melancholy rather than gay, and quick to take offence, all of which qualities Napoleon shared with his countrymen. Their strong interest in public affairs made the Corsicans born politicians and good orators, and to the youthful Napoleon a public career which would enable him to earn the respect of the world, seemed the height of ambition. For had not all Europe been watching Corsica and sympathizing with her in her struggles for independence? And so the keen ambition and ardent imagination which were the inheritance of most Corsicans, combined to inspire in Napoleon the feeling that nothing was beyond his reach. It all depended on "whether circumstances favoured him".

"When I entered the Army," said Napoleon one day to Madame de Rémusat, "I found garrison life very boring. I began reading novels and was tremendously interested. I even tried to write some which gave free play to my imagination and drew out the positive knowledge I had acquired; and often I amused myself dreaming, and then measuring my fancies by the light of reason. I transported myself in thought to an ideal world, and then sought wherein it differed from the real one in which I lived." So he was still a dreamer! Even when free from the restraints of school-life and in constant touch with every-day affairs he retained his old love of seclusion and reverie.[1] He was certainly not one of those who find time hang heavy on their hands. In speaking afterwards of his life at this period he remarked: "Even when I had nothing to do, I had always a vague feeling that I had no time to lose". At the outset he found there was quite enough to do even for him. At Valence he had all the practical part of his profession to learn, and in accordance with the regulations he had to begin as a private and work his way up from the ranks. It was not till three months later, on January 10th, 1786, that he became a full-fledged officer in the royal artillery corps. He then took the theoreti-

[1] Rémusat, "Mémoires," I. 267.

cal course in gunnery and practised at the range. As a matter of fact, under the old regime the French army did not demand very arduous services from either officers or privates. Heavy drills, training-camps, and manœuvres were then things unknown, for although after the reverse at Rossbach in 1757, one or two reforming officers had advised such, their counsels fell unheeded. The Government was too feeble, and the easy-going indolence of the aristocratic officers proved an insuperable obstacle. There was therefore no lack of leisure. But any young officer who sought to turn it to account, to carve out for himself a brilliant future, could only reckon on success provided he belonged to one of the great and wealthy families. Generals and staff-officers all belonged to such families. Those who were poor and of lesser rank had to be content all their life long with subordinate positions. Napoleon, with his ardent mind and feverish thirst for appreciation, now found himself confronted by the barren prospect of waiting half a dozen years to be promoted first lieutenant, another half-dozen to be made captain, retiring finally with that rank—poverty and privations having dogged every step of his way. Little wonder that his thoughts sought other channels.

He still clung unswervingly to his idea of liberating his country, and was zealously studying Corsican history and seeking to prepare himself by wide and thorough knowledge. This was the time when the greatest minds in France had come forward as the guides and teachers of the nation, proclaiming novel doctrines, condemning the existing state of things, and demanding a new state and a new society. The writings of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and d'Alembert were in every one's hands. While at the École Militaire at Paris, Napoleon had been an enthusiastic student of these authors, especially of Rousseau, whose words have seldom fallen on more fruitful soil. The young sceptic welcomed the anti-Christian tendencies of the Genevan philosopher, and in a pamphlet in which he defended them against the strictures of Abbé Roustan, he described the Church as a "bad patriot," and as the disturbing element in society, and argued that

priests should merely be the servants of the State and dependent on it.[1] He was greatly attracted by the "Contrat Social," especially those passages in which Rousseau descants on his favourite theme. On April 26th, 1786,—Paoli's birthday—Napoleon wrote a paragraph in his note-book proving that the Corsicans were right to throw off the yoke of Genoa. "It is sheer prejudice to maintain that the nations are wrong to rise against their rulers, that it is against the divine laws. What have divine laws to do with purely human affairs? Is it not absurd, this universal prohibition of the divine laws against shaking off the usurper's yoke? According to it, any murderer who was only clever enough to climb into the throne of the legitimate sovereign he had killed, would immediately be protected by divine law, whereas if he failed in his plan, he would need to lay his guilty head on the scaffold. . . . The pact by which a nation lays the sovereign power in other hands is not a binding treaty—i.e., the nation can always resume the demitted sovereignty. . . . Does not this justify the Corsicans, seeing that the Genoese sovereignty was only founded on a treaty? Hence they could shake off the Genoese yoke; hence also, do the same with that of France. Amen."[2] Rather an extreme view for a young French officer, fresh from school where he had been educated at the King's expense! But other considerations of a more material kind were now pressing upon Napoleon. His lieutenant's pay of 800 francs, supplemented in the case of an ex-pupil of the royal schools by an allowance of 200 francs and a pittance for board, brought up his total income to barely 1200 francs. Out of this he paid Mademoiselle Bon eight livres for lodging; he often ate only one meal a day and so out of his slender resources he contrived to send much needed help to the dear ones at home. He was looking forward to benefit them in a more effective fashion. According to a time-honoured custom, an officer after his first year of service was allowed six months' leave, which the War Office usually extended. As soon as he could, Napoleon meant to take advantage of this circumstance and return to Corsica.

[1] *Vide* Masson, I. p. 147. [2] Masson, I. p. 141.

Meanwhile at Valence he had begun to go into society. Through the Abbot of St. Ruff, a friend of Bishop Marboeuf of Autun, he was introduced to Madame de Colombier, whose *salon* was frequented by all the most distinguished society in the neighbourhood. This clever woman soon recognized intellectual abilities of no ordinary kind in the shy and ungainly Corsican, between whom and her daughter Caroline there sprang up a tender fleeting attachment which was still remembered long years afterwards.[1] Napoleon soon came to be regarded as a capable and valued officer, and he was now on good terms with his comrades, who on one occasion entrusted to him the task of drawing up the rules for a "court of honour" (Calotte). Yet, in spite of his youth, with its bright hopes and strong self-consciousness, he was not happy. Witness the melancholy feelings he described in May, 1786: "Always alone, even in the midst of people, I have withdrawn to my room to commune with myself and give free vent to my despondency. Whither do my thoughts turn to-day? To death. Yet my life is only at its dawn and I may expect to live a long time. I have been away from my native land between six and seven years. What a delight it will be to me to meet my compatriots and my own dear ones again! From the sweet emotions roused by the memories of my childhood, may I not conclude that my happiness will be complete? What madness is it therefore that urges me on to destruction? What indeed am I to do in the world? Since I must die some day, why not now? If I were a man of sixty I would respect the prejudices of my contemporaries and wait patiently till Nature had run her course. But since misfortune has met me on the very threshold of life and I have no delight in anything, why prolong such an existence? How far off men are from Nature! How cowardly, servile, and despicable! What sight awaits me in my native land? My countrymen, loaded with chains, kiss with trembling the hand that oppresses them. They are no longer the brave

[1] "Correspondance," IX. 7948, the letter to Caroline de Bressieux, *née* Colombier. She afterwards became lady-in-waiting to Laetitia, "Madame Mère".

Corsicans whom a hero inspired with his own virtues, no longer as of yore the enemy of tyrants and luxury and cringing courtiers. . . . Frenchmen! Not content with having robbed us of what we valued most, you have corrupted our morals. The present condition of my country and my powerlessness to alter it, is only a fresh reason for me quitting a world where duty compels me to praise those whom virtue bids me despise. What could I do, suppose I were back in my native country? what could I say? When his country has ceased to be, nothing remains for a good citizen but to die. Were there only one life to be destroyed in order to free my compatriots, I would instantly hasten to plunge a dagger into the tyrant's breast and so avenge my country and these dishonouring laws. My life is a burden to me, for it holds out no prospect of pleasure, and everything seems to turn into a cause of sorrow because those among whom I live and shall probably always live are utterly unlike myself, as unlike as sunlight to moonlight. I cannot therefore lead the kind of life which alone would make existence bearable, and hence arises endless dissatisfaction with everything."[1] Nothing could be more characteristic than this outpouring of a discordant soul. Goethe's "Werther"—which Napoleon is said to have read five times—and Rousseau's sentimental writings had not been without their effect on him. Such reading left its mark in more ways than one. But alongside of this element, and dominating his nature, was the vigorous intellect, extremely self-reliant, and so you feel that the writer of the diary who talks so fluently of death, has as little intention of killing himself as he had twenty-eight years later, at Fontainbleau, when a dethroned Emperor. It is always the same dual nature, to which Napoleon had himself alluded in the conversation with Madame de Rémusat, the same fantastic reveries, to be subjected afterwards to the calm and methodical scrutiny of his reason, the same idealism, curbed and governed by an intellect at once impressionable and calculating. Such was the groundwork of his character and the key to its comprehension.

[1] Repeatedly quoted and given by Masson, I. 145, with facsimile.

Bonaparte now suddenly formed a practical resolution. Once in Corsica he would get his leave extended on the "plea of health" as long as the forbearance of the Minister of War permitted. By this means his pay would benefit the other members of the family, while he himself would be able to gain a more thorough grasp of his country's affairs by being on the spot. In August, 1786, his first year of service expired, and by the middle of September he was back again in Ajaccio, delighted to be home and full of fresh hopes. His return was certainly well-timed, for his mother was battling hard with adverse circumstances. Lucien's school-fees were owing, Joseph had not yet found employment, while several sources of income on which the family had hitherto relied were no longer available. For although the lawsuit about the little estate of Milleli (worth about 13,000 frs.) had at length been decided in their favour, large sums of money were required before the property could be turned to account. Their great-uncle, the Archdeacon Lucien, certainly helped them from time to time, but his means were very limited. Among Carlo Bonaparte's ventures was a mulberry plantation for which Marboeuf (who had lately died) had obtained a grant from Government. Notice was now received that this grant would be discontinued. A salt-mine near Ajaccio in which Carlo had sunk a lot of money, hoping to have it subsidized eventually by Government, had to be abandoned. Petitions and representations on these matters were left unheeded, and Napoleon at last decided to go to Paris and try in person to obtain some recognition of their claims. He got his leave extended, and in the autumn of 1787 he reached the capital. But all his efforts to obtain assistance proved vain, and he returned home, more embittered against the French rule than before, to find his mother managing her large household without any help whatsoever. He remained at Ajaccio till his leave expired and only returned to France in June, 1788.

Auxonne, where his regiment was now quartered, was not a pleasant town. The climate was unhealthy, there was no society, and an officer had nothing to fall back on beyond his artillery instruction, his military duties, and his intercourse

with his comrades. But these very circumstances were invaluable to Napoleon, for they afforded him leisure not only to perfect himself in the science of artillery and to obtain a knowledge of tactics and strategy, but also to acquire a wide range of valuable information which his powerful memory both absorbed and retained. A box of books, partly borrowed, partly the fruit of stern self-denial, he had previously taken with him to Corsica. Montesquieu's "Esprit des Lois," Filangieri's "Scienza della Legislatione," Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" were among the books he studied enthusiastically in the company of his friend Pozzo di Borgo, afterwards his mortal enemy. Nor were the great French dramatists forgotten. Much of their works Napoleon committed to memory, and during the weeks he was laid up with fever in his little room in the Auxonne barracks he read more indefatigably than ever and made careful notes on the subject matter. He also made some attempts at authorship—a novelette, "Lord Essex"; a tale in the style of Voltaire, "The Prophet's Mask"; a chapter of a novel, the scene of which was to be laid in Corsica; and the beginning of a history of the island, entitled "Letters on Corsica" (largely borrowed from Filippini's work), which he intended to dedicate to Necker, and to send previously to one of the masters at Brienne for revision. He resumed his study of Plutarch, Rousseau having declared that his ideas of the State had been moulded by that author. For Napoleon was now intent on acquiring a political training which he hoped to turn to good account afterwards in the service of Corsica. He also studied English history in a work by Barrow, and felt himself in full sympathy with the English, the powerful opponents of Corsica's oppressors. Moreover, one of them, Boswell, had written the history of the island, and Paoli had enjoyed their hospitality, and so the French officers in Corsica called him an "Anglomaniac". But Napoleon did not neglect the history of France. From Mably he gained his knowledge of the Carlovingian period, and of Charlemagne, whom in after days he cited as his model. From Marigny and Amelot he learned about the Arabs and the Republic of Venice; from Rollin about

the nations of antiquity; from Baron Tott about Egypt and Ptolemy's Canal through the Isthmus of Suez, "which could be made navigable with very little trouble". All those historical works he studied with a view to learning as much as possible about the organization and government of States, and he was unsparing in his criticism when he found his expectations disappointed. Here is one of his comments while reading Rollin: "I find that the writers of history give no detailed information as to the nature of the taxes raised by the Sovereign, and as to the manner of gathering them and assessing them throughout the country. They give no details as to how the ruler makes his will known to his subjects." Surely this young islander was already looking forward to playing the rôle of ruler? "I shall be another Paoli," he would sometimes exclaim. The geography of his time he acquired from Lacroix, and his knowledge of modern France from Necker's "Compte Rendu au Roi," from the "Espion Anglais," Abbé Terray's pamphlet on finance, and Mirabeau's memoir on the "Lettres de Cachet". His knowledge of Prussian affairs under Frederick the Great was acquired from a "Vie de Frédéric II," by Professor Laveaux, published at Strasburg in 1787, and full of errors.

Raynal, however, seems to have influenced Napoleon's immediate development more than any of these authors. His "Histoire philosophique et politique des Établissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes," was one of the most widely read books of its day. Like Rousseau, Raynal spoke with admiration of the Corsicans' struggle for liberty, which of itself commended the book to Napoleon. But he was also attracted by the author's revolutionary tendencies, for the book contained more than the title implied. Thus it not only described the political condition of China but also compared it with that of France, to the detriment of the latter. With pathetic eloquence Raynal pictured the state of affairs in his native land, the unreasonable privileges of the nobility and the higher clergy, the deep gulf between poor and rich, the powerlessness of the middle class to obtain redress for their wrongs, the demoralizing venality of the

official class, and the wretched administration of the public finances: he not only prophesied a speedy collapse, he went further and even demanded a revolution, on the plea that such circumstances made it a duty. These ideas corresponded with Napoleon's own wishes and made a deeper impression on him than even Rousseau's teachings, of which he was already sceptical, and which he ultimately denounced as the "ravings of an idealist". To Napoleon, Raynal's book was congenial reading. It strengthened his love of independence,—independence of the French rule that did not implement its engagements towards Corsicans, that left its pledges unfulfilled (in spite of repeated promises his younger brother Louis had not received a free place), and that showed no consideration for a widow with eight children.[1] He wanted independence also of the royal power which the Corsicans who had never lived under a monarchical government found intolerable, according to Napoleon's representations. On October 23rd, 1788, he committed to paper the outline of a "Dissertation sur l'autorité royale". "This work," he says, "will begin by setting forth general ideas on the origin and growth of the word 'King' in men's minds. The military system is favourable to it. The work will then deal in detail with the authority usurped to-day by the Monarchs of the twelve kingdoms of Europe. There are very few Kings who have not deserved to be dethroned." He highly esteems Algernon Sidney, considering him an "enemy to monarchies, princes and nobles". In short he no longer felt as a subject of Louis XVI. The master at Brienne to whom he forwarded his "Letters on Corsica" for revision, reproved him for the words, "in the name of your King" in the dedication to Necker. While in Paris, in 1787, Napoleon had written, "Dear compatriots, we have always been unfortunate. To-day we belong indeed to a great Monarchy, but the defects

[1] La Férandière, the French commandant at Corsica, was not of this opinion. On December 27th, 1789, he wrote to the Minister of War, *re* Napoleon, "This young officer was educated at the École Militaire, his sister at St. Cyr, and his mother has been loaded with benefits by the Government." (Chuquet, II. p. 306.)

in its constitution are all we know of it and we can only look to the lapse of time for any amelioration of our sufferings." Yet now he himself was in the service of this Monarchy, in the service of these Frenchmen whom he had learned to hate in his childhood, before whom he had vainly stooped to sue for help and favours for the Bonaparte family, in the service of the conquerors of his native land, to liberate which had been the noblest dream of his leisure moments! And he, Napoleon, who looked up to Sampiero and Paoli as glorious heroes, had sworn allegiance to their victorious enemy, thereby fastening on his own fetters, crippling his ambition, and condemning his career to mediocrity. He had intended to become his people's hero, and he had only succeeded in becoming one of their gendarmes! It was intolerable, yet escape seemed well-nigh impossible. The unexpected would need to happen to brush aside the obstructions which thwarted the imperious will of this ambitious youth. The order of the world would need to change to let this self-willed genius take his flight. The unexpected did happen. The world entered upon a new era.

CHAPTER II.

NAPOLEON'S ADVENTURES IN CORSICA.

It does not fall within the scope of this narrative to estimate here the complex conditions and movements which culminated in France in the great upheaval of 1789, from which the social and political conditions of modern times may largely be said to date. Long before the decisive year a change was felt to be inevitable. As early as the middle of the century, during the reign of Louis XV, infamous alike in love and war, the word "Revolution" had rung forth like some prophetic cry of deliverance. But when Louis XVI succeeded his grandfather and showed himself sincerely desirous to redress grievances and introduce the needful changes, it at once became evident that the day for well-meant reforms was past. The evil had gone too deep, and already it was beyond the power of the ablest Minister to find a remedy. Since the seventeenth century the government of the country had developed into a despotic and highly centralized system, under which the fate of the nation became wholly dependent upon the King's pleasure and the arbitrary decisions of an all-powerful bureaucracy. The ancient rights of the people had been thrust aside. The States-General,—the representatives of the three great political divisions of the nation, the clergy, the nobility, and the bourgeoisie—had not been convened for a long time back to take their share in the legislation of the country, while with the "Parlements," the highest judicial courts in the State, the Government was at constant feud. Under this system the Church and the nobility had found it to their profit to forswear all political power, and the King had amply rewarded their devotion. They were exempted from taxation and retained all sorts of ancient privileges with

which the State in other days had rewarded their services as the judges and guardians of its subjects. The third estate, the bourgeoisie, which shared none of these privileges, had to bear the wrongful loss of its political rights and almost the whole weight of the expenses of the State. Two-thirds of the land were in the possession of the two privileged classes and therefore untaxed; the remaining third was divided among a large number of small proprietors, who were not empowered like the others to demand forced labour and levy tolls on roads and bridges, and whose meagre patches of land were burdened with all sorts of tithes and dues. The peasants living on the estates of the privileged classes had to pay taxes to the State, to the Church, and to their landowner's steward; what remained of their earnings was barely sufficient to keep body and soul together. In the towns there were a few rich and favoured circles, but the bulk of the inhabitants, who had no property and were excluded from guilds, corporations, and all municipal offices, earned their livelihood from day to day by toiling for the favoured few. In France, therefore, the poor were bitterly oppressed while the fruits of their hard toil were squandered by the aristocracy at the stately court in Versailles or in the luxurious and brilliant *salons* of the capital.

The first thinkers in France had long admitted that this state of matters was against nature, and in their writings, in language immortal by its brilliance and its noble simplicity, they had combated the intolerance of the Church, which even after 1760 had moved the authorities to harsh measures against those of the Reformed faith; they had exposed the injustice of the existing social conditions, and had sought in various ways to find an ideal State with which they might replace the present one, should it collapse as it deserved. That collapse was not long deferred. Bad financing on the one hand, bad harvests and famine on the other, hastened the crisis. In the early eighties, Necker, then Minister of Finance, had made public the desperate condition of the Treasury. His successor, Calonne, had vainly tried to draw upon the wealth of the two privileged classes in order to ease the national burdens. But it was not until the country's

credit had been exhausted by repeated loans, and bankruptcy seemed inevitable, that the King yielded at length to the popular clamour and summoned the States-General. Early in May, 1789, it met at Versailles.

The States-General, as it was when convened for the last time in 1614, did not form a united deliberative assembly such as, for instance, the English Parliament. The deputies of the three estates deliberated and voted separately and the majority of the three classes of voters—two versus one—decided the adoption or rejection of a law. Under such conditions the third estate was of necessity always in a minority, in opposition to the Church and the nobility. But the third estate of 1789 was no longer that of 1614. The example of two great and victorious revolutions, one in the seventeenth century in England, the other in the eighteenth century in America, had not been without effect. The doctrines of the philosophers and the politicians had penetrated their ranks; they were fully convinced of the wrongfulness of the existing conditions, and the desire to express these feelings in action led them to take their first step along the revolutionary path.

Contrary to the terms of the ancient Constitution, and to the wish of Louis XVI, the representatives of the third estate,—who equalled in numbers the Church and the nobility combined—refused to conform to the old procedure. They declared themselves the representatives of the nation, and summoned the deputies of the other two estates to meet and co-operate with them in making and passing laws (June 17th, 1789). They accomplished their purpose, and thus in place of the old feudal States-General, there arose a modern Chamber of Deputies which was no longer satisfied with complacently approving the Government loans, but considered itself called upon to sweep away the old regime, and in its place to organize a new France. Before the close of 1789 the first part of the task had been accomplished. During a late sitting on August 4th, amidst tumultuous enthusiasm, those memorable decrees were passed by which all privileges of rank were abolished, all feudal burdens removed from the peasants, the tithes imposed by the Church declared redeemable, trafficking

in Government appointments suppressed, and the principle laid down that all citizens should be eligible for any State office whether civil or military. Thus they tore down—far too rashly—the tottering fabric of the ancient French State and laid the foundations of a new and habitable structure.

These decrees, however, were far from being the outcome of mature reflection and calm deliberation. While the law-givers were framing the code of their newly acquired liberty at Versailles, Paris was in a state of wild uproar. Of late years there had been no lack of riots in the capital, but now it seemed as if rebellion had taken up its abode there. Shortly before the National Assembly passed their memorable decrees, the people of Paris, having become "sovereign," had defeated the royal troops in the Place Vendôme, stormed the Invalides, and razed the Bastille to the ground. It was only with the utmost difficulty that the deputies and the National Guards had succeeded in restraining them from further excesses. They were a motley throng these "People of Paris". Side by side with men of education, sincere enthusiasts for liberty, were brutalized vagabonds, thousands of whom had been driven into the town by the misery in the country districts, oppressed working-men, fighting for their right to an existence fit for a human being, shameless adventurers and all sorts of light-fingered gentry, fanatical theorists intent on their impracticable doctrines, and hundreds upon hundreds of the ignorant, acting blindly upon any chance suggestion overheard in the streets—an imposing army of anarchy soon to acquire a terrible significance.

The outbreak was not confined to Paris, whither the King and the National Assembly were forced to remove in October, 1789. Soon after the beginning of the revolutionary movement the provinces also had been swept in by the current. There hunger was the propelling power. The plundering of hundreds of granaries was only the prelude to further excesses. In southern France the harvest of 1789 was bad. In the central and northern provinces where it had been sufficient, no one had ventured to put the grain on the market. High prices continued and caused new disturbances. Proprietors were forced under

threat of death to deliver up their supplies. Peasants gathered in front of the castles and compelled the nobles to renounce their feudal rights and give up their goods. Whoever resisted was killed. In eastern France, from the extreme north down to Provence, peasant risings and the confiscation of goods were of common occurrence, murder and assassination far from rare; nor was there any authority able to quell these excesses.

Even at Auxonne on the Saône, where the La Fère artillery was stationed, the effects of the Revolution had been felt. Here too during July, 1789, the tocsin had rung. The toll-bar had been smashed and the tax-gatherer's office destroyed. A detachment of gunners told off to restore order, had refused to obey commands and had stood with grounded arms watching the progress of the insurgents. A few weeks previously there had been a riot in the neighbouring town of Seurre, and two corn merchants injured. On that occasion Lieutenant Bonaparte marched his company to the spot, and there, it is said, shouted to the crowd summoning all respectable people to withdraw, as his orders were only to shoot on the "*canaille*," whereupon they all dispersed.[1] About the middle of August the gunners at Auxonne mutinied and compelled the colonel to hand over the reserve moneys. Napoleon afterwards confessed that these signs of insubordination in the troops made a very unpleasant impression on him. Yet they were only the symptoms of a movement which he himself desired.

On August 23rd, the officers of the French army took the oath as decreed by the National Assembly, pledging their allegiance to the nation, the King and the law, and swearing to use their troops only in accordance with the decrees of the National Assembly. Napoleon also took the oath, although he still adhered unswervingly to his plans for Corsica. He had lately been remodelling his "Letters on Corsican History" and now intended dedicating them to the exiled Paoli. In the letter in which he expressed this intention, he again manifested his hatred of the French oppressors. Soon his one

[1] According to another account, the riot was over before the military arrived. Cp. Chuquet, "La Jeunesse de Napoleon," I. pp. 356, 359.

thought was how to utilize the Revolution so as to win power and influence in Corsica and to fight for his own independence as well as that of his country. Hence it was no longer a time for writing; and the "Corsican Letters" (Paoli had refused the dedication) remained unfinished. Their author was now intent on making a place for himself in the history of his native land.

Since its conquest by France there had been two parties in Corsica; the partisans of the foreigner, who had become reconciled to the new conditions and could turn them to their own account, and the Nationalists who only tolerated the new regime sorely against their will. To the former, the Conservative party, belonged the lesser nobility, the clergy with all those who obeyed them blindly, and part of the population of the seaport towns. For as the latter lay at the mercy of any foreign frigate, their inhabitants had long since learnt to accommodate themselves to foreign control, whereas the mountaineers of the interior were better able to preserve their independence. The National party was split up into two groups, one of which hoped to secure civil liberty by co-operating with the Revolutionary party in France, while the other would have nothing to do with France or compromise. The Conservatives were represented in the States-General by the official candidates, General Buttafuoco and Abbé Peretti, their opponents, the National Liberals, by Saliceti and Colonna di Cesare Rocca. The two latter succeeded in giving effect to the wishes of their electors by obtaining from the National Assembly an Administrative Council elected by the people, in place of the existing system under which the affairs of Corsica were managed by the Governor of the island assisted by a committee of noblemen. There was also to be a paid militia composed of Corsicans. The idea of a National administration originated with a group of ambitious young Corsicans, Pozzo di Borgo, Peraldi, Cuneo, and others who already saw themselves in anticipation regents of the island. The National Militia was Lieutenant Bonaparte's idea. He was then in garrison at Auxonne, but was kept closely informed of all that happened in Corsica by his Uncle Fesch,

Since the death of Count Marboeuf the Bonaparte family had thrown in their lot with the Opposition and Napoleon was now aiming at the highest position in the island. But he was not relying on elections, debates, and the fickle favour of the crowd as a foundation for his ambitious schemes. Already even he looked upon his sword as his surest means of power. He calculated that owing to his military training they could not refuse him one of the highest commands in the new Corsican Militia, and once at the head of an armed force—well—such plans could only be carried out on the spot! He applied for leave, which was granted, and September, 1789, saw him back again in Ajaccio.

He had no sooner landed than his difficulties began. Buttafuoco, the Conservative deputy, thanks to his influence with the royal Government, had succeeded in frustrating the plans of the Nationalists, and for the present all hopes of popular representation and a paid militia were at an end. But this was a time when opposition everywhere had recourse to violence, and Napoleon had been no idle spectator of the stirring events he had witnessed in the summer of 1789. He had watched the National Guards formed in the towns of France, and had seen for himself the magic spell of the "cockade". Now was the time for him to turn his experience to account and give proof of his burning zeal. His plan was to overthrow the reactionary party then in power, organize a National Guard, gain possession of the Bastille at Ajaccio, and drive out the French. At the Patriotic Club of Ajaccio his plans were received with wild enthusiasm and a National Guard formed. "Everything felt the stimulus of his indefatigable activity," writes one of his biographers. "He simply electrified Ajaccio." Just then, however, reinforcements arrived under Buttafuoco's father-in-law, Gaffori, who was second-in-command of the Corsican troops, and part of the populace declared themselves in his favour. The National Guard was disbanded, and by the end of October the Revolutionary party was reduced to sending a protest (drawn up by Napoleon) to the National Assembly at Paris, begging it to protect their liberties and to restore to the Corsicans

those rights "which Nature has granted to each man in his country".[1]

Meanwhile, at Saliceti's instigation, a revolt had broken out at Bastia, the seat of the Governor's residence and of the Royal Councils. Hither Napoleon hurried immediately; he carefully avoided all intercourse with the officers at the garrison, and as at Ajaccio, he was the very soul of the disturbance. General Barrin, the Commander-in-Chief, was compelled to hand over several hundred muskets for the use of the newly formed National Guard, and Napoleon wrote triumphantly to Ajaccio, "The brothers at Bastia have shattered their chains into a thousand pieces". In consequence of the news from Bastia, towards the end of November, Saliceti moved in the National Assembly at Paris that Corsica, hitherto regarded only as a conquered territory, be declared an integral part of France, and its inhabitants governed in accordance with the French Constitution and the decrees of the National Assembly. The treaty with Genoa in 1768, by which the island had been ceded to France "as security," was simply ignored, and in the close of the year Corsica celebrated her annexation by a Te Deum.

To the Bonapartes, the popular cries "*Vive la nation! Vive Paoli! Vive Mirabeau!*" sounded like kinship with Revolutionary France from which Royalist officials, both civil and military, were excluded. In June, 1790, the newly elected Municipal Council in which Joseph Bonaparte had at last found employment, imprisoned some of these Royalist officials, and Napoleon drew up a manifesto to the Municipality justifying this proceeding. Then, although himself an officer, he turned his energies against the army, and he and his confederates planned to get possession of the citadel by smuggling in several companies of the newly formed guard. But in this they were foiled by the vigilance of La Ferandière, the commandant of the town. The hated French remained,

[1] Vide Coston, "Biographie des premières années de Napoléon," II. 94; also Masson, II. 92, with Napoleon's signature and those of the Mayor of the town, Pozzo di Borgo, Peraldi, Paravicini, and several of the clergy of the capital, among them Archdeacon Lucien Bonaparte and Fesch.

only, however, as witnesses of the anarchy which was now destined to replace the royal authority.

No one was more struck by this state of affairs than Paoli, who returned about this time. In the previous April (1790), in the National Assembly at Paris, he had sworn fidelity and obedience to the French nation, and had thereafter made an almost triumphal progress through southern France, reaching Bastia about the middle of July. Thousands of his compatriots hastened to welcome him with rapturous enthusiasm. All the towns sent deputations. Now that the old Dictator had returned from exile, while the memory of his heroic struggles in the war of independence was still fresh in people's minds, he became an object of unmingled veneration. In September, 1790, when the elections for the Government offices began—as prescribed for all French departments under the newly organized administration—Paoli was unanimously elected president of the Government Council. The Conservatives were reduced to silence, while hatred of the late regime and the recognition of the new constitutional laws to which Paoli adhered, attracted to the latter all the Patriots, among them Joseph and Napoleon Bonaparte. Joseph, though not yet of age, was elected president of the Administrative Council of Ajaccio. Early in 1791, Napoleon [1] thinking thereby to commend himself highly to Paoli, had drawn up a protest in the form of a "Letter" to Buttafoco, who had frankly cautioned the National Assembly against Paoli's ambition. The letter, however, was superfluous, for two delegates from the Government Council had already been deputed to protest in Paris against Buttafoco's remarks. Nevertheless Napoleon did not intend to let slip the opportunity of coming forward publicly as Paoli's champion. He branded Buttafoco as a traitor—which he was not—and recapitulated events since 1769 in such pathetic and tragic colours that Paoli, in writing to Joseph Bonaparte, wished the "Letter" had been shorter and less partial. That opinion, however, was not shared by

[1] He had twice already had his leave extended, although towards the close of 1789, La Ferandière had written, "it would be better if he were with his regiment, for he is constantly stirring up agitations here".

the Patriotic Club of Ajaccio, which was affiliated to the Jacobin Club at Paris and numbered the Bonapartes, even the sixteen year-old Lucien, among its members. The club thought the pamphlet excellent and decided to print it.[1] There was no doubt about this young officer's aspirations. The Electoral Committee of the department had illegally bestowed upon Paoli the chief command of all the civil guards in the island. But Paoli was now an old man and moreover he was not a trained soldier; hence the opportunity for Napoleon to play a leading part at his side.

At this juncture the inevitable summons came, recalling Napoleon to France. He ought to have rejoined his regiment in October, 1790, instead of which he sent a certificate signed by the Municipal Council of Ajaccio, excusing himself and stating his inability to leave the island. Nor did he return to Auxonne till February 1791. About that time a great many Royalist officers were emigrating, and some of them attempted to win over Napoleon, but his reply provoked such a violent altercation that he narrowly escaped being thrown into the Saône. Thanks to this exodus of officers and to the reorganization of the artillery, his neglect of duty was overlooked, and on June 1st, 1791, he was promoted first lieutenant in the 4th Artillery Regiment at Valence.

Things having meanwhile quietened down outwardly he resumed his old manner of life, except that he now shared his modest lodging and meagre pay with his younger brother Louis, afterwards King of Holland. Twenty years later, when this same brother involved him in difficulties by arbitrarily resigning his throne, Napoleon remarked to Caulaincourt, referring to these early days: "Why should my brother injure me instead of helping me? I educated Louis out of my lieutenant's pay and God alone knows what sacrifices it cost me. I found the means to pay his board. But do you know how I did it? By never setting foot in a café, nor going into society, by eating dry bread and brushing my clothes myself so that they

[1] This document, which is dated from Milleli, January 23rd of the year II, has been repeatedly reproduced, among others by Masson, II. 180-193.

might last the longer. To avoid comment from my brother officers I lived alone like a hermit, in a little room with my books,—then my only friends. What strict economy it required even in the necessaries of life before I could allow myself the pleasure of purchasing them! When I had managed to save up two crowns by dint of stern self-denial, I wended my way to the bookseller's, as pleased as a child, and I examined his shelves long and anxiously before my purse would allow me to gratify my desires. Such were the pleasures and dissipations of my young days."[1]

Meantime he laboured unremittingly to improve his mind and to add to his stores of knowledge. Among the books he read at this time—pen in hand and making copious notes—were Duvernet's "History of the Sorbonne," William Cox's "Travels in Switzerland" (in translation, he never knew either English or German), Dulaure's "History of the Nobility," Le Noble's "Esprit de Gerson" (in defence of the Gallican Church against Ultramontanism), Machiavelli's "Florentine History," Meissner's "Alcibiades," Duclos' "Government of Louis XIV and XV," Bernardin de St. Pierre's "Indian Tales," Marmontel's "Incas," Ariosto's "Orlando Furioso," Voltaire's "Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations." Occasionally he ventured upon small compositions of his own. In one of these—The "Dialogue on Love," which is cast in the form of a conversation with his friend des Mazis, he shows how the tender passion interferes with our more serious duties. "I myself," he says therein, "was once in love, and my remembrance of it is still sufficiently clear not to require any metaphysical definitions which only confuse matters. I consider Love injurious to society and to the happiness of the individual. I believe it does more harm than good, and that it would be a blessing if Providence would free us from its power." Mazis, of

[1] Coston, I. 189. Cp. also Napoleon's remark in 1811 to a young lieutenant who complained of not being able to afford a horse: "When I had the honour of being a junior lieutenant, I breakfasted on dry bread and kept my poverty under lock and key to avoid invidious comparisons with my brother officers." (Sor, "Napoléon en Belgique et Hollande," I. 319).

course, defended the opposite point of view, claimed that Love was the mainspring of all good, and reproached his friend with never having loved. Napoleon maintained his argument, declaring that a passionate attachment claimed one's whole being and that "so long as it lasted one acted entirely for it".[1] A few weeks previously returning to France, homesick as usual, he had spoken very differently. Then he had looked to love for consolation. "If a man is in a foreign land, without relations and far from home, you may say what you will, he requires some bond, support or sentiment to take the place of father, brother, etc. Then Love comes to the rescue and asserts her claims. . . . What is Love? The feeling of his weakness, that comes over a man in his loneliness, the feeling of his powerlessness and yet of his immortality. The soul is oppressed, it expands, strengthens itself, the precious tears of bliss begin to flow—it is Love! . . ." Although in these sentimental effusions Rousseau's influence is strongly marked, the young lieutenant had already outgrown the Genevan's philosophy. Against several passages in the latter's "Origin of Inequality in Man," Napoleon enters the remark, "I do not believe this," and his comments on the book reveal already an independent view of human relationships and foreshadow a new effort of his pen.[2]

The Lyons Academy had set an essay on the subject of "The Truths and Feelings that Contribute to Human Happiness," for the best answer to which Raynal had offered a prize of 12,000 francs. This prize Napoleon hoped to win, but in this he was disappointed, for the judges considered his work, although showing evidence of feeling, ill-arranged and badly written. This youthful effort of the great Emperor is nevertheless highly interesting. Here he again brings forward his old favourite themes—love of Corsica, admiration of Paoli, respect for Rousseau (notwithstanding considerable divergence of view), dislike of the Church and of Monarchial domination, partiality for the Revolution and even for those

[1] Napoleon's manuscript has been reproduced for the first time by Masson, II. p. 277.

[2] Masson, II. pp. 214, 285.

Frenchmen who, "having grown apathetic under the rule of Kings and their Ministers, have wakened up and have given rise to the rights of man". On the other hand he shows an increasing preference for moderation, which further weakens his old enthusiasm for the gospel of Nature and Feeling. "Reason," he says in this essay, "modifies the sense of our rights, and while it draws gain from the past, it anticipates the future." History and mathematics help to make men's judgment sound, and hence by means of these two he intends to solve the question asked. He then proceeds to deal with the maxim that happiness does not consist in wealth. "Man can be as happy in a hut as in a palace, dressed in skins as in Lyons silks, at the frugal meal of a Cincinnatus as at that of a Vitellius." "But," he continues, "he must certainly have the hut, the skins, and the frugal meal." He then passes direct to his subject. Paoli he considers has solved the problem of happiness in Corsica by his plan of re-allotting crop and pasture land every three years among the inhabitants, whilst leaving untouched the hilly country, the vines, olives, chestnuts, and orchards which are private property. Nor, he proceeds, is happiness to be found in ambition with her pale, covetous face, anxious mien, impatient gestures and sardonic smile. The ambitious man plays with crime; intrigue is his tool; lies, slander and whisperings his arguments and figures of speech. If he finally succeeds in guiding the helm of affairs he soon wearies of the homage of the crowd." The only one who does find happiness is the man who is ambitious for the general welfare, who uses his strength and energy to conquer ambition instead of being conquered by it, who strives to rise solely that he may promote the happiness of others. Alexander, "on whose forehead lay the shadow of insanity," and Richelieu are cited as examples of the futility of selfish ambitious effort: "They sought for happiness and found only fame".[1] So wrote Napoleon, who had strained every nerve in Corsica to satisfy his ambition and whose thirst for fame was destined to convulse the world. Suddenly the fierce excitement into which

[1] Quoted in full by Masson, II. 292-332.

France had plunged broke in upon the young officer in his studious retreat.

During the early months of 1791, the fundamental laws of the new Constitution had been formulated, and only the King's signature was lacking to make them valid. But the new Constitution reduced the royal authority to the veriest shadow, and as the radical nature of the reform of the Church laws wounded his conscience, Louis resolved to flee from Paris and seek a refuge abroad for his person and prerogative. The plot miscarried. The royal family and their attendants were stopped on the way and brought back to the capital. The whole country was indignant at the King and at those who had advised him to forsake his people. The National Assembly suspended the royal authority, and in all the towns of France, the clubs, the National Guards, and the line troops swore inviolable fidelity to the decrees of the Parliament and to the new Constitution. With difficulty the "Feuillants" or Moderates gained the upper hand of the Radical "Jacobins," nor was peace restored till the King accepted the new Constitution. It was during these days that Lieutenant Bonaparte recorded his oath as follows:—

"I swear to use the weapons entrusted to me in the defence of my country and to maintain against all enemies, without and within, the Constitution decreed by the National Assembly, to die rather than suffer the invasion of French territory by foreign troops, and to obey only such commands as are given in accordance with the Decrees of the National Assembly.

"BUONAPARTE,

"*Officer in the 4th Regiment of Artillery.*

"VALENCE, *July 6th*, 1791."

Napoleon was also a moving spirit in the clubs and, despite his defective orthography, was secretary of the Friends of the Constitution at Valence which was affiliated to the Jacobin Club at Paris. In this capacity he made speeches which met with great applause, and drew up a loyal address to the National Assembly. At a patriotic

banquet on July 14th, he proposed a toast to the Patriots of Auxonne, where there was also a club. Yet it would be a mistake to attribute to him any of that enthusiastic patriotism which then animated the French and lent to the word "nation" a new significance. In the midst of it all he remained a staunch Corsican, and held unswervingly to the plans in which his own career was bound up with the future of Corsica. These projects were soon to take definite shape.

During a sitting of the National Assembly on July 22nd, 1791, it was decided to form battalions of paid volunteers with an effective force of fully 100,000 men. Of these battalions the department of Corsica was to furnish four, and by a decree of August 4th, officers in line regiments were allowed to exchange into these battalions. When the news reached Valence, Napoleon could hardly contain himself. The opportunity so long awaited, so eagerly desired, had come at last! Thanks to the friendly services of General du Teil he obtained three months' furlough, and September saw him back again in Ajaccio. His leave expired, but still he did not return. He was even thinking about resigning his commission and settling down at home. "In these troublous times," he wrote Sucy, then army-commissary at Valence, "a good Corsican's place is in his own country."[1] Things had suddenly improved with the Bonapartes. Archdeacon Lucien, the head of the family, had died recently and left them a little money, out of which Napoleon, jointly with Uncle Fesch, bought a house and piece of ground in Ajaccio. The rest of the money was very differently employed. At the election of deputies Joseph had been unsuccessful and that could not be altered; but the election of officers for the volunteer battalions was coming on, and hard cash might prove very useful then. Meanwhile, on January 1st, 1792, Napoleon had failed to put in an appearance at the review in Valence, and his name had consequently been struck off the army lists. Hence, it was urgently necessary that he should not fail now. Fortunately for him, one of the two

[1] *Vide* letter given by Coston, II. 178; also by Chuquet, II. 243.

candidates favoured by Paoli for the two vacancies in the Ajaccio battalion, withdrew in favour of the other, Quenza, a former comrade of the general's. Napoleon immediately abandoned his candidature for the first post in favour of Quenza, and so secured the latter's support for himself for the second appointment. But there were other candidates to be driven from the field, the most formidable being Mattias Pozzo di Borgo, brother of the deputy, for whom the wealthy Peraldi was canvassing. In the end of March, when the volunteers assembled at Ajaccio to elect their two commanders, Napoleon did not spare the Archdeacon's little nest-egg. He kept open house for the electors and interviewed them one by one in his own interests and to the prejudice of his opponents, who reproached him with having stooped to calumny. But it seemed as if all were lost when one of the three commissioners for the election arrived at the Peraldis, i.e., in the enemy's camp—and thereby threatened to divert the voting in Pozzo's favour. There was no time to be lost. The evening before the election Napoleon arranged with one of his supporters from Bocognano, who had been elected captain, that he and some of his men should fetch the commissioner from Peraldi's house and bring him to the Bonapartes', which was done—though only under threat of violence. On the following morning Napoleon arrived on the scene, accompanied by the commissioner. The desired effect was produced. Quenza and Napoleon were elected, and all Pozzo's protests were in vain. Such was Napoleon's first *coup d'état* (April 1st, 1792).

As Quenza's military training was very slight, the command of the battalion really lay with Napoleon. He had "*la forza in mano*" as he said. But although he had gained his end, he had to pay dearly for it. For he had fought recklessly against his old friends Pozzo and Peraldi, whenever their interests conflicted with his own, and henceforth he had made them and theirs his sworn foes. The fact that he had used questionable methods, such as were not customary in the island even during a period of anarchy, had not recommended him to Paoli. And so his fine sentiments on am-

bition about which he had written so eloquently only a few months before had vanished at the first contact with reality!

Again his thoughts turned to the citadel of Ajaccio, still occupied by French officers and soldiers, among them some artillerists from his own regiment. He hoped soon to obtain a foothold in the citadel. There was really nothing unusual in the local militia, which had been raised for the country's defence, living in the national fortresses. On that point he knew he was at one with Paoli and with the national Government at Corte. All that was needed was to wait for a favourable opportunity. In Ajaccio even more than in the other towns of the island, there was a considerable number of devout Catholics whose conscience was deeply offended by the new Church laws. Those priests who had not taken the oath under the civil constitution of the clergy, had no difficulty in embittering this feeling of hatred towards the new order of things and its partisans. Little wonder therefore that the Jacobin Club, which was in close touch with the clubs of Toulon and Marseilles, and the volunteer battalion which was strongly Radical, had many and bitter enemies; and of this hatred no one received a larger share than Napoleon. Even during the disturbance in June, 1790, threatening remarks had been made about him. The hostile feeling of the devout Catholics had not been allayed in the interval, and now a fresh development occurred. The National Assembly at Paris had suppressed the monasteries and in consequence of this edict the Capuchin Monastery at Ajaccio was closed. A petition sent by the Municipal and Judicial Councils of Ajaccio to the Government officials at Corte, begging that this favourite order be reinstated, proved fruitless, and gave rise to a virulent animosity between the pious workmen and sailors in the town, and the "peasants," as the volunteers were called. Napoleon took advantage of this circumstance, and under the pretext of "securing respect for the Decrees of the National Assembly," he quartered his volunteers in the deserted Capuchin Monastery. With small regard for his oath on August 23rd, 1789,

he retained the whole battalion in the town, contrary to the expressed command of the municipal authorities. As was inevitable, friction ensued and finally a street brawl occurred in which a volunteer lieutenant was killed. Napoleon then requested Colonel Maillard, the commander of the garrison, to allow the troops to enter the citadel. This was refused as the royal sanction was necessary. Thereupon, in Napoleon's presence, the volunteers began firing upon the peaceful citizens on their way to Church—it was Easter, April 1792—wounding women and children, plundering right and left, and making themselves the terror of the town. The municipal authorities in their turn now applied to the commander for help. Meanwhile Napoleon fraternized with the rank and file and sought to rouse them against their officers by circulating letters and pamphlets and inciting them to desert. The soldiers, however, remained loyal, and a regular engagement between line troops and volunteers seemed imminent, when Napoleon suddenly gave things a new turn. In conjunction with Quenza he addressed a letter to the municipality, attributing the continued presence of his troops in the town to an express command from Paoli, and laying on others all the responsibility for the inevitable bloodshed. Paoli's command was a pure invention, but it answered the purpose. The municipal authorities agreed to negotiations and the soldiers entered the citadel. During these proceedings, however, the deputies for the department came upon the scene, and insisted upon the cessation of hostilities and, to Napoleon's mortification, ordered the volunteer battalion to march back to Corte. The disturbance had lasted for a week and had been a failure. Napoleon had again shown himself openly unscrupulous and his position had become critical. He had completely alienated the majority of the townspeople of Ajaccio, Paoli would not forgive him for having used his name falsely, while Pozzo and Peraldi laid on him the entire blame for the occurrences on April 1st. Under these circumstances his best plan was to leave Corsica at once and try to regain his forfeited place in the army. This could only be done by

applying at the head office of the Ministry of War, and so on May 20th, 1792, he arrived in Paris.[1]

He found the capital in an extraordinary state of agitation. The truce between the monarchy and the Revolution had not lasted long. Louis had refused to sign the decrees passed by the Legislative Assembly against the priests who had declined to take the oath under the new Church laws, and against the emigrant princes and nobles who were threatened with the confiscation of their estates on account of their hostile demonstrations on the frontier. The King's refusal deepened the irritation of the Progressive party against him. Sensational rumours were afloat as to the relations of the Court with foreign countries, especially Austria, with whose reigning house the French royal family was connected. The Opposition calculated that a victorious war against a foreign Power would also mean a victory over the monarchy in France, and the Republican party, led by Brissot, accordingly entered war against foreign princes as an item in their programme. They turned out the party in power who were in favour of peace, and compelled the King to declare war against Austria.

The campaign began inauspiciously for France. An attack on Belgium, then an Austrian province, was repulsed with ease. This defeat caused an immense sensation at Paris. On all sides the cry was that they had been "betrayed," and the King was denounced as a conspirator against his own people. It so happened that just then Louis had dismissed a Girondist Ministry and had surrounded himself with Moderates who were also Royalists. The leaders of the Radical party turned the popular irritation to their own account and played off the anarchical element in Paris against the monarchy. On June 20th, an armed rabble poured into the Tuileries to compel the King to sanction two decrees, one demanding

[1] The description of the Easter disturbances given by Chuquet, II. 281, compares favourably with those given by Masson, II. 350, and Marcaggi, "La Gènese de Napoléon," p. 293, owing to its impartial account of Napoleon's behaviour, whereas Masson views him entirely as the champion of France and the Revolution, persecuted by the "Paolists". Yet Masson himself prints Napoleon's letters to Joseph which prove the opposite.

the deportation of those priests who refused to take the oath, the other the assembling of 20,000 National Guards from the provinces in a camp near Paris. By his calm and dignified bearing on this occasion Louis warded off an attack that might have cost him his life and which certainly went far to destroy his royal authority. Soon after this the allied Prussians and Austrians advanced against the French frontiers, and their commander-in-chief, the Duke of Brunswick, at Louis' wish, issued a manifesto threatening Paris with destruction if the Tuileries were again attacked. The excitement was intense. The National Assembly passed a resolution stating that the country was in danger. Thousands of National Guards, heedless of the King's veto, flocked to the capital; for the manifesto had everywhere aroused the suspicion that the King was in league with the foreign Powers, the popular belief being that the enemy was not merely on the frontiers but in the very heart of the kingdom. By a revolutionary coup the old Moderates were ousted from the Municipal Council of Paris and replaced by Radical Jacobins who kept up the fermentation. On August 10th, the storm burst forth afresh. Crowds of men armed with pikes, workmen from the suburbs St. Antoine and St. Marcel, and all sorts of riff-raff besieged the Tuileries and forced the King to flee for safety to the National Assembly. There, under the terrorism of the mob, his royal rank was declared forfeited and the monarchy suspended. With the King fell the Moderate Ministry. It was succeeded by a Government composed of Republican Girondists.

This important development of events at Paris had been followed carefully by Napoleon. He was an eye-witness of the proceedings on June 20th, and August 10th, and the impression made by these anarchical outbursts was highly unfavourable. His ideal of the State was too lofty to allow him to remain unmoved while he saw it trampled under foot by the rabble. His sympathies were with Lafayette, who had lodged a protest in the Chamber against the conduct of the crowd in June, with the Constitutional Ministers, and the majority of the army, as opposed to the majority in the Chambers and to

the Jacobins, whom he described as "*des fous qui n'ont pas le sens commun*". In his opinion Louis XVI would have conquered on August 10th, had he mounted on horseback, faced the crowd, and so disarmed "*la vile canaille*". Long afterwards speaking of these days, he said: "On the 10th of August, I felt that had I been bidden, I would have defended the King. I was against those who would have founded the Republic by the help of a rabble. Besides I saw civilians attacking men in uniform and that offended me." Such were certainly his true feelings, but his interests ran counter to them. The victory of the despised rabble was a lucky one for him.

He had applied for permission to rejoin his regiment and had forwarded documents which he hoped would procure him a favourable verdict. On the other hand the reports from Corsica described the part he had played there during the recent disturbances unsparingly, and weeks elapsed before he received a reply to his application. He had not money enough to wait so long, and twice over he was compelled to pawn his watch. During these days, in one of his letters to his brother Joseph, he talked of a quiet family life with an income of from 4000 to 5000 francs as ideal, and alluded to France as if it were some foreign country.[1] His own interests lay far away, for his hopes were still bound up in Corsica. There he meant to recover his lost ground, especially when he learned that the question of giving up the island had already been mooted in Parliament. He therefore allied himself closely with the Corsican deputies and even sought to renew his intimacy with Pozzo and Peraldi. He urged Joseph to keep on good terms with Paoli, as "Corsica will be made independent," and he advised the rest of the family "to cultivate all who are now our friends or who might become such". As a precaution for any emergency, twenty-five muskets belonging to the volunteers were to be sent to the house, "as at the present moment they might be required".

At length on July 8th, word came from the Minister of War that had it been purely a military affair, Quenza and Bonaparte deserved to be court-martialled, but as civil affairs were

[1] *Vide* Masson, II. p. 387.

also involved, the case had been handed over to the Minister of Justice. Ultimately, however, the War Office decided to regard Napoleon as being still an officer in the army. Nor was that all, two days later, on July 10th, it appointed him captain, dating his promotion from February 6th, the day on which it would have been due had he remained with his regiment.[1] Such a proceeding, strange as it seems nowadays, was due to the dearth of officers caused by the emigration of the nobility. The 4th regiment of artillery had lost nearly the half of its officers in this way. Napoleon was thus relieved of his immediate anxieties, for in these stormy times to be handed over to the civil courts meant that nothing further would be done.

One would naturally conclude that he would at last rejoin his regiment then on active service, and fulfil the duties for which he drew his pay. "I cannot conceal," wrote the Minister of War, "how desirable it is that your service in the (Volunteer) National Guard should allow you, at this time when your regiment is actively engaged, to fulfil your duties as Captain." The hint was sufficiently plain. His brothers, who considered the path was blocked in Corsica, advised him to remain with his regiment in France. But Napoleon still held unswervingly to his Corsican plans; he had no sympathy with France, and recent events were not calculated to alter his sentiments. Even had there been no pretext for returning home he would have made one, but it so happened that on August 17th, 1792, the National Assembly had suppressed the schools for the daughters of the nobility, which in turn affected the "demoiselles de Saint Cyr," among whom was Elise Bonaparte. Who could refuse a brother's request to escort his sister home in such troublous days? And so on September 9th, the two young Bonapartes left Paris.

[1] Masson, II. p. 400, publishes the letter from Lajard, the Minister of War, on July 10th, 1792, to Napoleon, informing the latter of his re-admission to the army, as captain. This destroys the view hitherto prevalent that he owed his return to the service to the political changes after 10th August, and to the fall of the monarchy. The decree certainly was not signed till August 30th, by the War Minister of the new Cabinet, Servan.

Early in October they reached Corsica and there Napoleon remained till the summer of 1793.

This was a momentous time both in Napoleon's history and in that of the world. He resumed the command of his battalion and in February, 1793, took part in an expedition against the Island of Sardinia. It was his first undertaking in the service of France which had no intention of surrendering Corsica. On February 24th, he was sent with his volunteers to operate against Santa Maddalena. He shelled the enemy's fortifications successfully and all was ready for the assault when the crew of the corvette which was to cover the expedition, mutinied and compelled him to retreat. In the report sent in to the Ministry the young captain spoke freely about loafers and traitors, and also submitted a detailed plan for conquering the island. However, the executive committee of the new National Convention had already decided to abandon the Sardinian venture. Again Napoleon had been disappointed in his hopes, and meanwhile his position at home had not improved; the tension between him and Paoli increased rapidly and soon ended in an open rupture. The cause of this lay to a considerable extent in the development of the general situation.

Paoli had come back from England enamoured of a constitutional monarchy, and he had given his allegiance to the new French Constitution because it promised similar conditions to those he had learned to value on British soil. Now, however, this Constitution had been shaken to its very foundations, the monarchy had been abolished by the new National Assembly, the King had been accused of betraying his country, had been condemned to death, and guillotined on January 1st, 1793, the Government had fallen into the hands of extremists, and there was no prospect of stability. Moreover, after the execution of Louis XVI, war had broken out with England where Paoli had found such a hospitable refuge. But Paoli still believed union with France to be advantageous for his native island, and did not allow the existing condition of affairs—however distasteful to him personally—

to estrange him from France nor to force him into a hostile attitude towards the new Republic. Nevertheless there were those in Corsica who accused him of both these things and others in France who believed them. In the elections for the Convention, Paoli's candidates were not successful, but in those for the administrative and judicial councils of the department they were more fortunate. The new "Paolist" Directory—"the Directory of respectable people" as they called themselves—accused their predecessors of not having had their accounts properly audited, and Saliceti, their syndic, (now a member of the Convention), of having abused his official position for his own advantage. The same suspicion fell upon his successor in the Syndic, Bartolomeo Arena. These two, Saliceti in Paris and Arena in Southern France, bent on revenge, deliberately set themselves by means of calumny and slander to combat Paoli and his confidential followers, especially the new syndic, Pozzo di Borgo. And in this they succeeded. Ere long it was believed in Government circles that Paoli was aiming at independent authority and conspiring with England, and action was taken accordingly. As a means of securing his powerful influence on France's behalf, Paoli had recently been made general of a division and commander in Corsica, an honour which he had only accepted under protest on account of his advanced age. Now, however, in order to remove him from Corsica, his division was attached to the Army of Italy and he was ordered to cross to the Continent; and when he did not do so, pleading his age and infirmities, three commissioners from the Convention (Saliceti among them) were dispatched ostensibly to "examine the coast," in reality to counteract secretly Paoli's influence. While the three were still at work, the Committee of Public Safety unexpectedly issued a warrant dated Paris, April 2nd, 1793, for his arrest. This iniquitous measure produced an extraordinary commotion. In the end of May an assembly of over a thousand delegates representing nine-tenths of the population of the island, declared themselves in favour of their venerable leader and proclaimed outlaws all who were adherents of the Paris

Jacobins and of the Saliceti-Arena party as well as the various members of their families.

Among those thus condemned by popular opinion to "everlasting contempt and infamy" were the Bonapartes. Paoli, as Joseph wrote to his brother in Paris, had declined to be associated with them ("*il ne veut pas s'amalgamer avec nous*"). Joseph, who was no longer a member of the Directory, carried his disappointment into the camp of Saliceti and the commissioners from the Convention, and joined them in plotting against the general. Lucien, at Napoleon's suggestion, had applied for the post of secretary to Paoli, but had been refused, so he relates in his "Memoirs"; full of hatred he crossed to France in March, 1793, and at the Jacobin Club of Toulon he denounced Paoli as a traitor, guilty of high treason, fit for the guillotine. This speech being reported in the Convention by the deputy for the department of Var, led to the issue of the warrant for Paoli's arrest. Napoleon had likewise been kept at a distance by Paoli, and the confidential post he had once so ardently coveted for himself was now bestowed on his enemy Pozzo. Paoli had only recently advised Napoleon to rejoin his regiment or else enter British service, thereby showing how little importance he attached to his presence in the island. The young captain's share in the Easter disturbances in the previous year had not yet been forgotten, his personal enemy was now the most influential member of the Municipal Council, and a zealous adherent of Paoli occupied the citadel with his volunteers. His only chance now of playing a leading rôle in Corsica lay in throwing in his lot with Saliceti, Arena, and the Paris Radicals, however little he was in sympathy with them. And that is what he did. Through Joseph's agency he intrigued busily with the commissioners from the Convention.

Nevertheless Napoleon intended to avoid any open breach with Paoli, whose influence he fully recognized, as also the fact that he could ruin both himself and the other members of the family. Consequently he was sincerely grieved when the news of the warrant came out. He immediately drew up an address to the Convention, in the name of the Jacobin

Club of Ajaccio, defending the general against the charge of high treason, denying that his ambition was a menace to the public welfare, and begging for a repeal of this unjust edict.[1] He even meant to go to Corte and see the general and defend himself and his brothers from the attacks of the "Paolists". But he was too late. Paoli had already in his possession an intercepted letter from Lucien to his brother, boasting vindictively that he had dealt the old leader and his Pozzo di Borgo a decisive blow. Napoleon was taken prisoner in Bocognano by Paolist peasantry and owed his escape to the devotion of a few trusty followers. He returned secretly to Ajaccio and lay in concealment in a relative's house till he was able to escape to the sea and so reach San Fiorenzo, where the commissioners from the Convention were. From there he wrote to his mother: "Make up your mind to it. This country is not for us". Laetitia and her children, accompanied by Fesch and a couple of friends, escaped by night under cover of darkness. Her house was plundered and her property laid waste. After wandering all day along the coast they took refuge on board one of the French vessels. Accompanied by the deputies from the Convention, and relying on the help of these vessels, Napoleon made one more attempt to conquer his native town. It failed, and on June 11th, 1793, he sailed for Toulon with his mother and the other members of the family. Only a week before, in a rapidly drawn-up memoir on the political and military situation in Corsica, he had accused Paoli of the most treasonable designs, and had heaped calumny and abuse upon the hero of his young days.[2]

[1] Masson, II. p. 427.

[2] Masson, II. p. 462. From the title of this memoir "Position politique et militaire du departement de Corse au 1er Juin, 1793," one might infer that it had been written on that date. But June 1st was one of the most exciting times in Ajaccio and gave no opportunity for writing. It is much more probable that Napoleon used his first day of safety in Calvi, June 4th, for that purpose. Chuquet (II. 280) gives the Memoir in the form in which Joseph, who took it to Paris, had it recopied and given to the Executive Committee of the Convention. The discrepancies are not unimportant; June 1st, does not occur in the second copy, where it merely says, "in the month of June" which supports the above con-

Napoleon's career in Corsica was at an end. Two motives underlay his revolutionary enterprises there. The first was a strong patriotism that paid small heed to whatever lay outside the confines of the island; the second was an ungovernable thirst for power and influence fed by his belief that he was called to be the liberator and ruler of his people. One of these motives had now lost its object. His people's curse had made him an outcast from his native shores and had killed his love for his land. During the two years following he still cherished a hope of reconquering the island and he made various efforts to compass his wishes—no longer from patriotism but from hatred of the patriots and to slake his thirst for revenge. Three years later, in 1796, when he reconquered Corsica for France, even these feelings had died out, and his native island stirred no more lively emotion within him than if it had been Malta or Corfu.

If there is any moral value to the individual in a sympathetic interest in the welfare of his nation, Napoleon's career henceforth lacked that influence. It was no longer possible for him to be a Corsican; he never succeeded in becoming a Frenchman. Hitherto his ambition had confined itself within the shores of one little island; henceforth it knew neither home nor bounds.

jecture. In the copy given by Masson the more extreme utterances on Pozzo di Borgo are omitted. Jung, I. 463, had already published them. Pozzo is accused of being "taré," and of corrupt practices. These passages are suppressed in Joseph's copy.

CHAPTER III.

THE SIEGE OF TOULON AND THE DEFENCE OF THE CONVENTION. JOSEPHINE.

The rising in Corsica was only one of a long series of revolts against the rule of the Jacobins who had become all powerful in Paris since the execution of Louis XVI. A struggle had begun almost over the King's grave, between the two Republican factions forming the Convention, the Radical "Montagnards" and the Moderate "Girondists," and had ended in the summer of 1793 in the defeat of the latter. All who had not taken refuge in flight were thrown into prison and generally perished on the scaffold. The victorious party proceeded to govern France through a committee instituted by the Convention and known as the Committee of Public Safety, the members of which, led by Robespierre, depended for their support on the Jacobin clubs and their affiliated societies. The Jacobin Government possessed what their Girondist predecessors had lacked, and what the circumstances of the country urgently demanded—phenomenal energy. The Girondists were for the most part well-intentioned orators with little aptitude for politics, "*des fous extrêment honnêtes*," and they had plunged France into war with almost every country in Europe, though neither possessing the requisite means nor the knowledge to cope with the danger they had conjured up. They left their successors in office a giant's task in these wars, a task they solved none the less, though at an awful cost, by illegal oppression, reckless cruelty and unsparing bloodshed. Commissioners sent out by the Convention traversed the country, superintending the compulsory recruiting among the masses and "in the name of the Representatives of the People," confirming the

authority of the Courts-martial and of the Revolutionary Tribunals where the refractory were punished and the suspected judged. As the new party had climbed into power by pandering unreservedly to the very lowest classes of the nation, and was only able to maintain its position by constantly granting fresh concessions, there now arose in Paris and in the leading towns of the provinces a tyranny of the masses. It was no longer only those of moderate political views who were accused of being "traitors to their country," and threatened and prosecuted, the same treatment was now extended to those whose only crime was their wealth or their culture.

This reign of terror soon provoked opposition, and that not only from those old partisans of the Monarchy and the Church who had taken up arms against the Parisians, as in La Vendée and Brittany, but even among those who had once been enthusiastic supporters of the Revolution. This was conspicuously the case in the towns of Southern France where the people had formerly joined zealously in the struggle against the old regime, but now, incited by fugitive Girondists, had revolted against this Radical tyranny. In Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon, the Moderate and peace-loving party was victorious over the Jacobins. In Provence a central committee constituted itself an independent government and proclaimed armed resistance to the terrorism of the Committee of Public Safety. Had the Convention promptly exercised a little tact and forbearance, peace might easily have been restored at once and all bloodshed avoided. Instead of that, when it learnt that the insurgent battalions from the South had reached Avignon, it immediately took up the challenge, announced as the first item in its programme the destruction of all its enemies from within, and ordered its Commissioner, Dubois de Crancé, to capture Lyons and prevent the rebel forces concentrating. Dubois quickly got together a corps, partly volunteers, partly regulars, and sent them under Carteaux, his second-in-command, to oppose the insurgents at Avignon. By the middle of July they camped outside that ancient residence of the Popes, and there Carteaux

was reinforced by a single artillery officer, one destined, however, to render the campaign against the southern towns no small service—Captain Bonaparte.

After their flight from Corsica, Napoleon had settled his family in a very humble way at La Valette near Toulon and thereafter had at last rejoined his regiment which was stationed at Nice, then only recently acquired. A certificate from his friend and fellow-countryman, Saliceti (now commissioner of the Convention), stating that his presence in Corsica during the last few months had been absolutely indispensable, saved him from censure. He was promoted "*Capitaine commandant*" and on June 25th, 1793, he entered on his duties in the Riviera shore battery. Here he was entrusted by General du Teil with the task of fetching an artillery park from Avignon. He arrived there on July 26th, just as the insurgents had surrendered the town and as Carteaux was advancing on Marseilles. Beaucaire, Tarascon, and Cavaillon had already been captured. The old tradition which represents Napoleon as taking part in the engagement at Avignon, pointing the guns, and by his personal intervention causing the rout of the enemy, is nowadays justly disputed.[1] But he certainly supported the operations of the Government troops by his pen. In a little pamphlet called "Le Souper de Beaucaire" he sought to convince the inhabitants of Marseilles of the futility of their resistance to the Convention. Two Marseilles merchants, a citizen of Nîmes, a manufacturer from Montpellier, and a soldier meet one evening in Beaucaire, and the soldier, supported by the two others, seeks to prove to the two Marseilles men that from a military point of view their town is untenable and its political attitude reprehensible. An historical interest attaches

[1] *Vide* Le Moine, "Une page de l'histoire de Napoléon I," where this tradition is maintained; but the passage quoted on page 55 as corroboration is not sufficient. Le Moine himself remarks: "Chambaud's Diary contains the following note on July 26th, on the margin: 'It was *subsequently* found that after the two guns under the command of N. Bte. (!) had wounded some artillerists from Marseilles, the enemy would not continue the fight'." Hence the tradition must be founded on some later version.

to the passage where one of the Marseilles men cites the example of the Girondists and is answered by the soldier (whom Napoleon makes the mouthpiece of his own views): "It is enough for me to know that after the 'Mountain,' whether from public zeal or party spirit, had resorted to extreme measures against the Brissotins (Girondists) and had outlawed, imprisoned, and I admit, slandered them too, they, the Brissotins, were lost without a civil war which would put them in a position to dictate terms to their enemies. Your war therefore was particularly useful for them. Had they really deserved their previous reputation they would have laid down their arms on the appearance of the new republican Constitution and have sacrificed their own interests to the public welfare; but it is easier to quote Decius than to imitate him." The Marseilles man then protests that he and his friends wanted a Republic, but with representatives chosen by the people; they wanted liberty, but liberty granted by trustworthy deputies, not a Constitution that favoured plunder and anarchy. Napoleon then lets him be set right by the Montpellier manufacturer, who blames the insurgents for resorting to illegal methods and usurpation, and declares the Convention to be the central force and the true "Sovereign" when the nation is divided.

Napoleon's pamphlet upholds the terrorist central party and advises the citizens of Marseilles to bow to circumstances —very much as he himself had done. But as mention is made of sundry reprehensible acts suffered by himself and Paoli, it was probably written with the secondary motive of recommending its author as one who had been persecuted on account of his adherence to the ruling system. Scarcely was the pamphlet finished when Saliceti and Gasparin, the Convention commissioners, arrived at Avignon on their way to join the army of the South. They were delighted with the "Souper," and had it immediately printed at Government expense, so that the moral effect it produced might facilitate their military operations. Meanwhile Carteaux had marched upon Marseilles, and on August 25th, after a successful engagement, had recaptured the town for the Convention. The

"traitors to their country" were punished with barbarous cruelty. After a brief delay the troops proceeded against Toulon. The capture of this seaport was all the more essential as the insurgents had been negotiating with England and had actually handed over to her the fleet in the harbour—the best France had. Napoleon played a decisive part at the siege of this fortress. During an engagement in the neighbourhood of Toulon, in the middle of September, Carteaux's senior artillery officer was dangerously wounded. Saliceti offered the post to Napoleon who gladly accepted it, for so tired had he become of his inactive life that he had recently applied to the Minister of War begging to be transferred to the Army of the Rhine. He saw at once what was wanted. The inner harbour must be attacked and the British ships, which were an invaluable support to the insurgents, driven out; on that all were agreed. Napoleon's particular service was that he immediately indicated with the utmost precision the point from which this end could be reached, viz. the peninsula of Caire on the west with Fort Eguillette, which commanded the inner harbour as well as the line of retreat for the fleet. This position might probably have been captured by a rapid assault had Carteaux been willing to adopt this plan. But he was a citizen general, destitute of military capacity, who owed his rank to the wild turmoil of revolutionary passions. Instead of instantly concentrating his troops at one point, he scattered them in small detachments round the town, and so allowed the enemy time to entrench themselves and to bring up reinforcements of Spanish, Neapolitan, and Scandinavian auxiliaries. As a result it took weeks of strenuous preparations for besieging the town before a new assault was possible.[1] Napoleon worked with indefatigable zeal and extraordinary contempt of danger at the construction of the batteries, one of which he named "the Fearless," as an incentive to the warlike spirit of his men. On October 19th he

[1] On November 14th, 1793, Napoleon wrote—and with justice—to the Minister of War: "The plan of attack on Toulon which I submitted to the generals and representatives is the only one practicable. Had it been followed from the beginning with more cordiality we would probably have been in Toulon to-day" ("Corr.," I. 4).

was given the command of the battalion of the 2nd Artillery, and a few days later, on the 25th, he addressed a memorial to the Committee of Public Safety, complaining that this branch of the service was neglected, and advising them to send down an artillery general "whose rank even would command respect, and who might be able to make some impression on a set of staff-officers who were so ignorant that one had constantly to be recapitulating and dogmatizing upon the veriest axioms of theory and practice". In conclusion he refused absolutely to obey the senseless commands of Carteaux. Just then several members of the Convention, Fréron, Barras, Ricord, and the younger Robespierre, arrived on their way back from the Italian army, and through their intervention Carteaux was replaced by General Dugommier, an able and experienced soldier who showed the greatest confidence in Napoleon and entrusted to him the command of the batteries to the west of the town. At a Council of War held on November 25th, a plan of operations was adopted in harmony with Napoleon's views. The guns were soon placed where he wished them. On November 30th, a sortie by the enemy was repulsed, and on December 17th, after a triple assault on the British fortifications—the Mulgrave redoubt—Fort Eguillette and the entire peninsula fell into the hands of the Convention troops. The enemy's fleet realized the danger threatening; and after a brief resistance the English and the Spaniards evacuated the remaining fortifications, embarked their troops, and sailed from the port carrying with them many fugitives from the city. On December 19th, the victorious army entered the town. As in Lyons and Marseilles so here too, all who were in any way compromised or suspected were hunted down by a rigorous and merciless tribunal, furious for revenge. Hundreds of such were gathered together and shot. Fréron, one of the commissioners of the Convention, had intended to put all the inhabitants to death, but this plan was opposed by Dugommier, and we can readily believe that Napoleon also counselled moderation. Useless cruelty was as uncongenial to him as the bloodthirsty fanaticism that slew its countless victims during that year of terror.

He had played an important part at Toulon, but not a leading rôle; he had only been commander of a battalion. Nevertheless by his strategic advice and his indefatigable zeal in organizing, he had rendered the Government the greatest service. An attack from the north and the east could not have produced those rapid results which were specially valuable at a time when the allied enemies of France had begun to attach great importance to Toulon, when England had already dispatched an expedition (destined primarily for La Vendée) to Southern France, and Austria too had decided to send troops hither.[1] It was therefore only a well-deserved recognition of his merits to appoint him, as they now did, a brigadier-general in the artillery. The appointment was made by the commissioners of the Convention in a provisory decree of December 22nd, 1793, and was afterwards definitely confirmed by the Committee of Public Safety. Du Teil had warmly recommended him to the Minister of War and had written: "I cannot find words to describe adequately Bonaparte's merits, his great knowledge, equally great discretion, and extraordinary daring. This is but a faint outline of this officer's characteristics." Dugommier also urgently counselled promotion for Napoleon; "for," he wrote to Paris, "if you are ungrateful towards him, this officer will contrive his own advancement".[2]

When the authorities on this occasion required of Napoleon the necessary information as to the circumstances of his life, he disclaimed his noble descent, which would only have injured him in the eyes of the Jacobins with whom he had thrown in his lot, and in whose service he found a sphere for his marvellous talents. Whether he was really in sympathy with them and had espoused their cause in his inmost heart,

[1] On December 16th, the day on which the attack on the Toulon fortifications began, there is a dispatch bearing that date from Thugut to the Austrian Ambassador in London, saying that, on the urgent representation of the English Ambassador in Vienna, four battalions had finally left Milan to march to Toulon. Vivenot-Zeiszberg, "Quellen zur Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserpolitik Osterreichs," III. 433, 382.

[2] Du Teil, "Une famille militaire," p. 410. Chuquet, III. p. 229.

or whether he was merely abetting them from necessity or ambition, remains unproven. Once, shortly after he was raised to the rank of general, undeterred by the predominating Radical element, he had proposed to rebuild Fort St. Nicholas, the Marseilles Bastille, solely on strategic grounds. Immediately he was declared "suspect" and had to appear before the Convention to justify himself. It was only with the utmost difficulty that Saliceti succeeded in getting the matter settled. In future, whenever an opportunity occurred, he never failed to give proof of his ardent Republicanism. "Bonaparte," says Mademoiselle Robespierre in her memoirs, "was a Republican, I might even say a 'Montagnard'. At least when I was at Nice in 1794 such was the impression he made upon me by his manner of looking at things. Afterwards his successes turned his head and he aspired to rule over his fellow-citizens. But at that time, when he was only a general in the artillery in the Army of Italy, he was an advocate of thorough liberty and genuine equality." The younger Robespierre, brother of the dreaded president of the Committee of Public Safety, recommended him in April as a man of "transcendent ability," and admitted him to such close companionship that his intimate friends called Napoleon the commissioner's "privy counsellor". Yet Robespierre did not forget to temper his praise with the remark: "He is a Corsican and offers no other guarantee than that of a man of that nation who has resisted Paoli's caresses and whose possessions have been laid waste by that traitor". Robespierre nevertheless offered Napoleon one of the posts of command in Paris which the latter wisely declined.[1]

In military matters Robespierre had absolute confidence in Bonaparte and secretly discussed with him and Ricord

[1] Lucien in his memoirs (I. 112) relates that Napoleon discussed the proposal with his brothers and, on their warmly advising him to accept it, had answered: "Ah, that requires careful consideration. It is not so easy to save your head in Paris as in St. Maximin (where Lucien had been sheltered by Saliceti). The younger Robespierre is an amiable fellow, but his brother is a stern man. My place is with the army, I shall command Paris some day. . . . What would I do in that crowd at present?"

(also a commissioner) a plan of operations for the so-called Army of Italy. This division of the French forces was then stationed on the Riviera with its headquarters at Nice, and was actively engaged against the allied Austrians and Sardinians who held the heights of the Apennines. The rising in Southern France had exhausted Provence, and the Army of Italy found itself obliged to draw its supplies from the neutral territory of Genoa. Two circumstances hampered the movements of the French troops, the difficulty of securing the indispensable convoys from being intercepted by the allies, especially the Sardinians, and the need for a successful offensive movement to open a path into the fertile plains of Piedmont. During May, 1794, Napoleon studied the whole question with the utmost care and drew up several plans of operation. In July he went himself to Genoa, officially to discuss with the Doge the condition of roads and coasts, secretly, however, to study the fortifications of Savona as a possible starting-point for invading the territory. He was accompanied by two aides-de-camp, Marmont and Junot,—afterwards the Dukes of Ragusa and Abrantès.[1]

But when Napoleon returned to Nice in the end of July he found things in France had assumed a totally different complexion. Robespierre had gradually been getting rid of his rivals in the Convention, Danton, Herbert and their followers, and had even threatened with death the more extreme "Montagnards," among them Tallien and Fouché. It had become increasingly evident that he was aiming at a Dictatorship. He was defeated, however, by a coalition of the Radical and the Conservative elements in the Convention,

[1] The printed pamphlet, "Note sur la position politique et militaire de nos armées de Piémont et d'Espagne," which the younger Robespierre laid in July before the Committee of Public Safety, and in which the war with Spain was represented as being prejudicial to the main purpose—the conquest of Germany,—while the operations against the Austro-Sardinians were represented as a helpful diversion, must partly be credited to Bonaparte, as has been shown with good reason by Colin in "L'éducation militaire de Napoléon" (pp. 295, 443), in spite of Krebs et Moris, "Campagne dans les Alpes" (143). *Vide* also appendix. In any case the two friends had consulted a great deal together.

and on July 27th, 1794 (9th Thermidor), he perished on the scaffold. With him fell the party into whose service Napoleon had only recently entered. His fate could not fail to be affected by the change, especially as the plan of operations which he had discussed with Robespierre was now represented as a plot for bringing about a reaction in the South of France. On the fall of their powerful chief the Jacobins, concerned for their own safety, had sought to protect themselves by denouncing others; and so it came about that Saliceti, now with the Army of Italy, as commissioner of the Convention, accused his fellow-countryman Bonaparte in the Convention of being the Dictator's "plan-maker". Napoleon was deprived of his rank as general, and on August 12th, 1794, imprisoned in Fort Carré near Antibes.[1]

What a flood of agitating thoughts must have surged in his brain when he suddenly found himself struck down in the midst of his ambitious schemes, and rudely swept from the path which had proved to many another man a short-cut to power and fame! The army reforms of 1793 with their principles of compulsory service and of simplified cadres —the work of Carnot and Dubois de Crancé—had already begun to bear fruit. In the end of 1792 there were only 112,000 regular troops in France. In the summer of 1794 there were no fewer than 800,000, animated by a sort of fatalistic patriotism, governed by an iron discipline, and commanded by generals whose talents had developed with marvellous rapidity in the free atmosphere of healthy rivalry. At the head of the Army of the North was Pichegru who, when a sergeant, had superintended the little cadets at Brienne. He was now driving the foreigners out of France and conquering the Austrian province of Belgium. Jourdan,

[1] He had probably foreseen that this would happen; for shortly before he had written a letter to Tilly, the French chargé d'affaires at Genoa, who he knew would be sure to transmit its contents to Paris. In this letter he spoke in very cold terms of his relations with the younger Robespierre, and added: "I was somewhat affected by his catastrophe for I was fond of him and looked upon him as pure; but had he been my father, I would have slain him myself if he aspired to tyranny" (Coston, II. 287). Napoleon III took the precaution to omit this letter in editing the official edition of his uncle's correspondence.

a volunteer officer in 1792, was now in command of the Army of the Sambre et Meuse, and had defeated the Austrians in the battle of Fleurus on June 26th, 1794, though the decisive attack on that day was led by General Marceau, a young man of Napoleon's age. Another, Hoche, a year older than Napoleon and only a subaltern when the Revolution broke out, was commander-in-chief when he defeated the Austrians at Weissenburg in December, 1793, and drove them out of Alsace, covering himself with glory and honours. Nor were these all. There was quite a list of others. St. Cyr, a captain in the volunteers in 1792, was now general of a division; Bernadotte, a sergeant-major at the outbreak of the Revolution, by 1794 was also in command of a division; Kléber, who was only in the volunteers in 1792, reached the same rank a year later; Moreau, commander of a volunteer battalion in 1792, distinguished himself greatly in the Belgian Campaign and was made general of a division in 1794; and so on. Yet here was he, the most ambitious of them all, as conscious of his talents and his worth as any one of them, shut out of the charmed circle—perhaps for ever—with a charge against him, less than which had cost many a man his life during that year of Terror.[1]

Napoleon was not one to give way to despair. He regarded it as a favourable omen that he had not been sent to Paris. In a letter to the commissioners of the Convention he took the opportunity of manifesting his ardent patriotism. "Since the beginning of the Revolution," so he writes, "have I not always maintained its principles? Have I not been seen in the struggle whether against enemies from within or fighting as a soldier against foreign foes? I have sacrificed my residence in my native department, I have given up my goods, I have lost everything for the Republic. Am I therefore to be confounded with the enemies of my country? Ought the Patriots thus unreflectingly to lose a general who has been of some service to the Republic? Should the re-

[1] The most distinguished generals of the revolutionary period were born during the years 1768 and 1769. To the former year belong Hoche, Desaix, Bessières and Mortier, to the latter Marceau, Lannes, Ney, Soult and Joubert.

presentatives compel the Government to be both unjust and impolitic? Hear me, remove the oppression which burdens me, restore me to the respect of the Patriots. An hour afterwards, if the evil-minded desire my life, I will surrender it to them willingly, so lightly do I value it, so often have I despised it. Indeed only the thought that it might again be of service to my country enables me to bear the burden of it with courage." Hard necessity had taught Napoleon to use the word "*patrie*" for France. His own country had now become a mere "*département*".

The letter produced the desired effect. Saliceti, satisfied that his own person was no longer in danger, came forward to his countryman's rescue, examined his papers, and declared they contained nothing suspicious. The decisive circumstance, however, was that the "plan-maker's" services were absolutely indispensable in the South. On August 20th, Napoleon was released, and on September 14th, after he had drawn up a new plan of offensive operations for the Army of Italy, he was restored to his rank as general of the artillery.

Meanwhile the Austrians had strengthened their forces at Alessandria and were now advancing through the valley of the Bormida to cut off the French communications on the Riviera with Genoa. In this they were not successful. On September 21st they were defeated at Dego and driven back as far as Acqui, a success which General Dumerbion, in his letter to the Convention, attributed "to the wise measures of his artillery general". Dumerbion then intended to turn against the Piedmontese and interrupt their communications with Austria, but Albitte, the commissioner of the Convention, would not depart from the instructions he had received from Paris to keep on the defensive. This plan was accordingly abandoned and the army withdrew to the coast. It has been justly remarked that in the situation at Dego, Napoleon had the materials to hand for a new and effective plan of attack.[1]

[1] In 1796, Napoleon remarked to the Piedmontese Colonel Costa de Beauregard, that two years previously, in the Dego affair, he had proposed the same plan as he had then carried out in a few days (Costa, "Un homme d'autrefois," p. 335).

For the time being, however, Carnot would not sanction offensive operations. He had withdrawn the army to the coast with the intention of sending it on an expedition to Corsica to prevent that island falling completely under the power of the English. This idea had already been mooted at the time of Robespierre's offensive plans, and now Carnot resolved to carry it through and to place the artillery under command of the Corsican Bonaparte. In Corsica, meanwhile, the last of the strongholds had fallen into the hands of the English ; San Fiorenzo on February 17th, 1794, Bastia on May 22nd, and Calvi on August 11th. In the interior of the island the English had obtained a footing somewhat earlier. Paoli had been invited by George III to come to England. At Corte on June 18th, through English influence, a public meeting was held at which the Corsicans declared their island a kingdom under English protection with Lord Elliot as Viceroy. When news of these events reached Paris the Committee of Public Safety determined to make another attempt to wrest this "*département*" from the enemy. But though the troops destined for this purpose were ready in the late autumn, the transport service was so bad that the expedition did not sail till the following February. Napoleon in one of his letters alluded to the impending conquest as a mere "military promenade," but events belied this assumption. When at last in March, 1795, the French fleet stood out to sea to chase the English ships from Corsican waters, they were defeated in a fight between Cape Corso and Leghorn. Two of their ships fell into the enemy's hands and the others were obliged to retreat to the Gulf of Lyons. After this rebuff the expedition was entirely abandoned, the troops on board were disembarked and attached to the Army of Italy, and for the time being Corsica was lost. Again Napoleon was without a command. Then came an unexpected order summoning him to join the Army of the West. He obeyed reluctantly, and early in May, 1795, he left Marseilles, accompanied by his adjutant and his brother Louis, who was on his way to the Artillery School at Châlons.

About the 10th he arrived in Paris, and there he intended to remain.[1]

After July 27th (9th Thermidor), 1794, the calmer and more thoughtful elements in the population of Paris awoke from the torpor that had so long paralysed their energies, and as if with Robespierre's death all terror had come to an end, they now stated their opinions fearlessly and formulated their demands. In newspapers and pamphlets, no longer fettered by the censorship, and in all places of public resort, the frankest expression was given to the odium the Jacobins had excited. Only now could the tale of victims be counted up. Very few families had passed unscathed through that terrible year. Some had lost one or more members; many all their property. With the opening of the prisons new and shocking revelations were brought to light each day, and deepened the indignation of those who had suffered injury. In the Convention itself where the various factions of the "Montagnards" had joined forces to overthrow the Dictator, one of these, composed of Danton's former adherents, withdrew from the Jacobins. They assumed the name of "Thermidorians," and claimed for themselves the credit of having decided the victory on that eventful day. Their leaders, Merlin, Tallien, Fréron and Barras, sought to combine with the Moderates of the Centre against the extreme Left. The proscribed Girondists were recalled by the Convention, while those who had been the most zealous agents of the fallen regime, after an unsuccessful attempt at resistance, perished on the scaffold.

While these events were in progress Napoleon arrived in Paris. Considering that he had only recently been accused of complicity in the plans of the hated tyrant, his appearance

[1] The dates of this journey are not sufficiently attested, specially that of his arrival in Paris. In reference to this question *vide* the following sources: Brotonne, "Dernières Lettres inédites," I. no. 7, Napoleon's farewell letter to Gassendi, dated from Marseilles, April 30th, which speaks of April 2nd or 3rd, for the journey, and receives further support in the same work (I. p. 5). We also know from a statement in Coston, that he had left Lyons on the 5th.

just then was not opportune. He himself could hardly have foreseen such a radical change, nor one so wholly unfavourable in outward circumstances to his prospects. The order he had already received to rejoin the Army of the West and serve as brigadier-general under Hoche (a man of his own age) was sufficiently mortifying to his vaulting ambition, and besides that, it was fighting against peasants and irregulars which would afford little scope for his talents. He made up his mind not to obey the order and sent word he was ill. He was determined at all costs to gain time and to await the outcome of a new move on the part of the Jacobins, to which party he still belonged. But the great revolt against the Convention on the 1st Prairial (May 20th), ended in defeat, and Napoleon's position became even more critical than before. His friend Saliceti, like Ricord, Albitte, and other Radicals, was accused of treason and obliged to go into hiding. Napoleon himself judged it prudent to pay a visit to Marmont's parents, near Châtillon. He was transferred to the infantry as being a supernumerary in the artillery and received peremptory orders to join the Army of the West. He saw now that if he was to maintain his footing in the new condition of things he must break definitely with the Radicals and get into touch with the Thermidorians.

He risked the change and found it answered. Luck never completely forsook him. It was a fortunate coincidence for him that Fréron and Barras, the leaders of the party now in power, had been present as commissioners of the Convention at the Council of War outside Toulon when the young artillerist's plans had been adopted. Bonaparte was then serving a Government which they themselves were endeavouring to uphold, and his conduct therefore did not appear blameworthy to them. They received him favourably and, indefatigable as always in cultivating useful acquaintances, he now secured in them new helpers. The influential Boissy d'Anglas, who had taken a liking to Bonaparte, recommended him to his colleague in the Committee of Public Safety, Doulcet Pontécoulant. The latter, who in August had replaced the hostile and Conservative Aubry on the Military

Committee, interested himself in the "little, pale, cadaverous Italian," and was much impressed by his "daring views and confident tone".

Projects and discussions now hinged on the plan of offensive operations in Upper Italy which Napoleon had communicated in the previous year to the younger Robespierre, but with one difference, due to the change in the political situation. Prussia was no longer on the list of the political enemies of the Republic, for on April 5th, 1795, she had signed a separate peace with France. Negotiations had also begun with Spain, and these soon after ended in a peace. The only redoubtable foe remaining was Austria, who, with Piedmont as her ally, certainly showed every sign of prosecuting the war vigorously. The plan of campaign had now to be modified to suit the altered circumstances. In the previous year Napoleon had proposed that the Army of Italy should take the offensive and co-operate with the troops in Germany, upon which country the burden of the action would fall. Now that Prussia had withdrawn and that the pressure from the German side had lessened, Napoleon proposed to strike a decisive blow at Austria in Italy. For this the Army of Italy would need to be substantially increased, which could easily be done by drafting into it the troops set free by the peace with Spain. The army thus reinforced was to make its way along the Riviera, which was to be retaken as far as Vado, and across the mountains to Piedmont, so as to isolate the King of Sardinia from Austria and win him over to the French side. Once in the plains the army would requisition its own supplies. If only they began at the right time—in February—Mantua could be captured in spring, and Trient reached by the end of the first campaign; in the second campaign, they would unite with the Army of the Rhine, and dictate the terms of peace in the very heart of Austria.[1]

[1] "Correspondance," I. 49, 50, 52, 53. Sorel's statement in his "L'Europe et la Révolution Française" (IV. 385), that Napoleon was already thinking of India is difficult to prove. The idea of meeting England there, as Sorel himself admits, was not unfamiliar to the Convention Government.

Such was the daring plan, carried out a year later with unrivalled skill, by which Napoleon laid the foundation of his fame and power. It is a disputed point how much of it was original and how much the result of diligent study, especially of Maillebois' Italian Campaign of 1745, with regard to the idea of detaching the Piedmontese from Austria, compelling them to sign peace, and forcing the Austrians back on the Adige. But to Napoleon alone belongs the credit of choosing the decisive point of attack, and concentrating his forces there. The plan was based upon his knowledge of a ground he had studied minutely during these last few years, and of an enemy with whom he was familiar—and now he was to be removed far from both, ordered off to play a subordinate rôle in La Vendée whilst perhaps another carried out his plans in Italy. The thought was intolerable! Relying upon the protection of his new friends he sent in an energetic protest against such an arrangement. "General Bonaparte," so ran his letter, "who has commanded the artillery under very unfavourable conditions and has contributed to some most brilliant successes, relies upon the justice of those members of the Committee of Public Safety who have the conduct of military affairs to reinstate him in his functions and spare him the pain of seeing his place taken by men who have always hung back, who are strangers to our successes and unfamiliar to the troops, and who now come forward to snatch the reward of victory for themselves without having shared the dangers of obtaining it."[1] To this petition he expected a favourable answer, all the more confidently as Aubry's successor, Doulcet Pontécoulant, had accepted his plan of operations, had forwarded it to the commanders of the Italian expedition for their consideration, and had attached him, though only temporarily, to the commission charged with the management of the armies and with the drafting of plans of campaign. Again the future seemed full of promise and the hopes that had been dashed by Robespierre's fall sprang up afresh. "My plans for the offensive have been accepted," he now wrote, "we shall soon be at it

[1] Jung, III. p. 521.

in real earnest in Lombardy." Should nothing better turn up he expected he could at least be sent on a mission to Constantinople to reorganize the Sultan's artillery, with a good salary and the flattering title of ambassador. "But it is quite possible that I may return to Nice as before." On September 8th, he wrote: "The future is full of pleasant prospects and, were it otherwise, one must just live in the present. A brave man does not fear the future."

Things turned out "otherwise" however, and his courage was soon put to a new and severe test. Henceforth it was his lot to hew out his path in life amidst incessant alternations of good luck and ill. Doulcet Pontécoulant left his seat in the Committee of Public Safety, in accordance with the law of rotation, before the young general's protest had been disposed of, and in him Bonaparte lost his staunchest supporter. He had no lack of personal enemies. Doulcet's successor, Letourneur, was not well disposed towards Bonaparte, and when the latter's case came up for settlement the War Department rejected his petition, and, owing to his obstinate refusal to rejoin the Army of the West, on September 15th, 1795, they removed his name from the list of French generals.

Once more the horizon had clouded over. He was without a position at the time when the general instability of affairs had brought ruin upon thousands; penniless, for Marmont relates that the few bank-bills (assignats) he had brought back from the army were soon lost in unfortunate speculations; without an income during a financial crisis when, by the end of July, 1795, paper money had depreciated to a fortieth part of its face value, and incapable of helping his family, who were again in difficulties owing to the change in the political situation. He was sadly mistaken; one cannot always "live in the present". What made the outlook even more ominous was the fact that a new and serious danger was already imminent. The Royalists and the Liberals of '89 and '91 were plotting against the hated Convention, and if they were successful then Bonaparte and his friends were lost.

The recent Jacobin revolts had forced the Thermidorians and the Independents—the Centre factions of the Convention —to take a step to the right, so to speak. The new Constitution, drafted in the summer of 1795, was intended to give the prominence to the Moderates and to render any recurrence of the events of the last few years for ever impossible. The union of the Legislative and the Executive powers in the hands of the National Assembly was now discontinued. Henceforth the Legislative power was to be entrusted to two bodies instead of to one—the "Council of the Five Hundred," and the "Council of the Ancients" (numbering 250). The Executive power was to lie in the hands of a Directory composed of five members, none of whom was to be under forty years of age. Every year one-third of the members of the two councils was to retire, and their places to be filled by fresh elections based on the census. The Directory had no part in proposing bills and no authority to refuse to execute the decrees of the councils. Every year one of its members retired and the outgoing member was not eligible for re-election for other five years. The Ministers of the different departments were subordinate to the directors, who were elected by the Ancients from the list of candidates drawn up by the Five Hundred. The directors were to have the charge of Foreign Affairs, Finances, War, Justice, and the internal administration of the country. They proposed war, the two councils declared it; they concluded peace, and the councils ratified it. The Constitution granted the liberty of the press, of religion, commerce and trade; protected civil rights and property; forbade clubs, and allowed political societies only on condition that no public meetings were held and that they did not connect themselves with other clubs. All popular petitions and demonstrations were prohibited; emigrants were not allowed to return to France and the Jacobin Club was closed.

Such were the leading points in the Constitution of the year III (1795). It was as far from meeting the wishes of the Jacobins as those of the Royalists. The moderation of the parties in power lured the Royalists into the belief that their time had now come, and they were already talking of over-

throwing the Republic and raising the late King's son to the throne under the title of Louis XVII when the little Prince died, worn out by the inhuman treatment he had suffered during his imprisonment. The partisans of the Bourbons immediately turned to the late King's brother, Louis XVIII, who was living in exile at Verona and had overrun France with his unskilful agents. Throughout the South of France this Royalist agitation was accompanied by deeds of violence that almost equalled the atrocities of the Terror. In La Vendée the civil war which Hoche had only recently quelled broke out anew. These events made a profound impression in Parliament. The Republican factions, seeing not only their power but even their existence endangered, closed up their ranks and passed a law enacting that two-thirds of the new legislative Council of the Five Hundred should be drawn from the members of the Convention and only the remainder be elected by free choice. This provisional decree and the Constitution itself were to be submitted by vote to the approval of the nation at large. While thus obtaining a majority for themselves in the new Constitutional Assembly, they thought they had chosen the best means of securing the permanence of the new order of things and of preventing any return to the old monarchical regime. Everywhere, however, this decree roused strong opposition, especially in Paris, where the citizens were in favour of the Constitution, but strongly against any continuation of the Convention, which they blamed for the financial embarrassments and the decline of the national prosperity, while its offensive policy they regarded as the stumbling-block in the way of peace. In view of this hostile attitude in the capital, the Thermidorians joined forces with the remnant of the Jacobin party, assembled a few thousand line troops in the capital and formed a "Patriots' Battalion" out of those same vagabond elements on whose pikes the reign of Terror had reared its throne.

This last precaution roused the bitterest indignation among the Parisians who were opposed to the Convention, and who now, fearing a recrudescence of the Terrorism of

the masses, took up arms. From 25,000 to 30,000 National Guards assembled, to cope with whom the Convention could only muster about 5000 troops and no guns, but the other side had none either. As the situation was critical the Convention declared itself in permanence and appointed a committee of five members drawn from the Government commissions, to maintain order. On October 4th, the sections in revolt in the inner city defeated the Convention troops under General Menou, who was afterwards accused of treason and dismissed. The committee then appointed Barras, one of their own members, commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior and placed the Paris troops under his command. Barras had taken an active part in the military operations in Thermidor and was certainly brave enough, but he lacked the clearness of view and prompt decision indispensable at such an emergency and he shrank from strenuous efforts which he felt to be beyond his capacities. Hence on the night of October 5th (13th Vendémiaire), he sent for his friend Bonaparte, who in this way re-entered the army and acted very much as chief of the staff to the commanding-general.

Long afterwards when talking with Madame de Rémusat about this decisive event in his career, Napoleon gave her the following account of it: "One evening I happened to be in the theatre, it was the 12th Vendémiaire (October 4th, 1795), I heard them saying there was going to be '*du train*' on the following day. You know that was the usual expression of the Parisians for the constant changes of Government which they had come to view with absolute indifference, seeing they no longer interfered with their business, their pleasures, nor even their dinner. After the Terror people were thankful if only they were left undisturbed. I heard them say in front of me that the National Assembly had declared itself in permanence. I hastened there and found all was confusion and dismay. Suddenly from the body of the hall a voice exclaimed: 'If anyone knows General Bonaparte's address, would he please go to him and tell him he is wanted in the committee'. I have always believed in trusting to my luck in such circumstances. This decided me,

I went to the committee, and there I met several deputies, among them Cambacérès,[1] greatly perplexed. They were expecting an attack next day and did not know what to decide. They asked my advice; I replied by asking for guns. They were horrified at this proposal. The night passed without them coming to any decision and the morning brought bad news. The whole matter was then put into my hands, and immediately they began to argue as to whether or not they had the right to repel force by force. 'Perhaps,' said I, 'you expect the people to give you their permission to fire upon them? I am now compromised, since you have nominated me; it is only fair you should let me act.'"

Unfortunately it is necessary to accept Napoleon's account of the events of his own life with the greatest reserve. He was seldom scrupulously truthful, and certainly not so when it was to his advantage to conceal his palpable scheming under an appearance of impulsive disinterestedness. Who would believe that the intimate associate of Barras and Tallien never knew that the Convention had declared itself in permanence till he learned it by chance at the theatre on that eventful night? Nobody. Equally incredible is Napoleon's statement to his suite at St. Helena that the command had been entrusted to him on the 13th Vendémiaire. Nevertheless the part he played as Barras' *adlatus* was fraught with important and decisive results.

It was only natural that Napoleon should insist on energetic measures. His own career was involved in the fate of the Convention. Like a good artillerist he knew the value of his guns. The National Guard had no cannon. Everything therefore depended on fetching an artillery park lying outside the city to the Tuileries. This Murat did—a cavalry officer, afterwards Napoleon's brother-in-law. On the following afternoon (October 5th) when the National Guards advanced upon the Tuileries where the Convention was sitting, they found the approaches flanked by cannon behind which Napoleon had posted infantry and cavalry. General Danican,

[1] One of the leaders of the Moderates who had recognized Bonaparte's genius.

commander of the National Guards, an utterly incapable soldier, now suggested that they should try and come to terms, on condition that the "Patriots" Battalion be disbanded. This proposal the deputies refused. Then a gun went off, and the fighting began. It will never be known whether the shot fired came from the attacking force or the defending one, perhaps even on secret orders from Napoleon. The police reports of the day's proceedings are missing from the Paris archives.[1] The fact remains that the right bank of the Seine was immediately cleared by volleys of grapeshot and the narrow streets leading on to the Rue St. Honoré were raked by cannon. During the night of October 5th, the National Guards were driven a long way back and easily vanquished on the following day by a few detachments of line troops.

Napoleon had undoubtedly saved the Convention by his prompt and effective measures; and the Convention was not ungrateful. On October 10th, on the motion of Barras and Fréron, it confirmed his appointment as second-in-command of the Army of the Interior. But that was not enough for Napoleon, who immediately petitioned, and with success, to be made general of a division. On October 16th he received his commission, and on the 26th he succeeded Barras—who had meantime entered the new Government—as commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior.

Yet only a few weeks earlier he had been without a position, his prospects shrouded in gloom, begging for a mission to Constantinople! The day after the 13th Vendémiaire he wrote his brother Joseph and rightly too: "Luck is with me". If it be true that Chance can make men fatalists, the brilliant favours it suddenly lavished upon Napoleon certainly inspired him with an unshaken belief in his star. "*Au destin,*" was the device on the betrothal ring which he gave

[1] An unimpeachable witness, Thibaudeau, then a member of the Convention, afterwards related in his "Histoire de Napoléon," that the latter had admitted to him that the fateful shot had been fired at his instigation. This agrees with the Emperor's remark at St. Helena that he had had great difficulty "in obtaining from Barras the order to fire" (Gourgaud, "Journal inédit," I. p. 466).

to his future wife. But his was no blind belief in Fate. He had learned whenever Fortune seemed dubious to throw into the scale his massive energy, his fertile genius, and that crafty circumspection which was the inheritance of his race. He was not the slave of Chance; he bent it to his own purposes. Regarded from an ethical standpoint, the paths by which he marched unswervingly to power were not always the straightest, and the means he used to reach his ends were often equivocal and despicable. If the function of history were merely to pronounce a judgment upon the way in which such great personalities have succeeded in establishing their power, it could not find words severe enough for the conduct of such a man. But there remains a far wider-reaching question: how was the power thus acquired, used and redeemed? In the answer to this question lies the measure by which we must judge Napoleon's historical significance.

The fall of Robespierre and his associates was more than a political upheaval, far more than a mere matter of transferring the power from one political faction to another. The population, hitherto paralysed by fear, re-asserted their rights, demanded and recovered their long-withheld freedom of action. Life was safe again and the people's delight knew no bounds. Crowds flocked to the theatres and applauded vociferously the scathing denunciations in which the new poets of peace and order recounted the atrocities of the fallen regime. The people hastened down from the rooms and flats where they had lived so long in terrified seclusion to enjoy once more the freedom and movement of the streets. And the public squares, where lately the guillotine had plied its ghastly trade, were now thronged with blithe-hearted dancers. The *salons* of the wealthy were filled with a very mixed company of parvenus of both sexes, all aping the manners of the *ancien régime*. Everywhere, pleasure, gaiety, gallantry, folly, debauch, and unbridled licence were the order of the day. The iron yoke of the reign of terror had deprived women of their rightful influence over the other sex, and now when that bondage had been destroyed, they wielded

their ancient sceptre once more and reconquered their old empire. As if to win back the lost years of their power they deployed all their arts, seductive beauty, voluptuous dress, and enchanting vivacity. Whoever had wit, like Madame de Staël, threw it also into the scale. Among the celebrities of the new society were Madame Tallien, the beautiful Madame de Récamier, Madame de Beauharnais, Madame Hamelin, and others who were also the leading figures in the circle which now gathered round the victors of Thermidor. Barras, the hero of the day, was the idol of this coterie though not the only object of their devotion.

Even the most cantankerous recluse could not escape the charm of this joyous awakening of life and pleasure, and certainly not young General Bonaparte, the author of the "Dialogue on Love" and the despiser of its power. He had cultivated the acquaintance of Tallien and Barras in order to further his own interests, but he did not make himself a favourite socially in the circles to which they introduced him. In spite of his skill in certain small social accomplishments, such as reading the lines of the hand, he lacked charm both of person and manner, he was unkempt and slovenly in appearance, and what little notice he attracted was due to his singular personality. Madame Bourrienne, the wife of one of his friends, describes him before Vendémiaire as being "badly dressed and untidy, cold and gloomy in disposition, his smile insincere and frequently very inopportune. But he could relate incidents in his career in the most delightful way, with irresistible humour and a touch of cynicism; on the other hand he sometimes indulged in wild outbursts of mirth which offended and repelled people. In the theatre when every one else was in fits of laughter he would sit silent and never move a muscle, or stare sullenly in front of him as if what was passing on the stage in no wise affected him."[1] Yet we know from his own confession that the unrestrained sociability of this new life, enhanced by all the attractions of beauty and gorgeous display, affected him profoundly. His

[1] The contemporary descriptions of him in the spring of 1795, given in Stendhal's "Vie de Napoléon" (p. 74), corroborate this picture.

letters bear witness to the fact. "Luxury, pleasure and art are reviving here in the most astonishing manner," he writes his brother Joseph in July, 1795. "The carriages and the dandies are all going about again, and the long eclipse of their gay career now seems like some bad dream. Everything that can amuse and make life pleasant is here in abundance. One tears oneself away from anxious thoughts; who could be gloomy in the midst of this light-hearted animation and bewildering activity? The ladies are everywhere, in the theatres, the promenades, and the libraries. In the studies of the savants you come across the most charming creatures. Here alone of all places in the world, they deserve to guide the helm. The men are simply mad about them, think of nothing else, and live for them alone. A woman only needs six months of Paris to know what is due to her and the extent of her power." A little later he writes: "This great nation has given itself up wholly to pleasure. Balls, theatres and women—here the loveliest in the world—are the supreme interests of life." On August 9th he writes: "Life is pleasant here and very gay. One would think that all were trying to repay themselves for their sufferings in the past, and the uncertainty of the future urges them to make the utmost of their fleeting pleasures. . . . Good-bye, dear friend, don't worry about the future, make the best of the present, be happy, and learn how to enjoy yourself."[1]

What a transformation for a nature hitherto so solitary, so averse to society, and now its victim! Nor was that all. The womanly element, so potent all around, had entered his life too. Napoleon was now seriously thinking of marrying and founding a family. This was the time when he was engaged on the Central Committees, when his prospects were good, and the future seemed full of promise. In the previous year his brother Joseph had married Julie Clary, the daughter of a wealthy silk manufacturer at Marseilles. Napoleon was thinking of her younger sister, Desirée, and Joseph was to be his intermediary. However the rebuff on September 15th, when his name was removed from the army list, seems to

[1] Ducasse, "Mémoires du Roi Joseph," I. pp. 133, 137, 140.

have put an end to this plan, while the victory on the 13th Vendémiaire turned the suitor's eyes in another direction.[1] Now that he had reached such a position, why should he not choose one of those brilliant women who gave the tone to the society of the capital, and who had both position and influence? For instance, there was Madame Permon with her long pedigree, well-known in Corsica, a relative of his father's, a great deal older than himself certainly—but rich and influential. It is said that Napoleon paid his court to her and was refused. Soon after he fell in love with another lady. This time it was a deep and genuine passion, the utmost of which his soul was capable. The lady was the Viscountess Josephine, widow of General de Beauharnais.

Josephine was the eldest of the three daughters of Joseph Gaspard Tascher de la Pagerie, and was born on June 23rd, 1763, at La Martinique where her father, an ex-captain in the Royal Dragoons, was managing his own estates. The family belonged to the old French nobility and came originally from Orléanais. Josephine was educated at the Convent of Fort-Royal and was married at Paris in 1779, to the young Vicomte Alexandre de Beauharnais, son of a former Governor of La Martinique, who had known the Tascher family long and intimately. The marriage was not a happy one. Beauharnais neglected his wife, whom he had only married in order to get control of her money. Their first child Eugène, was born on September 3rd, 1781. A year later Beauharnais went to the Antilles to fight against the English, and there fell in love with a Creole and tried to get a divorce. Meanwhile, in 1783, a second child was born, a girl, the "Queen Hortense" of history. When the Revolution broke out Beauharnais, who had returned to France, was elected a deputy of the Second Estate, and was one of the few men of his rank who were energetic defenders of the new Constitution. On the memor-

[1] Three years afterwards Desirée married General Bernadotte, and twenty years later she shared the throne of Sweden as the Consort of Charles XIV. The letters given in Hochschild's "Desirée, reine de Suède et Norvège," show that it was Napoleon who made a pretext for breaking off the intimacy. He afterwards sought to atone for this action by the consideration and favours he bestowed on Bernadotte.

able night of August 4th, 1789, he showed himself a zealous opponent of the *ancien régime*. Nor did he emigrate; he remained in the army, and when the Monarchy was replaced by the Republic he was made a general and appointed to an independent command in the Army of the Rhine, a post which was quite beyond his capacities. In 1793, when the Prussians recaptured Mainz, the blame of this reverse was laid on him and he resigned his commission. During the Terror, like many another aristocrat equally innocent, he was accused of being a traitor to his country and guillotined four days before the fall of Robespierre.

In prison Beauharnais had again come across Josephine, who, although she had done her best to appear an advanced Republican and even a "*sans-culotte montagnarde*," had fallen under suspicion owing to her intimacy with the Girondist Ministers, and to her intercessions on behalf of noble families. She survived Robespierre's downfall and owed her release to her intimacy with Tallien, who intervened on her behalf. For years past there had been no love lost between Josephine and her husband, and now she did not long lament his loss. To turn her back upon the gay life of the *salons* of the "*nouvelles couches*" of 1795 was not natural to her shallow, fickle, pleasure-loving nature. After the Revolution and the war with England little was left of her fortune. She was in debt and her position more than precarious. She identified herself closely with Madame Cabarrus (shortly afterwards married to Tallien) and was at that time regarded as one of the most popular figures in Paris society, and as the special friend of Barras. She certainly was never considered a coy beauty.[1] As to her personal appearance, all witnesses agree that she was a most graceful and bewitching creature. Even Napoleon's brother Lucien, who was not favourably disposed towards her, admits as much. In his memoirs he

[1] Rémusat, "Mémoires," I. p. 138: "Her reputation was seriously compromised". Viel-Castel, "Mémoires," II. 16: "My father was Chamberlain to the Empress Josephine, whose lover he had been prior to her marriage to Napoleon". *Vide* also, Dufort de Cherverny, "Mémoires," pp. 349, 430. Thiébault, "Mémoires," III. 364, etc. Barras' "Mémoires" make no secret of her intimacy with him.

traces the following picture of her: "In this large circle of pretty women, all of whom were considered '*galantes*,' the ex-Viscountess de Beauharnais could lay no claim to regular beauty, but there was a certain Creole grace in all the exquisite movements of her figure, which was rather under the average height. She had not naturally a good complexion, but under the glitter of the chandeliers, the aids of the toilette came to the rescue. In short, she still possessed some remains of the attractive charms of her youth." Arnault in his "Recollections of a Sexagenarian," is more just to her: "Her equable temperament, her good nature, the amiability that shone in her look and expressed itself not only in words but even in the tone of her voice, a certain indolence, native to the Creole, that betrayed itself in her carriage and her movements, and which never forsook her even when she hastened to do one some little service, all combined to lend her a charm that far outweighed the dazzling beauty of her two rivals, Madame de Récamier and Madame Tallien". The best description of all comes from Madame de Rémusat, who had known her since 1793. "Though not exactly pretty, her whole personality possessed a wonderful charm. Her features were refined and harmonious, her expression gentle; her tiny little mouth concealed her defective teeth most cleverly. Her somewhat sallow complexion was transformed by rouge and powder applied with faultless skill. Her figure was perfect; all her members small and beautifully modelled, her slightest movements easy and graceful. She was not a woman of much intellect. She was a Creole, a coquette, and very imperfectly educated; but she knew her own limitations and never compromised herself in conversation. Nature had endowed her with exquisite tact, and she had a happy knack of saying nice things in a pleasing way. Unfortunately she neither possessed any depth of feeling nor any true nobility of soul."

At this time Josephine had no real affection for the young general whose appearance was certainly far from prepossessing. He was short of stature (only slightly over five feet), and his broad, powerfully-built body was out of all proportion to his short legs. He was thin, and the harsh outlines

of his face disagreeably prominent, while his sallow skin gave him a sickly look. His frank grey eyes were full of decision and will-power with an occasional gleam of fierceness in them. His nervousness, which had been very marked even when he was a boy, had developed of late years to an abnormal extent under the strain of the violent excitements and incessant fluctuations of his career. Doubtless, too, it had been aggravated by the repeated baulking of his inordinate ambition. A contemporary relates that in these days Napoleon was only taking three hours' sleep, and was really very far from well. Later on he suffered from facial neuralgia, nervous twitching of the mouth and right shoulder, and various other little maladies. We are probably not far wrong in ascribing to this excessive nervousness much of his irritability, his impatience of contradiction, his distrust of all and sundry, and even the occasional violence of his behaviour. On the other hand his confidence in himself was very impressive, and interested people in him in spite of themselves. He even aroused Josephine's interest, though perhaps nothing deeper, notwithstanding the marked preference she showed him. At St. Helena he related how at Eugène Beauharnais' request, he had allowed the boy to retain his father's sword, although all weapons were confiscated after the Revolution. For this the mother came and thanked him in person. Napoleon then sent his adjutant to call and leave his card, whereupon Madame Beauharnais invited him to dinner. "She treated me charmingly, placed me next her and chaffed me. She was a delightful woman, but very fond of intrigue. I then invited her and Barras to dinner, and finally we fell in love with one another. Barras did me a service when he advised me to marry her. She belonged socially, as he said, to the old and the new regime, which would strengthen my position, obliterate my Corsican nationality, and make me thoroughly French, for her house was the first in Paris. I was determined to be absolutely French; among all the insults hurled against me at this time, that of 'Corsican' was the most mortifying."[1]

[1] Gourgaud, "Journal inédit," II. pp. 170, 329. Barras in his memoirs (I. 264) declares the story about Beauharnais' sword a pure invention of

Barras' advice fell on willing ears. Napoleon was one who would have curbed his passion had it run counter to his ambition. If he yielded to it now, it was because he saw in this union with an aristocrat, on intimate terms with the Directory, a means of strengthening his social position and promoting his interests. He felt that this marriage would be an advantage to him, would lift him out of his plebeian surroundings on to a higher rung on the social ladder, and help to obliterate the past. Even in his Jacobin days he could not repress a certain fondness for gentle breeding and an aversion to the coarse instincts of the masses. The refinement and polished manners of the aristocracy were none the less pleasing to him that he himself was entirely deficient in these qualities. There was yet another point. Barras had taken a true measure of Napoleon's genius, and his own somewhat indolent nature urged him to make this man his debtor, foreseeing surely that such talents and ambition were certain to bring their owner into power. He had already tried to get Napoleon appointed Minister of War but had not been able to obtain his colleagues' assent. Now he undertook to plead Napoleon's cause with Josephine, and vice versa. As a matter of fact it was quite as desirable for Josephine to secure her social position by a new marriage; and it was not easy for her with two children and no fortune to find a husband. What luxury she enjoyed was dependent on Barras'

Napoleon's; but then Barras himself is untrustworthy. In Las Cases' "Memorial," Napoleon gives the following account of his acquaintanceship with Josephine: "I was not insensible to the charms of the ladies. But till then they had not spoilt me, and I felt shy in their presence. Madame de Beauharnais was the first to give me confidence. One day that I happened to be seated next her, she spoke to me in flattering terms of my military talents. This praise simply intoxicated me, I appealed to her constantly, I followed her everywhere, and ended by falling passionately in love with her, a fact of which all our friends were aware long before I would have dared to tell her of it. When people began to talk, Barras spoke to me about it. I had no reason to deny it. 'In that case you ought to marry Madame de Beauharnais. You have your rank and talents to turn to account; but you are alone, without either wealth or influential connexions. You ought to marry; that would give you a position.'"

fickle affections, and hence she allowed the little Corsican to believe she loved him. On October 28th, shortly after Madame Permon had become a widow—when Bonaparte had absented himself for some days—she wrote him: "Are you not coming any more to see a friend who loves you? Have you quite forsaken her? You would regret that, for she is devoted to you. Come to-morrow to breakfast, I must see you and talk over your interests. *Bon soir, mon ami. Je vous embrasse.*"

Warm personal interest is not easily withstood. Napoleon went, and was conquered. Nevertheless Josephine was not in love with Napoleon, but was rather in that lukewarm condition often as fatal in love as in religion. In a letter to a friend written about this time, she says: "I admire the General's courage, his wide grasp of all kinds of knowledge, his ability to talk well on any of them, the quickness of his mind which lets him understand other people's thoughts almost before they have expressed themselves. But I confess I am terrified at the power he wants to exercise over all around him. There is something strange and indefinable in his searching glance; even the Directors are impressed by it. Lastly, that which ought to please me, the strength of his passion, which he expresses with an intensity that puts its sincerity beyond a doubt, often makes me withhold my consent when I had meant to give it. How can I, already past the first blush of youth, expect to keep for any length of time this stormy tenderness of the General's which is almost like a frenzy? Will he ever regret not having made a more brilliant marriage? What could I then do? What could I say?" Yet the fatalistic confidence with which Napoleon spoke to her of his plans and his future had cast its spell over her, and when at last the report spread that the Directory was about to nominate him commander in-chief of the Army of Italy, she gave her consent.[1] On March 9th, 1796,

[1] A genuine and typical love-letter from this man who had spoken so slightingly of love only a few years previously, is not without interest. "I waken and all my thoughts are of you. Your image and that rapturous evening yesterday leave my senses no rest. Sweet, incomparable

the civil marriage took place, Barras and Tallien acting as witnesses. The angel of Truth must have veiled his face when the bride and bridegroom presented their falsified certificates of birth to the registrar's clerk. Napoleon gave in the date of his birth as February 5th, 1768, Josephine, who was six years older, gave in hers as June 23rd, 1767, a little piece of deceit prompted by feminine vanity and willingly overlooked by the bridegroom. Matters of this kind were held of small account in those days, and Napoleon was the last to suffer for the truth. His brothers Joseph and Lucien also gave in false dates of birth when they were married, and by a curious coincidence all three brothers gave in different days *in the same year*, 1768, as the date of their birth! This lack of moral depth was common to the whole Bonaparte family.

Two days before the marriage the Directory, on Carnot's motion, had signed the decree, dated March 2nd, appointing Napoleon commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy.[1] On the

Josephine, what a strange power you have over my heart! Are you displeased with me? Are you sad? My soul is torn with grief. Your friend can find no rest. But what better am I when I yield to that deep over-mastering passion and draw from your lips and your heart a fever that consumes me? Ah! this very night I felt how different your portrait was from yourself. You leave at noon. I shall see you in three hours. Till then, *mio dolce amor,* a thousand kisses, but give me none in return for they scorch my very blood" (Rémusat, "Mémoires," I. p. 182). Afterwards at St. Helena Napoleon remarked: "I have never been genuinely in love, except perhaps with Josephine, and then only because I was twenty-seven when I made her acquaintance" (Gourgaud, "Journal inédit, II. p. 8).

[1] It was commonly reported at this time that the Italian command was Barras' wedding gift to Josephine, a rumour that has found its way into many memoirs, even into those of Lucien. Against it we have the testimony of two directors, Carnot and Larevellière, who emphatically declare that the proposal did not originate with Barras and that the decision was based solely on Bonaparte's merits. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the Directory was anxious to begin an offensive war in Italy as soon as possible, and that Scherer (who was commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy) declared it was impossible to do so with the means at his disposal and within the time required, whereas Napoleon who had daily opportunities of intercourse with the directors, was unwearied —and finally successful—in his efforts to prove the feasibility of his plan;

12th he took leave of his wife and set out for his new post. Now that he had an independent command he meant to show what he could do, divert the universal admiration from the victorious and invincible Hoche to himself, and at the same time further his own ambition in yet another direction. His former post as commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior was also a high and influential one, and he had rapidly gathered round him a considerable number of those who hoped to further their own careers by their adherence to this young general who had risen so quickly to a position of influence. On the other hand, since the 13th Vendémiaire, Napoleon was detested by the populace of Paris and bitterly envied by those who could not forgive him his rapid promotion and who, in order to injure him, made a regular practice of exposing all his faults and failings, from his Corsican adventures and his intimacy with Robespierre to his foreign accent and uncouth manners. As the law of the Constitution required the frequent changing of the highest officials in the State, there was no guarantee that new elements might not supervene and sweep him aside. In Paris, as general of the Army of the Interior, he was merely the candidate of a party. The victory in the streets of the capital had secured him nothing beyond the thanks of a faction; but in fighting against a foreign foe, in what he himself considered the most important theatre of war, there was both fame and honour to be won in the eyes of the nation with which he had now identified himself by his marriage with a Frenchwoman of ancient lineage. Such a career was more in accordance with the extravagant plans woven by his fertile and inventive mind; but these plans were as yet too vague and immature

and here Barras' influence was probably useful. Napoleon's marriage was not announced till February 7th, after Scherer had declined the ultimatum offered him on January 22nd (Fabry, "Histoire de l'armée d'Italie," 1796-7, II. p. 418). Moreover on the 18th Brumaire, 1799, when Barras was forced to resign office, Napoleon himself admitted Barras' decisive influence on his military career. In the letter submitted to Talleyrand for Napoleon's signature, Barras speaks of, "The glory accompanying the return of the illustrious warrior *whom it was my happiness to usher on to the path of fame*," etc. (Roederer, "Oeuvres," III. p. 80).

to withstand the constant ebb and flow of a political coterie. Power was his party; to win it his aim.

What Josephine lacked in love for her husband she made amends for by her faith in him, in his genius, and in his future; nor did he disappoint her. Unfortunately she had not the moral strength to remain a faithful wife. Hers was a sensual nature; not of the fierce passionate type such as Catherine II, that will risk danger and descend to crime to gratify its desires, but rather like Mary Stuart, unresisting, gentle and faithless, capable of suffering as a victim when danger threatens. Her staunch friend, Madame de Rémusat, who delights in doing justice to all her good points, does not conceal that Josephine's reputation was seriously compromised before she met Napoleon, and from his letters we are forced to conclude that she did not cease to play the coquette even during the first years of her new marriage. A few weeks after parting from his young bride, Napoleon implores her in a letter full of passionate longing to follow him to Italy. She lets two months elapse—till the end of the Paris season—before she decides to comply. "I am in despair," Napoleon wrote to Carnot. "My wife does not come; probably she has a lover who is detaining her in Paris. *Je maudis toutes les femmes.*" During the summer and autumn, while Napoleon was earning immortal triumphs, she lingered in Milan, Bologna and Rome with her lover, a Captain Charles, and on the first approach of winter back she hied to her beloved Paris. Later on, in the spring of 1798, when Napoleon went to Egypt with his expedition, she remained in France, where her behaviour was a cause of sorrow and anxiety to her distant husband. For Napoleon was kept constantly and not always very accurately informed of all that happened. From Egypt he wrote to his brother Joseph in a resigned way: "I have much sadness in my domestic life, for at last the veil is wholly rent. You are all I have in this world. Your friendship is very dear to me, and were I to lose it or you to deceive me, I would become a hopeless misanthrope. It is a painful position to need to keep all one's feelings for the one same person in the one poor heart. . . . You know what I mean. Look me out a country

house against my return, either near Paris or in Burgundy, where I can live quietly and spend the winter. I am disgusted with human nature. I need solitude and isolation. Greatness wearies me; all my affections are withered." Soon after this he thought of a divorce and paid marked attention to a young Madame Fourés whose husband had been sent to Europe on a mission. On the other hand, when it was reported in Paris that Napoleon had been assassinated in Egypt, Josephine, far from showing any grief, was mainly concerned how to secure her splendid diamonds from the Bonaparte brothers. On her husband's return her tears and penitence moved him to forgive her and she regained his favour.

After the *coup d'état* which made Napoleon master of France, and just as her powers of attraction were beginning to wane, Josephine for the first time clung to Napoleon with real tenderness, and when he amused himself with some passing flirtation she was miserable with jealousy. For a long time her devotion to him and his belief that she brought him good luck prevented him from divorcing her; but in the end his self-seeking policy triumphed even over his superstitious scruples.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS AND THE PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO.

As we have already seen, in 1795 Prussia and Spain withdrew from the great coalition which had been formed two years previously against Revolutionary France. Even before that, Tuscany had come to a separate understanding with the great Republic, so as to secure her own territory in case the French invaded Northern Italy. Holland, which had been conquered by Pichegru during the winter and re-named the "Batavian Free State," was now France's humble ally, and Belgium too had been retained, a circumstance which lent an irreconcilable character to the war with Britain and made that Power a central factor in European politics. For Pitt, the English Prime Minister, had long maintained that the incorporation of Belgium in France was inimical to Britain's vital commercial interests and that he would resist it to the utmost. Of the continental Powers, Austria and Russia were foremost in combating France's territorial encroachments, and now the rumour ran that Austria was carrying on secret negotiations at Paris. But the rumour was unfounded. The Emperor Francis had no thought of a separate treaty, for after the successes of the Republican armies in the previous year, such a peace would only have entailed further losses on Austria, and Thugut, the Minister who guided the Emperor's policy, counted on gains. Since losing Silesia (the acquisition of which had raised Prussia to the rank of a European Power), the Court of Vienna had been looking everywhere for compensation—to Poland, Turkey, Germany where it coveted Bavaria, and Italy where it aspired to win Venice and so connect Lombardy with the hereditary provinces.

On January 3rd, 1795, Thugut had secretly received from Russia a promise of support for these plans as well as a share of Poland, on the understanding that Austria remained the enemy of France. Hence all thought of negotiating with the Republic was out of the question. On the other hand, on May 20th, 1795, Thugut concluded with Pitt, the English Premier, a treaty of alliance and mutual guarantees according to the secret terms of which efforts were to be made to incite the Czarina to active hostility against France, and on September 28th of the same year Catherine II entered the alliance. The majority of the German States, acting under pressure from the Austrian preponderance in the Ratisbon Diet, had declined to join with Prussia in negotiating for peace, and they now entered the coalition as did also Sardinia, Portugal, and Naples. All prospect of peace was thus at an end.

Some amicable arrangement between France and Austria might still have been possible had the Republic been willing to surrender her late conquests and restore them to Austria. During the last days of the Convention, the disorder in all branches of the public service was unprecedented, and the state of affairs throughout the country so lamentable that a conciliatory attitude might well have seemed desirable. The Revolution, in its devastating zeal, had thrown down the corrupt fabric of feudalism, but had not put anything permanent in its place. Under the watchword of "Liberty," the political institutions of the country had been destroyed, while under that of "Equality"—the principle of which had been developed to a tyrannical degree—society had been shaken to its very foundations. The marriage laws, and those relating to inheritance, had been remodelled in accordance with Revolutionary tendencies, and the only result had been to deprive family life of its former importance and respect. Church property and the estates of the emigrants, most of them arbitrarily proscribed, had been confiscated and on the property thus obtained the Public Credit was established, in total disregard of the fact that the value of real estate depends upon the stability and protection of the laws, and that when this fails, the other becomes a mere fiction. As a result

France was inundated with worthless paper money, real estate fell to one-fourth or one-fifth of its nominal value, the well-to-do business class was ruined, gamblers and speculators throve, stock-jobbing took the place of trade, and corruption and unscrupulous practices were everywhere rife. Added to this, Church matters were in confusion and the new educational system, which made universal school attendance compulsory, was unable to enforce its own decrees. The Revolution had certainly done much towards uniting and strengthening the forces of the nation hitherto broken up into classes and corporations, but it had failed to establish order and security. It had introduced many admirable modern regulations, but these were so inextricably involved with others which were absolutely pernicious that a state of chaos had been produced. A just and accurate description of the state of affairs then existing in France is given in a memorial addressed to the Government by the Marquis de Poterat, a somewhat doubtful character, but a clear-headed observer: "Consider," he says, "the dangers of your position; they are truly alarming. With the exception of Prussia, all the great powers of Europe are your declared enemies; the majority of the young men of the country have perished in battles and hospitals, and soon recruiting will be impossible. Agriculture has been ruined for want of labourers, horses, and manure. Your trade, both home and foreign, has been destroyed, the factory workmen have either lost their lives or their reason. You have neither provisions, nor naval stores, nor imports of any kind. Your credit is exhausted both at home and abroad. The money market is saddled with an immense amount of worthless paper money. The administration of home affairs is making no progress because it has far too many ill-assorted divisions and sub-divisions. Lastly, you do not possess a Government. When will you have one? Will you ever have one? If so, will it not then be too late?"[1] (July, 1795).

There was no lack of inducements to turn people's thoughts

[1] A. Sorel, "Le Comité de salut publique en 1795," "Revue Historique," XVIII. p. 294.

to peace and to allow the country time to recuperate. Indeed, during the Convention there was actually a party within the Committee of Public Safety, who had advocated a general peace even at the cost of returning to the old frontiers. But the old frontiers were inseparably connected with the old regime, and the Revolution had aspirations beyond that. Hence its leaders would not consent to peace unless the conquests made in the previous year were to be secured and the Rhine established as the "natural" boundary of France. Rousseau had borrowed from Nature not only his theory of rights and morals but also that of the boundaries of countries. Now, however, the need for peace was urgently felt throughout the country, especially in Paris, and so it came about that the Conservative party had the support of the people, whereas the Progressives came into violent conflict with them and finally landed the Convention in the precarious situation from which Napoleon had extricated it on October 5th, 1795, by his strategic skill. Four days previously the majority in the Convention had agreed to the proposal of the Government Commission to incorporate Belgium and Luxemburg in France, and had thereby sanctioned the programme of conquest which was to remain for the next twenty years the policy of France. Already in Paris they were considering all the means of war which might prove effective in the struggle with "the modern Carthage" (the analogy was suggested by the classical tendencies of the Revolution), the exclusion of Britain from the Mediterranean, a landing in England, an expedition to India, the blockade of the Continent, and the arbitrary control of its armed forces by France. All these leading points in Napoleon's later policy were already under consideration in the Republic of 1795. Soon afterwards when the Directory succeeded to the Convention, the five men then at the head of affairs—Barras, Rewbell, Carnot, Letourneur, and Larévellière—belonged to the dominant party, and hence any change of policy was out of the question; their close connexion with the Republican Thermidorians (under Tallien) and the Jacobins (under Sieyès) made war against the monarchs a duty, and, to all

appearances, an interminable one. Indeed it was not intended to come to an end, as that would have meant an end to the Revolution also, and with it to the power of its ambitious leaders. To them the revolutionary tendencies in foreign countries held out the promise of welcome allies. Germany, Switzerland, and if possible Italy, were to be roused to insurrection by a systematic propaganda, and so drawn within the sphere of French politics. It was a programme of universal expansion.[1]

At first the execution of the plan fell far short of its daring design. Generals Jourdan and Pichegru, who had crossed the Rhine to assume the offensive, were driven back by the Austrian Commanders Clerfayt and Wurmser, and forced to recross the river. In the South, the Army of Italy was making no progress. It had been reinforced by the troops withdrawn from Spain and put under command of Scherer, an elderly general who till then had been engaged in the Pyrenees. He received orders from Paris to force his way over the

[1] In an edict of the Committee of Public Safety dated June 26th, 1795, and addressed to Barthélemy, chargé d'affaires, there occurs the following remark: "What use would this terrible war and this long Revolution have been to us if everything was just to be as it had been before? Do you believe the Republic could still have continued to exist?" Rewbell (afterwards leader of the foreign policy of the Directory) expressed his opinion on the matter to one of the foreign diplomatists and declared that one must either be very ignorant of the true interests of the Republic, or else be in the pay of Austria or England, to propose returning to the old boundaries for the sake of peace. Such a peace would not only be a disgrace to France but would lead to the destruction of the Republic. For were the armies to return to France, which is unable to pay them, they would soon consume what remained of the National Estates, and becoming dissatisfied would intervene in political and religious disputes, with the result that civil war would ensue. The other Powers would then step in and France would share the fate of Poland. On the other hand in Belgium alone there was public property to the value of three billions at least, and in the other countries occupied by French troops even more, and these afforded the sole means possible of redeeming the assignats. Tallien was never weary of re-stating the principle of 1792 as to the necessity of France surrounding herself with a circle of dependent Republics. Sieyès had even prepared a plan for secularizing the ecclesiastical principalities of Germany, very similar to what was actually carried out in

Apennine passes into the plains beyond, and to separate the Austrians from their Sardinian allies. He began well by a successful engagement at Loano, on November 23rd-24th, 1795. But instead of following up his victory, he withdrew to the Riviera for, as his repeated protests to the Directory had been unheeded, his troops were short of everything, especially of the means of transport. Then too the advent of winter rendered operations difficult. Fortunately, however, Austria did not attach much importance to the operations in Italy, although at Vienna they had for a moment considered the advisability of removing the bulk of the troops from the Rhine to Italy, as the reports sent by Mallet du Pan to Vienna during February, 1796, confidently asserted that the French were determined to force a road into Piedmont and Milan, "*coûte que coûte*". Yet no decisive step was taken. England, by her subsidies, was able to retain the Austrian troops in Germany and so suit her own interests; the Grand Duke of Tuscany refused the Neapolitan auxiliaries a passage through his territory, and Thugut, fearing aggressive measures from Prussia and wishing to be in readiness in Bohemia, refrained consequently from reinforcing the Italian Army except for a few battalions. Even in Paris the operations in Italy were regarded as only of secondary importance, and as before, Germany was considered the real theatre of the war. According to Carnot's plan of campaign in February, 1796, Jourdan and Moreau were to cross the Rhine at the head of two armies, each of which was much larger than the Army

1803. Mallet du Pan, the shrewd correspondent of the Vienna Cabinet, remarks in a letter of August 23rd, 1795: "The Royalists and many of the Deputies of the Convention would willingly sacrifice all our conquests to hasten on peace, but the fanatical Girondists and Sieyès' committee persist in their policy of expansion for three reasons: first, in order to increase their territory and with it the influence of the nation; second, in order to absorb Europe gradually into a federation with the French Republic; third, to prolong a war which maintains these extraordinary powers and the revolutionary methods". Cp. Chap. vii. (since the publication of the first edition of this book, these matters in the foreign policy of the Republic have been further elucidated by A. Sorel in his "L'Europe et la Révolution Française"). *Vide* especially Vol. III. pp. 243, 261, 271, 344, 473. Vol. IV. pp. 176, 267, 389, 392. Vol. V. p. 2.

of Italy. Everything, in short, conspired to mislead Austria as to the true theatre of war on which events of far-reaching importance were soon to develop. In marked contrast to Scherer's inactivity, Bonaparte's plan of campaign demonstrated not merely the possibility but the necessity of assuming the offensive as early as February. To Scherer's complaints about the destitute condition of his troops, a state of matters for which the exhausted finances could provide no remedy, Napoleon replied by pointing to the rich plains of Lombardy, and promised that the troops should find their supplies in the enemy's country. On January 19th, 1796, Napoleon's plan of campaign was definitely accepted and forwarded to the Commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy to be carried into effect. This Scherer refused to do. Such plans, he declared, could only be executed by those who had invented them, and he begged to resign. His request was opportune. On the 13th Vendémiaire young General Bonaparte had saved the lives of the men who were at present the leaders of the nation, and now he showed them how to save their policy. Where every reverse on the field weakened the Directory and consequently strengthened the Opposition, he promised triumphs which would justify the action of the Government and strengthen its position. Scherer was relieved of the chief command and replaced by Napoleon, who entered on his duties at Nice on March 27th, 1796.

The new commander found his troops in a deplorable condition. Out of an effective force of six divisions numbering upwards of 62,000 men, there were only about 41,000 fit for active service. Afterwards in his memoirs Napoleon gave the number of his troops as 30,000 and that of his opponents as 80,000, which was as wide of the truth as his letter to the Directory in which he represented himself as opposing with 38,000 troops a hostile force of 100,000. As a matter of fact the numbers were about equal. The French were seasoned troops inured to war and fatigue, but they were suffering from insufficient food and they were badly equipped. The miserable villages on the slopes of the Apennines could supply very little and the French Exchequer was empty.

Thousands of the troops marched barefooted, thousands had not even muskets; the officers carried their knapsacks themselves, and some of the generals had no mounts. For months past they had received no pay, and even if they had, it would only have been worthless paper money. Napoleon's address to his troops sounded in their ears like some message of deliverance: "You have had enough of misfortune and privations. I shall put an end to that. Over there beyond the mountains are stores, food, clothes, guns, horses, and money to reward us. Away with everything that keeps us from the enemy. Let us advance and thrust our bayonets into their bodies."[1]

These words express in plain unvarnished language the policy to which France had been reduced for years past by her financial embarrassments. Even before this the Convention had given orders to the armies crossing the Rhine that the troops must live at the enemy's expense, and their generals had instructions to direct their efforts so as to procure the necessary supplies from their opponents. The Directory adopted this maxim and greatly extended its significance. These words, however, are also characteristic of the man who uttered them. Young as he was—Napoleon was younger than any of his generals—he knew human nature far too well not to speak of gold and glory to men who were poor and ambitious. It was a daring speech, yet not so daring as the deeds which fulfilled it. Fortunately just at this time Saliceti, who was Government Commissioner to the Army of Italy, procured several hundred thousand francs in Genoa and obtained a million francs as ransom for a captured vessel, so that the most pressing needs could be met at once.

[1] It was not till later that he issued his famous manifesto: "Soldiers! You are starving and in rags. Government is in arrears with your pay and has nothing to give you. Your patience and your courage amidst these rocks are admirable, but they bring you no fame; no ray of glory lights upon you. I am about to lead you into the most fertile plains in the world; fruitful provinces and large cities will soon lie at your mercy; there you will find honour, profit, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy, have you the needful courage and perseverance?"

We saw how, two years previously, Napoleon had insisted with Robespierre upon the importance of forcing the Apennine passes from Savona, and how, on secret orders from the Dictator, he had procured for himself accurate and detailed information of the enemy's country and fortifications. Now he was about to turn that information to account, and on the same tactical principles which he had submitted at Paris in 1794 to the all-powerful Deputy. "The management of a war," he had then said, "is exactly like the siege of a fortress. You must concentrate your fire on a single point. Once a breach is made the equilibrium is destroyed, resistance becomes fruitless, and the place is captured. Attacks should never be scattered but concentrated. You must divide in order to find food, and unite for fighting. Unity of command is essential to success. Time is everything." [1]

The road leading from Savona to the north over the crest of the Apennines divides on the farther side at Carcare into two branches, one of which runs westward through Millesimo and Ceva to Turin, the other north-east through Cairo, Dego, and Acqui, to Alessandria and Milan. The former was held by the Piedmontese troops, the latter by the Austrians, and the two armies were in close communication. The question for the French was how to cut their way through between them. Napoleon's original intention was to attack and defeat the Piedmontese while the Austrians were still in winter quarters and then to turn upon the latter. He was therefore intensely annoyed to find that before his arrival a French division under Laharpe had advanced as far as Voltri to support Saliceti's demands for money, and had thus "wakened up" the Austrians.[2] Beaulieu, the commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces, had planned to fall upon Laharpe's division from above, so as to cut off the French communi-

[1] Krebs et Moris, II. 242.

[2] In a despatch of 6th April, to the Directory, Napoleon condemned this movement towards the east "which had wakened up the enemy" ("Corresp.," I. p. 121). But afterwards at St. Helena, in his "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 and 1797" ("Corresp.," XXIX. 85), he pretends he had deliberately lured on the enemy by this means, a military fiction now discredited.

cations with Genoa; while a second Austrian force, under General Argenteau, was to capture Montenotte, an important point north of Savona. By this ill-conceived plan, Bonaparte was obliged to give battle before his supplies had time to reach him. Laharpe fell back on Savona, but at Montenotte, on April 12th, 1796, Argenteau, who had scattered his forces, was out-numbered and defeated with heavy loss by Generals Masséna and Augereau. On the following day a second Austrian division, under the Piedmontese General Colli, was dispersed by Augereau near Cosseria on the road to Millesimo. Napoleon then turned immediately northwards in pursuit of Argenteau's corps, which he exterminated at Dego on the 14th. On the 15th, Beaulieu withdrew from the mountains into the plain near Acqui. Napoleon had thus won his first move; he had thrust his army in between the allies, driven back the Austrians, and isolated the Piedmontese. The latter, whose one idea had been to protect their own territory, after some heavy fighting evacuated their advanced position, and while on their retreat they were again defeated with heavy loss at Mondovi, on April 21st.

The promised plains now stretched before the French troops and ere long their advance-guard extended as far as Cherasco and Alba, plundering as it went. Napoleon had fully redeemed his promise to his soldiers, and henceforward they followed him with blind confidence. Besides Austrians and Piedmontese, his genius had conquered a third enemy, the envy and distrust of his generals, who served him in future with devoted loyalty. He had again compelled the Directory to acknowledge his merits; for although contrary to their orders he had defeated Colli before pursuing Beaulieu, he justified himself by having thereby avoided an enemy on his rear. The argument was unanswerable. The fact that he was now sending in millions by his war indemnities further enhanced his prestige at Paris.

The conduct of Victor Amadeus, King of Sardinia, corresponded exactly to Napoleon's expectations. Insufficiently supported by Austria, threatened by a revolutionary movement in his own country, and without any means of strength-

ening his position, he turned to the French and requested a truce as a preliminary to peace. This Bonaparte granted on condition that three fortresses were ceded as pledges, and that the French troops were granted free passage throughout Piedmont. On April 28th the treaty was signed and France was thereby rid of her Sardinian opponent. Napoleon then hastened in pursuit of the Austrians, who had meanwhile withdrawn from Piedmont into Lombardy and were awaiting the enemy in a strong position in the Lomellina. For Napoleon had concluded a truce with Colli in which, in order to mislead Beaulieu, he had stipulated for a passage of the river at Valenza. Now, however, he appeared where Beaulieu did not expect him; he had marched down the Po and avoided crossing it till he reached Piacenza. Here an Austrian corps under Liptay allowed the French vanguard to cross to the other bank unopposed, and soon the whole army followed. By the time Beaulieu heard of this step it was only with the greatest difficulty, and at the price of abandoning Milan, that he was able to reach Lodi and take up a position behind the Adda. But even this proved untenable. For on May 10th, the French columns arrived at Lodi and forced the passage of the river with incredible bravery, some crossing by the bridge under Napoleon's leadership, others fording the shallow river. The Austrians fled and scattered, nor did they rally till they were across the Mincio and had reached the sheltering walls of Mantua. Lombardy was conquered. On May 16th, Napoleon made his triumphal entry into Milan and Austria's suzerainty was replaced by the "Lombard Republic". Napoleon has left it on record that the fight on the bridge at Lodi marked a turning point in his life. "Neither the success in Vendémiaire," said he afterwards at St. Helena, "nor that at Montenotte caused me to consider myself anything special. It was only after Lodi that I felt I might henceforward play a decisive rôle on the political stage."

At Paris, however, the Government was watching the young general's triumphant progress with considerable misgiving. Without consulting Saliceti, the commissioner at-

tached to the Army of Italy, Bonaparte had arranged a truce with Piedmont, whereas the Government had intended to make this country a Republic. The Directory reluctantly ratified the treaty, and in May they concluded peace with King Victor Amadeus. But as a means of preventing any repetition of such high-handed action on the general's part, they ordered Kellermann, who was commander-in-chief of the Army of the Alps, to reinforce the Army of Italy with his troops, and in all future operations to divide the command with Bonaparte. The latter was to proceed against Tuscany, Rome, and Naples, and replenish the empty treasury in France, while Kellermann was to prosecute the war against the Austrians. All diplomatic affairs were to be conducted by Saliceti. This decree reached Napoleon after the victory at Lodi, and he was bitterly indignant. To him it was intolerable to yield up to another the fame and power he meant to win for himself. His ambition dictated a letter to which his shrewd mind gave tactful expression. "If you hamper me by all sorts of restrictions," he wrote the Directory on May 14th, 1796, "if all my steps are made dependent on the decisions of the Government commissioners, if they are authorized to alter my movements, to send me troops or withdraw them, then expect no further successes from me. . . . In the present state of affairs in Italy it is indispensable that you should possess a general in whom you have entire confidence. If I am not that one, I shall not complain; I shall labour with redoubled zeal to win your esteem in whatever post you entrust to me. Every man has his own way of carrying on a war. General Kellermann has more experience than I, and will do it better;[1] but the two of us together would only be a failure." To Carnot, who was at the head of military affairs, he wrote: "I can only be of use to you if you treat me with the same esteem as you did in Paris. It is a matter of indifference to me where I fight, whether here or elsewhere; to serve my country, to win a page from posterity in the history of the nation, to give the Government

[1] In the previous year Kellermann had been obliged to evacuate Voltri which was re-captured later by Scherer.

proof of my attachment and devotion, is all my ambition." [1] That was not so. Where he fought was not a matter of indifference to him. In the whole declaration only one statement is sincere, the appeal to posterity. Napoleon constantly kept the verdict of posterity in view and even in his last days he sought to influence it by a vast tissue of inventions and embellishments. "Human pride," he remarked to Madame de Rémusat when he was Consul, "creates a public of its own in an ideal world which it calls posterity. If it once succeeds in imagining that a hundred years hence a poem will celebrate some great deed, a picture immortalize it, then the imagination grows with what it feeds upon; the battlefield loses its terrors, the cannon booms in vain, its roar is only the sound of a hero's name a thousand years after, in the ears of posterity."

Whether or not the appeal was sincere, the fact remains that the Directory gave way. Kellermann was not a person of much consequence to them, whereas Bonaparte, with his faculty for levying requisitions, was almost indispensable, owing to the exhausted state of the finances. The order was repealed, the Directory merely expressing the wish that an expedition should be sent via Leghorn to Rome and Southern Italy before the march northwards was resumed. Henceforward Napoleon had a free hand in Italy to act as he thought fit. "The Commissioners of the Directory," said he to a friend, "have nothing to do interfering with my policy. I shall do what I want." [2] Yet he wisely observed the customary formalities, so as to avoid again rousing distrust at Paris. Napoleon's first consideration was to render Beaulieu powerless. At Pavia, however, he was detained for a couple of days by a rising of the peasantry, who had joined forces with the towns-folk and had compelled the French garrison to surrender. The place was now carried by storm, merciless punishments inflicted, and permission granted for a thirty-six hours' plundering of the inhabitants; the French commandant was court-martialled and shot. When he judged it

[1] "Corresp.," I. pp. 420, 421.

[2] Miot de Melito, "Mémoires," I. p. 86.

necessary, Napoleon never hesitated to be cruel, and at this juncture it was absolutely indispensable that he should be able to proceed without being threatened in his rear.

At this time the territory of the town of Venice extended as far west as the Lake of Como, and Brescia and Bergamo were Venetian provinces. Napoleon sent part of his troops to invade this territory, thereby threatening the Austrian general's retreat from the Mincio into the Tyrol. On May 30th, Napoleon forced the passage of the river at Borghetto and cut Beaulieu's army into two, one portion being driven back into Mantua, the other on to the Adige and towards the Tyrol. With the exception of the 13,000 troops occupying Mantua, not a single Austrian corps was now left on Italian soil.

This was a very considerable step towards the realization of Bonaparte's plan for advancing through the Tyrol on Bavaria, uniting there with Moreau when he advanced from the Rhine, and together dictating terms of peace to the Emperor. Moreau, however, had not crossed the Rhine, and the report ran that the enemy was preparing for fresh struggles. Napoleon, therefore, proceeded at once, in accordance with the Directory's wishes, to subjugate Austria's allies or at least to extort from them the heaviest indemnities possible. "Take everything out of Italy that can be transported, and that is of any use to us." So the Directory had written, and he followed their instructions to the letter. On May 9th he concluded a truce with the Duke of Parma, and on the 17th one with the Duke of Modena, by which they agreed to pay him several million francs, besides works of art and supplies of all kinds. In the list of articles requisitioned, paintings by the old masters are entered alongside cattle and corn.

After the victory on the Mincio, Naples likewise was forced to sign a treaty by which that State pledged itself to remain neutral and to withdraw its ships from the English fleet. Napoleon also received the ambassador of the Venetian Republic, and upbraided him with having surrendered Peschiera to the Austrians, although, as is evident from his letter to the Directory, he had accurate information that Beaulieu had

deceived the Venetians. He had just picked a little quarrel, so he wrote, as a means of getting 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 francs out of these wealthy merchants, and he could continue it if the Directory had further wishes in the matter. The Directory wished 12,000,000 francs, and this was procured in the form of a loan. Even so the Venetians had not prevented Napoleon from occupying Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago. Soon afterwards, on June 23rd, fearing lest these godless republicans should invade the Eternal City, the Papal Government purchased the right to be exempt from invasion till peace had been concluded, by ceding to France the legations of Ferrara and Bologna, and the important harbour of Ancona, by undertaking to keep the English fleet at a distance from the shores of the Papal States, by paying to the victors 20,000,000 francs in money, and handing over to them a large number of works of art and manuscripts. In these transactions it was no easy task for the representative who had to negotiate with the restless and excitable young commander-in-chief. "You have no idea of the insolence and haughtiness with which he received me," wrote the Spaniard Azara, who was conducting the negotiations for Rome and was friendly to France. "He vowed he would march upon the capital, and in his rage he tore up with his teeth a document he was holding. The Government commissioners had difficulty in pacifying him."[1] From Bologna, Napoleon crossed the Apennines to Leghorn where he levied extortionate requisitions of English wares, and then proceeded to Florence, where he called upon the Grand-Duke whose father, Leopold, had confirmed the Bonaparte patent of nobility when Carlo Bonaparte was applying for a free place for Napoleon at the École Militaire.

Napoleon, however, was very far from being allowed to

[1] *Vide* Carini's "Nuovi Documenti per la storia del tretato di Tolentino," quoted by du Teil in "Rome, Naples, et le Directoire" (p. 147). Miot de Melito, who saw Napoleon during these days, says of him, "His ardent nature expressed itself in quick and hasty movements, his broad thoughtful forehead bespoke the deep thinker, his manner of speech was curt and at this time very incorrect. For instance, in conversation he invariably confused the words 'armistice' and 'amnestie,' etc." ("Mémoires," I. p. 84).

enjoy his successes in peace. Austria, as we have seen, had the strongest reasons for seeking to save her possessions and her prestige in Italy, and she was now exerting herself to the utmost to reconquer her lost position. Wurmser, the general commanding the Austrian army on the Rhine, was ordered to the Tyrol to replace Beaulieu in the chief command, and, with the help of fresh troops, to advance to the relief of Mantua. Napoleon was well aware that a hard struggle lay before him, involving in its issue the maintenance of his own powerful position, and he took his measures accordingly. What the young general achieved here during the few following months against four relieving armies in succession forms one of the most brilliant pages in military history. The extraordinary results he obtained were no doubt due to the superiority of his fertile, resourceful genius, to his clear-sighted grasp of the possibilities, favourable or otherwise, of his ground, and to his appreciation of his enemy's strong points as well as weak ones, and merits as well as mistakes. Added to this, his watchfulness was incessant; eye and mind noted every detail, every phase of the action, and he made the utmost of his opportunities. Nor should it be forgotten that the generals who opposed him in the Italian campaign had been trained in the principles of the so-called "methodical" strategy, and like all generals under the old monarchies their armies being composed of costly mercenaries, they were bound to be as sparing as possible of the lives of their troops. Hence the aim of their strategy was manœuvres without bloodshed. The generals of the Revolution, on the other hand, with hundreds of thousands of national troops inflamed by a fanatical zeal for conquest and liberty, with recruits who cost nothing, and wars waged at the expense of foreign nations, did not need to subordinate their strategy to economic considerations, and aimed at decisive battles, no matter how many lives were sacrificed. Frederick the Great, whose writings Napoleon studied most carefully, had frequently preferred battles to manœuvres,—stern necessity and the pressure of his opponents' allied and superior forces having compelled him to do so. But there was one essential

in which his method of waging war differed from Bonaparte's. As has been very justly observed, he did not, like the latter, "have 10,000 men per month to spend". The merit of having organized the Revolutionary Armies belongs to Dubois de Crancé and to Carnot; Napoleon's merit lies in having developed with incomparable genius the principles of offensive tactics evolved by the Revolutionary Armies, whereby the old line tactics were replaced by swarms of skirmishers and attacking columns. The contrast between the young Republican general of twenty-seven, headstrong and daring, obeying only the dictates of his own inspiration, and the venerable Austrian commander of seventy-nine, dependent upon Emperor, Ministers, and the Aulic Council, left its mark only too plainly throughout the course of the next campaign.

In the end of July—much too late—the Austrians hurried down from the Tyrol. They had divided their army into two, one column, under Quosdanovich, skirting the Western bank of Lake Garda, the other under Wurmser following the course of the Adige. Their fighting force was about 5000 in excess of the French, who, including the troops besieging Mantua, only numbered 42,000. If they succeeded in their plan to surround Napoleon's army by combined and simultaneous action, its fate was sealed. The prospect was the more ominous for Napoleon as the Austrian troops had fought with conspicuous courage and steadiness in the first engagements. In the west the French were driven out of Brescia and forced back as far as Desenzano, while in the east the bulk of the army under Masséna was obliged to withdraw with heavy loss beyond the Mincio (July 29th and 30th). Napoleon fully realized his danger and thought of retreating beyond the Adda, but under the influence of Augereau's boastful assurance he risked an engagement, although in constant danger of being caught between two fires. His daring venture succeeded. With all his available troops he turned first upon Quosdanovich, defeated him at Lonato, after heavy fighting on August 3rd, and compelled him to retreat into the Tyrol. Then he turned upon Wurmser who, thinking to surround the enemy all the more securely, had delayed cross-

ing the Mincio till Goito, and was therefore powerless to succour Quosdanovich. He paid dearly for his mistake. On August 5th, Napoleon inflicted a crushing defeat upon him at Castiglione, leaving him only the road to the mountains free. Not till Trient was reached did the routed Austrians succeed in rallying. The French were now free to resume the blockade of Mantua.

These victories, however, had not secured any decisive results, and as Napoleon still aimed at co-operating through the Tyrol with the Rhine Army, the first thing necessary was to clear Wurmser from the path. The French troops had suffered severely during these last engagements, but once they had recovered, Napoleon intended to march on Trient, defeat the Austrians there and capture the road to Innsbrück. A conflict was immediate and inevitable, for Austria fully realized the importance of Mantua, whose possession was almost indispensable for the safety of her Italian territories. Accordingly, on August 19th, the Emperor Francis sent Wurmser peremptory orders to advance again to the relief of Mantua. Early in September Wurmser proceeded along the Brenta valley with one division of his army, while the other, under Davidovich, was to take up a position in the valley of the Adige and hold the French in check. By advancing westwards, after having relieved Mantua, Wurmser would thus be able to cut off the enemy's communications. But Napoleon saw through this plan and frustrated it at the start by marching into the Tyrol with the main body of his army and driving Davidovich back beyond Trient. Then, entering the Brenta valley, he overtook Wurmser by unrivalled forced marches and inflicted a crushing defeat upon him at Bassano on September 8th, 1796. After more fighting and much arduous exertion, the aged field-marshal with the remnants of his army succeeded in reaching the sheltering walls of Mantua. One division had effected its retreat eastwards behind the Isonzo. This expedition had cost Austria over a hundred cannon, all her munitions of war, and more than 10,000 troops.

From a military point of view it was a much greater success for Napoleon than the battle of Castiglione. It was

all the more effective coming as it did at a time when the advantages won in Germany by the armies under Moreau and Jourdan had again been lost. By withdrawing troops for the operations in Italy, Austria had weakened her army in Germany, and the young Archduke Charles, who had distinguished himself in the campaign in the Netherlands and now replaced Wurmser in the chief command, over-estimating the enemy's strength, judged it advisable to recross the Rhine. Thereupon Moreau, who had succeeded Pichegru in the chief command of the Army of the South, decided to cross the river and pursue the Austrians. He defeated the Archduke and drove him beyond the Danube. Jourdan advanced successfully against the second Austrian division under Wartensleben and invaded Franconia. Württemberg and Baden then concluded peace with France, while Saxony withdrew her troops and declared herself neutral. It looked as if the projected junction of the Republican Armies in the Tyrol for a united advance on Vienna was about to be realized. In the beginning of September, however, the Archduke Charles defeated Jourdan in a decisive battle at Würzburg, and thereby compelled him and Moreau to retreat from Southern Germany back to the Rhine. Austria had at least brilliantly retrieved the honour of her arms. Once more everything depended on Mantua, and this time not only for Austria but also for Bonaparte, whose co-operation with the army in Germany was henceforth out of the question. His independent position and his personal prestige now depended upon his ability to withstand the power of Austria, who at present regarded him alone as her real foe. "In Italy," the Directors wrote him, "we must find compensation for the defeats in Germany; there we must compel the Emperor to sign peace. Every day the conquest of Italy becomes more important for our interests; it depends on Mantua."

After his last victories Bonaparte again acted contrary to the wishes of the Directory, who had intended to restore Lombardy to Austria in return for Belgium and the Rhine frontier and so conclude peace. Instead of this, Bonaparte had stirred up the peoples of Northern Italy to revolt against

their hereditary rulers and to form national legions. Such were actually organized in Milan and Bologna. Thus, Bonaparte informed the Directors, he protected his rear and flank by making friends of the Italians. He now announced the peace with Modena, whose Duke was forced to flee, and in the middle of October the "Transpadane Republic" was founded at Bologna by representatives from the territories of Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara. Like the Lombard Republic it had its own administration. As the Duke of Modena was related to the Hapsburg dynasty, Austria's prestige now hung in the balance and she spared no efforts to save it. Extensive armaments were made, especially in Croatia and on the military frontiers, the imperial troops were reinforced by a levy *en masse* of the Tyrolese sharpshooters, and ere long Davidovich commanded an army of over 18,000 men in the Tyrol, while Quosdanovich had over 25,000 troops at his disposal in Friuli. The Commander-in-chief of these forces was the aged General Alvinczy, a brave soldier, but wedded to antiquated methods. It seemed as if Fate had ordained that this energetic and youthful genius should be confronted with the oldest of generals, and those who were the most inveterate slaves to tradition, so as to make his victories even outwardly the triumph of a new era.[1]

[1] In 1797 Bonaparte made the following remarks about his opponents: "My military successes are great; but think how the Emperor is served! His soldiers are good and brave, although somewhat heavy and slow in comparison with mine. But what officers! They are contemptible. The generals who were sent against me were incompetent. Beaulieu had not the faintest idea of the localities in Italy; Wurmser was deaf and interminably slow; Alvinczy quite incapable. They have been accused of accepting bribes from me, which is utterly false; I never even thought of such a thing. But I can prove that these three generals did not possess a single staff but what several of the principal officers were devoted to me and in my pay. In this way I not only knew of the plans they had decided upon, but of those still under consideration, and could frustrate them before they had finished discussing them" (Jung, "Bonaparte," III. 154). How far this harsh judgment is justified it is impossible to decide; there is certainly undisputed evidence of irregularities among the Austrian officers. Wimpffen, for instance, in his contemporary account of the campaign, leaves it an open question as to whether the enemy's information

The Austrians were again numerically superior on November 1st, when they began their advance from the Piave westwards under Alvinczy, and southwards under Davidovich, on Verona. The troops, however, were mostly young recruits who, like the Croatians, showed to advantage on the offensive but soon evinced a serious lack of staying power. At the outset the fighting was wholly unfavourable to Napoleon, who found himself again, as at Castiglione, in danger of being attacked simultaneously by both divisions of the enemy. At Caldiero on November 11th and 12th, Augereau and Masséna were defeated with a loss of nearly 3000 troops and driven back on Verona. Even this town Napoleon found himself compelled to evacuate, but although much depressed he rejected the idea of falling back on the Mincio, and devised instead a new and brilliant plan by means of which he caught Alvinczy in flank and rear. With almost incredible audacity he reduced the forces at Verona and those outside Mantua to a minimum, and marching out from Verona westwards he descended the course of the Adige by night at the head of all his available troops—about 20,000—and at Ronco crossed on to the east bank of the river so as to cut off the enemy's retreat at Villanova. But this proved no easy task.

At Arcole, on the little river Alpone, two battalions of Croatians under Colonel Brigido were posted so as to defend the bridge until reinforcements arrived. Everything depended upon Napoleon being able to effect the passage of the river and to capture the hamlet commanding the bridge before these reinforcements came up. But the successive assaults of the French were driven back by a murderous fire from the enemy who were under cover. Napoleon thereupon seized a flag and rushed on to the bridge with his suite. One

about Wurmser's plans was obtained by reconnoitring or treachery ("Streffleur's öst. Milit. Zeitschrift," 1889, 3, 191). Thiébault, "Mémoires," II. 31, decides in favour of the former so far as Alvinczy's strength and marching routes were concerned. Of this general Napoleon has elsewhere spoken with cordial recognition, declaring him to be the most capable of his opponents. (Cp. Chaptal, "Souvenirs," p. 301. Bray's "Erinnerungen," 159. *Vide*, also, Bailleu in the "Revue Napoléonienne," 1902, p. 49.)

of his adjutants, Muiron, was shot dead by his side, and several of his officers were wounded; but all in vain. A charge from the Austrians threw everything into confusion, and Napoleon, forced back by his fleeing troops, fell into a marsh and nearly lost his life. His aide-de-camp Marmont, and his brother Louis [1] had the greatest difficulty in extricating him from the morass and in hiding him from the pursuing enemy. Under cover of night, however, the French succeeded in regaining their position on the Adige (November 15th). Meanwhile the whole of Alvinczy's troops had concentrated at Arcole and on the two days following a fierce and long indecisive struggle raged round the village, but in the end, by sheer physical endurance, Napoleon's iron veterans wrested the victory from the brave Austrian recruits. The three days' battle at Arcole, from November 15th till 17th, 1796, ended in favour of the French. The dilatory Davidovich who did not arrive till the 17th, was immediately attacked and compelled to retreat into the Tyrol, while Wurmser, who had also started too late, fell back on Mantua. And so ended the third unsuccessful attempt to relieve Mantua.

Nevertheless Austria was determined to make a fourth effort, and not to abandon her advanced position in Italy till her strength was exhausted. Early in 1797 Alvinczy left the Tyrol, and once more advanced against the enemy. He himself had no expectation of success and was merely obeying his Emperor's commands. Yet on the plateau of Rivoli, on January 14th, an opportunity occurred which, wisely used, might have proved a decisive success. For the Austrian troops were already advancing victoriously when they were thrown into confusion by a cavalry attack and completely routed. A similar fate overtook a column under Provera marching from the Brenta to relieve Wurmser. It was defeated by Masséna's troops on their rapid advance from Rivoli, and so the fourth and last effort ended miserably. On February 3rd, Mantua fell, and Austria's predominance in Italy was at an end.

[1] According to another account the officers Belliard and Vignolle.

Thugut, a man of resolute will and great political ability, could scarcely believe it. Only two years previously, when Austria divided with Russia what was left of Poland, he had secured the political support of his northern neighbour for further conquests in Italy. But in November, 1796, Catherine II died, and her successor, the Czar Paul I, emphatically refused to assist Austria in her efforts at aggrandizement. Just then, too, England, her other ally, abandoned Corsica and withdrew her fleet from the Mediterranean, thereby greatly facilitating French operations in Italy, but making it correspondingly difficult for Austria to carry out her plans. And now, after all, the struggle had ended in a decisive defeat. Nevertheless, Thugut did not intend to give up the contest. "We are not yet at the end of our resources; we must simply pull ourselves together." So strongly did he believe this that early in 1797 he had declined an overture of peace from the Paris Directory, whose plenipotentiary, Clarke, had offered some Bavarian territory and Lombardy in exchange for Belgium and the Rhine. Even yet Thugut would not consent to negotiate; and he now intended to withdraw all the troops from the Rhine and to concentrate in Italy—an excellent step had it been taken a year earlier. The Archduke Charles, who had been victorious in the previous year, was to be appointed to the chief command of the Italian Army; and reinforced by the troops from the Rhine, he was to advance from the Tyrol southwards and make a bold effort to check Bonaparte's progress and prevent him marching on Vienna. Such a plan required prompt and vigorous execution, and the reverse happened. Moved by the entreaties of his consort, who sued for peace at the instance of her mother, the Queen of Naples, and prejudiced against Thugut (who was a self-made man) by the high Tory party, the Emperor hesitated for weeks before deciding to continue the war. By that time the great body of the troops were no longer in the Tyrol, but in Friuli whither they had retreated after the battle of Rivoli, and where they had remained on account of food supplies being easily obtainable. Unfortunately, however, as the communications between Friuli and the Tyrol, through

the Val Sugana, had been cut by the enemy, it took the reinforcements from the Rhine several weeks longer to reach their destination; and so it happened that they were still on the road when the French began operations in the first fortnight of March, 1797.

Bonaparte had likewise been unable to resume hostilities immediately after the fall of Mantua. His army had suffered severely and large reinforcements from the Rhine and the Sambre were necessary before any new and daring enterprise could be undertaken. He turned the intervening time to account by a move against Rome. Pope Pius VI had refused the Directory's proposals of peace because they encroached upon the jurisdiction of the Church in demanding recognition of the civil constitution of the clergy in France, the suppression of the Romish Inquisition, and other similar concessions. In accordance with an agreement come to with Austria, Pius had not paid the millions of indemnity promised to France within the time specified. But the fall of Mantua ruined the Pope's plans, and on February 1st, 1797, Napoleon declared war against him. With a mere handful of troops he drove back the Papal soldiers, who proved unspeakable cowards, and cut a path for himself through the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino as far as Ancona. Lannes, who commanded the advance-guard, compelled thousands of the enemy to surrender, though the French losses were insignificant. One day, when accompanied only by a few officers, he encountered some hundred Papal cavaliers, whom he ordered to dismount and disarm. Completely nonplussed, they obeyed! Napoleon assured the prisoners of his good will and sent them home, as a result of which all the towns from Faenza to Fano opened their gates to him. In vain the monks exhorted the Papal soldiers to stand firm, and all the images of the Madonna averted their eyes in wrath against the French—the Pope's army was not a whit the braver and the fall of Rome seemed imminent. But such was not Napoleon's purpose. To have threatened the capital would have compelled the Pope to take flight, and so have prolonged the war, which after all was only a mere episode in the larger struggle which

Napoleon wished to bring to a successful finish as speedily as possible. As he said afterwards to Chaptal: "The taking of Rome in that campaign would have cost me twenty days and would have been a corresponding gain to the Archduke". Here again Napoleon's political insight stood him in good stead and prevented him falling into the same error as the Directory in underestimating the political importance of the Church. Instead of striking at the very heart of Catholicism, as the Directory wished him to do, he left the Pope a free hand in all religious matters, refrained from threatening Rome, and at Tolentino on February 19th, 1797, he concluded a peace by which he obtained important advantages both material and political, viz. the Pope pledged himself to refrain from all alliances against the French, to close his harbours to the English, to cede to France the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, and the valuable port of Ancona, and to pay 14,000,000 francs in addition to the 16,000,000 still owing. Among other things Napoleon had requested the banishment of Cardinal Albani, the leader of the anti-French party, but Cardinal Mattei, the Papal negotiator, throwing himself at his feet, pleaded with him till he consented to withdraw this humiliating condition. What food for this young victor's boundless self-confidence to see the Pope's ambassador prostrate before him! Shortly before this, Carnot had written to Napoleon: "Your fame is that of the whole nation. You are the hero of all France." Assuredly such incidents as these are responsible in no small degree for inflating this man's ambition to an abnormal pitch.

Once more Napoleon had carried out his own plans contrary to the intentions of the Directory. It was evident that his designs in Italy differed from those of the Government at Paris. We find him on one occasion defending himself from the accusation that he wanted to be made Duke of Milan, or even King. It is quite possible that he had thought of such a thing and had in consequence sought a *modus vivendi* with the Pope, but it is more probable he was even then looking forward with confidence to the prospect of some day ruling France, and wielding his sceptre from a firmer foundation and

over a wider field than the Directory had ever obtained. Carnot foresaw in him "a second Cæsar who would not hesitate to cross the Rubicon as soon as the occasion offered". As a matter of fact, very little of the wealth raised by these vast requisitions in Italy was ever at the Government's disposal or contributed towards the support of the other French armies. On the contrary, Napoleon was not ill-pleased when his generals sought their share of the booty, as he thereby secured their loyalty to himself. The treasure thus obtained was secretly conveyed to Switzerland. Afterwards, at St. Helena, Napoleon declared that he himself took a great deal of money out of Italy at this time.[1]

When Bonaparte reached Ancona, its proximity to Turkey made a deep impression on him. "In twenty-four hours," he wrote to Paris, "you can cross from here to Macedonia. This port is invaluable for our influence on the fate of the Ottoman Empire." The image of Alexander the Great was probably in his mind and had fired him with the idea of the conquest of the East. He was still under the spell of this idea when he went to Egypt, and it was not until he returned to France after that expedition, to found his Empire in the West, that the image of Charlemagne displaced that of the great Macedonian as his model.

Napoleon differed from his immediate predecessors in the system of conquest initiated by the Revolution—from the doctrinaire Girondists with their ideal of universal liberty, and from the Directory with their fruitless agitations—in that he founded his ambitious schemes on the firm ground of historical fact and shaped them according to a policy with a clearly defined aim. But it was his inability to shake off the thrall of the Revolution that ultimately proved his ruin.[2]

[1] Gourgaud, "Journal inédit," I., 468.

[2] Just at the time when his Italian victories were following one another in rapid succession, Mallet du Pan sent these remarkable lines to the Vienna Court: "Those who think that the 'imperishable Republic' will collapse some day are certainly right; but if they think that the rest of Europe will then be safe, and that black will suddenly become white, they are wrong. *The present Republic might easily be succeeded by another Republic under either a Dictator or a Monarch. Who knows? In twenty*

Napoleon's fame as a general was firmly established by the campaign of 1796. He had even eclipsed the much admired Hoche. But well he knew that the French nation cared far less for new victories than for peace, and that the Directory had roused both hatred and opposition by their war policy. The elections for renewing a third of the Council of the Five Hundred were at hand, and there was no doubt but that the candidates chosen would be Conservatives in favour of peace, and that a majority would thus be created hostile to the Directors. Bonaparte knew that if he succeeded in arranging with Austria the preliminaries of a peace favourable to France he would not only win the favour of the populace, who had not yet forgotten the 13th Vendémiaire, but would also confer an obligation upon the Directors who with such a treaty in their possession could then await the result of the elections with equanimity. Moreover, he understood the high value Austria set on her position in Italy, he knew that she would not let herself be thrust out of her territories there without further resistance, and that she had long been aiming at the conquest of Venice.[1] He therefore determined to use the first opportunity of offering the Emperor Francis the territory of St. Mark with its dependencies in Istria and Dalmatia, in exchange for Lombardy and Belgium. The fact that his doing so involved the destruction of an inde-

years a nation in a state of unrest might mould a Revolution of this kind into a hundred different forms." Mallet du Pan was far from suspecting that the "Revolutionary Monarch" would be the very man to whom he alluded so scornfully as "this Bonaparte, this little puppet, with his dishevelled locks, whom the parliamentary orators describe as a 'young hero,' 'the conqueror of Italy'. He will soon have to pay for his montebank tricks, his misconduct, thefts, fusillades, and shameless lampoons; for the proclamations issued by the Directory in his praise are not meant to be taken seriously. There were even some wished the 'young hero' sent to the Place de la Revolution to get five and twenty bullets through his head. But being Barras' friend he escaped the chastisement his folly deserved." ("Correspondance inédite" etc., II. 86, 129).

[1] Sorel, v. 144, justly remarks that there is no proof of this surmise. Nevertheless as Delacroix, the Foreign Minister, knew of Austria's wish to possess Venice, it is probable Bonaparte also knew of it, possibly through Clarke, the negotiator for the Directory.

pendent neutral State was no obstacle to one who pursued his own ends relentlessly, wholly regardless of others. Had not Poland been treated precisely in this manner by the old legitimate monarchies? This plan was evidently engrossing his thoughts when the new campaign of 1797 began, and hence it was of paramount importance for him that Austria should be reduced as speedily as possible to such a state as would make his offer acceptable, and so enable him to reap his laurels before the armies of the Rhine under Hoche and Moreau had time to dispute them.

In the beginning of March, Bernadotte arrived with the reinforcements for the French army while those for the Austrian army were still far distant. Napoleon immediately resumed hostilities. Three small divisions, 20,000 strong, under General Joubert, were sent into the Tyrol to cut the communications of the 15,000 Austrians stationed there and at the same time to protect the French flank. Napoleon in person with other four divisions, numbering over 40,000 troops, undertook the campaign which was to win the peace. On March 10th, he swept aside the Austrian vanguard posted on the Piave and hastened on to the Tagliamento behind which the Archduke Charles had drawn up the main body of his army. The Austrians fell back before this superior force, but instead of moving northwards on Pontebba they withdrew eastwards behind the Isonzo, where they meant to await their reinforcements from the Rhine. Owing to the direction in which his adversary was retreating Napoleon feared lest the Austrians were secretly planning to co-operate with their Army of the Rhine, and by a powerful diversion in the Tyrol to attack him in rear. He therefore urgently begged the Directory to make Hoche and Moreau advance. But his fears were groundless. The Austrians were unable to maintain their position on the Isonzo. The Pontebba pass was inadequately defended, and on March 23rd, Tarvis and Villach fell into Masséna's hands, thereby cutting off the communication with the Puster valley through which the ardently desired reinforcements were to have come. By his prompt and energetic action Masséna had frustrated the designs of

the Archduke, who had hoped at Tarvis to defeat successively the French divisions under Masséna and Guieus as they advanced through the Fella valley, and thereafter to obstruct Napoleon's retreat. But for the present any serious resistance to the French was out of the question. In these few days the Austrian losses, especially in prisoners, had been enormous, and the remaining troops—barely 15,000—were led by the Archduke Charles, first to Klagenfurt, and then northwards along the high road to Vienna. Napoleon judged the moment had now come to propose negotiations for peace; and at Klagenfurt on March 31st, he wrote the Archduke a letter which he himself describes as "philosophical". In it he alludes to the Directory's attempt, which had been frustrated by England, to conclude peace with Austria: "Is there no hope of us coming to an understanding, and must we continue to slaughter one another for the sake of the interests and passions of a nation far removed from the evils of war? I appeal to you, Commander-in-Chief, placed by birth so near the Throne and far above the petty passions that so often animate Ministers and Governments, are you resolved to earn the title of benefactor of humanity and true saviour of Germany? As for myself, if the overtures which I herewith have the honour of making, should be the means of saving a single life, I would be prouder of the civic crown thereby earned than of the sorrowful glory that is the reward of military success." In order to give these words the proper emphasis Masséna was sent to capture the passes at Neumarkt whereby far more than a "single life" was lost, and to advance through the Mur valley as far as St. Michael and Leoben till he had cut the enemy's last communications with the west. On April 7th, Masséna completed his task and entered Leoben. To have advanced farther was not desirable. Napoleon knew that in his rear the Venetian peasantry were revolting, that the Pope was again proving fractious, that the brave Tyrolese peasantry were banding together and might harass his troops while he himself was still isolated, without supplies from France, and in the heart of a vigorous and hostile monarchy. He would not consent to a truce as

the Austrians wished, for that would have allowed them time to develop their resources and in the end would have robbed him of the prestige of peace-maker. Hence he was resolved on peace and on concluding it as speedily as possible. He blamed the Directory for Moreau not having yet crossed the Rhine, although he knew Hoche was even then preparing to do so, but he assured them that the terms of the peace would certainly be more favourable than those obtained by Clarke during the winter.[1]

The Archduke Charles had immediately communicated Napoleon's letter to Thugut who, however, was unwilling, without a military force to support him, to enter into negotiations with a general who had possibly advanced farther than was prudent. Hence, thousands of volunteers were enrolled, the Hungarian Militia called out, and preparations made for the defence of Vienna, before Thugut sent his plenipotentiaries to Leoben. There in the Castle of Göss, Napoleon's headquarters, the negotiations began. General Merveldt and the Marquis di Gallo represented Austria; Napoleon, France. Napoleon led off by playing his trump card—the State of Venice in exchange for Milan and Belgium. The offer produced an immense sensation at Vienna. Badgered by the Court party and the nobility, who were clamorous for peace, unsupported by Russia, hoping against hope that England would send her fleet into the Adriatic and increase her subsidies, and convinced that Prussia was scheming for her own aggrandizement, Thugut reluctantly accepted the terms offered. The acquisition of a territory so long and so ardently coveted seemed to him to compensate somewhat for other losses. Austria would still possess some territory in Italy, and if a favourable opportunity presented itself she might yet regain her lost ascendancy. When he inquired how this

[1] *Vide* also the letter to the Directory of April 30th, 1797. "Corr.," III. 1756. The grand plan of marching through Bavaria and Salzburg on Vienna, had been frustrated by Moreau's inactivity. Hoche alone was able to move out, but, thinking the campaign lost, he was afraid that the two armies might be defeated one after the other. The peace restored the balance of military power in Germany and robbed the peoples of Hungary and Austria of a pretext for rising.

promised territory was to be obtained, Napoleon immediately replied that he would take advantage of a dispute with the Republic to get possession of its land and thereafter hand it over to the Emperor.[1]

But when Napoleon demanded the cession of Modena, the negotiations became more difficult. It was evident he wished to confine the influence of the Emperor Francis in Central Italy within clearly defined limits, making the Oglio, or if possible the Adige, the boundary line, so as to prevent Austria's territory adjoining Tuscany. Thugut, on the other hand, endeavoured to retain Modena for its prince and through him for the House of Hapsburg, and to confine the French sphere of influence in Italy within a line running from Lake Iseo along the Oglio to the Po, and then following the Enza valley to the shores of Massa and Carrara, so as to exclude the Republic from the peninsula proper. The diplomatic struggle ended unfavourably for Austria. Modena became and remained Republican; the Duke being promised compensation later. On April 18th, 1797, peace was signed in the Eggenwald Garden at Leoben. It was only a preliminary treaty—Napoleon had yielded so far to Thugut's wishes—and while it contained the fundamental points of an agreement, various items were subject to modification in further negotiations. According to its articles, the Austrian territory of Milan and the Duchy of Modena were to be ceded to the new Lombard Republic; Belgium was to be handed over to France, whose so-called "constitutional" frontiers, as defined by the Constitution of 1795,[2] were to be recognized; Austria

[1] The following passage occurs in Thugut's instructions of April 15th: "If, as already indicated, they offer you a portion of Venetian territory you must represent to them that the Emperor could not accept indemnifications of this kind before they actually belong to France" (Hüffer, "Diplomatische Verhandlungen," I. 245). Napoleon was therefore wrong when he wrote to the Directory on April 16th, representing Austria as the one who was making requests and asking part of the territory of Venice in exchange for Milan. He offered, the other accepted; and neither party comes well out of this disgraceful transaction ("Corr.," II. 1735).

[2] Not the Rhine frontier. The integrity of the German Empire was one of the fundamental points of the agreement.

was to acquire the territory of Venice as far as the Oglio, with its dependencies Istria and Dalmatia on the eastern shore of the Adriatic; while the Republic of St. Mark was to receive as compensation the three former Papal legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna. There was to be a six months' truce during which the peace was to be negotiated, and concluded within three months.

While Napoleon was signing his name to the treaty which brought hostilities to an end, Hoche had won a momentous victory on the Rhine over the Austrians and had penetrated far into Germany. But his success came too late. Bonaparte had rendered it superfluous, provided the Directory was willing to ratify a treaty which he had no real authority for concluding. On April 19th, he sent to Paris a detailed letter justifying his action. He declared that as soon as he saw how serious the negotiations were likely to prove, he sent off a courier to Milan for General Clarke, the diplomatic plenipotentiary appointed by the Directory; but as ten days elapsed without the latter putting in an appearance, and as there was a danger of letting slip the favourable moment, he had been obliged to set aside all scruples and to act independently. He had been allowed full power, however, in all military affairs, and as matters then stood these preliminaries for peace with the Emperor had simply become a military operation.[1] Moreover, in a letter of April 22nd, he stated that the preliminaries were only the first draft of an agreement between the two Powers, and that in the final peace any alterations could be made in accordance with the wishes of

[1] "Corr.," II. 1745. In the passage "Vous m'avez donné plein pouvoir sur toutes les opérations diplomatiques; et dans la position des choses, les préliminaires de la paix, même avec l'Empereur, sont devenues, une opération militaire," the word "diplomatiques" should be "militaires," otherwise there is as little meaning in the sentence as there is point in the "scruples," and sending for Clarke. Hüffer in his "Diplomatische Verhandlung" (I. p. 255), translates the passage, "You have given me full power for all diplomatic affairs," but this version is not warranted by the French text. Hüffer himself, on p. 244, quotes Merveldt's despatch of April 15th, according to which Bonaparte did not possess the requisite authority.

the Directory. In this way he hoped to make the contents of his agreement more palatable to the Directors who considered the "constitutional" frontiers insufficient, and would have liked the Rhine as boundary. Barras, Rewbell, and Larevellière, the ruling majority in the Directory, were highly indignant but did not venture to remonstrate, as Bonaparte had immediately offered to resign, alleging that he wished to return to France and go in for a political career—which was the last thing they wanted. On April 10th, the result of the elections had been wholly in favour of the Opposition, and so afforded an invaluable opportunity to a popular and victorious general who had brought peace back with him. As it would have been highly impolitic to have driven Bonaparte into the Opposition camp, the Directory ratified his treaty, making only one stipulation, that he should abandon further proceedings against Venice, as the projected measure ran counter to the principles of the Sovereignty of the People, and the Emperor Francis was quite strong enough to obtain possession of the territory for himself. But the advice came too late. A week previously, on May 2nd, Napoleon had declared war against the "City of Lagoons". He had not deemed it necessary to inform the Directory that he had taken upon himself at Leoben to obtain the territory of Venice for Austria, and for this purpose was to commence hostilities against the Republic of St. Mark immediately on the conclusion of the treaty.

He had long had an excuse in readiness. In spite of his assurances to the contrary, it may safely be assumed that before invading Austria, Napoleon had organized a democratic revolution in the Venetian towns against the old aristocratic regime. Such an intention had existed in Robespierre's time, and Napoleon could scarcely fail to be aware of it.[1] The fact remains that the "Patriots" rose, but with the un-

[1] A Venetian emissary who had been sent to Paris, wrote home after a conversation with Robespierre on June 6th, 1794: "They will not attack Venice direct. Their plan seems to be to stir up agitations which would furnish them with a pretext for intervention." (Romanin, "Storia documentata di Venezia," IX. p. 521).

expected result that the peasant population, who were friendly to the Government, turned against the insurgents and killed a number of French soldiers who had openly taken part in the rising. During Easter of 1797, there was a counter-revolution in Verona which cost both Democrats and Frenchmen their lives and was only suppressed by the energetic intervention of the French garrison. Shortly afterwards a fight broke out in the harbour of Venice between a French and a Venetian man-of-war, in which the captain of the former vessel was shot. Thereupon Bonaparte sent a declaration of war to the Doge. A democratic movement in Venice, openly abetted by the French chargé d'affaires, helped to bring matters to a crisis. On May 15th the "Grand Council" was forced to resign and the "Patriots" substituted for it a provisional Government, which at once disbanded such troops as the Government still had at its disposal, and concluded an agreement with Napoleon, in virtue of which he undertook in return for a payment of 6,000,000 francs, and a number of war ships, paintings, and valuable manuscripts, to grant the Republic the protection of his troops (May 16th, 1797). How insincere he was in assuming the rôle of protector, is shown by the fact that shortly afterwards he offered the town of Venice to the Marquis di Gallo, whom Thugut had sent to Milan to conduct the negotiations for the final peace, provided he would withdraw the Austrian frontier from the Oglio to the Adige. (May 24th, 1797).[1] In order that the Venetians might suspect nothing he wrote two days later to the new Municipality: "In any case I shall do my utmost to convince you how greatly I desire to see your liberty confirmed and to see unhappy Italy once more free, glorious, and independent of foreign influence, playing her part on the world's stage and resuming the rank among the great nations to which she is entitled by her nature, position, and destiny". In direct

[1] Sorel, v. 157, says that Gallo had insinuated in these discussions that the Emperor would acquiesce in France's encroachments in Germany in return for the cession of Venice. But so far as one can see it is difficult to prove Austria's initiative in the matter, while Napoleon's attitude throughout the whole transaction is dubious.

contradiction to this on the following day he wrote in a memorandum to the Directory: "Venice has been steadily going down since the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the rise of Trieste and Ancona, and it will be difficult for her to recover from the blows we have just dealt her. With her shiftless, idle population, destitute of any capacity for liberty, without land or rivers, it seems quite natural that we should hand her over to those to whom we have given the main land. We shall seize all the vessels, clear out the Arsenal, carry off the cannon, and lay the Bank in ruins. Corfu and Ancona we shall reserve for ourselves."[1] Thus despoiled and defenceless, the proud city was to be handed over to Austria.

It was doubtful, however, whether the Court of Vienna, despite its desire to obtain the Papal Legations, would accept Napoleon's new proposals. Meanwhile events at Paris were assuming an aspect which affected Bonaparte's attitude and consequently reacted upon foreign affairs. The new elections in France in April, 1797, as already mentioned, had proved very unfavourable to the Directory, the Moderates being in the majority both in the Council of the Five Hundred and in that of the Ancients. A new Director had to be elected at the same time. The vote fell to Barthélemy and he and Carnot (also a Moderate) formed a Conservative minority in opposition to Barras, Rewbell, and Larévellière. The Jacobin or Democratic elements, who advocated the "natural frontiers" and were therefore prepared to wage war indefinitely, dominated the Directory while the legislature was controlled by the Conservatives and Royalists, the peace party who were in favour of the "old frontiers," the Moderate Republicans, the Liberal Monarchists who looked forward to the King's return as a constitutional monarch, and the reactionary members of the old regime. Each day the antagonism grew keener till a conflict became inevitable. One day the Opposition would attack the wretched financial policy of the Government, which still clung to its existence, despite a double bankruptcy; another day it would denounce its treatment of priests and emigrants, or its colonial administration,

[1] "Corresp.," III. 1832, 1836.

its commercial policy or its foreign policy, which was constantly assuming more and more the character of a revolutionary propaganda with the manifest aim of making Europe republican. The Directory was accused of pursuing their interminable wars because they were unable to support the troops at home. The suicide of some naval officers, whom hunger had driven to despair, created an immense sensation. The proceedings in Italy were severely criticized, especially the treatment of Venice. The Directory was blamed by the right wing of the Opposition for allowing declarations of war to be made without the consent of the Chambers, as required by the Constitution, and for interfering, also contrary to law, in the internal administration of foreign States, thus systematically frustrating a definite settlement of peace.

Aware that he was among those aimed at in this adverse criticism, and that he had as little to expect from a restoration of the legitimate monarch as from the "old frontiers" party, who would have made short work of his powerful position in Italy, Bonaparte took up the challenge and defended the majority in the Directory against the majority in the Chambers.[1] On July 14th, the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, he issued a manifesto to his army which was a virtual declaration of war against his political opponents. "Soldiers," said he, "I know you are deeply distressed by the misfortunes threatening our country. Yet it runs no real danger! The men who have helped it to triumph over the allied nations of Europe are at hand. You would cross the mountains which divide us from France with the swiftness of the eagle, should need be, to maintain the Constitution, to defend liberty, to protect the Government and the Republicans. Soldiers! the Government watches over the laws entrusted to its keeping. The Royalists have only to show themselves and their lives are forfeit. Let us banish our fears and swear by the spirits of the heroes who have fallen at our sides in the fight for liberty, let us swear on our new

[1] "For my part," said he to Miot de Melito, "I shall certainly not play the rôle of Monk, nor shall I allow others to do it" (Miot, "Mémoires," I. p. 184).

standards, implacable war to the enemies of the Republic and of the Constitution of the year III!" This appeal found an echo in all the French garrisons in Italy, and the various divisions sent up loyal addresses to the Directory, assuring them of their Republican sentiments. In addition to this Napoleon drew up several papers, justifying his policy towards Vienna, very ably written, but utterly false. In one of these he warned the orators of the Opposition in the Chambers: "I prophesy, and I speak in the name of 80,000 men, the time is past when cowardly lawyers and contemptible babblers could send soldiers to the guillotine. If you drive them to it, the soldiers of Italy and their general will appear at the *barrière de Clichy*, and then woe betide you!"[1] Napoleon was not a man to rest satisfied with words alone. He despatched one of his generals, Augereau, to Paris with the addresses from the troops, and placed him at the disposal of Barras and his two colleagues for their protection. Bernadotte was also sent to the capital with a number of flags captured in battle to assure the Government of the homage of the army of Italy. Immediately on his arrival Augereau was appointed to the command of the Army of the Interior.

Napoleon rendered the three Directors yet another service.

[1] The Royalist Club held its meetings in the Rue de Clichy. In the National Archives at Paris there is a draft in Napoleon's handwriting of a Memorial entitled, "Note on the Events in Venice," reprinted in the "Corr.," III. 1971. It is not dated, but probably belongs to this period, June, 1797, as Bonaparte sent a Memoir to the President of the Directory complaining of a speech by Deputy Dumolard, in which he says: "I repeat, citizen, my request and my resignation. I require rest, provided that the daggers of Clichy spare my life" ("Corr.," III. 1970). On July 15th, he wrote to the Directors, "I cannot remain insensible to the aspersions and slanders spread abroad daily and on every opportunity by eighty newspapers without a single one rebutting them. . . . I see that the Clichy Club means to pass over my dead body and proceed to the destruction of the Republic. Are there no longer any Republicans in France? . . . . By a single blow you could save the Republic and conclude peace within twenty-four hours. Arrest the emigrants, destroy the influence of foreigners, and if you require force, summon the armies. Destroy the printing-presses of the newspapers in the pay of England." ("Corr.," III. 2014.)

At Trieste, Count d'Antraigues, one of the principal Bourbon agents, had fallen into the hands of the French. He was sent to the headquarters at Milan, and there in his pocket-book they found an account of a conversation with another agent—Montgaillard—which contained evidence of General Pichegru's relations with the Bourbon Prince Condé in 1795. These revelations were all the more valuable at that time as Pichegru had become one of the leaders of the majority and was President of the "Five Hundred". Whether by promises or by threats, Napoleon contrived to make d'Antraigues write down these communications, and before long the document found its way to Paris, where it furnished the three Directors with an excellent pretext for a *coup d'état* by means of which—supported by Augereau—they rid themselves of their two colleagues, Carnot and Barthélemy, and a considerable number of Conservative Deputies (September 4th, 1797). Carnot escaped, but Barthélemy was arrested along with fifty-five deputies and a large number of journalists. The vacant places in the Directory were given to two men of pronounced Democratic views, Merlin de Douai and François de Neufchâteau. The venture had been a complete success. As justification for it, Pichegru's so-called treason was made public. But the real victor on the 18th Fructidor, as on the 13th Vendémiaire, was Bonaparte. In a bulletin of September 22nd, the anniversary of the foundation of the Republic, he openly claimed the victory for himself and his army. "Soldiers," so runs one passage, "chains had been prepared for you; you knew it; you spoke. The nation was roused; it seized the traitors, and already they are in fetters."

He stood higher in favour with the Government than ever. Augereau, who had been a mere tool, but who imagined himself the leading factor in the *coup d'état* was appointed to the chief command of the Army of the Rhine and so removed from the political arena. Hoche, Napoleon's only serious rival, died about this time from rapid consumption, Pichegru was under a cloud, while Moreau, who was aware of the latter's connexion with the Bourbons, but had kept silence till after the *coup d'état*, was now under suspicion and deprived

of his command. The Royalists were defeated, the Moderates condemned to inactivity, and the new Directory, being under obligations to the general, was careful to avoid thwarting him. "I have been blamed for favouring the *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor," said Napoleon to Madame de Rémusat some years later, "which is practically blaming me for supporting the Revolution. It was necessary to turn the Revolution to account and to reap some advantage from all the lives that had been sacrificed for it. And how was that to be done? By surrendering voluntarily and unconditionally to the Bourbons, who would constantly have taunted us with our ill-luck since their expulsion, and have closed our mouths by alleging the necessity of recalling them? By exchanging our victorious banners for their white one which did not recoil even from appearing on the battle-field among those of the enemy? By contenting myself with a few million francs and the title of Duke?[1] Monk's part indeed is not a difficult one to play. It would have cost me far less trouble than the Egyptian campaign or even the 18th Brumaire. I could certainly have found means to dethrone the Bourbons a second time had it been necessary, and the best advice which could have been given them, would have been to get rid of me." This admission is fully borne out by those who watched him closely during that year. One of his old friends, Sucy, the Commissioner of War, wrote in August, 1797, "there is no halting place for Bonaparte, he will either end on the throne or the scaffold". Count d'Antraigues says in a note dated September of the same year: "This man means to conquer France, and through France, Europe. If there were a King in France and he not that King, he would wish to have raised him to the throne and maintained him there at the point of his sword, which he would never lay aside so that he

[1] Like Pichegru, Bonaparte had been approached by Bourbon agents. In December, 1796, in the event of his declaring himself in favour of the hereditary monarchy, he had been promised the Dukedom of Milan and the baton of a marshal of France. Those short-sighted schemers had not the faintest suspicion that what they were offering had long ago ceased to satisfy Napoleon's ambition.

might thrust it into his Sovereign's heart the moment he ceased to do his bidding."

Now that he stood without a rival, Napoleon did not trouble much to conceal the fact that he was aiming high. Even outwardly his conduct bore the stamp of independent power. At the castle of Mombello, near Milan, he held a court like a prince, and received the ambassadors from Austria, Naples and Piedmont, as if he were one. He even had his meals served in public like a monarch of olden times, a spectacle for the curious. Here, too, he had been rejoined by Josephine and most of the Bonaparte family. The stern and bitter privations of the time at Marseilles were already things of the remote past, for after Vendémiaire, as soon as Napoleon had reached an influential position, he had made prompt and ample provision for all the family, and now they were witnesses and participators in his power and glory. Laetitia was there with her three daughters, Elise, who had been at school at St. Cyr, Pauline, and Caroline, then a girl of fifteen. For her daughter-in-law, Josephine, Laetitia had an unconquerable aversion, shared by Elise and the brothers, and it was the beginning of those family feuds between the Beauharnais and the Bonapartes which lasted for long years and threw its shadow even across the events of the political world. Elise, who was rather plain-looking, was married early to a Captain Bacciocchi. Pauline, then seventeen years of age, a beautiful creature, whose exquisite face and form were afterwards immortalized by Canova, was now married to Leclerc, a capable officer and a member of Napoleon's general staff. Joseph, who had lately returned from a mission to Paris, was a man of gentle and amiable character, keeping his ambitions generally to himself. He had turned his brother's glory to his own advantage and had been appointed by the Directory Ambassador to Rome. The turbulent Lucien was absent as War Commissioner in Corsica, where he was endeavouring to secure what remained of the family fortunes. Louis, who had served with spirit under Napoleon in the late campaign, was suffering from an ailment the depressing effects of which

remained with him all his life. Jerôme, then a boy of thirteen, was also there. Nor was Uncle Fesch far away. His holy orders had been laid aside for the time being, and he was now exclusively absorbed in the lucrative task of purveying for the army. Among those other than relatives who were closely associated with Napoleon here, were Berthier, chief of the general staff, Monge and various savants, Marmont and Junot, his adjutants, Bourrienne, his secretary, and often also Regnault de St. Jean d'Angély, who edited a very well-written French newspaper, published at Milan, which served as a sort of official chronicle of Napoleon's doings. Besides these, who were all more or less on terms of intimacy, there was also a large number of generals and officers, members of the titled families in the neighbourhood, and dignitaries of the new Lombard Republic, who looked up to Bonaparte as their chief.

Miot de Melito, a diplomatist who represented France worthily in Florence, Rome, and Turin, relates in his memoirs an interesting conversation he and Prince Melzi, a Milanese nobleman, had with Napoleon, in which the latter was surprisingly frank about his plans. "What I have done hitherto is nothing," said Napoleon, "I am only at the beginning of my career. Do you think I have been winning victories in Italy merely to enhance the authority of the lawyers in the Directory—Barras and Carnot?" (This conversation took place before Fructidor.) "Or do you think it has been to found the Republic more securely? A Republic of 30,000,000 beings! with our morals and our vices! How should that be possible? That is a chimera which has taken possession of the French, but it will pass away like many others. What they want is glory, the satisfaction of their vanity. As for liberty, they know nothing about it. Look at the army—our victories have already brought out the true character of the French soldier. I am everything to him, and if the Directory were to deprive me of the command it would soon see who is master. The nation wants a chief, a supreme head covered with glory, but it does not want theories of government, fine phrases, and the discours-

ings of '*ideologues*,' none of which the French understand. Men must have playthings; for these please and interest them and they willingly submit to be guided, provided you are careful whither you are leading them. . . . I would only leave Italy to play a rôle in France similar to what I play here, but the time has not yet come—'*la poire n'est pas mûre*'. Till then we must stick to the republicans. The peace (with Austria) which is necessary to satisfy the gaping Parisians, I myself shall conclude. Were I to leave that task to another it would raise him far higher in public opinion than all my victories would me."

In short, he was counting on being master of France and probably was already regretting that he had placed Augereau so unreservedly at the Directors' disposal in Paris, thereby making their position the more secure.[1] For the time being his immediate concern was to retain his authority in Italy untrammelled by restrictions from the Paris Government. After their victory in Fructidor, at the time he was negotiating the final peace, they had attempted to force upon him their democratic doctrinaire views and had wished him to make Italy republican throughout and to oust the Austrian Emperor altogether. But this demand Napoleon rejected as unpractical with such peremptoriness, even threatening to resign, that the Directory, feeling themselves powerless, left him a free hand. His dispatches to the Foreign Office at this date are couched in the tone of a superior instructing those whom he addresses. In one of these addressed to Talleyrand, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, there occurs the following passage: "You little know these Italian peoples. They do not deserve that 40,000 Frenchmen should be sacrificed for their independence. I see from your letters that you start from a false hypothesis, you imagine that liberty can work wonders in this idle, superstitious, buffoonery-loving, cowardly race. . . . The distinctive characteristic of our nation is that we are too rash in prosperity. If we take as the basis of all our transactions, the true policy which is simply the art of calculating chances

[1] *Vide* Barante, "Souvenirs," I. p. 45, Regnault's narrative.

and combinations, we shall long be the great nation and the arbiter of Europe. Nay more, we shall hold the balance of the world in our hands and make it rise and fall as we like; and even, if Fate so wills, I think it not impossible within a few years to attain those great results already dimly discerned by the ardent and enthusiastic imagination, but which can only be realized by a man who was exceptionally calm, persevering, and judicious." Although Napoleon herein indicated that the time had not yet come for driving Austria out of Italy, that belief did not make him any more compliant towards the Viennese Court, which was soon to feel the pressure of his preponderating influence and increased authority.

Thugut had readily consented to depart from the terms of the preliminary treaty in April, but he did so in the full expectation of increasing Austria's sphere of influence by acquiring the legations. In this he was mistaken. Napoleon had willingly consented to alterations, only, however, with a view to reducing Austria's power still farther. Hence, in May he offered the town of Venice with the Adige as boundary, a proposal Thugut instantly rejected, though he kept the negotiations dragging on for months, in the hope that a victory of the Moderates in Paris might effect a considerable modification in France's foreign policy. But the *coup d'état* in Fructidor destroyed that hope. The Directory became more overbearing than before, broke off the negotiations with England then in progress at Lille, drew off from Russia with whom it had lately been on closer terms, and offered Austria even harder conditions. In September, when the Emperor Francis sent his ablest diplomatist, Count Louis Cobenzl, to Udine to conduct the negotiations for peace, Austria's prospects were far from favourable.

It was a factor of vital importance in these negotiations that one of the contracting parties represented in his own person an independent authority and could take upon himself to deviate from his official instructions. For after Clarke had been removed (owing to a suspicion of his having been implicated with Carnot), Napoleon conducted the negotiations

alone on behalf of France, and the fact that he could not always see his way clearly between his diplomacy and his personal interests, made the task one of peculiar difficulty. On the one hand he was resolved not to surrender his commanding position in Italy—it would come to an end when the war was over—on the other hand he was well aware that all France was longing for a final peace which he and he alone must procure, so as to confirm the power he had already won. These conflicting claims kept the young general anxious and excitable, and made the task of negotiating with him far from easy, especially towards the end of September, when the Directory renewed their request, this time more urgently than before, that all Upper Italy should be made republican and subject to France. To pacify the Directors Bonaparte demanded from the Austrian plenipotentiary a formal and unconditional recognition of the Rhine frontier, adding somewhat gratuitously that he "considered himself higher than Kings". On Cobenzl refusing, he flew into a towering passion, dashed a valuable porcelain vase to the ground and rushed from the room, cursing and shouting. Scenes such as this—but no longer unpremeditated—he repeatedly enacted in after years in presence of the envoys of foreign Powers. At last, on October 17th, 1797, after the negotiations having twice been on the verge of a rupture, the final peace was signed at Passariano near Udine, although the document was dated Campo Formio. France acquired Belgium, the Ionian Isles, and the Venetian Settlements on the Albanian coast; Austria, the City of Venice and the territory of the Republic as far as the Adige, and the district to the south of this between the Bianco Canal and the principal artery of the Po. The territories of Mantua, Milan, Bergamo, Brescia, Modena, and the three Legations, were formed into the "Cisalpine Republic"; the Duke of Modena receiving as compensation the Austrian territory of Breisgau. As compensation for the loss of the latter and also for the earldoms of Falkenstein and Frickthal in Argovia, which Austria had to surrender, the Emperor Francis was to receive the Archbishopric of Salzburg and the Bavarian territory on the right

bank of the Inn. These claims France pledged herself to support. Austria in return promised to use her influence in the forecoming negotiations for peace to enable France to obtain the long-coveted Rhine boundary from Andernach to Venloo. These affairs which directly affected the German Empire, were to be arranged in special congress to be held shortly at Rastatt. As a proof of good faith the Emperor Francis immediately evacuated the important fortress of Mayence in favour of the French.

When the news reached Vienna that peace had been concluded, the delight of the people both in the Court and in the town knew no bounds. A few far-sighted statesmen, Thugut amongst them, deplored the terms of the treaty as a misfortune for the Monarchy, and refused to believe that a situation created by such conditions would prove stable. The Emperor had consented to his territory being diminished; he had expressed his willingness to annex the territory of an ecclesiastical Prince, although it was precisely these ecclesiastical States which were the staunchest supporters of the Hapsburg dynasty; and after all Austria had not gained her longed-for extension of territory. She had been relentlessly thrust back eastwards. Napoleon, on the other hand, had every reason to be content with his handiwork. On the day on which the treaty was signed he is said to have expressed his delight with the utmost frankness and to have treated the Austrian Ambassador with charming friendliness which, like the consummate actor he was, he could simulate as cleverly as anger or bluster. To him personally the failure of the negotiations would have meant all the fatigues of a toilsome winter campaign in the inhospitable Alps. Their successful conclusion, on the other hand, strengthened his popularity and left him free to devote his energies to the vast designs which he had been maturing in the course of the summer. Seldom, indeed, has mortal man conceived plans of such world-wide compass and pursued them with such unerring aim.

CHAPTER V.

EGYPT AND SYRIA. 1798-1799.

When Napoleon in the guise of the helpful ally concluded a treaty with the Government of Venice, he was not merely seeking to obtain something which he could offer to Austria as compensation. Part of the inheritance of Venice he reserved to France, and he hoped likewise to transfer to her the supremacy which the ancient republic enjoyed in the East. In May, 1797, the Venetian fleet, under General Gentili (a French officer), was sent to occupy the Ionian Isles, the inhabitants of which welcomed him warmly as the emissary of the illustrious soldier who had delivered them from the hateful tyranny of the Lion of St. Mark. Napoleon had thus taken a momentous step towards the East where he foresaw a wide field for French influence and his own ambition, provided the two corresponded. Already, in May, he had called attention to the necessity of France occupying Corfu, and somewhat later he had written to the Directors, "Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia are of greater interest to us than all Italy"; and to Talleyrand on the same day, August 16th, 1797, he had said: "Corfu and Zante make us masters both of the Adriatic and of the Levant. It is useless to try and maintain the Turkish Empire; we shall see its downfall in our lifetime. The occupation of the four Ionian Isles will put us in a position to support it or to secure a share of it for ourselves." Hence at these islands, by means of capable agents, he had got into touch with the Greeks, the Mainotes, and the pashas of Janina, Scutari, and Bosnia. Already his far-seeing eye had discerned new objects. France had long cherished designs to block England's path to India, and with this end in view she had sought to obtain as strong a foothold as

possible in the Mediterranean. In pursuance of this policy Napoleon sent General Gentili in 1796, after the English fleet had withdrawn, to reconquer Corsica,[1] and in the spring of the following year he proceeded to treat Genoa precisely as he had treated Venice. On June 5th, 1797, a treaty was concluded with France by which the "Ligurian Republic," with her new democratic constitution, after the latest French model, placed herself unreservedly at the disposal of France. Finally on August 16th, 1797, Napoleon wrote to the Directory, "The time is not far distant when we shall feel that in order to ruin England utterly we must seize Egypt. The vast Ottoman Empire, which is daily crumbling into decay, makes it our bounden duty to take measures betimes to protect our Eastern trade." In reading the "Ruines" of his friend Volney, Napoleon had been struck by his theory that France ought to try to gain Egypt when the Turkish Empire collapsed, "for through Egypt we come into touch with India; we shall reopen the old route through Suez and let the other —by the Cape of Good Hope—fall into disuse". His mind had rapidly measured the path to the land of the Pharaohs. "Why should we not seize Malta?" he wrote Talleyrand on September 13th, "Admiral Brueys could easily anchor there and take possession of the island. Four hundred knights and a regiment of 500 men at the most, constitute the entire garrison of La Valette. The people, numbering over 100,000, are well-disposed towards us and are tired of the knights, who have no means of subsistence and are starving. I purposely confiscated all their Italian possessions. With the Island of St. Pietro, which the King of Sardinia ceded to us, Malta, Corfu, etc., we shall be masters of the Mediterranean. Should it happen that in arranging peace with England we were obliged to surrender the Cape of Good Hope, we must take possession of Egypt. The expedition could be under-

[1] Napoleon granted an amnesty to the Corsicans from which he excluded only the heads of those families who had ranged themselves against him under Paoli, viz. Pozzo di Borgo, Peraldi, Bertholini, and others. Pozzo di Borgo remained throughout life his enemy and implacable opponent.

taken with 25,000 troops and an escort of eight or ten ships of the line or Venetian frigates. Egypt does not belong to the Sultan. I wish you would find out for me in Paris what sort of effect our Egyptian expedition would have on the Porte."

The general's plans found an enthusiastic champion in Talleyrand whose keen intellect probably discerned the coming ruler under all this insolent superiority. Moreover, he himself had once cherished similar projects, and a short time previously, in July, 1797, he had read a paper before the members of the National Institute, "Sur les avantages à retirer des colonies nouvelles après les revolutions," in which he had called attention to Egypt and had claimed for Choiseul the merit of being the first to advocate this idea.[1] During the past year Magallon, the French consul at Cairo, had been constantly insisting in his reports upon the advantages of an Egyptian expedition; hence Bonaparte's proposals now met with a ready welcome. Talleyrand entered into them heartily, and in February, 1798, drew up an exhaustive memoir on the subject, recommending them to the Directory and laying stress on the importance of French supremacy in the Mediterranean, and especially on the Nile. Indeed, he even boasted on one occasion to the Prussian Ambassador that he had himself been the instigator of the project, although in the following year, 1799, he publicly disclaimed this.[2]

It is very doubtful if Napoleon was really intending at

[1] The idea was even older. Leibnitz had suggesed it to Louis XIV in order to divert the attention of the French from the Rhine. In 1738, D'Argenson, afterwards Minister of France, again brought up the plan and suggested cutting the Isthmus of Suez. In 1780, the explorer Sonini met a French officer in Cairo, who had been sent out to study the possibility of a conquest of Egypt and of advancing from Egypt upon India. Five years later the project was again mooted when the Emperor Francis thought of assigning Egypt to France in his scheme for partitioning Turkey.

[2] Bailleu, "Prussia and France, 1795-1807," I. p. 173; Pallain, "Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire," p. 124; Jonquière, "L'Expédition d'Egypte," I. 191.

this time to lead the Egyptian expedition in person. It was scarcely consistent with his ambitious plans that he should embark with 25,000 troops on an adventure in a distant country, risk his great and rapidly won fame in engagements which might prove of very uncertain value, renounce his powerful influence in France, and rid the Directory—so unprofitably for himself—of the anxieties his ambition caused them. He did eventually lead the expedition, but only when he was compelled to do so by circumstances upon which he had not reckoned in the autumn of 1797. For the conquest of Egypt was but a single link in a chain of plans the ultimate aim of which he revealed in a proclamation to the fleet: "Comrades, as soon as we have restored peace on the Continent we shall unite with you to conquer the liberty of the seas. Without you, we are only able to carry the glory of France into a little corner of the Continent; with you we shall cross the seas, and the most distant lands shall be filled with our national glory."

In a letter to Talleyrand, written on the day after peace had been signed with Austria, he described the present moment as being specially favourable for a struggle with Britain: "Let us concentrate all our energies on increasing our Navy and destroy England; that done, Europe is at our feet". Even earlier than this the Directory had been considering a landing on the English coast and had made preparations accordingly, and now the Directors fell back eagerly on this plan, which afforded them an opportunity of removing the dreaded general from his commanding position in Italy and at the same time kept him away from Paris. There was another advantage. The threatened invasion would compel Britain to employ her ships in guarding her own shores and would thereby facilitate the expedition to Egypt, which was regarded as quite a secondary object in the great struggle with the "modern Carthage".[1]

[1] In Talleyrand's Memoir of February 14th, 1798, to the Directory *re* the Egyptian project, he remarks, "It would only take from 12,000 to 15,000 troops to conquer Egypt and then withdraw; but if it is to be retained 20,000 to 25,000 troops would be required; there need be no fear

On November 2nd, Bonaparte was notified that peace had been confirmed and that he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of England. He saw through the Directory's intentions. To Miot he remarked: "I know they are jealous of me. In spite of all the incense they offer I shall not let myself be hoodwinked. They have hastened to make me General of the Army of England in order to get me out of Italy where I am master, and more monarch than general. They will soon see how things go when I am no longer there. I am leaving Berthier behind; he is not capable of commanding as general-in-chief; he will do nothing but make mistakes." Bonaparte, of course, accepted the command of the Army of England. He immediately ordered twenty-one demi-brigades (over 40,000 troops) of the Army of Italy to march to the coast, and had cannon of English calibre cast, so that "once in the enemy's country they might be able to use English projectiles". But there were other matters that touched him far more nearly than these military schemes. He had long ago ceased to play the part of "obedient servant" to the Directory in military affairs. It was one of the needs of his nature to conquer for himself a leading position wherever possible, and he now sought to wield the power he had exercised so arbitrarily abroad over the Government at home, right in Paris itself. In the conversation with Miot already alluded to, he remarked: "I assure you I am no longer able to obey, I have acquired the taste for command and I cannot give it up. I have therefore decided that if I cannot be master, I shall leave France".

On November 16th, 1797, he left his head-quarters at Milan and proceeded immediately to Rastatt, where he was to procure the ratification of the treaty of Campo Formio, and to see that the secret articles were carried out. Then, as pre-

of England. Our war with this Power presents the most favourable opportunity for the invasion of Egypt. Threatened by an imminent landing on her shores, she will not desert her coasts to prevent our enterprise which must be kept secret. It further offers us a possible chance of driving the English out of India by sending thither 15,000 troops from Cairo via Suez. In that case, instead of 20,000, or 25,000 troops, 35,000, must land in Alexandria" (Jonquière, "L'Expédition d'Egypte," I. 161).

mier plenipotentiary of France, he was to negotiate with the Emperor's ambassadors the peace with the German Empire. He did not remain long at Rastatt, only indeed till Cobenzl arrived and had signed with him the treaty concerning the surrender of Mayence (December 1st, 1797). On the same evening he left for Paris whither Larevellière, now head of the Directory, had invited him on a short visit, and whither he himself was impelled by his eager desire to turn his fame to account.

The Directory received him outwardly with every appearance of cordiality. Fêtes were held in his honour in the Luxembourg Palace and the Louvre, the walls of which were adorned with the spoils of Italy, and gala performances given at the theatre and so forth. Even the populace seemed to forget its distrust of the man of the 13th Vendémiaire, and to regard him only as a victorious hero. Some viewed him with sympathy, others with admiration, and everywhere he aroused at least interest and curiosity. At the theatre, if it was known he was in the house, the audience clamoured to see him, so that he could hardly escape ovations. The National Institute elected him a life member in place of Carnot, and from that time forth he always appeared in the plain frock coat of a savant, as an evidence of his citizen leanings. Everywhere he conducted himself with an absolute simplicity of manner that must have been no small strain on his ambitious spirit. He lived quietly in his wife's modest house in the rue Chantereine, rechristened in his honour rue de la Victoire, accepted the many attentions shown him with studied reserve, and seldom appeared in public. To his friend Bourrienne he remarked, "In Paris things are quickly forgotten. If I were to remain long inactive, I would be lost. In this Babel one reputation crowds out another. If I had been seen even three times at the theatre, they would have thought no more about me; therefore I go very seldom." Bourrienne remarked that he must feel flattered at the way in which the crowds flocked to see him. "Bah," he replied, "the crowd would flock to see me just as eagerly if I were going to the scaffold!"

The finest of all the official festivities was the magnificent fête given in his honour on December 10th, 1797, by the Directory, when they received from his hands the treaty of Campo Formio ratified by the Emperor Francis. All the notabilities and high dignitaries in Paris assembled on that day in the reception hall of the Luxembourg Palace, which was superbly decorated for the occasion. Talleyrand delivered the congratulatory address and extolled Napoleon's preference for the simplicity of olden times, his love of science, his contempt for mere empty show, adding that the possession of such qualities was the surest guarantee that he would never allow his ambition to mislead him. Amidst breathless silence Napoleon began his reply—somewhat incoherently, for in spite of his wealth of ideas and words he was nothing of an orator—"The French nation had to fight with Kings to win its freedom. To obtain a Constitution founded on reason, it had to overcome the prejudices of eighteen centuries. The Constitution of the year III, and you, have triumphed over all these obstacles. Religion, the feudal system, and monarchy, have in turn governed Europe during twenty centuries, but from the peace you have just concluded dates the era of representative governments. You have succeeded in organizing this great nation so that its territory is circumscribed by the bounds which Nature herself has set. You have done even more. The two most beautiful countries in Europe, once so famous for arts, sciences, and the great men whose cradle they were, behold with joyful expectation the Spirit of Liberty rise from the graves of their ancestors. These are two pedestals upon which destiny will place two powerful nations. I have the honour to hand over to you the under-signed treaty of Campo Formio, ratified by the Emperor Francis. . . . When once the welfare of the French nation has been established upon the best organic laws, all Europe will then be free."

The drift of this speech was not very obvious. The last sentence especially was enigmatic. Its solution was only divined by the few, the great majority exhausted themselves in conjecture. So then France, with her much-vaunted Constitution of the year III, was not yet established on the best

organic laws? Certainly not, according to Bonaparte's innermost convictions. Shortly before this, in a letter of September 19th, 1797, on the Cisalpine Constitution, he had written confidentially to Talleyrand, "The organization of the French nation has only been roughly sketched out as yet. In spite of our great opinion of ourselves, of our thousand and one pamphlets, and our interminable speechifying, we are very ignorant of political science. We have not yet defined what we mean by executive, legislative, and judiciary power. Montesquieu's definitions are misleading. Not indeed that that great man was unequal to the task, but that his work is, as he himself admits, only a sort of analysis of what exists or used to exist, a collection of notes made during his travels or suggested by his reading. He has turned his attention to the English government and has defined in general terms the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers. Why indeed should the right of declaring war, concluding peace, and levying taxes be considered the attribute of the legislative body? One of these functions, the English Constitution, with commendable sense, has delegated to the House of Commons, a wise thing to do, for the English Constitution is just a charter of privileges, a dark ceiling but edged with gold ("*un plafond tout noir mais bordé en or*"). And as the House of Commons is the sole representative of the nation for better or for worse, it is only just that it should levy the taxes; it is the one barrier by which the insolence and despotism of the courtiers can be controlled. But in a Government where all the power comes from the people, where the nation itself is sovereign, why include in the legislative function things that are foreign to it? The governing power, in all the latitude I would allow it, should be regarded as the true representative of the nation which ought to rule in virtue of the charter of the Constitution and of the organic laws. This power, it seems to me, would fall into two clearly defined jurisdictions, one of which would supervise but not act, and to it the other, what is nowadays called the executive power, would be obliged to submit its important measures, as it were for ratification. The first

body would really be the grand Council of the nation and would possess all the administrative or executive functions entrusted by our Constitution to the legislative body. In this way the Government would be vested in two bodies elected by the nation, for one of which, a very numerous body, only those would be eligible who had already served in some official capacity and had consequently a certain experience of Government affairs. The legislative body would then have only to frame and change the organic laws, but not in two or three days as at present; for in my opinion, an organic law, once in operation, ought not to be changed till it has been under discussion for four or five months. This legislative body, without rank in the republic, unemotional, without eyes and ears for what is going on around it, would be devoid of ambition and would cease to flood us with these innumerable regulations made for an emergency and annulled by their own innate absurdity, which make us a nation without laws although possessing three hundred in-folio volumes of them."

These statements, which Napoleon calls his "Code complet de Politique," are of the highest interest. They reveal his dissatisfaction with the existing conditions, but say not one word as to his idea of what the real executive power ought to be; on that point he kept his own counsel. The letter was addressed, as already mentioned, to Talleyrand, who was to show it privately to Sieyès, the great doctrinaire and Constitution-maker. These two men were as little enamoured of the existing Constitution as was Bonaparte (then twenty-nine) who strongly objected to Article 134, which required that Directors must be forty years of age. But this inconvenient Constitution might be overthrown if only a favourable opportunity presented itself. Should such occur during the winter of 1797-8, Napoleon was prepared to attempt a *coup d'état* against the Directory and the Constitution. During the festivities on December 10th, an onlooker fell from the roof of the Luxembourg, and this sad accident was immediately interpreted as an omen of the impending fall of the Government.

The authorities indeed did everything possible to remain

on good terms with Bonaparte. The Directors did not insist on him returning to Rastatt; they invited him to be present at their meetings when important matters connected with their foreign policy were under discussion, and they acted more or less upon his suggestions. "Without him, the Directory can no longer do anything," Barras comments somewhat ironically in his "Notes". The Directors hoped in this way to profit by the general's fame, and to prevent him being left to his own resources, which would not have been without danger.[1] Napoleon on his part accepted their advances willingly, so as to keep near the helm. His influence was potent also in personal matters. Bernadotte, for instance, received the post of ambassador at Vienna instead of the command in Italy, because Bonaparte preferred to see this ambitious soldier transferred from a military career to a diplomatic one, and also because Bonaparte wished to keep his own hand in in Italian affairs. He even had a share in important political events. In the end of December, 1797, the Democratic party in the Papal States, with French help, attempted a rising which was suppressed by the Papal troops. During the engagement General Duphot was killed, and the Directory, acting on Bonaparte's advice, took advantage of the incident to attack the Papal Government. The French Ambassador, Joseph Bonaparte, was recalled, and Berthier received orders from Napoleon to enter Rome, where the rule of Pius VI was declared at an end and a republican government proclaimed (February 15th, 1798). It has been justly surmised that Napoleon himself had no intention of proceeding to such an extreme step as dispossessing the Pope. In this point probably the feeling in the Directory was too strong for him, and

[1] Madame de Staël, "Considérations," II. 194, relates of him that he was then carrying about with him the plan for overthrowing the Directory and putting himself in its place. *Vide* also Barras, "Mémoires," III. p. 160. Bourrienne, "Mémoires," V. p. 46. In 1802, Bourrienne declares he remarked to Josephine: "Scarcely two years ago your husband, who had just returned from Italy, said to me he was aiming at the throne, but frankly admitted, on my representations, that the venture was too daring".

for personal reasons he judged it unwise to resist. In the instructions he issued he had assumed as a matter of course that Pius VI would take to flight, and it must have been a mortifying disappointment to him to find that the frail and aged Pontiff refused to abdicate and preferred to be taken prisoner. Rome was plundered and Masséna's name tarnished by the violence and brutality that accompanied the deed. The Romans were granted a Constitution with five Directors (here termed Consuls) besides Senators and Tribunes; they were compelled to pay other 23,000,000 francs, and to support the army.

As the Batavian Republic, which was at this time under a government of marked Federalist tendencies, felt itself unable to meet the burden of ships and money imposed on it by the treaty with France, the French envoy came openly to the aid of the Democratic Centre party who, by a *coup d'état* like that of the 18th Fructidor, climbed into power on January 22nd, 1798. General Joubert, one of Bonaparte's favourites, was made commander-in-chief of the Dutch troops, and on March 17th, Holland likewise received a new Constitution, with a Directory which placed itself unreservedly at the disposal of the French authorities.

But Napoleon's influence is even more apparent in the management of Swiss affairs. While still in Italy he had detached the Valtelline, Bormio, and Chiavenna from the Grisons—"since, according to the rights of nations, no people could remain subject to another"—and incorporated them in the Cisalpine Republic, which had a Directorial Constitution but was governed like a province by the French Commissioners, Brune, Fouché, and Joubert. Napoleon was now intent on having a high road through le Valais so as to connect France with Lombardy. But that would only be feasible provided Switzerland, like the Batavian and the Cisalpine States, could be induced to join the circle of dependent republics with which France meant to surround herself as a bulwark against the rest of Europe. On his way from Milan to Rastatt, Napoleon had fraternized with the Swiss Democrats and had held out prospects of French aid to enable them

to oppose the Government of the Bernese patricians,[1] and now he urged the authorities at Paris to revolutionize Switzerland. The Bernese were wealthy and, if need be, could supply the means for the expedition. The policy pursued here was that which had proved so efficacious in Holland, Venice, Rome, Milan and Genoa. When the Vaudois Democrats appealed to France for protection against the Government at Berne, the Directory willingly granted their request and notified its diplomatic agents in the leading towns of Switzerland to do their utmost to fan the insurgent movement. Bonaparte and Rewbell had drawn up a regular plan for a revolution with Ochs of Basel, the leader of the Democratic party, and had promised armed intervention from France. General Brune then invaded the territory and separated the combatants, under the pretence of liberating them; and finally on March 5th, 1798, he took possession of Berne and handed over to the Directory the "Bernese treasure," amounting to over 25,000,000 francs (upwards of 8,000,000 francs in hard cash and 18,000,000 francs in foreign bonds) besides great stores of provisions and munitions of war. Ere long the western half of Switzerland lay in his power and the Revolution was an accomplished fact. The Bernese bonds were indeed refunded, but only in return for enormous bribes. The new "Helvetian Republic" received a directorial Constitution, and later on was burdened by an oppressive alliance with France (August 21st, 1798). Switzerland had virtually become a French dependency. Of the money seized, 3,000,000 francs went into Napoleon's war chest for use in the projected expedition against Egypt.[2] But great as was the complaisance

[1] Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich," I. p. 178.

[2] Madame de Staël in her "Considérations," II. p. 207, says: "There was no money to send an army to Egypt, and the most reprehensible thing Bonaparte did was to stir up the Directory to invade Switzerland in order to get possession of the Bernese treasure". Jonquière in his "L'Expédition d'Egypte," I. p. 88, maintains the reverse, and states that the Swiss episode had been decided upon several weeks before the Egyptian expedition was settled. This is so far true, for the Directory's decree relating to the Vaud territory belongs to the end of December, 1797, whereas their decision regarding the Egyptian expedition is dated March

with which the Directory treated the victorious general in their councils, he did not possess a recognized official position commensurate with the influence he exercised. Bourrienne declares that, in spite of the Constitution, he asked to be made a member of the Directory, and was refused; which was true. He then allied himself closely with Tallien and Talleyrand, and finally took Barras into his confidence in the hope of being appointed the fifth Director. Even at the time of the recent *coup d'état* he had expected, through Barras' influence, to be admitted into the Directory, and as he was under the prescribed age, to have had his appointment ratified by a special decree.[1] On that occasion his plan fell through, but this time he counted on success and on Rewbell's support, for there was a project on foot to marry the latter's son to Hortense Beauharnais, Napoleon's step-daughter—an honour which Rewbell is said to have declined.[2] In political circles it was rumoured that Barras had caused dissensions in the Directory through attempting to have Bonaparte made Dictator, but this rumour was false. In his quest for admission to the Directory, Napoleon received no encouragement from Barras, who records in his memoirs that he reminded Bonaparte that for the legislative bodies to pass a decree sanctioning an exception, would be to violate the Constitution, and that the Directory would be compelled to reject any such measure.[3] Even at the present day all the details of this intrigue have not been cleared up.

The fact remains that Napoleon was not admitted into the Government, and he wisely set about finding another sphere of action. Early in 1798, Mallet du Pan wrote to the

6th, 1798. But before giving its sanction to the latter the Directory must first have seen its way clear to defray expenses, and this possibly Bonaparte showed them the means of doing, for he had learned in December of the "Bernese treasure". Talleyrand mentions the Egyptian expedition in a letter to Napoleon on August 23rd, 1797. *Vide* Pallain.

[1] So says Barante in his "Souvenirs," I. 45, according to a statement of St. Jean d'Angély, which again is corroborated by Barras' remarks in his "Mémoires," III. p. 154. *Vide* also Bailleu, I. p. 156.

[2] Barras, III. p. 141. Cp. Bailleu, I. p. 178.

[3] "Mémoires," III. p. 184.

Vienna Court that his star was on the wane and that he was a dead man unless some new war broke out and brought him again to the front. In February the Prussian Ambassador reported that the fickle Parisians were already asking what the general was doing so long in the capital and why he was not sailing for England? Hence Napoleon now ran the risk of seeing the glory won by his victories effaced by the daily pressure of petty facts, and his popularity forfeit, if he remained any longer inactive. For the present, at least, a successful *coup d'état* was out of the question, that he clearly saw. The Directors were detested by the populace, and he himself was not sufficiently well liked to risk his popularity by fighting them.[1] His first care, as he himself said, must be "to keep his glory warm". In the meantime the unsatisfactory condition of the French navy made a landing in England, popular as that was, far too risky an undertaking. Some years later, in 1805, he again avoided attempting this expedition, and eagerly seized the opportunity afforded him by the coalition of employing his forces elsewhere. He even preferred to fall back on his Oriental plans. "I shall not remain here," said he to Bourrienne, "there is nothing to do here. I see that if I stay I shall soon be done for. Everything wears out here; my glory is already used up. This little Europe offers too small a field. One must go to the East to gain power and greatness.[2] I am willing to make a tour of inspection on the northern coast in order to convince myself of what might be ventured. If, as I fear, the success of a landing in England should appear doubtful, I shall make my Army of England the Army of the East and go to Egypt."

The said journey to the coast was begun on February 8th, and soon ended. Bonaparte was not long in convincing him-

[1] "He saw that they were not liked, but also that for the time being it was counter to the general republican sentiment to put a general in the place of the civil councils." (Staël, "Considérations," II. p. 205.)

[2] In Italy he had spoken in a similar strain to Bourrienne,—"Europe is a mere mole-hill; it is only in the East where there are 600,000,000 of human beings, that there have ever been vast empires and mighty revolutions".

self that in the meantime the expedition was impracticable; and on his return to Paris he sought to bring the Directory to his way of thinking. In two dispatches, dated February 23rd, he maintains that without being master of the sea, a landing on the English coast would be one of the most daring and difficult adventures, and if possible, then only so during the long dark nights, and consequently not to be thought of before the following year. Furthermore, in the second dispatch, he states that the enterprise was only possible on the assumption that the entire naval forces of the country would cooperate. But as the condition of the navy made this improbable, it was necessary to consider other undertakings against England, such as the conquest of Hanover and of Hamburg, or the Egyptian expedition. In any case the proposed landing should be virtually abandoned and only the outward appearance kept up. If nothing came of these various schemes they could fall back on peace with Britain, who would then certainly come forward at Rastatt with increased demands. Further reports from the coast confirming Bonaparte's doubts, he recommended the Directory a few days later to proceed at once with the expedition to Malta and Egypt, and decided to lead it in person.

This decision proved far more efficacious than any of the arguments he brought forward in support of the enterprise, for it rid the Paris Government of this ambitious man and his masterful plans. On March 5th, the Directory founded a "Commission for the surveillance of the Mediterranean coast," and troops were to be stationed at Toulon, Marseilles, Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Corsica. On April 12th, 1798, Napoleon received his nomination (drawn up by himself) to the chief command of the Army of the East. He was given full powers and ordered to take possession of Malta and Egypt—of the former because that in 1793 (!) the Order of St. John had declared against the French Republic; of the latter because the Mameluke chiefs were in league with the British and perpetrating the most shocking cruelties on the French, who were being daily tortured, plundered, and murdered." He was then to drive the English from their

Eastern possessions as far as he was able to reach them, especially from the Red Sea, which he was to secure for France by cutting a channel through the Isthmus of Suez. Until his return a substitute was to be put in his place in command of the troops destined for service against England. It was taken for granted that on the termination of the Egyptian campaign he would resume the command of the combined forces for the English invasion. There exists a private memoir of April 13th, in Bonaparte's handwriting, in which he reverts to this project. During the summer an endeavour was to be made to bring the Brest squadron up to thirty-five ships of the line and to have these properly equipped. The 200 sloops at Boulogne and Dunkirk on the north coast were to be supplemented by other 200, and all was to be in readiness by the end of September. "After the termination of the Mediterranean expedition" other fourteen French ships of the line would be free to join the Brest squadron, and so bring up the number by October or November (when he expected the Egyptian campaign to be over), to fifty war vessels. "It would then be possible to take 40,000 troops to some point on the English coast, while other 40,000 troops were preparing to embark, and the Dutch fleet with 10,000 troops could threaten Scotland. In this way the landing in England was almost certain to be in November or December," as the English would be obliged, by the expedition in the East, to detach part of their Channel fleet for India and the Red Sea. Who but himself could carry out this invasion? At Toulon he addressed the troops for the East in the words, "You are a wing of the Army of England!" and in his general orders he signed himself "Commander-in-Chief of the Army of England."[1]

He made his preparations with a zeal such as those about him had never before seen him show, and on such a scale as would ensure success and preserve his glory from all risk. But it was no longer a matter of a small expedition easily accomplished by 25,000 men and a few frigates. It was with an army of 38,000 of his best troops and escorted by the finest fleet

[1] *Vide* "Correspondance," iv. p. 2594.

France then had at her disposal, and which was to make her Mistress of the Mediterranean, that he now undertook the campaign in the East. A staff of over a hundred savants, mechanics, engineers, architects, authors, and interpreters, among others, Monge, the mathematician, and Berthollet the chemist, accompanied the general to make a scientific conquest of the East, to prepare the way for the projected colonization, and to open up the indispensable waterways. Nor was a library omitted. Among the books chosen were Ossian, Tasso's "Jerusalem Delivered," Homer, Virgil, Rousseau's "Héloïse," and Goethe's "Werther". An interesting and significant trait is the grouping of the Bible, the Koran, the Vedas, and Montesquieu's works, under the heading of "Politics". History especially was strongly represented. There naturally Plutarch's "Lives" found a place, and Arrian's "Alexander," and also Raynal's "Philosophical History of the Two Indies". We have already seen what a deep and enduring impression this book had made on Napoleon, and certainly the passage on Egypt could not fail to strike him vividly. It runs thus: "On beholding this country, lying between two seas, one of which is the gate to the East, the other the gate to the West, Alexander conceived the plan of transferring the capital of his kingdom to Egypt and of making that country the centre of the world's commerce. This prince, the most enlightened of all conquerors, recognized that if there were any means of binding in a permanent union the conquests he had already made and those he intended to make, it was through this country, which seemed to have been predestined by Nature to link Africa and Asia with Europe."

It is quite evident that the vast schemes of the great Macedonian were at this time engrossing the attention of Napoleon, and that he was aspiring not merely to equal Alexander but to surpass him. No flight was too far or too high for his imagination. Yet he knew how to control it. "I have always two strings to my bow," he used to say. Hence, in spite of the vastness of his schemes, he never neglected what was within reach and feasible. When Bourrienne

asked him how long he meant to remain in Egypt, he answered, "A few months, or six years, it all depends upon circumstances". The fact was that as things then stood it was only too probable that within a few months a fresh war would break out on the Continent of Europe which would necessarily bring his name again into public notice. For owing to the progress of the Revolutionary movement in Italy and to the conversion of the Papal States into a republic, Tuscany and Naples were now threatened, and there seemed every likelihood that Austria would intervene to protect the Princes of these States who were kinsmen of the Hapsburgs, and to safeguard her own interests at the same time. Russia, too, was sure to resent France's intervention in the Eastern question, for the republican propaganda had roused the Czar from his indecision. Already the threads of a new coalition were being spun between St. Petersburg and Vienna, and England in her anxiety was sure to form a third party.[1]

It would be a mistake to regard France's policy at this time as entirely Bonaparte's handiwork. Long before the young general exerted the slightest influence on the country's affairs, France had begun her self-appointed task of revolutionizing her neighbours.[2] But he was certainly now advocating this policy in secret in the selfish hope that a coalition war by increasing the Directory's embarrassments would bring it into discredit, render his recall imperative, and raise his prestige and his power so high that he would be able to seize the leadership for himself. France was to be defeated in the West while he was winning fresh laurels for himself in

[1] On April 21st, at a meeting of the Directory a memoir from Talleyrand was discussed, according to which Bernadotte sent word from Vienna that the English Ambassador had proposed to the Emperor a coalition between England, Russia, and Denmark (Jonquière, "L'Expédition d'Egypte," I. 385).

[2] On May 25th, 1796, Mallet du Pan in writing to Vienna had shrewdly remarked: "In all countries which they do not care to retain, they will sow the seed of republicanism, pose as the allies of every State that imitates the example of France, and stimulate this imitation by every possible means; and in this way they flatter themselves that they will obtain within a short space of time what has been, since 1792, one of the first and most important aims of the war."

the East; such was the programme of his unpatriotic ambition. Hence, too, he had taken with him the flower of the troops and the best generals. "I am leaving for the East," said he to his brother Joseph, "with every means to ensure success. If France needs me, if the number of those who think with Talleyrand, Sieyès, and Roederer increases, if war breaks out and proves adverse to France, I shall return, feeling surer of public opinion than now. On the other hand, if the republic is successful in war, should another general like myself arise and the people build their hopes on him, well then, in the East I shall perhaps render the world greater services than he." [1]

Before he left for Egypt, while he was still lingering in Paris, the first symptom of fresh complications had already appeared. At Rastatt the Austrian plenipotentiary had opposed the Directory's demand for the entire left bank of the Rhine; and in Vienna the French representative, Bernadotte, had offended the Court circles and had incited the populace to revolt, in consequence of which he was obliged to leave the country. The situation was critical and war seemed imminent. Napoleon hesitated and postponed his departure. It was reported that he was displeased on learning that Bernadotte had put up at Rastatt at the rooms intended for himself. Perhaps he feared that if war broke out the leadership might be given to Bernadotte. And now, uneasy lest a resumption of hostilities might imperil his treaty of peace, he was eager to go to Rastatt to make things secure. At first the Directory was inclined to comply, but when they heard that Cobenzl, with whom alone Bonaparte had to deal, had left for Vienna and that Thugut promised satisfaction at the earliest opportunity, they preferred to accept this assurance, all the more readily as it made the general's intervention superfluous. François, one of the Directors, attended the conference at Seltz, where the peace was to be confirmed anew, and Barras again reminded Napoleon of the Egyptian expedition. It is difficult to say whether, as Miot relates in his Memoirs, Bonaparte wanted to go to Rastatt merely to

[1] Du Casse, "Memoirs du Roi Joseph," I. p. 71.

gratify his ambition by conducting negotiations which placed the choice of peace and war in his own hands, or whether, according to Mattieu Dumas' Memoirs, his thoughts had turned for the nonce to a *coup d'état* and a dictatorship. The Directors seem to have thought so and to have insisted on his departure. On the night of May 3rd, Napoleon left Paris for Toulon and there embarked for the East.

In the port of Toulon the preparations had been pushed forward with extraordinary activity. The actual destination of the expedition was only known to a select few. Egypt indeed had been much talked of. Paragraphs about it had appeared in the newspapers, and precisely for that reason no one seriously believed in an enterprise that would deprive France of her ablest general at such a critical time. Yet so it was. On May 19th, 1798, the fleet set sail with part of the expeditionary force on board, the commander-in-chief being on the flag-ship "Orient". At the same time the divisions under Baraguay d'Hilliers, Vaudois, and Desaix, sailed from Genoa, Ajaccio, and Civita Vecchia, and joined the Toulon squadron, the combined fleet making an imposing display of fifteen ships of the line, fifteen frigates, eight corvettes, and a large number of smaller war-ships carrying in all about 2000 guns as protection for the 400 transports conveying the troops for the East. Among the generals in command of divisions were Berthier, head of the general staff, and in addition to those already named, Kléber, Menou, Reynier, and Dugua; among the brigadier-generals occur the names, afterwards famous, of Lannes, Davoût, Murat, Andréossy, and many others; Marmont, Junot, Lefebvre, and Bessières were among the colonels.

The gravest danger threatening the expedition came from the English, who had previously, for their own security, formed an alliance with the Spaniards and the Dutch, and had withdrawn their fleet from the Mediterranean to the Channel to protect their shores against the French invasion. But their suspicions having been aroused by the ships at Toulon, a squadron had at once been sent off under Admiral Nelson to watch that port, a circumstance of which Napoleon

had not the faintest suspicion. Fortunately for him, a few days before the French fleet set sail, Nelson had been driven by a storm from his hiding-place outside Toulon. By the time he returned the French had got clear away, and while he was searching for them in Naples and Sicily, they had already captured Malta and completed the first stage of their expedition.

A year previously a few of the Knights of St. John, in whose possession the island had been since the time of Charles V., had been bought over by French gold. The Grand Master of the Order, M. de Hompesch, a man devoid of ability and foresight, was quite unequal to the occasion. On finding the Knights disaffected and the soldiers unwilling to fight, he made no attempt to resist Napoleon, and on June 13th, 1798, surrendered the strong fortifications of La Valette without even attempting to hold out till English aid had arrived. It was a disgraceful capitulation, although Napoleon avoided using that term in his proclamation, sarcastically remarking that such a word must have an ugly sound in the ears of an Order once so war-like. The possessions of the Knights were confiscated, they themselves received a meagre pension, and were obliged to leave the island. A few of them entered the victorious army. "Now," wrote Talleyrand to the ambassador at Constantinople, "the trade of the Mediterranean must fall entirely into the hands of France."

Leaving a sufficient garrison behind him at Malta, Napoleon set sail again for the East, and while off Candia he learned for the first time that a strong English squadron was in pursuit. This did not at all fit in with his plans; for both the Egyptian expedition and the subsequent invasion of England were based on the supposition that the French fleet should remain mistress of the Mediterranean, at least until she had brought home the conqueror of the Mamelukes. Hence it was of paramount importance that the 400 transports with the troops on board should escape the enemy and reach Alexandria in safety. In his conduct at this crisis Napoleon showed that had he followed his original choice of a career, France would have possessed in him a most

efficient admiral. He now gave orders to skirt the south coast of Candia, and so succeeded in escaping immediate danger. Meanwhile Nelson, not finding him at Naples, had decided to steer for Egypt, but in his eagerness to meet his foes he sailed so fast along the north coast of Africa that he outdistanced them and reached the Straits of Alexandria before they had come up. Not finding them there, he left at once and sailed for Syria. Immediately after his departure on July 1st, the French fleet reached Egypt and disembarked the troops.

While still at sea, Napoleon had issued a proclamation to the soldiers, preparing them for the task that awaited them: "Soldiers," said he, "you are about to begin a conquest the results of which on the world's commerce and culture are incalculable. You will deal England the surest and deadliest blow she will receive before you finally strike her dead. We shall have some wearisome marches to make, we shall fight several battles and we shall win; fortune is on our side." He admonished them to respect the religion of the Mohammedans and their muftis, adding: "The peoples whom we are about to encounter treat women differently from us, but in every country the man who wrongs a woman is a scoundrel. Plunder enriches only a few and dishonours all; it destroys our resources and makes us hated by those whom it is to our interest to have as friends. The first town on our route was built by Alexander. Every step we take will awaken memories of great deeds worthy of exciting the emulation of Frenchmen." But to the bulk of the troops what he had promised at Toulon appealed far more strongly—that on the return of the expedition each soldier should receive enough money to buy six acres of land.[1]

After the capture of Alexandria on July 2nd, Napoleon even interested himself in the natives. In a proclamation in Arabic he described himself as the Sultan's friend come hither to destroy his enemies the Mamelukes, and to deliver

[1] Reported by his Adjutant Sulkowski. *Vide* Jonquière, I. p. 464, and Vigo Roussillon, "Mémoires militaires," "Revue des Deux Mondes," 100, p. 582.

the Egyptian people from their tyranny. He proclaimed the equality of all men in the sight of God, the same God whom he recognized in the Koran; he declared himself and his army "true Mussulmans," and in order to inspire greater confidence he related how he had vanquished the Pope and annihilated the Knights of St. John. It is very doubtful if these words made much impression on the obtuse minds of the fellaheen. They submitted to this new invasion as they would have done to any other. Of more importance was the fact that the newcomers announced themselves as the friends of the Sultan, which for a considerable time stood them in good stead with the Mussulman population of the larger towns. Unfortunately, however, one of the embassies which had welcomed the general with eager deference was shot down by mistake on leaving his presence, and this incident did not increase the confidence in the "liberators". Bonaparte's real foe, however, was the armed force of the country, the Mameluke cavalry. Originally, in the twelfth century, it had formed the Caliph's body-guard, and was composed of slaves bought for the purpose. But the Mamelukes had soon made themselves masters of Egypt and such they had remained until the sixteenth century when they were defeated by the Ottomans, after which the Sultan Selim I entrusted the government of the country, as a Turkish province, to twenty-four of their chiefs. Each of these Beys or Chiefs commanded a considerable body of horsemen, and as the Turkish Empire began to decline, the power of the Beys increased, until gradually the Sultan's authority became purely nominal. At the time Bonaparte began the struggle with them, their two generals, Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, had under their command from 8000 to 10,000 cavalry, splendidly equipped and trained, handling sabre, lance, and musket with brilliant skill. Unfortunately they had no regular troops to support them. Their infantry consisted of hordes of fellaheen without proper weapons, while all the artillery they possessed were the few cannon on their small flotilla on the Nile. Under such conditions the French with their four-fold superiority in numbers could not fail to gain the victory.

Other circumstances, however, were to render their triumph less easy.

First of these was the bitterness of disillusion and the consequent discouragement of the troops. At the very outset Alexandria had disappointed them. It was only a twelfth part of what it had been in the days when the Macedonian hero had given it his name; the rest of the city was simply refuse and ruins. On July 7th, Napoleon broke up camp and began the march to Cairo. Instead of the longer but more comfortable route by Rosetta and the banks of the Nile, he chose the shorter road across the desert, and the suffering of the troops from hunger, thirst, and heat, were so awful that all their skilfully fed belief in the paradise of the East was destroyed at once and for ever. The soldiers murmured, threatened to turn back, and scoffed at the savants on whom they laid the whole blame of the deception. In the villages of the fellaheen there were none of the appliances of civilization; grain there was in abundance, but neither mills nor ovens, and nothing to drink but the slimy water of the cisterns. Home-sickness broke out in the ranks and drove many to suicide, and the demoralization spread even among the higher officers. When at last they reached the Nile, at Ramanieh, they came into touch with the enemy, detached bands of whom kept harassing the divisions, so that they were forced to march in closed squares with the artillery and the cavalry in the centre, the loose sandy soil making their advance both slow and laborious. At Schebrachit on July 13th, they fell in with the main body of Murad Bey's army, but after an engagement between the two flotillas on the Nile it withdrew without offering battle.[1]

[1] One example from among many will serve to illustrate the extent to which the doings of the army of the East were exaggerated by the time they reached their final form in Napoleon's dispatches to the Directory at Paris. Marmont tells in his Memoirs how four or five Mamelukes rushed madly upon a square at Schebrachit and were hewn down. Bonaparte, in a letter to Menou, who had remained behind at Alexandria, magnifies the number to fifty, but in his dispatch to the Directory on July 24th, 1798, he actually speaks of the "battle of Schebrachit," in which 300 of the enemy were killed. Later in life, he frankly declared that a states-

On July 19th, at Omm Dinar, three miles from Cairo, the French troops got their first sight of the Pyramids. After great fatigues and hardships, marching always in the early morning from two o'clock onwards, they at last reached Embabeh where Murad Bey had entrenched himself. Here on July 21st, with only some 5000 cavalry and a crowd of armed fellaheen, Murad attacked these veteran French troops who far outnumbered him. It was scarcely necessary for Napoleon to fan the courage of the republican soldiers by his appeal: "Soldiers! remember that from the summit of these pyramids forty centuries are beholding you!" Their numerical superiority alone assured them the victory, while their longing to be done with the desert made them eager for battle. Bonaparte immediately drew up his five divisions in squares six deep with the artillery at the corners and the staff and the baggage in the centre. Murad flung himself impetuously upon Desaix's division; repulsed there, he attacked the divisions of Reynier and Dugua where Napoleon had taken up his position. But all in vain; and baffled in every charge he turned and fled. After a short resistance his camp at Embabeh with its rich booty fell into the hands of the victors. Ibrahim Bey, who had taken up a position on the farther side of the Nile, near Boulak, now abandoned it and fled eastwards to the borders of the Syrian desert. The battle of the Pyramids scattered the enemy and delivered Cairo into the hands of the French. On July 22nd, the victors took possession of the town, and on the 24th, Napoleon established his head-quarters in Mohammed Bey's palace in the Esbekieh Square.

Hitherto he had soothed the troops by glowing descriptions of the splendours and wealth of Cairo, but when they at last reached this city with its 300,000 inhabitants, it only proved one disappointment the more. Food could certainly be had, but of the vaunted prosperity there was not a trace. Everywhere, even in the deserted Mameluke quarters, poverty and squalor met the eye. The discontent deepened. The numerous letters written home by officers and privates, which

man ought to be perfect in the art of telling lies. The negotiator of Udine and Passariano was a true statesman.

were intercepted and published by the English, show how widespread was the dissatisfaction in the army and how dispirited the troops had become. Bonaparte had as much as he could do, punishing, appeasing, promising, attending to the countless details of organization and administration, and scheming to overthrow his enemy, who had only withdrawn to collect strength for a new effort. And all the time no news was reaching him from Europe! Just then a messenger arrived from Alexandria with tidings of an appalling disaster. On August 1st, the English fleet under Nelson had reappeared off the coast of Egypt, and the French fleet lying in Aboukir Bay had been annihilated.

On leaving the squadron under Admiral Brueys, Bonaparte had given him instructions to bring it into the old harbour of Alexandria if the channel were sufficiently deep; if not, he was to take up a secure position in the Straits of Aboukir; or, if that were not possible, he was to leave behind a few frigates and light craft and sail for Corfu. Finding that all his ships could not pass the entrance to the harbour, Brueys decided to moor in the open roadstead off Aboukir, where he declared his position was sufficiently strong, since on the one side he was protected by the shore batteries, while on the other there was not room for the enemy's ships to take up a position between him and the shore. A fatal mistake! On August 1st the English squadron came in sight. Till then Nelson had been searching for the enemy with anxious haste, but all in vain. He now bore down upon the French ships while a considerable number of their crews were still on shore. Then, indeed, it was clearly proven that Brueys' position was not impregnable. The English ships of the line, although fewer in number, manœuvred with such consummate skill and incomparable daring that they were able to pass between their enemy and the shore. Caught thus between two fires, one French vessel after another went down. The heroic courage of the sailors was of no avail. Brueys atoned for his mistake with his life. The "Orient" blew up with him and all his crew, the brave sailors shouting with their dying breath, "*Vive la Republique!*" Never before had such a victory

been gained on sea. Two ships of the line and two frigates was all that Rear-Admiral Villeneuve was able to save by flight. A few other frigates had previously been towed into the harbour. Everything else had been destroyed or had fallen into the enemy's hands.[1]

The news reached Bonaparte on his return from a march eastwards in pursuit of Ibrahim, while at the same time he had been endeavouring to come to terms with Murad, but without success. He received the tidings with perfect composure—he was sitting in Marmont's tent at the time—and immediately began to calculate its effects. "We are now alone in Egypt," said he, "cut off from France, but this country was once before a mighty kingdom; in any case it is a good starting-point for conquests when the Turkish Empire

[1] In his dispatches to the Directory and long afterwards at St. Helena, Napoleon laid the blame of the disaster to the fleet entirely upon Brueys, but his own letters and documents, recently brought to light, prove that this was not so. It was unfair of him to write to Paris as he did: "When I left Alexandria I ordered the Admiral to enter the harbour within twenty-four hours, or if that were not possible, to sail to Corfu," for he had himself suggested the Straits of Aboukir as an alternative. While he was still in Alexandria he and Brueys had evidently agreed upon the position to be taken up in the roadstead, for on July 7th, he wrote Kleber: "The squadron will anchor at Aboukir in such a way that it will be protected by the batteries we are erecting". Lachadenède (a naval ensign) in his contemporary memoirs mentions an interview with Brueys: "The admiral came ashore to receive the orders of the commander-in-chief. In this conversation it was settled that if they could not sail into Alexandria, the Fleet was to anchor off Aboukir" (Jonquière, II. 91). Later on the admiral began to feel doubtful, and on July 13th, he wrote Bonaparte, "The roadstead is too open for a squadron to take up a military position in presence of a superior enemy. The pilots hope they have at last found a channel in the old harbour" (Jonquière, II. 248). On July 27th, and again on the 30th, Napoleon replied from Cairo that according to what he had heard a suitable passage had been found, and that he supposed the fleet was in the old harbour. But these letters came too late. Brueys had learned of Nelson's approach, and did not wish to be caught while entering the harbour, and besides he was so destitute of provisions that he was compelled to lie at anchor. *Vide* his letter to Menou on July 24th, in Guitry's "L'Armée de Bonaparte en Egypte," p. 119. In Paris, however, it was really believed that Brueys had acted contrary to Bonaparte's orders (Jonquière, II. p. 263).

breaks up, and a base for offensive operations against the English." "Perhaps we are destined," said he to Marmont, who relates the incident in his Memoirs, "to change the face of the East and to write our names alongside those in ancient and mediaeval history which have graven themselves most deeply on our memories. But there must be no slackening of courage. It is in such moments that men of superior character prove their mettle." Brave words these, nor did they fail of their effect. Yet they did not reveal the whole impression the news had produced on the general. The loss of the fleet had cut deeper than he cared to show. He had intended to conquer Egypt, secure possession of it, and then return to France, if war had meanwhile broken out afresh in Europe and its vicissitudes had taught the nation the value of his sword. "From what General Bonaparte told me," says Bourrienne, "before the news of August 1st he intended, once the possession of Egypt had been secured, to return to Toulon with the fleet which was no longer required, send back reinforcements and supplies to Egypt, and take over the command of the fleet and all the forces the Government had meanwhile gathered together for service against England, whose navy he then hoped to outnumber. The loss of his ships shattered all these schemes."[1] It did more, it even jeopardized France's position in Egypt.

Napoleon had hoped to deceive the Sultan as to the nature of his expedition in Egypt, or, failing that, to prevent him interfering. This part of the task fell to Talleyrand, as ambassador extraordinary. Becoming sceptical of success, however, after the English appeared in the Mediterranean, Talleyrand transferred this duty to Ruffin, the French chargé d'affaires

[1] Bourrienne and Bonaparte were at this time unaware that the Directory had already renounced their plan of an invasion of England in the coming autumn, and that they had sent the ships lying in the northern ports to the help of the Irish who had revolted against England in the end of May, 1798. This expedition was a complete failure. Scattered in separate expeditions, some of the ships were lost, some driven out of their course, and any fresh concentration of the naval forces in the north was for the present out of the question ("Mémoires," II. 133).

at Constantinople.[1] But the Sultan's suspicions had been aroused by Napoleon's intrigues with the Pasha of Janina and the Greeks, and he hesitated long between "friendship" for the Republic and an alliance with Russia, urged upon him by the Czar Paul I, whose political sphere of action had been disturbed by France's intervention in the East and her seizure of Malta. Just at this crisis news reached the Bosphorus that the French fleet had been destroyed, and the Sultan decided against the Republic. Then followed what one would have thought impossible; Russia won over Turkey (which England had been tampering with), and persuaded her to defend her rights of suzeraignty over the Ionian Isles and Egypt against the French invaders. On September 1st, the Porte declared war against France, imprisoned the French chargé d'affaires, and with Russia's help took possession of the Ionian Isles.

Bonaparte, whose communications with Europe were now cut off, did not at once learn the new turn affairs had taken, though he soon suspected it. Immediately after his arrival in Egypt he had written to the Grand Vizier and Governor of Syria, Achmed Pasha, surnamed "Djezzar" (the Slaughterer), on account of his barbarous cruelty, assuring

[1] Talleyrand's attitude in this matter is not clear. According to Miot ("Mémoires," I. 221) he neither dealt fairly with Bonaparte nor with the Directory. It now appears that he had had the post of ambassador in view when he saw his ministerial position no longer secure in May, 1798, and had informed Napoleon on his departure of this wish. About that time Talleyrand remarked to the Prussian Ambassador: "I shall probably be removed from a post in which I have had nothing but annoyance. Perhaps I shall be appointed ambassador in Constantinople, which I would like to accept" (Bailleu, I. 208). Shortly afterwards, however, finding his position more secure, he gave up all thought of going to the Bosphorus, and proposed another man, Descorches, for the post. Bonaparte was not aware of this decision, and on August 22nd, wrote to the Grand Vizier that the Directory had appointed Talleyrand ambassador, and that he ought by then to be in Constantinople. On October 7th he wrote the Directory, "it is very important that an ambassador should be sent via Vienna to Constantinople. Talleyrand ought to go there and keep his word." On December 11th, he wrote the latter to Constantinople ("Corr.," IV. 3076, V. 3439, 3748).

him that his sole aim was to protect the interests of French commerce against the Mamelukes. These letters had remained unanswered. On the other hand, early in October, Bonaparte learned that the Porte had everywhere arrested the French consuls. But still he knew nothing definite as to the attitude of Turkey. Should facts prove unfavourable he would then have a double task on his hands; he would need to defend the position he had conquered not only against the hatred of the Arab population and the hostile forces of the Mamelukes, but also against the lawful ruler of the country, the Sultan. After the destruction of his fleet at Aboukir, which had naturally produced a bad impression in France, new triumphs became imperative to blot out speedily the memory of that disaster. The laurels he had culled for himself in the battle of the Pyramids, even though he had magnified the enemy's losses tenfold, were no longer sufficient to uphold his personal prestige, to enhance which he had gone to Egypt. On September 8th, he wrote to the Directory: "I am expecting news from Constantinople. I cannot be in Paris in October as I promised you, but perhaps a few months later."

During these anxious months of waiting, Bonaparte had ample opportunity for convincing himself that the people of Egypt only tolerated the foreign rule with the greatest reluctance, and that his profession of sympathy with Islam had been of small use. On his arrival in Cairo he had speedily organized some valuable measures for the administration of the country. In the capital itself the government was conducted by a Divan of nine members (all Sheiks), two police officials, and one committee for provisioning the town, and another (which met daily) for supervising burials. The Turkish police were placed under the charge of a French commandant. Similar measures were carried out in the provinces. There the Divans consisted of seven members who referred all disputed matters to Bonaparte. Their duties were to keep the peace and to spread enlightenment among the natives. A Janissary captain with his guard, co-operating with the French commandant, was made responsible for the

maintenance of public order. The taxes which were to equal in amount those hitherto rendered to the Mamelukes, were to be collected by a steward and his clerks. All property was to be left in the hands of its possessors and pious foundations to be retained by the mosques. Justice was to be administered as before.

These various measures were rigorously carried out. "The Turks," wrote Bonaparte to Menou on July 31st, "can only be governed by the utmost severity. Every day I have five or six executions in the streets of Cairo. Hitherto we have been obliged to grant pardons in order to destroy the reputation for terror which preceded us; now, however, we must strike the note these people are to obey, and they only obey when they fear." Originally he had confiscated only the goods of the Mamelukes, and had levied contributions from the rest of the population. But after the battle of Aboukir, when the army was cut off from all supplies and money was scarce, he modified this system considerably. Religious property was no longer exempted from taxation and a new and oppressive tax was imposed on houses. Lotteries were started and paper money in the form of fifty-franc notes was issued by the Director of the Mint for all who were willing to exchange their silver and gold jewels and ornaments for money. Such measures, however, did not heighten the popular regard for "Ali Bounaberdis," as the natives called Bonaparte, who had appeared at the Worship of the Nile clad in a burnous, just as Alexander in Asia had dressed in Persian garments. Furthermore, since the change of policy at the Porte, Turkish agents had been reaching Egypt through Syria, and were inciting the people to mutiny. Firmans from the Sultan were read aloud in the mosques, ascribing to Bonaparte the intention of destroying Islam, and the Faithful were called upon to resist. The people's passions had been roused to white heat by the current rumours that the Sultan had declared war against France, that Djezzar was advancing from Syria, that the French would be forced to leave, and that they would previously burn the town. In October a revolt broke out. The populace stormed the houses of the

foreigners and killed a number of Frenchmen, among them five and twenty invalid soldiers. The commandant of the town was also killed, and the mob then procured weapons and organized a rebellion; but Napoleon had the disaffected quarter surrounded, bombarded the great mosque, and ere long the disturbance was completely extinguished. As a check on any repetition of such scenes, he immediately had a large number of prisoners beheaded, and on each of the following nights there were thirty executions. "That will teach them a good lesson," he wrote to his generals, adding that he had hoped to gain his ends by milder means, but that "intimidation alone has any effect here".[1] The lull that followed these harsh measures was employed in building up the internal organization of the country. The savants who accompanied the expedition founded an "Institute," where they read papers upon their scientific researches and upon the cultivation of the land. Reports of these meetings were published in a periodical entitled "La Decade Egyptienne," while political and local news appeared in the "Courier d'Egypte". The various sections met every five days, when answers were returned to a series of questions propounded by Napoleon as to increased facilities for obtaining supplies more rapidly for the troops, and similar matters. He also inquired into the condition of jurisprudence and education and as to the reforms necessary in these domains. At the same time abundant materials were gathered for that monumental scientific work, "Description d'Egypte," which began to come out ten years later, and which laid the foundations of the scientific study of the country. At Rosetta a French officer discovered the trilingual monument which gave Champollion the key to decipher hieroglyphics. At one of these meetings Bonaparte got into a dispute with Berthollet, and on being repeatedly contradicted by the latter, completely lost his temper, whereupon the great chemist quietly re-

[1] The number of those beheaded has been exaggerated in Royalist sources till it reaches the figure of 60,000. Napoleon put it at from 2000 to 2500, but other authorities consider even this number too high (*vide* Jonquière, III. 284).

marked: "You are wrong, friend, for you are being rude". And when Desgenettes (head of the medical staff) also sided with the savant, Napoleon angrily exclaimed: "It is quite evident you are all in league here. Chemistry is the scullery of medicine and medicine is the science of assassins." To which Desgenettes calmly retorted: "Then how would you define the art of the conqueror, Citizen General?"

The news of Turkey's declaration of war (which had been the cause of the revolt in Cairo in October), had been quite accurate, that of Djezzar's advance merely premature. In December, 1798, Bonaparte went to Suez to examine the traces of the old canal which had once connected the Nile with the Red Sea, and which might in future shorten the route to India. He also investigated the reputed site of Moses' miracle. He was still at Suez when tidings came that Achmed Pasha's troops had invaded Egypt and were occupying the frontier fortress of El Arisch. Immediately he began preparations for assuming the offensive in Syria. It was an opportunity for fresh victories and he seized it eagerly. He was also much relieved by some news he learnt about the end of January, 1799, from two Frenchmen, Hamelin and Livron, who had reached Alexandria on a merchantman from Ragusa, and who brought him word that the negotiations at Rastatt were still pending, and that Naples was the only State at war with France. This was precisely what Napoleon wanted to learn, that the great European war had not yet broken out, and also the probability that, kindled by the dispute with Naples, it would not be long delayed. He intended to return to France, as he had informed the Directory in October, and in a letter of February 10th, 1799, written before leaving for Syria, he again reminded them of that fact.[1]

[1] "If, during the month of March, Hamelin's information is confirmed, and if war breaks out between France and the monarchies, I shall return to France" ("Corr.," v. 3952). On the same day, before leaving for the East, he repeated this remark to Bourrienne ("Mémoires," II. 201). In his letter of October 7th, 1798 ("Corr.," v. 3439), he says: "Once I know what course Turkey means to follow, and once the country here is better ordered and the fortifications more advanced, I shall decide to go to Europe, especially if fresh news leads me to believe that the Continent

In the same letter he disclosed the plan he intended to pursue in his march into Syria. He meant not only to drive back the invasion, and by fortifying the frontier prevent the Syrian army co-operating with a second Turkish army (which would probably disembark in the Delta), but also, once in possession of Syria, to adopt more energetic measures against Turkey and deprive the English squadron of its source of supplies. The Syrian expedition was to restore the political prestige France had lost by the disaster to the fleet. There is a strong probability that Napoleon was secretly cherishing plans of much wider scope. On January 25th he had written Tippo Sahib, Sultan of Mysore, and sworn enemy of England, inviting his co-operation. He had also opened negotiations with the Shah of Persia with regard to halting-places for the troops on a march to India. Five years later he told Madame de Rémusat: "In Egypt I felt myself free from the cramping restraints of civilization. I had all sorts of plans in my head and saw the means of realizing my dreams. I imagined myself, after having founded a new religion, on my way to Asia, mounted on an elephant, a turban on my head, and in my hand a new Koran composed according to ideas of my own. I had meant to combine the experience of two hemispheres in my undertakings, ransacking history to serve my own ends, attacking the power of the English in India, and by this conquest coming into touch again with old Europe." Yet in a historical narrative it would be unwise to attach too much importance to these visionary schemes, for in Napoleon's case they were immediately subjected to the calm scrutiny of reason. He told Bourrienne in confidence that if, after completing the conquest of Egypt, he had been able to leave 15,000 men behind him and to advance

is not yet pacified". After the battle of Aboukir, and owing to the vigilance of the English cruisers, intercourse with France had become extremely difficult; even more so, too, after Turkey's declaration of war, when the Barbary States adopted a hostile attitude and so rendered communication between Tripoli and Egypt very uncertain. Hamelin's account of his intercourse with Bonaparte is preserved in the Paris Archives and reprinted by Guitry in his "L'Armée de Bonaparte en Egypte," p. 350.

with 30,000, he would have risked the expedition to India. As these conditions were lacking he confined himself to the Syrian expedition. "He was well aware," says Bourrienne in his memoirs, "that these plans were out of keeping with our small forces, the feebleness of the Government, and the soldiers' loathing of the desert." He was probably thinking more seriously then of another plan. Talleyrand relates in his memoirs that "he spoke several times of returning to Europe via Constantinople," which was not precisely the route to India. Yet it did not require great penetration to divine that, after making a triumphal entry into Stamboul, he neither intended to restore the throne of the Sultan Selim nor yet to replace the Ottoman Empire by a "united and indivisible republic".[1]

The conquest of the Holy Land was undertaken by four divisions (about 13,000 troops) under Kleber, Reynier, Lannes, and Bon. In Upper Egypt, Desaix opposed Murad, while Dugua and Marmont remained in the Delta. On February 20th, after a Turkish auxiliary corps had been defeated, the garrison of El Arish was induced to capitulate on being promised that they would be allowed to withdraw unmolested. On the 24th, the advanced guard reached Palestine, where the troops, exhausted by the fierce heat and maddened by thirst, were able to recuperate. Gaza soon fell into the hands of the French, for the enemy only numbered a few thousand and did not attempt a serious resistance. On March 4th, the fortress of Jaffa was invested, but here a more obstinate resistance was encountered. A French officer, sent to negotiate terms, was beheaded by the Turkish commander-in-chief, a deed which roused the troops to reckless fury. On March 7th, the batteries, consisting entirely of light field-pieces, succeeded in making a breach and immediately the place was carried by assault. Then followed a horrible carnage, the conquerors massacring in the streets all who fell into their hands. Of the 4500 Turks composing the garrison, 2000 had already been slain; the others withdrew fighting and took refuge in mosques, caravanseries, and a little citadel. On the following day,

[1] Talleyrand, "Mémoires," I. p. 262.

when two of Bonaparte's aides-de-camp appeared, the besieged Turks sent a message offering to surrender provided their lives were spared. The two officers, without seeking further orders, agreed to this condition, greatly to the annoyance of the commander-in-chief, for whom such a large number of prisoners was a most unwelcome encumbrance. No escort could be spared to send them to Egypt, to release them would only have been to strengthen the enemy, to incorporate them in the ranks presented difficulties quite as great, and meant so many more mouths to feed. Some of the generals whom Napoleon consulted were strongly in favour of letting the laws of war run their course, according to which the defenders of a fortress carried by assault forfeit their lives. Bonaparte then ordered the prisoners to be taken down to the beach and killed. Some were massacred, others driven into the sea and drowned.[1]

[1] History has generally condemned this cruel deed which military critics have justified, only, however, in so far as the Jaffa garrison is concerned. A staff-officer in the expeditionary army relates the following: "Contrary to the terms of the capitulation, the prisoners of El Arish were forced to bring up the rear. Bonaparte feared that instead of going to Bagdad, they might proceed to Jaffa or Acre, and so reinforce the enemy. After the storming of Jaffa the El Arish captives became restless and dissatisfied. They contended that Bonaparte had no longer any cause to fear that they would go to Jaffa, and that he ought, in accordance with the terms of the capitulation, to let them march to Bagdad. Bonaparte could not bring himself to consent to this, and as he had already made up his mind to get rid of the prisoners taken at Jaffa, he secretly had the captives of El Arish mixed up with the others and had them all massacred together on March 10th." [The actual date was March 9th.] ("Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine," xxxvi. 141). If this statement were true, no laws of war could justify such an iniquitous deed. And it is confirmed from other sources. A second eye-witness, Vigo Roussillon, relates that the captured garrison of Jaffa "suffered death with that of El Arish whom we had brought along behind us" ("Revue des deux Mondes," v. 100, p. 604). The official account of the incident as represented by Napoleon, Berthier, and others, gives the impression that the militia of El Arish had been released and had actually gone not to Bagdad but to Jaffa, where, contrary to their promise, they had taken part in its defence and had justly suffered the fate of the others. Rose, in his "Life of Napoleon," i. p. 204, cites in support of this view a

On March 19th, Bonaparte encamped outside Acre. To all appearance there was little to distinguish this fortress from those of El Arish and Jaffa which had been so easily captured. A superficial reconnaissance of the fortifications confirmed this impression, and as the heavy artillery ordered up from Alexandria had not yet arrived (assuming it had escaped the English cruisers) the commander-in-chief began the siege with the same means which had sufficed in the previous cases. But here things were quite different. The fortifications were much stronger than they looked, for the space behind the outer walls had a counterscarp. Then too, Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, whose ships were lying at anchor in the bay, kept the fortress supplied with food and ammunition, and had sent the Djezzar a very able engineer to superintend the defences—Picard de Phélipeaux. By a strange coincidence Bonaparte and Phélipeaux had sat side by side on the benches of the "École Militaire," and now they met again—this time as foes—the Corsican in the service of France, the Frenchman in the service of England.

To Bonaparte it was a matter of the highest importance that Acre should be speedily reduced, for war had now actually broken out in Europe. In March he received a dispatch from the Directory, dated November 4th, 1798, informing him that the Neapolitan troops were about to take the field under the command of the Austrian generals Mack and Sachsen, which was tantamount to a commencement of hostilities on Austria's part; further, that an Austrian division had entered the Grisons and had thus violated the neutrality of Switzerland,

letter of March 1st, from the Djezzar to Sir Sidney Smith, saying that those of his troops who had not been able to hold El Arish and had also had to abandon Gaza, were at Jaffa in great fear of the French. But here the Turks meant are not those who defended El Arish, but those who had not succeeded in relieving the fortress. Other trustworthy witnesses, such as Detroye, an officer in the Engineers, from whose diary Waas gives quotations in the "Hist. Vierteljahrschrift," 1903, makes no mention of the El Arish captives. Malus in his Agenda (p. 123) says their treatment was perfidious because, contrary to agreement, they were not set at liberty, but that they all escaped at a favourable opportunity, which is highly probable.

France's ally. In view of these complications the Directory had ordered a levy of 200,000 troops and had given command of the Army of the Rhine to Jourdan, and that of the Army of Italy, where the decisive battles would in all likelihood be fought, to Joubert. As for Bonaparte himself, he was to be guided by circumstances and to rely on his own judgment. The Directory not being in a position to support him, refrained from sending orders or instructions. The letter concludes: "As it would be very difficult for you at the present juncture to accomplish the return voyage to France, there seems to be only three courses open to you: to remain in Egypt, so arranging that you will be safe against all attacks from the Turks—in which case you will not forget that there are seasons of the year very unwholesome for Europeans; or to press on to India, where, once you have arrived, you will be sure to find numbers of people ready to join you in destroying the power of the English; or lastly, to march on Constantinople against the enemy threatening you". Accompanying this letter were newspapers down to the month of February, which the Genoese consul had forwarded by the same courier, and which told that not only had war actually broken out against Naples and Sardinia, but that the Russians were advancing on Italy. This was simply confirming the information which had led Bonaparte to write his letter of February 10th, to the Directory, apprising them of his probable return. He at once informed General Dommartin privately that he intended returning to France with a few of his generals.[1] From the tenor of their letter the Directory evinced small desire to have him back in Europe, but on the other hand they did not show much confidence of success in

[1] Richardot, one of the officers on Dommartin's staff, relates in his memoirs, "Outside Acre General Bonaparte informed General Dommartin of the bad news he had received from France and of his immediate intention of returning with a number of generals, Dommartin being one of them. The latter consented, as one can readily believe. I can vouch for this, for a few days later General Dommartin took me into his confidence and told me I would in that case be one of the officers who would return with him" ("Nouveaux Mémoires," p. 188). Dommartin, however, fell before Napoleon's departure.

the war. Now, he reckoned, he had only this "heap of stones" to conquer and then, covered with the glory of having outshone the exploits of the crusaders, he would return alone to Europe. In the end of March, in spite of Kleber's protests, he ordered an immediate attack on the fortifications.

But Acre did not surrender. The assault was driven off and success gave confidence to the besieged. Good cannon, directed by English gunners, wrought dire havoc amongst the French; Albanian sharpshooters threatened instant death to any one who imprudently exposed himself; brave Caffarelli, a distinguished general in the Engineers, died from the effects of a wound got in the trenches. Frequent sorties kept the besiegers constantly on the alert, while to add to their difficulties, a relieving force, organized at Damascus, had crossed the Jordan, and Kleber's division which had been sent against it, was soon surrounded by vastly superior forces, and in spite of heroic efforts was now in a perilous plight. Napoleon was obliged to go to their rescue, and on April 16th, he won a brilliant victory at the foot of Mount Tabor, scattering the hordes of the enemy, the remnants of whom were driven across the Jordan by Murat.

Meanwhile the besiegers had not been idle. Mines had been laid, but with small success. The assault had been renewed time after time; and all in vain. Finally they changed the point of attack, but with no better success than before, for Phélipeaux had constructed a second line of defence within the fortress and had also barricaded the streets. On May 8th, 1799, with dauntless courage, yet another assault was made, but was foiled by these various obstructions, only a few hundred of the most foolhardy grenadiers reaching the interior of the town, where they were ultimately forced to surrender to the English. Soon, too, plague broke out in the French camp, ammunition ran short, and as if to cut off all hope of success, a Turkish squadron landed reinforcements. On May 16th, the last decisive attack was made on the now almost ruined town; it failed like its predecessors. To have persisted would have been futile and disastrous, as

well as highly prejudicial to Bonaparte's prestige with his troops, whom he had sacrificed unmercifully. The two days alone, May 7th and 8th, had cost the French nearly 3000 troops and two generals. The soldiers began to murmur and to compare their self-willed and inconsiderate commander-in-chief with the humane Kleber, and there were even some who wished the chief command transferred to the latter. Napoleon now resolved to retreat to Egypt. The more his chance of capturing Acre dwindled, the more he had expatiated upon the marvellous schemes he meant to undertake once the siege had succeeded. He would arm the malcontents of Syria with the weapons captured at Acre, march upon Damascus and Aleppo, proclaim the downfall of the tyranny of the Pashas, and with his army reinforced by these hordes, advance upon Constantinople. "I shall then overthrow the Turkish Empire," said he to Bourrienne. "I shall found a new and mighty empire which will secure my fame with posterity, and perhaps return to France by Adrianople and Vienna, after having annihilated the Hapsburg dynasty." But already tidings had come in that a Turkish army under Mustapha Pasha, which had been seen off Rhodes, was to be disembarked in the Delta of the Nile, and he saw clearly that if it were not defeated all would be lost. The splendid dreams woven by his fertile imagination, and never with more luxuriance than when facts denied him the glory he aimed at, vanished at once before the hard grip of iron-handed necessity. He afterwards declared to Madame de Rémusat that "his imagination died outside Acre". However that may be, it is evident from his letters written there during April, that, whether the fortress fell or not, he meant to return to Cairo.[1] Still there was always the possibility of founding an empire elsewhere than in Asia.

On May 20th they raised the siege and began the retreat

[1] To Marmont he wrote on April 14th, 1799, "In the course of May, I shall be in Egypt," and to Dugua on April 19th, "Acre will fall on the 6th Floreal (April 25th) and I shall leave immediately for Cairo. I shall not reply in detail as I shall soon be back," etc. ("Corr.," v. 4091, 4100, 4102, 4103).

amid terrible hardships. Here is a description by an eye-witness of the march from Acre to Jaffa: "Devouring thirst, total lack of water, excessive heat, and the exhausting march across the burning sands demoralized the men, drove out all generous sentiments, and filled them with brutal selfishness or distressing indifference. I have seen officers with amputated limbs flung out of the litters which had been ordered for their transport, even when the bearers had been paid in advance for their labour. Those suffering from wounds or amputations, and those affected by plague, or even suspected of it, were all abandoned. Our march was lit up by the torches which were to set fire to the towns, villages, hamlets, and the rich harvests in the fields. The whole country was in flames. We were surrounded by dying men, pillagers, and incendiaries. By the wayside lay the dying, pleading piteously that they were not plague-stricken but only wounded, and to prove the truth of what they said, tearing off their bandages. But no one believed them. Even the sun which shines with such brilliance in this clear atmosphere, was obscured by the smoke caused by our incessant incendiarism. On our right lay the sea, on the left the desert we had ourselves created, before us toils and privations; such was our plight." Besides this, they were surrounded by swarms of Naplousans, one of whom fired on Napoleon, who had fallen asleep one day on horseback while on the march. On May 24th, they reached Jaffa. Here Napoleon remained for five days in order to destroy the fortifications and to arrange for the transport of the sick and wounded, the majority of whom were sent by sea, the others by land. Here, too, plague had broken out. Napoleon himself hurried through the hospital wards, telling the sick that the walls had been destroyed and that he must return to Egypt to defend it from the enemies who were advancing. "In a few hours the Turks will be here. Let all those who are able to rise come with us; they will be carried on litters and on horseback."[1] What of those

[1] Bourrienne, II. 250, 257. The statement that some of the wounded had also been left behind as recorded in Vigo Roussillon's memoirs, is contradicted in a letter from Chief Surgeon Larrey given by Triaire, in "Dominique Larrey," p. 256.

who were not even able for that? Upwards of thirty who were suffering from plague were left behind. Tradition has greatly exaggerated this visit to the Jaffa hospital, both in literature and art. Malevolent critics have accused Napoleon of conniving at crime because he had thought of saving those left behind from the savage cruelty of the Turks by having narcotics administered so as to ensure them an easy and painless death. He has never denied the charge, and at St. Helena he argued with his doctor that it was the most reasonable thing to do, and that had his own son been so circumstanced, he would have wished him to have been so treated.[1]

On the army toiled, with their ranks sadly thinned, past Ascalon and Gaza, and then for nine weary days across the burning sands of the desert,[2] a march smaller in extent but similar in horror to the terrible retreat from the pitiless snows of Russia, which, thirteen years later, preluded the turn in the Emperor's fortunes. France had sacrificed 5000 lives without having produced the slightest impression on the Porte. Least of all had Napoleon's ambition been satisfied, though he was now most careful that the truth should

[1] *Vide* the letter of Dr. Warden given in Hérisson's "Le Cabinet Noir," p. 233. Degenettes relates in his "Histoire medicale de l'armée d'Orient" (2nd edition, 1830, p. 245), that he had rejected Napoleon's views on the subject but that the latter had obtained others to carry out his purpose, and in this way from twenty-five to thirty were served with poison. Some, however, were not fatally affected and their lives were afterwards spared by Sir Sidney Smith, who entered the city with the Turks. Larrey (Triaire, p. 258) declares there was no opium available and denies the whole tale. But there were certainly sick men left behind at Jaffa, for Sir Sidney Smith found seven of them still alive (*vide* Rose, i. 212). The general's visit to the plague-stricken in the hospital at Jaffa, immortalized in Gros' canvas, did not take place on the retreat, but in March, five days after the town was captured, and according to Degenettes (the head physician), Maure (the steward) and others, was of a heroic nature, Napoleon, in order to overcome the soldiers' fear of the plague, helping to carry out the dead body of a plague-stricken man.

[2] In the desert between Syria and the Nile the thermometer registered 34° Réamur (108° Fahr.) when exposed to the air, and 42° Réamur (125° Fahr.) in contact with the ground.

not leak out. On April 10th, 1799, when he was still besieging Acre, he wrote to the Directory saying that he had gained his object, and that, as the season was now unfavourable, and he was required in Egypt, after reducing the fortress to ruins, he would recross the desert. In another dispatch, May 27th, he declared he could have occupied the town, but had not done so as he learned from his scouts that plague was raging there. (What a pity his scouts had not found that out sooner!) In a bulletin of May 16th, announcing his victory to the Divan of Cairo, he stated that he was bringing back a great many prisoners and flags, that he had razed the Djezzar's palace to the ground, also the walls of Acre, and had bombarded the town till not one stone was left upon another. The inhabitants, he declared, had all fled by way of the sea, while the Djezzar, who was wounded, had withdrawn with his followers to a fortress. He even consoled his troops with the audacious misstatement that in a few days they might have hoped to capture the Pasha of Syria in his own palace, but that owing to the season of the year and to the fact that the Turks might land meanwhile in Egypt, the capture of Acre was not worth the loss of time.[1] When his secretary demurred at this perversion of facts, he bluntly told him he was a simpleton who worried about trifles and did not understand matters of that kind.[2]

In the middle of June the Syrian army, now only some 8000 strong, entered Cairo in triumph. Soon after Napoleon learned from Marmont, who was at Alexandria, that 100 Turkish ships under Sir Sidney Smith's escort had sailed into Aboukir Bay on July 11th, and had disembarked nearly 18,000 soldiers.[3] The two Beys, Ibrahim and Murad, whom Desaix

[1] "Corr.," v. 4124, 4136, 4138, 4156.

[2] At St. Helena, when reading over his Egyptian proclamations, he exclaimed, "C'est un peu charlatan". (Gourgaud, "Journal," I. p. 168.)

[3] The number varies according to English and French estimates between 8000 and 18,000. The former figure is undoubtedly too low; the latter, in comparison with the number of transport ships, too high. It would scarcely be possible to embark more than 15,000 troops on a hundred Turkish transports. This number occurs in the letters of Napoleon and is certainly not too low an estimate.

had hitherto kept at a respectful distance, were evidently aware of this fact, for Ibrahim now reappeared on the Syrian frontier, while Murad with a few hundred Mamelukes tried to reach the North, both of them in the intention of co-operating with the newly-landed Turks. As Alexandria had been fortified by the French, the Turks had entrenched themselves on the peninsula of Aboukir. Here Napoleon decided to attack them and that as speedily as possible. Ere long Murad was driven back to the south and Ibrahim kept under observation. In order to obtain a greater concentration of the forces, Desaix was recalled from Upper Egypt, and the commander-in-chief, at the head of all his available troops (about 6000 men and 2000 reserves)—then advanced upon the enemy. The plan of action, rapidly thought out and executed at Aboukir with brilliant success on July 25th, 1799, was in every way characteristic of Napoleon, for it was based on his principles of concentrating his forces before giving battle, turning all his resources to account during the action, and aiming at the annihilation of his enemy. His success, moreover, was greatly facilitated by the defective disposition of the Turkish troops. After their left wing had been surrounded and driven into the sea, their right wing shared the same fate. Lannes' troops then succeeded in capturing a commanding redoubt round which Murat and his cavalry had ridden with reckless hardihood, and as this constituted the strongest point of the Turkish centre, their position was no longer tenable. Only a remnant of the Turkish forces escaped to the fortress on the extreme point of the peninsula where they were soon starved out and forced to capitulate a week later. Napoleon wrote—and truthfully—to Cairo: "You will have learned from the staff the result of the battle of Aboukir, one of the most brilliant victories I have ever seen. Of the Turkish army recently disembarked not one man has escaped."

After this triumph there was only one thing lacking to satisfy his selfish ambition—to know that the second assumption on which he had acted in going to Egypt had been realized. He now learned that the war which had meanwhile broken out in Europe was proving disastrous to France,

thereby bringing the Government at Paris into discredit but enhancing his own personal importance. Hence the possibility of a resolute and successful soldier grasping the power for himself. Ere long Napoleon was destined to have even his inferences confirmed.

Since the message which had reached him outside Acre Napoleon had received no further communication from the Directory, and was therefore unaware that in May, 1799, Admiral Bruix had been ordered to combine his squadron with the Spanish fleet, defeat the English in the Mediterranean, and then bring the troops home from Egypt. But the Spaniards refused to co-operate and so the scheme fell through. Also, a letter which the Directory sent him on May 26th, advising him of Bruix's mission and recalling him to Europe, had failed to reach him.[1]

Nevertheless he learned what he wanted. It is almost certain he got news from his brothers, via Tunis, through the French consuls at Genoa and Ancona, who were devoted to his interests. Here again luck came to his aid. Outside Alexandria, Sir Sidney Smith was lying at anchor, negotiating with Bonaparte about the release of prisoners, and keenly enjoying his self-appointed task of keeping Bonaparte posted up in the latest news of the French reverses in Italy, where Scherer had been defeated in April and the Cisalpine Republic dissolved. To confirm the truth of these statements he sent Bonaparte a packet of the most recent newspapers, adding quite gratuitously that he had instructions to prevent the

[1] Here is a passage from this letter, signed by three of the Directors: "The extraordinary efforts that Austria and Russia are putting forth, the serious and almost alarming turn the war has taken, compel the Republic to concentrate all her forces. The Directory has accordingly commanded Admiral Bruix to use every effort to make himself master of the Mediterranean and to bring the army under your control back from Egypt. You will judge if you can safely leave part of your force behind, in which case the Directory gives you full power to hand over the command of the troops to whomsoever you think fit. The Directory would be gratified to see you at the head of the Republican armies which you have commanded hitherto with such brilliant success" (Boulay de la Meurthe, p. 126).

return of the army as desired by the Directory. That at once decided Napoleon to carry out a plan he had long had in view. The words in which he communicated his decision to Marmont reveal the course of action he was about to follow. "I have decided to return to France," said he, "and I intend to take you with me. The state of affairs in Europe compels me to take this important step. Our armies have been unsuccessful and it is hard to say how far the enemy may have advanced. Italy is lost, and with it the price of so much strenuous effort and so many lives sacrificed. But what can one expect from the incapable men who are at the head of affairs? Theirs is a rule of ignorance, folly, and corruption. I alone have borne the burden and by constant successes have strengthened the Government which, without me, would neither have been able to get into power nor keep there. When I leave, everything falls to pieces. Let us not wait till the ruin is complete. The news of my return will reach France simultaneously with that of the destruction of the Turkish army at Aboukir. My presence will raise the people's spirits, restore to the troops their lost confidence, and to good citizens their hope of happier days to come." He only confided his purpose to a select few, the majority of his generals were left in ignorance. The two frigates lying at anchor in the harbour of Alexandria were fitted out for the voyage with the greatest secrecy, and no sooner had Sir Sidney Smith left for Cyprus to renew his water supply, than Napoleon took advantage of this fortunate coincidence and left for Europe. The English admiral had evidently never suspected that the commander-in-chief would leave without his army. On the night of August 21st, Napoleon set sail, accompanied only by a few devoted followers, Berthier, Lannes, Marmont, Murat, Andréossy, Bessières, Duroc, Monge, Berthollet, Bourrienne, and a few hundred soldiers of the Guard. The chief command of the army in Egypt was entrusted by written order to Kleber, whose uncompromising honesty had made him obnoxious to Napoleon.

Although Napoleon does not seem to have felt that he was in honour bound to remain with the troops who had been

entrusted to his leadership and who had served him in his ambitious plans with heroic devotion, yet it is hardly fair to accuse him, as some have done, of having deserted them.[1] His position with the Directory was certainly exceptional. When he left for Egypt it was an understood thing that he would return during the autumn of 1798 and take over the command of the Army of England. But it was not intended that the whole of the expeditionary force should return, as the idea then was to found a colony and lay out plantations which would need to be constantly protected. The Directory's letter of November 4th, 1798, which reached him during the siege of Acre, left him, as we saw, full liberty to act as he thought best. He himself had repeatedly and openly announced his approaching return to France, which he would not have done had it been contrary to his instructions. Undoubtedly, however, he was guided entirely by consideration for his own private interests and ambition. So far as he was concerned there was nothing more to be gained in Egypt and everything to lose. The position of the expeditionary army was bound to become more and more critical, for Napoleon's assertion that he was leaving it just after a victory in the field which would secure it from attack for a long time, was not strictly in accordance with facts. He was silent, too, upon the effect of the destruction of the fleet at Aboukir, though long afterwards at St. Helena he let it escape that after the loss of his fleet he was convinced the expedition would end in disaster, since any army which is unable to recruit, must ultimately capitulate. He prudently refrained from touching upon other matters which honest Kleber exposed in a letter to Talleyrand, viz. that the army, now reduced

[1] Thiébault represents this attitude in his memoirs and especially reproaches Napoleon for having taken generals with him who ought only to leave their posts on orders from the Government. Larevellière-Lepaux in his "Mémoires," II. 349 uses the word "desertion," declaring that Bonaparte returned on his own initiative "without him having been allowed much less commanded to do so; which could only have been after the renewal of the Directory, in the middle of Prairial." That is not so, for the letter from the Directory recalling Bonaparte was dated March 26th, and the change in the Directory in Prairial took place on June 18th.

to half its numbers, was short of ammunition and clothing; that the population of Egypt whom the Sultan had stirred up to animosity against the Christians, was ready to revolt at any moment; that fresh Turkish troops were advancing; that Alexandria was almost defenceless, since the heavy artillery had been lost in the Syrian campaign and the rest taken to equip Napoleon's two frigates; finally, that the difficulties of the situation were aggravated by the want of money, the arrears of pay due the troops amounting to 4,000,000 francs—and Napoleon had left not a *sou* in the treasury, nothing but debts.[1] As the expeditionary army was thus in a critical plight and the maintenance of French authority dependent upon it, Napoleon could not mend matters by remaining behind. The only help that could avail must come from France; hence his return at this crisis stands free from blame. As we shall see, he did not leave his Egyptian expedition in the lurch after his return to France.

Much has been said of Napoleon's courage in sailing the Mediterranean in the midst of enemies. It is a matter of opinion if it did not require greater courage under the circumstances to stay behind. In this courage Napoleon would certainly not have been found wanting, had not his ambition at this crisis spurred him on to grasp the power in France. He had long been resolved as to the course of action he meant to pursue, nor did he lack for devoted followers to further his plans. These, indeed, had very nearly been realized by a *coup d'état* shortly before he left for Egypt. The fact that the vast proportion of the Eastern troops were strongly Republican may have made it easier for him to leave them behind, and it probably suited him much better to feel

[1] This dispatch fell into the hands of the English and was afterwards published. Napoleon attempted to contradict it, but in view of the facts now in our possession his attempt cannot be considered successful. (Cp. Dugua's letter to Napoleon, August 26th, 1799, given in Vitry's "L'Armée en Egypte," where his departure is characterized as "flight".) When Napoleon cavils at the losses in the army as given by Kleber and corrected these figures by the number of troops returning later, he overlooked the fact that the gifted and considerate Kleber had partly succeeded in filling the gaps in the divisions by means of natives.

they were far from France when he was actually engaged in carrying out his designs.[1] During the Italian campaign he had acted entirely on his own initiative, had conducted himself in the conquered country like a monarch, and had negotiated and concluded the treaties of Leoben and Campo Formio on behalf of France, as if he already were one. In Egypt, where he had been even more completely his own master, his greed of power had found fresh sustenance, his ardent longing to rule alone had struck even deeper roots. He could scarcely think of himself any longer without a crown. Now, however, it seemed to him easier to pluck it from the blighted Tree of Liberty of the Revolution than to seek for it in the interminable sands of the desert.

[1] "The great majority of the army," relates Vertray, one of the officers, "was Republican at heart. Shortly before Bonaparte's departure, Colonel Boyer of the 18th demi-brigade, said, 'Bonaparte, as a general of the Republic, will always find me ready to follow him anywhere; but if I suspected he would ever become a Cæsar he would find me the first Brutus to plunge a dagger into his heart'" (Galli, p. 142).

CHAPTER VI.

THE *COUP D'ÉTAT* AND THE CONSULATE.

In those days when wind and weather reigned supreme, the duration of the voyage between Egypt and France depended greatly upon the season of the year. From early spring till autumn when the north wind blew pretty steadily, it was an easy voyage from Toulon to Alexandria, but a tedious one back. Consequently, the two frigates, "Muiron" and "Carrère" (the former with Napoleon on board) sailed for France at a very unfavourable time of year. It was solely the chance of eluding Sir Sidney Smith's vigilance that had induced them to put to sea in August. The contrary winds compelled them to alter their course, and instead of steering direct for Toulon to skirt the northern shores of Africa. They made little progress, some days they were even driven back ten miles and only made up their lost way at night when there was a breeze off the shore. In spite of their impatience and the constant danger of being overtaken by the enemy in their rear, it was three weeks before they reached the headlands of Carthage. When at last the wind did change and favoured the homeward-bound frigates, their perils began in real earnest; for they had to sail through the narrow passage between Tunis and Sicily which was guarded by a cruiser belonging to Nelson's fleet (then anchored at Syracuse), and if it discovered the frigates, the dread admiral would be upon them at once. Luckily for them, however, they passed by night with all their lights out, unobserved, and sailing close to the western shores of Sardinia they steered northwards on to Corsica. Here in the beginning of October, the wind veering to the north-west, they were detained for several days, to Napoleon's intense annoyance. At Ajaccio he was deluged with visits from relatives

of both sexes, god-children, and all who wished to claim kinship with him. But of these visits the only one that gave him any real pleasure, was the meeting with his old nurse, whose joyous welcome of "*Caro figlio!*" went straight to his heart. He pointed out, not without a certain pride, the former possessions of the Bonaparte family, and took his companions hunting with him in the neighbouring thickets. This was the last time Napoleon saw his birthplace.

As if his programme were destined to be fulfilled point by point, at Ajaccio he learned that the French armies had met with fresh reverses—at Trebbia on June 19th, and again on August 15th, at Novi; also that General Joubert had been killed. He was further informed that the Directory had been defeated in a dispute with the Legislative Body and had been forced to admit some new members, among them Sieyès, upon whom Napoleon at that time placed great reliance. All this news was therefore thoroughly satisfactory, and he at once decided to change his destination. Instead of going first to the theatre of war in Italy as he originally intended, taking over the command there, and by fresh victories commending himself to the nation as their deliverer in time of need, and then attacking the Directory, he now resolved to go direct to Paris, and abandoned the detour by the battlefields as a pure waste of time.

His first concern therefore was to reach the shores of France as quickly as possible. But although so near the goal and so many dangers already passed, this was to prove a much more difficult task than one would have expected. At last the wind changed, and with a favouring breeze they sailed from Corsica. On October 8th, they were steering for Toulon, and the islands of Hyères were already in sight, when suddenly, at sunset, they discovered the English squadron bearing down upon them. It was a critical moment; for the English had also sighted the frigates and had immediately given chase. Bonaparte's admiral wanted to turn at once and make for Corsica, but Napoleon insisted on his continuing the voyage and holding to the north. He had decided that if it came to the worst, he would lower a small

boat and make for land alone. Once more fortune favoured the brave. In the distance the English were misled by the apparent direction of the Frenchmen's sails, and thinking they were steering north-east followed quickly in pursuit. Night coming on prevented them finding out their mistake in time, and so the hard-pressed frigates escaped. Next morning, on October 9th, they anchored in safety in Fréjus Bay. In a twinkling the news of Bonaparte's arrival had spread through the town and the sea was alive with small boats eager to escort the general to the shore. Neither here nor at Ajaccio was he troubled with quarantine restrictions, no small saving of time. Even more precious to him was the conviction arising from this enthusiastic welcome that public opinion had veered round greatly in his favour. Marmont relates that one of the local orators addressed him publicly in these words: "Go and fight the enemy and defeat him, general, and then we will make you a king if you like!"

After a short rest, Napoleon continued his journey without halting till he reached Aix, whence he sent a messenger with a carefully worded letter announcing his arrival to the Directory. The letter began by stating that the general had received a Government dispatch of November 4th, of the previous year, from which he concluded that war was about to break out in Europe; the fact that he did not immediately place himself at their disposal was due to the invasion of the Turks, which had to be quelled before he was free to return; the voyage home he would have risked in any case, even though he had had to do it "in a small boat, wrapped in his cloak". He also mentioned that he had left everything admirably organized in Egypt. At the same time, he took the precaution to arrange that the letter would reach Paris very little in advance of himself.

From Aix onward he pushed forward rapidly. It was a veritable triumphal procession. Words failed the general's companions to describe the wild enthusiasm of his reception all along the line of route from Lyons to Paris. The different towns vied with one another in showing homage to the

man whom they regarded not so much as the victor over a distant foe, as the leader who was to rescue the country from internal dissensions, settle the conflicting claims of Bourbons and Anarchy, and heal the sickness that had so long prostrated the political life of the nation.[1] Nor was this feeling confined to the provinces. At Paris the news of his arrival produced the same effect and was hailed with the same wild enthusiasm. Since the early days of the Revolution, popular expectation had not centred so upon one name as it did now when all were longing to see an end of this political unrest. Yet only eighteen months before these very people had shown small regret on seeing this man leave on a perilous venture in a distant land. What was it that had so quickly and deeply affected public opinion and realized the calculations Napoleon had founded upon the change? To answer this question we must look closely at the events which had been taking place in France during his absence.

After the *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor, the Directory had sought to prevent a recurrence of the danger to which they were exposed through the Conservative party being in the majority. For this purpose they had recourse to a system by means of which a Radical minority had once before maintained itself in power; they set up a tyrannical dictatorship which muzzled the organs of the Opposition press, proscribed the nobility and the clergy, compelled over a hundred thousand men of means to emigrate, banished political opponents to the colonies, and thereby paved the way for the return of those elements which had been driven into obscurity by the events of the 9th Thermidor. Such were the despotic methods by which the Directors now sought to retain their supremacy. In order to secure their position and their policy, Barras,

[1] Barante relates in his memoirs (I. 44): "On the highroad I met the carriage with Bonaparte returning from Egypt. It is difficult to convey any idea of the enthusiasm aroused by the news of his return. . . . Without knowing what he meant to do, or forecasting what might happen, every one, in all ranks of society, was convinced he would put an end to the death-struggle in which France was perishing. People embraced one another in the streets, hastened to the line of route, and endeavoured to see him."

Rewbell, and Larevellière, were holding millions of their countrymen in terrified subjection and ruining the property of the nation.

Soon, however, the Directory was forced to see that the Radicals, their allies of the 18th Fructidor, might prove as dangerous as the Conservatives or the monarchical party. The quieter and law-abiding elements had certainly been vanquished, but the partisans of the Reign of Terror were again asserting themselves arrogantly. Jacobin clubs, although forbidden, were constantly being founded, and by their old methods of co-operation and their catch-word of "political virtue" (in contradistinction to the corruption of Barras and his colleagues) they managed to control the elections in April, 1798, when a third of the Council of Five Hundred was being renewed. The supporters of the Directory were left in the minority and the Directory found itself menaced by a preponderance of extremists and in as great danger from them as it had been in the previous year from the Conservatives. But there was one means which they had already used successfully in summer and meant to use again—the violation of the Constitution. Instead of declaring the elections illegal because carried out under pressure of terror, and ordering new elections, the Directory induced the Five Hundred to confirm the election of the members favourable to the existing Government and to exclude sixty Radical members (May 11th, 22nd Floreal). All that was gained by this proceeding, however, was that neither of the two great parties in the country any longer supported the Government. The Conservatives detested it and since the 18th Fructidor had been its sworn enemies, while since the 22nd Floreal the Jacobins had been equally hostile.

The Directory was now secure only so long as the army remained loyal. But even there, party spirit was strong. Moreau, for instance, belonged to the Conservatives, Jourdan to the Jacobins, and among both officers and privates there was a deeply rooted and increasing dislike to this "Government of lawyers". Its position, therefore, was liable to become precarious, unless a European war broke out soon and

diverted these various discontents into another channel. And that is what happened.

As on the 13th Vendémiaire, so again on the 18th Fructidor, the peace party was defeated. The sudden rupture of the negotiations with England, the insolent demands of the envoyés at Rastatt, Bernadotte's provocative attitude at Vienna, the deliberate friction with the lawful powers in Italy and Switzerland, the virulence of the Republican propaganda in Southern Germany and the encroachments in the East, could not fail to kindle a new European conflagration which would tax the country's strength to the utmost and meanwhile prolong the authority of her rulers. Now, too, France had raised up for herself a new and bitter enemy in Russia. Exasperated by the help France had openly extended to the Poles,[1] by her occupation of the Ionian Isles, her secret alliances with the restless elements in the Balkan Peninsula, her expedition to the East, and worst of all, her seizure of Malta, whose Knights had only recently elected the Czar their protector, Russia now stood forth as the adversary of France and the champion of the principle of Legitimacy threatened and combated by the Republic and her agents.

When news came of the destruction of the French fleet and of Bonaparte being shut up in Egypt, an alliance was concluded between Russia, England, and Turkey (who was seriously affected by the French aggressions in the East) and the Czar was eager to take the offensive. On the other hand, contrary to Thugut's advice, England, or rather Nelson, had induced the King of Naples to commence hostilities against the French who were occupying the Papal States. But this enterprise was premature and proved a miserable failure. For although the French general, Championnet, evacuated Rome, he defeated the Neapolitan troops under the Austrian General Mack a few days later (December 4th, 1798), and then marched upon Naples. Here, after having compelled the King to fly to Sicily, he founded the "Parthenopean Republic" with a Constitution similar to that of France. This was

[1] A corps of Polish volunteers had served in Bonaparte's army.

a fresh step towards French ascendancy throughout the whole of Italy, and nowhere was its effect more keenly felt than at the Viennese Court, whose Sovereign was connected by ties of kinship with the royal house of Naples. All relations between Austria and France had been broken off when Bernadotte, the French ambassador, left Vienna, nor had the conferences at Selz between Cobenzl and the ex-Director François de Neufchateau succeeded in re-establishing them. France refused to entertain Austria's demands for compensation in Italy, and so the negotiations proved fruitless. Meanwhile Italy was becoming more and more republican. In December, 1798, when Naples was incorporated within the French sphere of influence, the revolutionary movement in Piedmont became so acute that the King abdicated and withdrew to the Island of Sardinia. Nor was Austria more fortunate elsewhere. In Germany the revolutionary propaganda had been prosecuted with great vigour. The negotiators at Rastatt and a French envoy at the Ratisbon Diet were commissioned to incite the lesser German Princes against their Emperor. Both at Munich (where the Kurfurst Max Joseph and his Minister Montgelas, had established a regime friendly to France), and at Stuttgart, French emissaries were at work endeavouring to form a South German league against Austria and to foster the republican spirit in the towns of Suabia. It seemed as if the Italian experiences were to be repeated in Germany. The illegal occupation of the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein after its capitulation in January, 1799, brought matters to a crisis. The outbreak of hostilities was only a question of weeks, for Russia and Austria had now come to an understanding and a Russian auxiliary corps had entered Galicia. When therefore France demanded that these troops should be withdrawn, adding that failure to comply with this request would be regarded as *casus belli*, all hope of maintaining peace was at an end. The Russians continued their advance and Thugut ignored the French threats. Early in March the French crossed the Rhine, the Austrians under the Archduke Charles the Lech, and on March 12th, 1799, France de-

clared war against Austria. As if the situation were not sufficiently serious, the congress at Rastatt ended in a tragedy. On April 28th, soon after leaving the town, the French envoys, Bonnier, Roberjot, and Debry, who were known to be implicated in the political disturbances in Southern Germany and to have valuable papers in their possession, were attacked by some Austrian hussars and murdered, Debry alone escaping. Although this heinous deed was due to a misunderstanding, and as remote from the intentions of the Vienna Government as from those of the Archduke in command, it greatly embittered the existing animosity.[1]

[1] The valuable "Contributions to the History of the Murder of the Rastatt Envoys," by the Austrian captain, Criste, in the "Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegsarchivs of 1899," have not succeeded in weakening the firm conviction that the perpetrators of the deed were Szekler hussars. Indeed the documents adduced lend fresh support to that belief, e.g. the Archduke Charles writes on May 1st to Kospoth, the F.M.L. commander of the corps: "From the memoranda sent in by the F.M.L. and the dispatches from Colonel Barbaczy I have learned that the French envoys were surprised and massacred outside Rastatt by troops from this side (Criste, 215). In the colonel's dispatch the motive of the deed is attributed to a 'misunderstanding,' 'that according to the rumours lately all too prevalent, they were Frenchmen who meant to attack us'" (Criste, 194). On May 18th the Archduke entreated his imperial brother's consideration for Schmidt, the head of the general staff, who, during the brief illness of the commander-in-chief, undertook the duties at headquarters, and in a private letter to Mayer (the head of Kospoth's staff) had expressed his hatred of the spying French envoys in remarks which the addressee misconstrued. "Mayer gave the contents of this confidential letter a meaning of his own, and so the matter went from bad to worse, for in the lower ranks the story received several additions and finally led up to the unfortunate event." (Hüffer, Der Rastatter Gesandtenmord; *vide* also Criste). On September 2nd the Prince wrote to the Emperor that after the Reichstag (to which the investigation had been entrusted) had referred the matter to the head of the Empire, "there were only two ways of terminating the matter; first, either by making the affair public in its true aspect, or second, by giving it a different turn, so that the massacre would appear to have been the work of foreigners and not the Szekler hussars. If the former way was chosen, the question of satisfaction would immediately arise. No punishment can be meted out to the hussars themselves because they were acting upon orders. Satisfaction could only be obtained from those who had caused the deed." Among the latter he classed General Schmidt, Lieutenant-Colonel Mayer,

One would naturally expect that as the Directory had deliberately provoked the war by their policy, they would have made adequate preparations for coping with the danger facing them. But now it was plainly seen how disastrously the system of government pursued by the leaders had reacted upon the country's affairs. The finances had fallen into hopeless disorder and the contributions levied on neighbouring States were not sufficient to meet the deficit. Recourse was had to indirect taxation; the existing taxes on doors and windows, for instance, were doubled. The army, to which the Government looked as its last resource, missed the capable and energetic administration of Carnot, who was in exile, while Bonaparte, its ablest general, was away in the distant East. In September, 1798, military conscription was instituted, according to which all unmarried Frenchmen between the ages of 20 and 25 were held available for service as settled by lot, and orders were given forthwith for a levy of 200,000 men. But the law did not effect the desired re-

the Brigadier-Generals Merveldt and Görger, but he disapproved of this way, as it might compromise the prestige of the Court and the army (Criste, 382). Criste's surmise that the Archduke had not sufficient information on the subject, does not hold good, because the text of the above letter presupposes a knowledge of the real aspect of the case and the same information for himself as for the Emperor. This letter and the original reports from the officers on April 29th, admitting the deed (Criste, 187, 193), nullify the protocol (given on pp. 233-43, from a duplicate in the Vienna State Archives) of the Villinger Investigation Committee of May, 1799, before whom the officers and soldiers sought to prove their innocence. In any case the Archduke, who was sure to be fully informed, does not seem to have considered it of pressing importance, otherwise he would not have spoken again in September to the Emperor of the hussars' share. Compare also Bray, "aus dem Leben eines Diplomaten der alten Schule" (1901), 35-52. The wild excesses of public opinion in France against the Emperor Francis and his Government, both perfectly innocent in the matter, and the war itself, relieved the Vienna Court from the necessity of rendering satisfaction. Later on such was no longer demanded, as in Paris this misdeed was laid to the account of the Directory. It is well not to measure the events of that time by the feelings and opinions of our own day. Compare, for example, the description of the hussars of 1857, in Wattman's "Dreiundfunfzig Jahre aus einem bewegten Leben" (1903), p. 87, with modern conditions.

sult, for many young men in order to avoid service married before they were twenty; others escaped by deserting, thousands were given leave of absence, while a number of departments (sixteen) refused outright to furnish recruits.[1]

In Upper Italy there were not more than 56,000 troops to oppose the enemy, in Southern Germany, barely 40,000, in Switzerland there were 30,000 under Masséna, in Northern Germany and Holland 23,000 under Brune and Bernadotte, in Rome and Southern Italy 34,000 under Macdonald, who had succeeded Championnet. With these troops and a few garrisons, amounting in all to 180,000 men, France undertook to uphold the Revolutionary policy of aggression against a European coalition. The armaments were defective, the commissariat in the hands of speculators as unscrupulous as the Government, while the Directors were at variance among themselves as to who was to be entrusted with the command. Some of the generals, Joubert, for instance, were not on good terms with the Government commissaries attached to the armies; others, such as Moreau, were too Conservative, and so it happened that the important post of commander-in-chief in Italy devolved upon the elderly and incompetent Scherer.

The enemy came upon the scene much better equipped. In the three theatres of the war, Suabia, Switzerland, and Northern Italy, Austria had the superiority in numbers, in the Archduke Charles she had an admirable leader, and in the Russians under Suvoroff a powerful auxiliary. The results were almost inevitable. Jourdan, who had advanced to the Danube, was defeated by the Archduke at Osterach, and again at Stockach in March, 1799, and forced back to the Rhine, Masséna who had advanced victoriously from Switzerland eastwards, was checked at Feldkirch, while Scherer was defeated by the Austrian General Kray at Magnano in the Cisalpine Republic and driven back across the Mincio What Scherer had failed to accomplish against the Austrians alone, his successor Moreau was far less able to accomplish against the united Austro-Russian army under Suvoroff and

[1] Vandal, "L'avènement de Bonaparte," I. p. 49.

Melas ; and on April 27th, 1799, at Cassano on the Adda, he met with a decisive reverse which opened the gates of Milan and Turin to the northern victors and put an end to the Cisalpine Republic. By taking advantage of a popular movement in favour of the Conservatives during which the Democrats were everywhere driven from their positions, Austria again recovered possession of Lombardy, the fortresses alone remaining in the hands of the French. Soon afterwards, on June 4th, the Archduke Charles defeated Masséna at Zurich, by which victory one-third of Switzerland fell into the hands of Austria. These events compelled General Macdonald to evacuate Naples and march northwards. Soon after his departure the Parthenopean Republic came to a painful end, for on the return of the Court bitter vengeance was taken on the recalcitrant subjects. The only chance of regaining the lost conquests depended on Macdonald effecting a junction with Moreau and the troops on the Genoese Riviera and winning a victory. But that was not to be, for before the intended union had been effected the Russians fell upon the French in a furious onslaught, defeated them in a three days' battle on the Trebbia (June 17th to 19th), and drove them back with heavy loss beyond the Apennines. A few weeks later Mantua, for which so many lives had been sacrificed only two years before, was obliged to capitulate.

These losses in the field told unfavourably on the Directory. Two years previously war had strengthened the position of a thoroughly unpopular Government, but then there had been a succession of brilliant victories, gained by a general who had made this policy of conquest and expansion his own. Now, however, one defeat succeeding another had dimmed the glory of the army, whose leaders were not partisans of the men in power. Hence it was not surprising that at the election in the spring of 1799, the Directory received a fresh check. It was but a symptom of the prevalent distrust that Rewbell, the retiring Director, should be succeeded by Sieyès, the man to whom Bonaparte had asked Talleyrand to show privately his plans for re-organizing the Constitution. Even when he was a member of the Con-

vention, Sieyès was known to be hostile to the Constitution of the Year III and to be ambitious of giving France a better one. Barras, pliable and unprincipled, immediately attached himself to the popular Abbé, with the result that, as in 1797, the Opposition were in the majority in the Chamber and in a minority in the Directory—Sieyès and Barras against Treilhard, Larevellière and Merlin—which was a fresh source of friction. In view of the reverses abroad, the ruling majority in the Directory could no longer fall back on a *coup d'état* as on previous occasions. They had to meet their opponents in Parliament, and being attacked by them on the scandalous confusion in the finances, bluntly characterized as "robbery" by the Radical Left, the hated three were turned out of office.[1] Treilhard was the first victim. His election as Director was now declared—somewhat tardily—not to have been in accordance with constitutional methods. His removal put an end to the Triumvirate. On June 18th (30th Prairial), Larevellière and Merlin, hard pressed and threatened, resigned office. Treilhard was immediately replaced by Gohier as President of the Court of Cassation, Laverellière by General Moulin, Merlin by Roger Ducos. The latter was a partisan of Sieyès, while the other two belonged to the Jacobins. The work of the State, for which this Government was ill qualified, lay in the hands of the Ministers—the Girondist Rheinhard, who was to replace Talleyrand in this new Government of "clean hands," Cambacérès Minister of Justice, the Jacobin Lindet Minister of Finance, and Bernadotte Minister of War. The latter, however, soon resigned as the Jacobins were constantly asserting themselves more and more boldly and were counting on his aid for effecting a coup.

The fall of the old Government was the result of a coalition between the two great parties in the Council of the Five Hundred, the Radicals and the Moderate Republicans, the latter led by Boulay de la Meurthe, and numbering in their ranks Napoleon's brothers Lucien and Joseph. No sooner had the victory been won than the coalition collapsed. The

[1] The Constitution required that at least three Directors should agree for any Government measure to be valid.

Moderates being now in power, since they had the majority in the Directory (Sieyès, Ducos, and Barras), the Jacobins joined the Opposition and at the outset were so well supported by the neutral element in the Chamber that they managed to carry through a bill imposing forced loans on the rich, and passed a law against the nobles, claiming them as hostages in the Royalist departments. Elated by this success, they illegally reopened their club at Paris and brought forward a Radical programme advocating that children should be brought up in common, that public workshops should be established for the poor, and that the people should have the right of co-operating among themselves. They also issued a proclamation declaring that the country was in danger, hoping by this means to introduce a form of government similar to that of 1793. But these proceedings cost them their allies. In Paris, their appeal to the people found no response among the working men and small tradesmen who still remembered vividly the misery and sufferings that had followed the carnival of liberty, and many of whom had been deprived of their means of livelihood owing to the changed habits entailed upon the rich by these forced loans. In the departments the new dissensions roused by the Jacobin agitation were intolerable, and such was the state of public opinion that Sieyès could now venture to close the Jacobin club, "The Friends of Liberty and Equality," which met in the riding-school adjoining the Tuileries, and to organize a system of strict surveillance under the charge of Fouché, an ex-member of the Convention, now Minister of Police.

For Sieyès it was a matter of no small moment that he should have reliable support from the army, and hence his first efforts were directed to securing a decisive victory at the theatre of war as a means of confirming his own position. During July the equipment of the troops was pushed forward vigorously and the command given to the youthful General Joubert, with Moreau to second him, in the hope that Joubert if successful might prove a useful tool in home affairs. But Sieyès was as unfortunate as his predecessors. The reinforcements Joubert took with him to the Riviera

early in August were quite inadequate to cope with the combined forces of the Austrians and the Russians. The hope that the Austrians would be detained by the siege of Mantua, and thus leave the French numerically superior to the Russians under Suvoroff, proved vain; for in the end of July Mantua fell, and the Austrians then proceeded by forced marches to rejoin their allies. In the awful carnage of the battle of Novi on the Bormida, August 15th, 1799, the Republic lost 10,000 men, Joubert his life, and Sieyès his prestige.

The only one who benefited by these untoward events was the man whose name rose instinctively to every one's lips now that France was the loser in the game of war—precisely as Bonaparte had foreseen. People asked why he was not there? Where were the thousands of troops he had taken away with him? Was it really better for the interest of the State that its sons should perish on the sands of the desert, while near home the glory of the army was being allowed to wither on the very scenes of its former triumphs? Government was accused of having "exiled" the general, and the Radicals in the Opposition, who even demanded that the ex-Directors should answer this charge before a tribunal of justice, inveighed against those in power for having left the Eastern expedition in the lurch.[1] On September 18th, Rheinhard, Talleyrand's successor, was commissioned to write a letter recalling General Bonaparte and "his brave troops". Application was immediately made to Spain to negotiate with Turkey for the return of the expeditionary army; if need be, France was even prepared to relinquish Egypt. In short, everything was to be done to conciliate public opinion. In 1798, when Napoleon was still associated in people's minds with the hated Directory, he had only gained the sympathies of the few in spite of all his victories; now, however, when people thought of him in opposition to the Government, as even the victim of their selfish policy, he became the popular favourite, the ideal of the leaderless millions

[1] Lucien and Josephine did everything in their power to foster the belief that the Directory had wished to get rid of Napoleon by sending him to the East.

who were longing for tranquillity and order and for a strong Government which would put an end to the perpetual changing of the fundamental laws of the State, and to the disastrous confusion in the Administration, so that the land might have peace and the citizens be able to enjoy the wholesome fruits of the Revolution. To them Napoleon was not merely a brilliant general who could defeat a foreign foe, but far more; he was the man of energetic purpose, able to crush anarchy. That is why on his return from the East Napoleon was greeted with unbounded enthusiasm, and why his popularity suffered no eclipse even when it became known that in the end of September Masséna had defeated the Austrians and Russians in Switzerland, that early in October Brune had defeated the English in Holland, that the coalition had collapsed, and that every danger threatening France from abroad had disappeared. Napoleon was now the people's favourite. There was no longer any need for him to seek fresh triumphs in the battlefield before attempting a *coup*. He was right when he told his brother on leaving for the East, that when he returned he would be surer of public opinion. A year and a half earlier it had failed him when he had been meditating a *coup;* now, however, he was sure of it, and he meant to let nothing prevent his ambition from reaching its goal.[1]

On 1803, when talking over his career with Madame de Rémusat, Napoleon remarked of the time immediately following the Egyptian expedition, "The Directory was uneasy

[1] Vandal in "L'avènement de Bonaparte" (I. 217), maintains that there is little evidence of Napoleon being regarded at that time not only as a conquering hero, but as the "coming man". Yet proof of that fact is not altogether lacking. The words of the Jacobin at Fréjus, who spoke of a crown, were prompted by the same sentiment as Barante noticed, and as led Bandin (in the Ardennes) to kill himself from joy at Napoleon's return. Incidents such as these cannot be explained merely by the enthusiasm for the soldier, who moreover had been baffled at Acre and compelled to retreat, especially as the danger from invasion was past. Bandin saw and desired in Bonaparte "le régénérateur de la Republique". Vandal (p. 217) does not deny that there was a feeling in France at that time in favour of a personal government. *Vide* also Brinkmann's report and the narrative of Hyde de Neuville.

about my return. I watched myself closely. At no time in my life have I behaved with greater skill. I saw Sieyès and promised him that his verbose plan of a Constitution should be adopted; I received Jacobin leaders and Bourbon agents, I gave my advice to all who sought it, but solely in the interest of my own plans. I held aloof from the people, for I knew that when the right time came, curiosity would urge them to seek me out. They all hastened into my toils, and when I became head of the State there was not a party in France but had built some hopes on me."

Bonaparte now posed as the disinterested friend, and was as eagerly welcomed by the Moderates as by the Jacobins, both of whom claimed him for themselves, although in reality he was threading a clearly defined path of his own through a labyrinth of dissimulation and intrigue. It was evident that he meant to grasp the leadership; the only difficulty was as to the means he should employ. To have been nominated Director would have been the simplest plan, and with this in view, he one day sounded President Gohier, a sincere and zealous Jacobin of the narrow-minded type that had once formed the backbone of the party. Gohier, however, reminded him that according to the Constitution men under forty years of age were excluded from the Directory, a restriction of which Bonaparte was only too well aware. It had once already blocked his path. He had long been thinking out a plan for overthrowing this inconvenient Constitution, and as was natural he now made common cause with those who were likewise desirous of seeing it abolished. Barras, with whom he remained on terms of intimacy, favoured the American type of Republic with a President at the head of the State. But one day when Bonaparte was drawing him on the subject, Barras, as a blind for his own name for the post of President, suggested that of a certain nonentity, while Bonaparte was to be put off with the laurels gained in a new campaign in Italy. That was conclusive for Bonaparte. In vain Barras hurried along next day to the *rue de la Victoire* to assure the general that he alone was the man for the post of Presi-

dent and to offer him his services. Henceforth Bonaparte thoroughly distrusted his old patron, intimacy with whom was no longer without its dangers, for by his crooked courses Barras had brought his name into discredit. Besides he was too late. On leaving Barras, Napoleon had gone direct to Sieyès to make terms with him.

Ever since 1795, when his plan of a Constitution had been rejected, Sieyès had ostentatiously held aloof from Government. But in 1799, when there was a widespread dissatisfaction with the state of affairs, Sieyès had again accepted office, thinking the moment had at last arrived for him to bring forward his plan and play the rôle of his country's deliverer. It even seemed as if the aggressiveness of the Jacobins would help to further his plans. He had the secret support of a large number of Moderate Republicans in both Chambers and of Bonaparte's brothers. On the following points they were all agreed, viz., that in order to strengthen the central power the five Directors should be replaced by two or three Consuls to be elected for a period of ten years. Alongside these there was to be a Senate composed of life members, and a Chamber of Deputies elected by popular suffrage. To ensure this Constitution being carried through, the Council of the Ancients (the majority of whom were in favour of reform) was to authorize the transfer of the two Chambers outside Paris,[1] so that the Jacobin opponents in the Council of the Five Hundred would be cut off from the formidable support of the Paris suburbs. Once the transfer had been accomplished, the Council of the Ancients was to lay Sieyès' proposals before the Five Hundred, win over the neutral members, and have the new Constitution confirmed by a plebiscite. The one doubtful point was whether the Five Hundred would quietly submit to the decree of the Ancients. Their refusal to comply would prove all the more dangerous as Generals Jourdan, Augereau, and Bernadotte were Radical deputies, and had plans of their own for remodelling the Government. Hence the necessity of having

[1] This right was granted to the Council of Ancients under the Constitution of the Year III.

some soldier of outstanding merit to whom the execution of the new measure could be entrusted. Sieyès had first thought of Joubert, and on his death of Macdonald (who had declined), then of Moreau, who seemed to him the man they wanted, as his ambitions were wholly military and not political. He was accordingly summoned to Paris. However, just as Moreau reached the capital Bonaparte came upon the scene, greeted by the plaudits of the entire population, while his vanquished rival was received in silence. Sieyès could not hesitate as to which of the two he would entrust with his plan. He had to choose Napoleon, even at the risk of being overshadowed by him.

Immediately on his brother's return, Lucien Bonaparte confided to him the proposed scheme of reforms, and Napoleon had expressed himself in sympathy with it. He required a new Constitution to enable him to reach the power, while Sieyès required the power to enable him to carry through his Constitution. Such was the pivot on which France's destiny then turned. On November 1st, the two men met privately at the house of Lucien Bonaparte, who out of compliment to his brother had been elected President of the Five Hundred. Bonaparte suggested that the new Constitution should not be laid immediately before the Chambers as Sieyès intended, but should first be submitted to a commission of deputies for their consideration. Meanwhile, however, they were to do their utmost to bring in a provisional government consisting of himself, Sieyès, and Ducos. To this Sieyès had to consent whether he liked it or not. He saw clearly that his rôle of Deliverer was impossible once his Constitution had been handed over to a committee, and it was equally clear that in a provisional government which included Napoleon he would not play the leading part. All the same it was too late to draw back.[1]

[1] After a dinner at which Joseph Bonaparte, Sieyès, and the Deputy Cabanis (who was also in the secret), were present, Sieyès said to them, " I will go with General Bonaparte because of all the soldiers he is most of a civilian. But I know what to expect. Once his enterprise succeeds he will just do so with his two colleagues," whereupon he stepped in

Napoleon continued to behave "very skilfully". He carefully concealed his intentions from the other Directors—Gohier, who was daily at his house paying court to Josephine and professing himself their friend, and Barras, who blindly fancied himself indispensable. The greater number of the officials in the department of Paris were adherents of Barras and were won over on being given to understand that he too was in the secret; and the same thing happened with the commandants of the Parliamentary Guard and of the Directorial Guard, neither of which belonged to the line troops.

On November 6th, after a banquet given by the Chambers in honour of Generals Moreau and Bonaparte, at which the latter proposed a toast, "To the unity of all Frenchmen," Sieyès and Bonaparte discussed the final arrangements. It was felt there was no time to lose, for in the Five Hundred the majority seemed to be in favour of repealing the recent unpopular decrees, especially the one relating to forced loans, and this would have had a very prejudicial effect on the projected *coup d'état*. It was therefore decided to make the attempt on the 18th and 19th Brumaire (November 9th and 10th). On the former day the Ancients were to take action, on the latter the resolutions were to be moved at St. Cloud, whither the Legislative Body was to be transferred.

During the following days Napoleon sounded the generals and officers. Several of the regiments in the Paris garrison had served under him in the Army of Italy, and the great majority of the officers in the National Guard had been appointed by him after the 13th Vendémiaire, while he was general of the Army of the Interior. Affection and discipline made him confident of the loyalty of the rank and file, who idolized their "*petit caporal*". Of the generals, Augereau, an unprincipled blusterer, was not of much consequence.

quickly between Joseph and Cabanis and by a powerful and dexterous movement of his arms flung them back on the fireplace and remained standing alone in the middle of the room! Joseph afterwards related this incident to Napoleon, who laughed heartily at it, exclaiming, "Long life to the witty. That's a good omen!"

With Jourdan, Napoleon had an interesting conversation, in the course of which the Jacobin general expressed himself in favour of a stronger government and of a change in the Constitution—"provided the great Revolutionary principles were preserved intact". Napoleon reproached him with the Radical proposals of his party and their trafficking with the baser elements of the populace, but calmed his fears as to the future of the Republic. Bernadotte who, as he wrote Lucien in 1804, could easily have roused the suburbs, had recently become brother-in-law to Joseph Bonaparte and yielded to the latter's entreaties not to oppose the enterprise. Moreau and Lefebvre, the commandant of the city, merely obeyed their superior officer. The others were soon won over by a skilfully chosen argument: "What can generals expect," said Bonaparte, "from a Government of lawyers? They need a chief who knows how to appreciate, employ, and support them."[1] Meanwhile Sieyès and his associates had left nothing undone to secure matters in the Council of the Anciens. A threatening movement on the part of the Jacobins was grossly exaggerated in order to scare the hesitating into compliance by arousing their dread of a second Terror. On the eventful day those deputies who could not be relied upon were kept away from the meeting through the connivance of the hall inspectors, who either gave them false information as to the hour, or else gave them none at all.

On November 9th (18th Brumaire), at seven in the morning, the Council of the Ancients began their sitting. Regnier, one of the initiated, rose and made the following motion: "In accordance with articles 102, 103, 104 of the Constitution, the Council of the Ancients decrees: (1) That the Legislature be transferred to St. Cloud, where both Councils can be held in the Palace. (2) That on the 19th Brumaire (November 10th) they meet there at noon, and that till then all deliberations be forbidden. (3) That General Bonaparte be entrusted with the execution of this decree, and that, in order to secure the safety of the two Chambers, he receive

[1] Thiébault, "Mémoires," III. p. 64.

the command of the Guard of the Legislative Body, of the National Guards, and of the garrison of Paris. All citizens must render assistance whenever he demands it. (4) General Bonaparte must appear before the Council of the Ancients to receive this decree and to take the oath. (5) This decree is to be communicated to the Five Hundred and to the Directory, and to be published and distributed among the people.[1] This motion was carried, and it was also decided to issue a manifesto to the nation declaring that the Council of the Ancients had passed these measures in order to control those factions which wanted to tyrannize over the national representatives, and as a means of securing peace in the internal affairs of the country.

While the Ancients were thus engaged, Bonaparte was at his house, surrounded by generals and officers, awaiting his summons. As soon as it arrived he mounted on horseback and rode off with his suite along the Boulevards, across the Place de la Concorde—where the statue of Liberty was being repaired—and on to the Tuileries. Sieyès, who had only recently learned to ride, was also on horseback, and arrived from the Louvre accompanied by two adjutants. Roger Ducos was there too. Barras, Gohier, and Moulin remained behind

[1] The articles of the Constitution of 1795, to which the Ancients referred, are the following :—

Art. 102. The Council of the Ancients has the power to change the place of meeting of the Legislative Body. In this case it indicates the place and time at which the two councils are to be convoked.

The decree of the Council of the Ancients on this point is irrevocable.

Art. 103. On the day on which this decree is passed, neither of the councils may deliberate in the place in which they have hitherto met. Those members who continue their functions there will be held guilty of attacking the safety of the Republic.

Art. 104. Members of the Directory who refuse or delay to seal, promulgate, and send out this decree shall be held guilty of the same crime.

No mention is made in the Articles of the right of deputing the execution, nor even the supervision of such a matter, to a general. This was the first irregularity committed by those who had contrived this *coup d'état*, and they managed to roll it off on to the shoulders of the national representatives.

in the Luxembourg, and were much astonished at the absence of the Directorial Guard. On reaching the Tuileries, Napoleon immediately went into the hall where the Council of the Ancients had assembled, to take the oath as required of him. Here he made a short speech in his usual tone of command, closing with the following words: "Your wisdom has decreed this measure which secures the public welfare; our arms shall carry it out. We want a Republic founded on true liberty, on civil liberty, on national representation. We mean to have it, I swear it in my own name and in that of my brothers-in-arms." "We swear it," chorused the officers. Of upholding the Constitution he said not a word, on the contrary, every syllable betrayed a complete change in the political situation. Nevertheless the general's speech was applauded by the galleries and many of the council, and the session was brought to a close, not to be resumed till at St. Cloud on the following day. Shortly afterwards when the Council of the Five Hundred met, the decree of the First Chamber was announced, whereupon Lucien immediately adjourned the House and thus suspended the functions of the Legislature.

On leaving the Ancients, Napoleon had ridden off to the Tuileries gardens and reviewed the troops drawn up there, telling them he hoped soon to lead them again to victory, but first of all "the rebels must be disarmed". He then issued a proclamation to the National Guard and another to the army, in both of which he arraigned the Government. "For two years past," he tells the soldiers, "the Republic has been badly governed. You had hoped that my return would put an end to these evils; you celebrated it with a unanimity that lays me under obligations. I shall fulfil them and you will do your part. Liberty, victory, and peace will again restore the Republic to her ancient rank in Europe, of which she could only have been deprived by incapacity or treachery." The deed followed hard upon the threat. Sieyès and Ducos, as previously arranged, had tendered their resignation as Directors, and if only Barras could be induced to follow their example there would no longer be the three signatures indis-

pensable for the validity of any Government measure, and the machinery of the Government would be at a standstill. Up till then Napoleon had left his old friend and patron in ignorance of his real designs, using him as a sort of pawn to hold Sieyès in check. But the time for precautions was past, and he now sent two trusty confidants, Talleyrand and Bruix, to request Barras to give up office. And Barras consented. Two things induced him to do so, his own unpopularity and the power now at Napoleon's disposal. Meanwhile his private secretary, Bottot, arrived in the Tuileries gardens and requested an interview with the triumphant general. No sooner did Napoleon espy him than, beckoning him to approach, he addressed him in a loud voice, so that all those standing near could hear. "What have you done with France which I left you so glorious?" he asked the terrified secretary. "I left peace and I find war. I left you victorious and I find defeats. I left behind the millions of Italy and I find nothing but plundering and poverty. What have you done with the 100,000 Frenchmen who were my companions in glory? They are dead. This state of things must cease; in three years it would lead to despotism. We want a Republic founded on equality, morality, civil liberty, and political toleration. Under a good administration factions will soon be forgotten, and the citizens will become Frenchmen once more. The defenders of the Fatherland will again enjoy that confidence they have so amply deserved." Soon after this outburst Bottot, having been privately assured by Bonaparte that his personal sentiments for Barras remained unchanged, returned to the Luxembourg Palace, where Talleyrand and Bruix had already arrived and were awaiting Barras' signature to a memorandum to the Legislative Body announcing his resignation. Realizing that his day was past, Barras acquiesced. A large sum of money was given him as a solatium for resigning office, and an escort having been granted, he left the capital immediately.

Barras' resignation rendered Gohier and Moulin powerless. Josephine had invited M. and Madame Gohier to breakfast at eight o'clock on the eventful day. Perhaps Bonaparte

hoped even then to secure his support. But Gohier did not come. In the course of the forenoon he learned from his wife what had taken place, and hastened with Moulin to remonstrate with Napoleon; but without success. The two Directors then returned disconsolate to the Luxembourg Palace, where Moreau had received orders to detain them.[1] The Executive had now ceased to exist. The next step was to have the change in the State ratified by the two councils at St. Cloud, to induce them to accept the provisional government, and to elect the committees which were to report upon the new Constitution. Sieyès had proposed that on the following day from twenty to thirty of the more extreme Radicals, Jourdan and Augereau in particular, should be prevented from attending the Council of the Five Hundred. But Napoleon declined to countenance such a proceeding, unwilling that any one should think him afraid of these two. Furthermore he wished to cut himself adrift from the associations of recent years, and so he refused to sanction the closing of the city gates and various other revolutionary methods such as had made the Directory abhorred. "On the whole," said he cheerfully to Bourrienne that evening, "things went not so badly. We shall see what happens to-morrow." As a precaution, however, he loaded his pistols before going to bed.

Next day, November 10th, the members of the two Chambers met as arranged at St. Cloud at noon. The castle, which had been sequestrated at the Revolution and the furniture sold, was at this time standing empty, and it had now been hurriedly fitted up for the nonce to accommodate the two administrative bodies. The Ancients were located in the hall on the first floor of the castle, the Five Hundred in the "Orangerie" in the gardens. Before the sittings began the deputies met in the grounds and eagerly discussed the event of the day. Those members of the Ancients who had been excluded on the previous day, insisted upon explanations;

[1] Afterwards, when in exile, Moreau sought to explain the undignified part he played at this time by declaring that he was then firmly convinced Napoleon would be overthrown in six weeks (*vide* Boulay de la Meurthe, "Les dernières années du duc d'Enghien," p. 293; also Hyde de Neuville, "Mémoires," I. p. 255).

others, after conversation with the deputies of the Five Hundred, began to realize that through false representations they had been inveigled into bringing about a *coup d'état*. At the very outside they had only intended to aid in affecting a change in the Government, not in overturning the Constitution; and they were indignant at the presence of the troops who filled the courtyard. The sittings began at one o'clock. Napoleon and his generals were on the first floor, Sieyès, Ducos, and himself being in a private room where he was kept closely informed of the course of events in both councils. What he learned was not very comforting. In the Council of the Five Hundred one of the initiated (Gaudin) rose to speak, but he was interrupted by the Radicals with shouts of "No dictatorship!" "Down with dictators!" They further proposed and carried a motion requiring that on the roll being called every member should renew his oath to the existing Constitution. Through his countryman Saliceti, Napoleon had got into touch with the Jacobin deputies and had assured them that the Republic was in no danger. But they had not trusted his deputy. Moreover, on the previous day there had been too much of the military commander about Napoleon, which was certainly not what he intended, for a *coup d'état* was what he had planned, not a *coup de main*. He had meant it to be a reform dictated by public opinion and carried through by the representatives of the people. Now, however, the waverers in the Five Hundred were soon won over by the Jacobins who thereby became the majority. Fortunately for Napoleon, taking the oath was a tedious performance occupying a couple of hours, and so afforded him an opportunity of turning the time to account by inducing the Ancients to take a decisive step. For if this hostile current were to go on gathering force, the troops also might be swept along by it; then all would be lost. "There must be an end of this," said Napoleon excitedly to the officers of his suite, and immediately he proceeded to the Council of the Ancients.[1]

[1] Sieyès was really to have addressed both councils, but it is said that he hesitated and grew faint-hearted, and hence Bonaparte's sudden

Here, where the deliberations were usually of a formal nature, they were engaged in dealing with those members of the Opposition who had not been notified on the previous day, the contrivers of the *coup* falsely maintaining that all the notices had been issued in the proper way. It was then decided to await the news that the Five Hundred had been constituted, and immediately thereafter to communicate with the Directory. Just then, however, word came that all the Directors had resigned but one, which gave rise to endless conjectures. So the precious hours had passed without any one having had the courage to attack the Constitution. Napoleon felt it was time to strike, and at this juncture, when the sitting had been interrupted, he entered the Council Chamber accompanied by Bourrienne, Berthier, Joseph Bonaparte, and two adjutants. He was formally invited to take part in the deliberations, and immediately he proceeded to address the House. He was no orator, and what he now attempted to say was disjointed and incoherent. He told them they were on a volcano, that he and his comrades-in-arms had willingly obeyed the summons of the Council, and that now he was being calumniated and accused of playing the rôle of a Cæsar or a Cromwell. Had he wanted to destroy the country's liberty he could have done so already several times. He then alluded vaguely to dangers threatening the Republic which was now without a government. It was for the Council of the Ancients to act and that speedily, and to preserve Liberty and Equality. "What about the Constitution?" cried a voice. That hit the weak spot. Napoleon retorted angrily: "The Constitution? You violated it on the 18th Fructidor, on the 22nd Floreal, and on the 30th Prairial. It has been challenged and disregarded by all parties. It is no longer a safeguard, for the people have ceased to respect it. Let us seek some means of securing

resolution. "I shall relate in my memoirs how and by whom he was compelled to take this step," says Boulay de la Meurthe in "Bourrienne et ses erreurs," II. p. 43. When matters became critical Sieyès had a carriage in readiness at the park gates so that if need be he could make his escape under the protection of the troops.

for every one the liberty to which he is entitled and which the Directorial Constitution is unable to guarantee." Some of the members demanded an explicit statement of the dangers threatening the country. Caught in his own trap, Napoleon tried to clear his feet by a lie, declaring that Barras and Moulin had entrusted him with plans for a revolution. The President, Lemercier, challenged him to reveal the plot, but having no facts to bring forward, Napoleon merely repeated what he had said, declared the Constitution unserviceable, and finally, in his excitement and helplessness, apostrophized the troops who were standing outside but not within earshot. Addressing them in flattering terms, he expressed his confidence that they would defend him if any member "in foreign pay" attempted to declare him an outlaw, "for," said he, "the God of War and of Fortune is on my side!" He had completely lost control of himself. Bourrienne, who with Berthier was standing beside him, whispered, "General, you no longer know what you are saying," and persuaded him to withdraw.

Nothing had been gained here, and there was a still more difficult task before him. Napoleon now went downstairs to the Council of the Five Hundred, the members of which had meanwhile one by one been taking their oath to the Constitution, and were now waiting for an explanation from the First Chamber as to the reason for the transfer of the Legislative Body; and the fact that no communication was forthcoming did not tend to improve matters. Then came a letter from Barras, announcing his resignation and declaring that he withdrew in favour of one who was signally distinguished alike by his personal glory and by the confidence shown in him by the National Assembly. The Jacobins then requested to be informed of the circumstances which had induced the Director to resign. Suddenly, without being announced, Napoleon entered the hall, followed by his officers and four grenadiers. Leaving them behind, he marched boldly up to the President's chair. It was an audacious disregard of the respect due to the House. A storm of indignation instantly flashed forth. "Armed men here!" exclaimed the Jacobins.

A group of Radicals, beside themselves with rage, rushed upon the intruders. Napoleon was seized and jostled towards the exit. For a moment he lost consciousness in the tumult, and sank into the arms of the grenadiers who carried him out. Behind him the Chamber rang with fierce yells of "*Hors la loi!*" "*Hors la loi!*" (Outlaw him!)—a cry which only a few years before would have been his certain death-knell.

It is impossible to say what might have happened had the Jacobins given Napoleon a fair hearing. Brinkmann, a Swede then resident in Paris, and a shrewd observer, expresses the popular verdict when he says: "They should either have killed the general there and then, or else have let him have his say out and have regulated their own conduct in strict accordance with the Constitution and common sense, and so have thrown all the blame on the aggressor". Certainly in acting as they did the Jacobins landed themselves in a position which, skilfully used, would place them at a disadvantage. No one noticed their mistake sooner than Lucien, the President, against whom they now directed their attack, some of the more excited demanding that he should at once submit the question of his brother's proscription to the vote. One deputy declared that Bonaparte was not in command of the troops, as the Council of the Ancients had not the authority to appoint him; others again demanded that the deputies should go out in a body and confront the troops. There were even definite proposals brought forward that the legislative bodies should declare themselves "in permanence" and return to Paris. The troops, it was claimed, were under their command. But in the tumult none of these motions was given effect to. The table in the centre of the hall was besieged by members clamouring to be heard. In the midst of the confusion Lucien vacated his seat to the Vice-President and went to the tribunal to plead for his brother. But his voice was powerless to make itself heard. He was accused of obstructing proceedings, and again the cries of outlawry were raised against Napoleon. Lucien then sent off a trusted deputy to warn his brother that unless something could be done within ten minutes his chances were gone.

Meanwhile Napoleon had recovered from his faintness, and finding that the question of his proscription was to be put to the vote and that to a certain extent his life was at stake, he appealed to the troops stationed below. "To arms!" he shouted to them from the window, and instantly the summons passed from rank to rank. Hurrying outside he then mounted on horseback and rode along the Parliamentary Guard till he came to the line troops, whose passions he sought to rouse by violent and false accusations against the Five Hundred, among whom he declared there were traitors "in foreign pay" who wanted to murder him. The effect of his words was heightened by some traces of blood on his face, the result of a scratch received in the recent scene. Lucien's messenger appearing at this juncture, a picquet of grenadiers was immediately dispatched to rescue the President and escort him into the open. He arrived, accompanied by several deputies. In the councils at least the failure of the *coup d'état* seemed a foregone conclusion. It remained to be seen how the troops would act.

On their behaviour hung the destinies of the day. This Lucien promptly realized, and mounting horse he harangued the battalion, exaggerating the tumult raised by the Jacobin party into an attack upon Napoleon's life. "Frenchmen," he exclaimed, "the President of the Council of the Five Hundred assures you that the vast majority of that assembly is at present terrorized by a number of deputies armed with daggers who besiege the tribunal, threatening their colleagues, and proposing the most violent resolutions. I tell you, these insolent brigands, doubtless in the pay of the English Government, are rebelling against the Council of the Ancients, and are demanding the outlawry of the general deputed to carry out the council's decree. I assure you this handful of violent men, by their assaults upon the liberty of this assembly, have put themselves outside the law. To the soldiers I entrust the duty of liberating the majority of the nation's representatives, so that, protected from daggers by your bayonets, we may be able to deliberate in peace on the interests of the Republic. You will regard those only who

have come here among you with their President, as deputies of France. As for those who have stayed behind in the Orangerie to vote upon the act of outlawry, thrust them out. These robbers are no longer the representatives of the people—but of the dagger!" "And if any one offers resistance, kill him. Follow me! I am the Divinity of the day!" added Napoleon. He would have gone on in this strain had not Lucien whispered to him "for any sake to be quiet". "*Vive Bonaparte!*" shouted the soldiers, but never a man budged. It was no light matter to turn their bayonets against the nation's representatives whom it was their duty to protect. Realizing the full significance of this perilous hesitation, Lucien drew his dagger and, pointing it at his brother's heart, vowed he would slay him with it if ever he imperilled the nation's liberty. The grenadiers were conquered. On a sign from Napoleon a detachment under Murat entered the Orangerie with drums beating. As the Radical deputies disregarded the summons to disperse, the soldiers then advanced and the legislators were forced to take flight, some making their escape by jumping from the windows.

Nothing could illustrate more forcibly than this lamentable incident the deep gulf which separated the army from the nation. Their constant absence from France had weakened the natural bonds between the soldiery and the people. Whoever now commanded the army might become undisputed master of the nation. It is true the Bonapartes had descended to calumny and falsehood in order to rouse the armed force of the country against the lawful authorities. The allusion in Lucien's speech to English influence was wholly devoid of fact; as for the "daggers" of the deputies no one had seen them. The President of the Chamber had never been in any danger; and the dagger scene with Napoleon was a mere piece of vulgar clap-trap. But that such means should succeed and be sufficient to decide the fate of a great nation showed how sadly the times were out of joint. As for the people themselves, on the 18th and 19th Brumaire, the citizens of Paris went about their business just as usual. About five o'clock in the evening, while the fate of the country

was hanging in the balance at St. Cloud, crowds were flocking to the theatres, and even in the workmen's quarters all was quiet. What only a few years before would have made every heart beat fast, what thousands upon thousands of enthusiasts for Liberty would once have shed their blood to defend, was now barely sufficient to tickle the public curiosity.

After force had made its authority felt, things quickly fell into line again. Lucien now had an opportunity of giving the Ancients as impartial an account of the events in the Council of the Five Hundred as he had already given to the troops. He called upon them to pass a resolution that "the fasces of the Consuls, that glorious symbol of republican liberty in ancient times, should be adopted to disarm slanderers and reassure the French nation, whose universal consent will consecrate your labours". The Council at once agreed to adjourn both Chambers, to appoint a provisional Government consisting of three Consuls, and to elect a commission to deliberate upon the new Constitution. A small body of deputies of the Five Hundred[1] was brought together the same night though not without some trouble, and those resolutions passed. Lucien acted as President as he had filled that office in the previous assembly, so that at least some appearance of lawful methods was observed. The proposed amendments to the Constitution were then brought forward and remitted to a committee, Boulay de la Meurthe defending the amendments in a long speech in which he condemned the Constitution of the Year III, and the policy of the late Directory. This "Rump Parliament" then passed the following important resolutions, formulated in sixteen articles: "The Directory has ceased to exist. A committee of the three Consuls, Sieyès, Ducos, and Bonaparte is to form a provisional Government. In them is to be vested all the

[1] The number varies from 30 to 120. The latter figure Brinkmann gives on the testimony of impartial eye-witnesses. (Léouzon, "Leduc Correspondance Diplomatique," p. 338.) Bourrienne, on the other hand, speaks of only thirty deputies, which is certainly too low a figure. Thiébault, who also mentions the "Conseil des Trente," considers fifty the right number.

power of the Directors. They are to restore order in the administration, tranquillity in the interior, and to establish an honourable and permanent peace abroad. The Legislature will adjourn till February 20th, 1800, after having declared sixty-two deputies, designated by name, to have forfeited their seats; and after having appointed a commission consisting of twenty-five members which, along with one appointed by the Council of the Ancients and the three Consuls, shall undertake the urgent business of the police and the financial legislation, and formulate a new representative Constitution and a new civil code."

The members of the Commission were then selected and the decree sent over to the Ancients, by whom it was confirmed. In conclusion the three Consuls swore inviolate fidelity to the Sovereignty of the People, to the French Republic, to Liberty, Equality, and the Representative system. It was long past midnight when the assembly broke up. Before leaving, Bonaparte rapidly drafted a manifesto to the nation, stating that in the Council of the Five Hundred, twenty murderers "armed with daggers," had rushed upon him and had in like manner threatened their President whom he had rescued from their rage. He thereupon sent the grenadiers to clear the Chamber. "The conspirators, terror-stricken, dispersed, and the majority, now safe from attack, returned free and tranquil, listened to the proposals made in the public interest, and discussed and passed a salutary law for the welfare of the Republic. The feeling of stability, security, and liberty has again revived." Such was certainly the honest opinion of many of those who had taken part in the eventful proceedings. The grenadiers returned, singing "*Ça ira*," the old song of Liberty, as if they had been victoriously defending the principles of the Revolution against some flagrant attack. The *coup d'état* was over.

The days following showed the accuracy of Napoleon's calculations in risking everything on the 19th Brumaire. There was no doubt about it, the country was satisfied with the *coup d'état*. "All previous revolutions," wrote Sandoz-Rollin, the Prussian Ambassador, on November 13th, "in-

spired distrust and fear. This one, on the contrary—I myself can testify—has refreshed the people's spirits and kindled the brightest hopes." In an interesting letter of November 18th, Brinkmann offers the following explanation: "Perhaps no legitimate monarch has ever found the people so compliant to his will as Bonaparte, and it would be unpardonable in this clever general if he failed to turn this fact to account by founding a better government on a surer basis. It is literally true that France will move heaven and earth to do her part, for the nation—except the contemptible anarchist crew—is so wearied, so disgusted with revolutionary horrors and follies that they are convinced that any change must bring some gain. All classes of society scoff at the heroics of the demagogues, and everywhere the feeling is in favour of extinguishing rather than realizing their idealist dreams. Even Royalists of every hue are well disposed towards Bonaparte, whom they credit with the intention of gradually restoring the old order; the indifferent look to him as the man best fitted to procure peace for France, and liberal-minded Republicans, although trembling for their own form of government, prefer to see the power in the hands of one man of talent rather than vested in a coterie of schemers." The Royalist Hyde de Neuville, relates: "Everything combined to facilitate his gigantic task of raising France out of her ruins and strengthening her tottering foundations. All hands were outstretched to a liberator, be he who he might, to aid him in the great work of redemption." And so, even when it became known that the accusation against Barras and Moulin was a slander, the abortive conspiracy and the daggers pure inventions, hatred of the Jacobins and the longing for a tranquil life were so great that for the sake of the end the immorality of the means was overlooked.

In contemporary accounts of the *coup d'état*, it is astonishing how it is always Bonaparte who is mentioned and no one else, except very rarely Sieyès and Ducos. Yet all three were on the same footing in the Provisional Government, and at the outset they each observed the others' rightful authority with punctilious care. In a very short time, however,

Bonaparte had become sole and undisputed master of the government, and although he had prudently declined Ducos' request to preside at the meetings of the councils, his name was almost exclusively before the public, whether in the Press, the theatre, or the streets. This partiality for Bonaparte was due to various causes. In the first place the public looked upon him as their deliverer, whereas Sieyès and Ducos, having formerly been Directors, were viewed with disfavour and did not arouse any general interest; and aware of that fact they withdrew into the background. Of the three Consuls the only one who had any practical experience of State affairs was Napoleon, who had been regent of Italy in 1797, and had reorganized Egypt in 1798. Moreover he alone possessed that inexhaustible appetite for work and extraordinary capacity for it which were indispensable in restoring order and security amid such thousand-fold confusion. Ducos, conscious that he was not equal to his post, soon withdrew, and Sieyès, seeing his cherished plan for delivering his country had collapsed, devoted his energies to elaborating the new Constitution in interminable discussions with the two commissions, leaving to his indefatigable colleague the manifold labours of ruling.

Napoleon on his part left nothing undone to foster the feeling in his favour. In interviews with journalists he repudiated his bellicose utterances on the 18th and 19th Brumaire as thoughtless. He always appeared in civilian dress, he attended the meetings of the National Institute, and on the repeal of the laws concerning hostages he at once went to the State prison in the Temple and announced their liberty to the prisoners. This line of conduct was all the more prudent as in popular opinion the strength of the new government lay in its affording some guarantee for peace and order. Hence the necessity for obliterating as much as possible the part played by the military and for preventing the impression arising that it was a military dictatorship. The latter view would have been quite erroneous. The entire armed forces then in Paris consisted of a demi-brigade of infantry, two cavalry regiments, and the Consular Guard

(which was made up partly of grenadiers and of the old Directorial Guard), amounting in all to 9000 troops. The Consuls had simply replaced the five Directors and entered into their inheritance plus a large increase of political power. For the Consuls possessed the right to initiate legislation and they were without an Opposition in a Parliament which was now reduced to a tenth of its numbers. The path for useful reforms being thus clear, the Consuls proceeded to elect their Ministers. Cambacérès was Minister of Justice, Bourdon (temporarily) Minister of Marine, and Rheinhard Foreign Minister, though he was merely a figurehead for Talleyrand. Fouché, at Napoleon's request, was made Minister of Police. Out of compliment to the "Institute," which had cordially supported the change of government, the Ministry of the Interior was bestowed on Laplace, the great mathematician, but, as he was utterly lacking in the requisite qualifications, he soon resigned and was replaced by Lucien Bonaparte; Berthier, the skilful stage-manager of Napoleon's military operations, was Minister of War; Gaudin, who had had wide experience in the administration of the public revenues under the Monarchy and had declined office under the Directory, now became Minister of Finance, and immediately entered upon his onerous duties.

His task could hardly have been more difficult. The Directory had left the Treasury practically empty and there was the prospect of a deficit of 300,000,000 francs in the current year. This desperate state of affairs was somewhat eased by the reviving confidence inspired by the new Government. A significant proof of this was seen in the fact that after the *coup d'état*, 5 per cent "Rentes" rose from 11 to 13 and in a few weeks to 17; and when those pernicious compulsory loans were abolished, the capitalists grew more confident. They subscribed a loan of several millions and guaranteed a State lottery. An extra war tax of 25 per cent. was added to the existing taxes on property and personal estate, and in order to secure payment, a law which had previously been under discussion, was put into force for collecting direct taxes. Hitherto the matter had lain in the hands of

the local authorities, for the Revolution believed in entrusting the regulation and receipt of the taxes to the citizens of the State. The result had been that the tax-rolls either did not exist or were utterly inadequate, and the revenues were lacking. The Consulate now ventured to transfer the management of the taxes to the State and to establish in each '*département*' an office with its own directors and controllers for assessing the taxes. Ere long the official tax-gatherer, who had been tabooed for the past ten years, was again able to discharge the functions of his office. More than anything else the growing confidence of the public facilitated the payment of the taxes. But still there was nothing to provide for immediate wants. In order to obtain money at once, the receivers-general in each department were required to furnish securities, by means of which sums the most pressing claims at least could be met. Subsequently these securities were required of other officials as well, and even of lawyers. By a supplementary military law those who were unfit for service or who had been allowed to retire were required either to find a substitute or to pay 300 francs. Deserters, who were disinherited by law, could recover their inheritance on payment of 1500 francs and on re-entering the service. The former authorities, being well paid for their complaisance, had allowed upwards of 40,000 Frenchmen, fit for service, to leave the army, and as there was no lack of repentant deserters, this law now brought in a sum of 12,000,000 francs to the Treasury. These methods were not altogether free from objection, but they met the special needs of the moment. The requirements of the State were reduced for the time being by postponing expenditure on the navy till after the Peace. The armies, owing to recent victories, were again able to live partly at the enemies' expense, and the State was thus saved from immediate ruin. The next duty was to establish it on definite principles. Sieyès' Constitution, which was now in the hands of the two Commissions, was based on the principle of the various powers in the State counterbalancing one another. The people was declared "Sovereign" and universal suffrage guaranteed. The nation,

however, no longer chose its own representatives, but merely candidates from among whom the legislators were to be elected. The 5,000,000 adult Frenchmen were to elect from their number one-tenth—500,000 men who would then form the "Communal Notables" and be eligible for communal appointments. These 500,000 again chose by the same process 50,000 departmental notables, i.e. candidates for departmental appointments, and these finally elected the 5000 National Notables, i.e. candidates for the Legislative Body and for the higher State offices up to that of Minister. This final list of the National Notables was to include all those who had been deputies or had held high State appointments during the last ten years, and all the lists (which were to be completed by 1802), were to be valid for ten years. From the National Notables were to be chosen the members of the two Chambers, one of which, the Tribunate, was to discuss the bills whether emanating from themselves or proposed by Government, but was not to vote upon them, while the other Chamber, the Legislative Body, was to vote upon them without discussing them. At the head of the State was to be a President, styled the Grand Elector, who was to receive a large salary, represent the Republic, sign laws and treaties, and appoint or dismiss the two highest officials, the Consuls. There, however, his functions ended. One of the Consuls was to be at the head of the war department (i.e. Army and Foreign Affairs); the other at the head of the peace department (the Ministry of the Interior), and each was to appoint the officials for his own department. As a check upon the Government and a protection to the Constitution there was to be a "Constitutional Jury," composed of eighty members appointed for life, who were to choose their own successors, to nominate the Grand Elector, and the Deputies of both Chambers, and to set aside all unconstitutional laws. If the Grand Elector or any other high official abused his powers, this jury could appoint him one of their members, and so remove him from office, for the two official positions were not tenable simultaneously.

Such was the leading features of Sieyès' intricate and in-

genious Constitution. The rights of the sovereign people were paralysed by the jury, the functions of the first Chamber by the second, the authority of the Consuls by the Grand Elector, and that of the Grand Elector by the jury, a system suited perhaps for some theoretical state but not for a living organism. A man like Bonaparte, who saw his dreams of power now near fulfilment, could not view such a toppling piece of mechanism with much favour. He ridiculed the whole contrivance to Joseph, describing it as far too "metaphysical," and when Sieyès, through Roederer, offered him the post of Grand Elector he declined it, "as he did not wish to make himself a laughing-stock".[1] Boulay de la Meurthe then suggested that instead of the Grand Elector there should be a First Consul who was not to remain inactive, but was to take part in the deliberations in common with the other two Consuls and have the casting vote. This idea the two Commissioners agreed to consider. Sieyès fancied his party would be in the majority, but Napoleon's trusty agents, Talleyrand, Roederer, and Boulay, had been working for him and obtained a verdict in his favour. Napoleon invited the members from December 2nd onwards to meet for their daily sittings in his private rooms in the Luxembourg Palace, and there, at his suggestions, sweeping changes were made in Sieyès' plan. The useless office of Grand Elector—"Roi fainéant," "fatted hog," as Napoleon called him—was immediately suppressed, and in its stead, as head of the State and the Legislature, was put a First Consul, elected by the Senate for ten years. He appointed and dismissed Ministers, ambassadors, and the various Government officials (prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors), all the officers of the army and of the navy, and all the judges except the members of the Court of Cassation, and the Justices of Peace. His will became law when promulgated in the form of Government degrees. He controlled the diplomatic service and was commander-in-chief of the military forces. He signed treaties and laws when they had

[1] In the newspapers it was said that in contrast to Sieyès' monarchical tendencies, he posed as the advocate of the Democracy, which proved very helpful to him. (Vandal, "L'avènement de Bonaparte," I. p. 508.)

been passed by the Legislative Body, and appointed the members of the Council of State, which was a branch of the Executive and was intended to assist the Government with its advice. Alongside the First Consul there were to be two colleagues whose powers were much inferior to his, for they could only advise, and could exercise no influence in the appointment of State functionaries, the decision of the First Consul being sufficient. It almost looked as if they were merely there to disguise his power.[1]

In such a Government an efficient Legislative Body was out of the question, and consequently Bonaparte fell in willingly with the electoral system of lists of candidates. The legislative powers of the people were vested in three bodies, and Sieyès' Constitutional Jury was transformed into a Senate with life membership (*Senat Conservateur*) whose eighty members (none of them under forty years of age) were elected from the National Notables. From the same lists the Senate elected the Legislative Body with three hundred members, and the Tribunate with one hundred. None of these bodies had the right of proposing laws. The Executive laid the bills before the Tribunate, where they were debated, but the vote taken was only in reference to whether certain of its members designated for that purpose were to plead for or against the measure in the Legislative Body. The members of the latter did not debate, but merely voted after hearing the tribunes. In one of his letters to Talleyrand, Napoleon had spoken of a Legislative Body "impartial, without eyes or ears for what surrounded it". He had found it. In the same letter he spoke of a Council of State as one of the two factors in the executive power, but he did not say who was to form the other, the supreme authority. Now, however, that also was perfectly plain; it was to be himself, and himself alone. The remaining provisions of the Constitution dealt with the judicial and the financial regulations, especially the Court of Appeals (cour de cassation) the members of which were elected by the Senate

[1] "Circumstances then required that the exclusive power of the supreme head should still be concealed," said Napoleon later, in describing these proceedings ("Corr.," xxx. 345).

as were also those of the Exchequer. The salaries of the various officials were then fixed. The First Consul received a yearly allowance of 500,000 francs, his two colleagues of 150,000 francs, and all three had residences in the Tuileries. Senators received 25,000 francs yearly, tribunes 15,000, and legislators 10,000. All that now remained to be done was to elect the three highest officials of the State whose names were to figure in the Constitution of the year VIII. Napoleon of course was unanimously named for the post of First Consul. The choice of the other two, on Sieyès declining, fell on Cambacérès and Lebrun. The former, an ex-member of the Convention and "a regicide," was a distinguished jurist, fond of good living and ostentatious luxury, and had been Napoleon's patron before 13th Vendémiaire. Lebrun was an able financier who had served his apprenticeship under the Monarchy and now brought his ripe experience to the service of the new regime. They represented two periods which met and merged in Napoleon, who used to say of them "the one covers my right, the other my left". Sieyès received a sinecure, the Presidency of the Senate, with a handsome salary and a fine country seat, a price Napoleon gladly paid to be rid of him. Ducos was made a senator.

On December 13th these appointments were duly submitted to the members of the two Commissions, who received a hint to accept them without further debate. There were many things omitted that should have found a place in the Constitution, and there were many points on which the members of the Commissions were not unanimous. But Napoleon was urgent for haste, and no one ventured to oppose him, as he let it be plainly seen that he meant to appeal to the nation alone. Moreover a new Government with many posts at its disposal always attracts a large number of pushing, ambitious, place-hunting adherents, a circumstance which Napoleon turned to good account in consolidating his power. The new leaders were elected with acclamation and the Constitution accepted as it stood. Sieyès and Ducos in collaboration with Cambacérès and Lebrun, chose twenty-nine senators, who in turn elected others, bringing up the number to sixty. The

Senate being thus constituted, proceeded to elect the Tribunes and the members of the Legislative Body, while Napoleon chose the members of the Council of State and appointed his Ministers. Talleyrand, ex-Bishop of Autun, was again made Minister of Foreign Affairs, for although justly reproached for his sordid avarice and the irregularities of his private life, yet in his comprehensive grasp of the great game of international politics he stood unrivalled. Laplace was succeeded by Lucien; Cambacérès by Abrial; Forfait was made Minister of the Marine. Only one thing was lacking,—the sanction of the "Sovereign," i.e. the French nation. But there was no doubt as to what its verdict would be. As a matter of fact, in the course of the year over 3,000,000 Frenchmen recorded their votes in favour of the Constitution, only 1500 against it. Napoleon boldly proceeded with his task without awaiting the result of the voting. The manifesto which he issued on December 15th, 1799, recommending the Consular Constitution to the French nation, closed with the words, "Citizens, the Revolution has returned to the principles from which it set out. It is finished!"

That remained to be seen.

CHAPTER VII.

WAR AND PEACE.

Although Napoleon was now virtually Dictator, with unlimited power over France, and although he had made the representative bodies of the nation his humble and willing tools, so that he might ultimately destroy the Republic and replace it by his own absolute sovereignty, the Revolution was nevertheless not finished. It had only changed form. To borrow a figure from chemistry, it had undergone a metamorphosis, the allotropic condition into which it had passed being the result of the decomposition of the Directory. For the Consulate retained two of the fundamental principles of the Revolution, equality at home and constant expansion abroad. Civil and social inequality, the dividing barriers between classes and cliques, had been swept away by the Revolution, and these the Consulate had not sought to restore. "Liberty" had been too often abused by the people during the ten years of their supremacy for them to set much store by it now; "Fraternity," owing to the countless wrongs done in its name, had become a hateful word; "Equality" alone still carried weight. Napoleon was right when he repeatedly asserted (what the Bourbons were far too blind to see) that Frenchmen valued equality far more highly than political liberty. "There is scarcely anything you take seriously except equality," said Napoleon to Madame de Rémusat. "Liberty is a mere pretext. Equality is your hobby." [1] He himself had learned its value when as a young lieutenant without prospects it had opened a path for his lofty ambitions, and again, when in spite of his insignificant social rank, it

[1] "Mémoires," I. 273, 292.

had made it possible for him to woo and win a lady of the old *noblesse*, and finally when it enabled him by merit alone to wield the power over a great and honoured nation.

Conquest was the second revolutionary principle retained by the Consulate. France's striving after universal power has often been represented as entirely due to Napoleon's personal ambition. Those historians who see in it a fresh proof of his greatness, and those who make use of it to condemn his disastrous and insatiable greed, maintain that this thirst for power was characteristic of the man, and that he alone was responsible for the results it produced. But this view is scarcely accurate. As far back as 1792, the revolutionary leaders in France had begun their policy of universal domination. It is true it was only to be the universal domination of revolutionary ideas, the so-called "universal" rights of man. But when any of the old States offered material resistance to these ideas, their opposition was crushed by the Republican armies which, filled with hundreds of thousands of enthusiasts, penetrated far into foreign territories, summoning the populations to rally to the cause of Liberty and to resist their hereditary rulers. Like Mohammed, who imposed his tenets at his sword's point, and the pious men of the sixteenth century who took up arms for their faith, so the believers in this new political creed invaded the neighbouring countries to convert them by conquest. But when the question came up for consideration as to whether conquests made in war were to be retained in peace, it was settled not according to ideal theories, but according to material needs. The only possible way of relieving the financial embarrassments at home was by drawing upon the resources of the neighbouring States, either by annexing them or by creating on the frontiers of France a girdle of dependent Republics and transferring to them part of the financial burden. We have already seen how this motive of self-preservation had induced the Republican Government in 1795 to incorporate Belgium and to seek to obtain the Rhine frontier.

Thus it came about that the Revolutionary theories of liberating the nations degenerated in practice into the con-

quest of them. It was no longer a question of conquering in order to liberate, but of liberating in order to conquer. "When the Committee of Public Safety offers peace," writes Mallet du Pan in October, 1795, "that always means submission. Their invariable aim is to compel all States which lay down their arms to France to become her allies, i.e. her tributaries. Those minor princes who hope to escape this fate by treaties and capitulations, strangely misunderstand the character of this Revolution." This is the identical system pursued by Napoleon up till the year 1812.

As in the days of Louis XIV so now, the greatest opponent of France's territorial aggrandizement was England. If France adhered to this policy which had been forced upon her by the ideal tendencies of the Revolution, and which her material needs prevented her from abandoning, Britain would also be compelled to continue her opposition, at sea by means of her navy, on land through her allies. For the English Government could not tolerate the idea of allowing the navies of Holland and Spain, the commerce of Belgium, the ports on the Mediterranean and ultimately all the markets of Europe, to lie at the mercy of another Power. According to the reports of that time, during the summer of 1795 France was not only intending to land an army in the British Isles but also to destroy England by closing all European ports against her commerce. Here, therefore, was Napoleon's continental blockade already shadowed forth. Even in his Oriental plans the authorities at Paris had preceded him. At the time the landing in England was being planned, and long before Napoleon had dreamt of outrivalling Alexander, the Directory had Britain's sources of wealth in India under consideration. Mallet du Pan writes in a dispatch dated July 3rd, 1796: "There is no bounds to the activity of the Directory. It is rousing Persia, undermining Constantinople, and filling India with its emissaries." In like manner during the last ten years of the century we find the policy to be pursued towards Germany mapped out point by point, exactly as it was afterwards accomplished by Napoleon. The idea of the secularization of the German ecclesiastical principalities had

already been mooted under the Convention in 1795, Sieyès wrote a memorandum on a scheme for the indemnification and aggrandizement of the temporal principalities at the expense of the ecclesiastical, such as was actually carried out in 1803 with only a few alterations. In the diplomatic records of the Committee of Public Safety and the Directory, the idea is suggested of a Confederation of the Princes of the Rhine under French protection which became fact in 1806, and likewise the design of forcing Prussia and Austria as far East as possible, so as to bring the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe under France's control and thus withdraw them from that of England. "Robbed of these invaluable waterways," so runs a passage in the instructions for the French Ambassador at the Hague, in August, 1795, "England would be in great difficulty with her Asiatic and Colonial produce. These goods not being marketed would fall seriously in price and the English would suffer through there being a glut, just as they had intended to make the French suffer by their scarcity." In a report to the Directory dated from Berlin, July, 1798, Sieyès frankly declares the German shores of the North Sea, "the most important part of the world for France when one reflects that the Directory could then shut all the harbours and markets of the Continent against England, from Gibraltar to Holstein, or even to the North Cape".

It is evident, therefore, that the Revolution meant to extend its influence and its power to the farthest bounds of the Continent. But both plan and method were lacking, just as in the home administration, where one decree had been added to another haphazard. Now the need was for some man of exceptional sagacity and practical insight to lend coherence to these diverse aims. Herein consists Napoleon's personal share in the policy of the Revolution. Till now he had only been its pupil and advocate, in so far as his personal interest coincided with its aims. The Revolution recognized no bounds, neither did his ambition. Once master of France, he meant to let things run their course, and then he foresaw the possibility of a universal monarchy such as the world had

never before witnessed. Like a strong swimmer whose destination was the mouth of the river, he only needed to get into the main current to be sure of reaching his goal. In the early days of his career, when he drew up the plan of campaign in Italy with the younger Robespierre, he had grafted his own policy on to the Revolutionary tree, and now that he overshadowed the Revolution, he could no longer change his soil unless at the cost of tearing up his power by the roots.[1]

History tells of Kings whose tragic story moves us to compassion. But there are nations too with tragic stories, nations who in consequence of one great sin, suffer and languish for centuries. Such a one is France. Nothing could be more striking than the career of this people full of enthusiasm for the real good of humanity, reduced within a few short years to act in cruel opposition to these ideals; thirsting for peace, yet condemned to long and exhausting wars. When Robespierre fell and the Reign of Terror was at an end, the nation called loudly for peace; when the Directory succeeded the Convention they repeated their cry; later, when Sieyès entered the Government, their hopes centred on him; and now when Bonaparte had seized the helm, often as they had been deceived before, they turned again to him.

Some have held that by submitting to a few restrictions Napoleon might have concluded peace immediately in 1800. That is scarcely so. For since the Directory had adopted the practice of transferring part of the burdens of the State to its "liberated" neighbours, and of entering the contributions levied on the enemy's country as if they were permanent items in the budget, it had supinely turned its back on the difficult and ungrateful task of restoring order in the finances. Here, too, Napoleon's indomitable will had wrought improve-

[1] In after days at St. Helena, he remarked: "I might steer as I liked, the waves were stronger than my hand. I never was really so much my own master; I was always controlled by circumstances. A man is but a man after all; his forces are nothing when circumstances and the prevalent feeling do not favour him; public opinion dominates everything." (Gourgaud, "Journal," II. p. 78.) Had he forgotten then how often public opinion had felt the weight of his heavy fist?

ments, but in the first few months of his rule he could do no more than lay a foundation for his reforms. Capital was still scarce, the rate of interest very high, the revenue from the taxes incomplete, and as we have seen, many a harsh measure had to be pressed into service in order to raise money. If the State was to continue to exist, these contributions from allies and the moneys extorted from conquered foes were in the meantime indispensable. To have concluded peace at this juncture would have meant that wealthy Holland, Switzerland, the conquered German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, the Riviera, Malta, Egypt, and the possibility of levying contributions during war, would all need to have been given up. France would then have had to draw back within her own boundaries, her native resources seriously crippled or as yet undeveloped, while her disbanded armies would only have helped to swell the starving ranks of the proletariat. Besides that, there was the danger that the contrast between the abject misery of the poor and the opulence of those unscrupulous parvenus who had battened on the financial embarrassments of the State, might have provoked a social war.[1]

Moreover, these Frenchmen who were clamouring for peace did not for a moment mean peace at any price, or founded upon the reverses of the previous year, but upon new and brilliant victories for which Napoleon's name was a guarantee—that "honourable and lasting peace" which the

[1] In May, 1801, three months after the peace of Lunéville, Cobenzl wrote from Paris to Vienna: "The French Government would have been totally destitute of means if the war had been carried into their own territory, hence their constant desire to seize every opportunity to maintain their troops at the enemy's expense" (W. St. A.). In July, 1801, the Prussian Ambassador, Lucchesini, writes: "Bonaparte is far too much of a conqueror to give France and Europe a lasting peace. In addition to his power-loving nature, another factor influences his political attitude—the inadequacy of the French revenues to support the troops, and the greed of the generals. If the 120,000 Frenchmen presently being maintained by Swiss, Italians, Dutch, Spaniards, and Portuguese were to return, the embarrassments of the Treasury would reach a climax." (Bailleu, II. p. 51.)

Rump Parliament had desired of the Consuls on the 19th Brumaire. Then, too, the army wished for war and victory to retrieve its reputation; and finally, what was of decisive importance, the First Consul himself wished it. He needed war so that by acting on the time-honoured principle of employing the forces of the State abroad, he might reduce the various parties at home to obedience, and maintain and confirm the position he had so audaciously won. He needed war to regild and heighten his fame, and to silence those whispering tongues which were spreading reports about the disaster at Acre and the utter futility of the whole expedition to the East.[1]

Napoleon's present powerful position was largely due to the prestige he had won two years previously when he had returned triumphant in war, bringing peace with him; and without forfeiting his prestige he could not now withdraw from the boundaries gained at Campo Formio. After all, the treaty of 1797 was simply a landmark of France's aggressive policy, leading up to the natural frontiers and to a sphere of power far beyond that. Now, after a year of victories, France could not expect her enemies to evacuate their advanced positions without a struggle.[2] Hence Bonaparte's letters of December 26th, 1799, to the King of England and to the Emperor

[1] "The Egyptian expedition, which afterwards appealed so strongly to the imagination, was then regarded as little else than a madcap enterprise. Nelson's destruction of the fleet at Aboukir, the siege of an eyrie like Acre—which had to be given up—and the information which came through England, greatly discounted the impression created by the bulletins of the Army of the East, which were regarded as being more boastful than accurate; the adventurer seemed to overshadow the great general." (Pasquier, "Mémoires," I. p. 141.)

[2] He referred to this explicitly at St. Helena ("Corr.," xxx. p. 493): "Napoleon then required war. . . . A treaty of peace running counter to that of Campo Formio and annulling all the Italian creations, would have offended public opinion and have deprived him of what he needed for bringing the Revolution to an end and founding a definite and permanent system." To Lucien, on his appointment to the Ministry of the Interior, Napoleon wrote: "If it were not that I required war I would begin with the parishes in founding France's prosperity" ("Corr.," VI. 4474).

Francis, expressing his desire of peace but bringing forward no definite proposals, carried no weight and can only be regarded as a clever stroke of personal policy. England was then holding Malta and Egypt in a state of blockade, and the fall of these two French positions was only a matter of time. Both were much too valuable to Britain's interests to be relinquished, and Pitt therefore declined to entertain Bonaparte's overtures.[1] Furthermore for a long time past English money had been supporting on French soil a whole army of Royalist partisans who were only awaiting a fresh success of the Coalition to stir up a civil war and recapture the throne for Louis XVIII. In the return of the hereditary dynasty (which also implied the old frontiers), as Pitt stated in his brusque reply, England saw the best guarantee for peace; certainly not in the person of one who in the summer of 1797 had supported the war party in Paris, frustrated the negotiations with England, had made Italy and Switzerland dependent on France, had compelled Austria to give up the Netherlands, and had threatened Britain's position in Egypt and Asia.

Austria meanwhile had quarrelled with the Czar. After the victories of the allied armies the Emperor Francis had wished to regain not merely the old Lombard territory but also the three papal legations, a design which Russia suspected. Any immediate rupture, however, was prevented by the plan of campaign brought forward by England, according to which Suvoroff was to leave Italy and conquer Switzerland, where the Archduke Charles was in command. The Archduke, greatly against his better judgment, was then to proceed to Southern Germany, where he was to operate against the Central Rhine and to support an Anglo-Russian army in Holland, with a view to reconquering Belgium. During the marches entailed by this dislocation of the troops, Masséna won a victory over a Russian corps at Zurich and

[1] "The overtures we are now making to England will not lead to any practical results," said Napoleon to Lucien (Lucien's "Mémoires," I. p. 377).

thereby regained possession of Switzerland. But at Ancona, which was captured by the Russians and Austrians in November, 1799, fresh misunderstandings broke out, in consequence of which Suvoroff returned to Russia. With the exception of Genoa, where there were still some French troops, Austria was now sole mistress in Upper Italy and such she expected to remain, all the more so as on November 4th, her troops defeated Championnet at Genoa, and on December 14th, captured Cuneo, the last stronghold in the Alps. Furthermore, the Royalist elements in Provence were at this time preparing the ground for an invasion of France, and hence when Napoleon's letter reached Vienna Thugut also declined his overtures. Before doing so, however, he requested an assurance as to "whether the First Consul was prepared to go back to the real causes of the war so as to prevent their recurrence; whether he was prepared to discard that mistaken policy which had been disastrous for France and a menace to the existence of the other Powers; whether there was any difference between the overtures of the new Government and those of its predecessors; and whether General Bonaparte would influence public opinion in France to recognize the general principles of international law which alone bound nations together and taught them to respect each other's peace and independence." To this Talleyrand replied on February 28th, offering to open negotiations on the basis of the Treaty of Campo Formio. There was no mistaking the significance of that reply; any further efforts to negotiate were simply for the sake of appearances. How insincere Napoleon was in his talk of peace is shown by the fact that on the very day on which the above letters were dated he addressed the soldiers of France in these words: "You have conquered Holland, the Rhine, and Italy, and dictated peace under the walls of terrified Vienna. Soldiers, it is no longer your frontiers that have to be defended; the enemies' countries must be captured." To the Italian army on the Riviera, lately placed under Masséna's command, he issued a proclamation in which, as in 1796, he consoled the starving warriors with the prospect of fresh victories in

the near future.[1] In short, Bonaparte had meant to fight from the first, and these letters to the two Sovereigns were simply intended to create the impression in France that it was he who was urging peace and the enemy who was pressing for war.[2] He could now safely venture to spin out the negotiations with Thugut. On April 7th, he even offered, through Talleyrand, some Italian territory, confident that the offer would be declined, as was the case. Meanwhile he was zealously endeavouring to improve the condition of the army and seeking everywhere for money. In order to popularize the war he published the interchange of letters with the two Sovereigns, and had a bill passed allowing substitutes in certain classes of the population. A new charter was granted to the Consular Guard, and further rewards and honours projected in the recognition of valour.

Before proceeding against the foes without, however, those within had to be conquered. La Vendée was still in revolt.

[1] This second manifesto affords a conspicuous instance of Napoleon's matchless skill in appealing to the ordinary private. A demi-brigade had grown faint-hearted. "Have they all died," he asked, "those heroes of Castiglione, Rivoli, and Neumarkt? They would have perished rather than have abandoned their colours, and they would soon have won back their younger comrades to honour and duty. Soldiers! you complain that your rations have not been regularly distributed. What would you have done if, like the 4th, and the 22nd Light Infantry, and the 18th and the 32nd line regiments, you had been in the heart of the desert without bread or water, with nothing to eat but the flesh of horses or mules? 'Victory will give us bread,' said they, and you—you desert the colours!"

[2] In a valuable treatise on the "Anglo-French Peace Negotiations" (December, 1799, till January, 1800) H. M. Bowman has recently sought to prove that Bonaparte, assuming the probability of both his overtures being rejected, had taken this into account, but had framed his letters so as to produce the impression on the French nation that he had not desired this rejection, that he had been in earnest about the peace. At St. Helena, however, Napoleon confessed that "England's answer filled me with secret satisfaction," and in an exposé of Talleyrand's early in 1800 occur the words, "one puts oneself into a good position by showing oneself anxious for peace at the beginning of a campaign and desirous of re-establishing it. If the campaign is successful one has then acquired the right to be severe; if it is a failure, one is at least free from the reproach of having brought it about" (Bailleu, I. 522).

The success of the campaign in Holland had put at Napoleon's disposal a splendid army of 30,000 troops which he further reinforced so as to give full weight to a manifesto to the Vendéens, offering a free pardon to the insurgents on their laying down their arms, but threatening with death those who continued to resist. As the manifesto was accompanied by various decrees removing the restrictions on Catholic worship, admitting the relatives of emigrants to Government offices, etc., it was a complete success. As early as January the Royalists of La Vendée accepted the terms of peace; in February the Royalists of Brittany, who looked to Bonaparte to restore the Monarchy, followed suit. Of the various bands of Vendéens only three ventured to resist, and they were forced to capitulate. Frotté, the most implacable of their leaders, was captured by stealth and condemned to death. The province was then sufficiently tranquil to admit of part of the Army of the West being sent elsewhere.

Of the remaining French forces, 120,000 were under Moreau in Switzerland opposed to an Austrian army of equal size in Suabia under the brave but incompetent General Kray; for the Archduke Charles, ill, and offended by Thugut's arbitrary orders, had resigned the chief command. In Italy, on the other hand, Masséna had only 30,000 troops as against 80,000 Austrians under Melas, an elderly general, frail, conscientious, and extremely circumspect. To remove this disparity in numbers the First Consul gave secret orders to Berthier, the Minister of War, to assemble at Dijon a reserve force of from 50,000 to 60,000 troops, the nucleus of which was to be the aforesaid Army of the West. At the outset Napoleon was somewhat uncertain as to the allocation of this reserve army, which he had originally intended to command in person. But the Constitution forbade the Consuls to take part in war, and on that account and also partly to avoid being personally compromised in case of defeat, he entrusted the chief command to Berthier. As soon as possible he wished Moreau to cross the Rhine at Schaffhausen and assume the offensive, supported by the reserves, then press on into Lombardy, either over the Splügen or the St.

Gothard, so as to relieve Masséna's position by a diversion in the Austrian rear. But as Moreau advocated crossing the Rhine at Strassburg instead of Schaffhausen, Napoleon abandoned the idea of this co-operative movement and decided to send the reserves to Geneva, from whence they could be moved either into Suabia or into Italy. If the Rhine Army succeeded in driving the Austrians back into Bavaria and cutting off their communications through the Tyrol with Italy, the reserves, supported by one of Moreau's corps (under Moncey) which was to hold Switzerland, were then to cross the St. Gothard into Upper Italy. Here they were to co-operate with Masséna, threaten the Austrian communications, compel the enemy to fall back and then defeat them. At Basel in 1800, Moreau and Berthier agreed to carry out this plan, Moreau crossing the Rhine and Berthier assuming the command at Dijon. Carnot meanwhile was to replace Berthier as Minister of War.

Early in May, however, bad news arrived from Italy. The Austrians had occupied the Riviera as far as Nice, had driven Masséna back on Genoa where they had held him in check by land while the English did so by sea, and had forced an auxiliary corps under Suchet back on the Var. There was no time to lose. Without waiting for the success of Moreau's operations, the reserves, numbering barely 45,000, were sent to Geneva, from whence they were to proceed by the shortest route—the St. Bernard Pass—into Italy. In order to have this audacious plan effectively carried out, Napoleon left Paris on May 6th, travelling as fast as the fleetest horses could carry him, and henceforth, although not nominally commander-in-chief, he directed the operations. In Paris the rumour was spread that he had gone on a short journey. Again fortune favoured him, for just as he was leaving the capital he learned that Moreau had been victorious at Stockach, and soon afterwards he heard of fresh successes at Engen and Möskirch and that the Austrians had been thrust back as far as Ulm. Moreau was then able to send the auxiliary corps to join the reserve army, bringing it up to nearly 60,000. Fortunately, too, Melas did not proceed to

the Riviera to complete his conquest of Upper Italy till the month of April, for although, in accordance with his orders from Vienna, he had been ready to begin operations in February, he had let himself be persuaded to postpone the undertaking by the remonstrances of his suite who made much of a fall of snow in the mountains and of the fact that the stores were still incomplete. By this delay he had allowed Masséna time to procure sufficient means of resistance to maintain his position at Genoa until June, by which date Napoleon had crossed the Alps, and so, early in May, when Melas at length divined Berthier's intention of invading Piedmont, the main body of his army was under Ott besieging Genoa, another division was on the Var, and various detachments, numbering about 17,000 in all, were holding the passages in the North, far too weak a force to offer any serious resistance to an army advancing in a compact body. Circumstances could scarcely have been more favourable to Napoleon or better calculated to speed him in his daring plans.

On May 14th, 1800, the first battalions gained the top of the pass, just as a French army of similar strength had done two years previously but without any guns.[1] Now, however, they brought their artillery with them, dragging their cannon behind them on runners made of the hollowed-out trunks of trees. On the 22nd the last division reached the summit, Napoleon and the Guards having passed on the 20th. Till then, favoured by the weather, they had escaped any serious mishap beyond the hardships inevitable in such a manœuvre. The Austrians had never expected an entire army to make its appearance there, least of all by such a route, and their defences were utterly inadequate. Fort Bard, a little fortress in the Val d'Aosta, presented the only serious obstacle. "There," writes Coignet, one of the grenadiers, "the Consul took many a pinch of snuff, and even with his great genius it took him all his time." As a matter of fact the Austrian Captain Barnkopf with a couple of hundred men compelled

[1] Mommsen ("Hermes V") and F. Berger in his "Heerstrassen des Romischen Reichs," have shown that this was not the route traversed by Hannibal.

Berthier, cavalry and infantry, to fall back on a steep and circuitous path, and so delayed the artillery transport for a week. Under cover of night, however, six cannon, their wheels wrapped in straw, were successfully smuggled down the direct road past the fortress, the village street having previously been strewed with horse-dung.[1] These cannon were distributed among the three divisions, and on June 2nd, when Fort Bard capitulated, the remainder of the artillery came on. The vanguard under Lannes captured Ivrea with scarcely any guns and pushed on to Chivasso in order to mislead Melas as to the movements of the army advancing on Milan, where Napoleon arrived on June 2nd. Here the army was joined by Moncey's corps numbering 11,000, bringing it up to a total strength of ten divisions (about 60,000 troops). Five of these were sent forward to cross the Po between Pavia and Piacenza, so as to block the enemy's retreat; three others, on the Ticino and in Piedmont, were to intercept Melas' escape to the North, while two were to watch the Adda and the left bank of the Po. But Melas, who was well informed of the enemy's movements, the significance of which he had at first under-rated, was not misled by Lannes. Aware of his danger, he realized that he must reach Piacenza and retreat across the Po as soon as possible, in order to extricate himself from his "sad plight". But he was too late. Masséna had held out obstinately at Genoa, and by June 4th, the day on which he at last capitulated, the French had reached the Po, and were ready to come immediately to his relief. The Austrian division recalled from Var was unable to prevent them, for having been badly guided, it lost its way in the Alps and half the troops perished without even a blow having been struck. Ott now turned northwards through Novi with his troops from Genoa, only to find that the enemy had already crossed the river. At Casteggio beyond Montebello, where he was attacked, on June 9th, by Lannes' corps

[1] Berthier, in his dispatch relating to this manœuvre, speaks of "dead and wounded". Napoleon drew his pen through "dead," and so, in the "Moniteur" mention was made only of "wounded" (Cugnac, "Campagne de l'armée de reserve," I. p. 519).

and one of Victor's divisions, he was defeated with a loss of several thousand troops, and compelled to fall back on the Scrivia with his battalions in confusion. Melas, who had concentrated his forces at Alessandria, had now two courses open to him, either to offer battle and break through the barriers, or to avoid an engagement by marching north, crossing the Po at Casale and Valenza, and restoring his communications with Mantua via Milan. He immediately decided upon the latter course, and Zach, chief of the general staff, had already begun his dispositions, when on the following day word came that the French were in force on the opposite bank of the Po and were threatening Valenza, thus foiling Melas' manœuvre. There was therefore no choice left but to fight.

The rivers Scrivia and Bormida run parallel to each other northwards to the Po. Tortona is on the Scrivia, and a few miles to the west, on the Bormida, lies the fortress of Alessandria. The high road from Turin through Asti to Piacenza and the east, passes through both towns, and between them, rather nearer Alessandria, lies the village of Marengo. The road running south from Tortona, and the one running south-east from Alessandria, join at Novi and form the highroad to Genoa. On June 12th, the corps of Lannes, Victor, and Desaix (who had recently returned from Egypt), had advanced as far as Tortona, and on the following day Lannes and Victor crossed the Scrivia only to find the country deserted, for Ott had fallen back on the Bormida. It was not till they reached Marengo that the French came upon the Austrian troops, who withdrew across the Bormida after a brief engagement. Napoleon then imagined that Melas wanted to elude him either by retreating northwards through Valenza or Pavia so as to block the road to France, or by moving south to Genoa. The possibility of a battle on the ground the enemy had just evacuated was an idea he never entertained.[1] To

[1] The idea of diverging to Genoa and from thence passing on eastwards via Bobbio was momentarily entertained at the Austrian camp. Prince Hohenzollern, who had remained in Genoa with a few thousand troops, related in his remarks on the campaign of 1800 : " Meanwhile (June 8th), I

clear up this point, however, at noon on the 13th, Napoleon sent one division northwards to reconnoitre on the Po and a second under Desaix southwards towards Novi. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 14th, everything being still tranquil, he concluded his surmises were correct and sent fresh orders from his head-quarters at Torre de Garrofoli to Desaix to continue his march. Scarcely an hour later word came that the enemy had assumed the offensive on the Bormida. At first Napoleon was inclined to discredit the news, but on going to the scene of action he found the divisions under Victor and Lannes already hotly engaged. The Austrians, who had the advantage of numbers and heavier artillery, were endeavouring to get possession of the village of Marengo which, after a struggle lasting for several hours, the French were forced to evacuate. Convinced now that a decisive battle was in progress and that he had committed a glaring blunder in detaching two divisions, Napoleon immediately sent off a messenger recalling the two generals and begging Desaix "for God's sake," to return as speedily as possible. And help was urgently needed, for the French, with only light artillery, were being gradually driven farther back by the Austrian centre, and even the Consular Guard[1] had failed to hold its ground. By the side of the road sat Napoleon, a prey to nervous excitement, lashing the dust with his riding-whip and calling vainly on his fleeing troops as they passed him by to make a stand, to wait, that the reserves were coming. It was only with difficulty that he was dissuaded from placing himself at the head of a demi-brigade, the 72nd, and leading them back to recommence the futile struggle. There was no doubt about it, the Austrians had won the battle. Proud of their victory, with shouldered arms —some of the columns already disbanded—they followed the

received orders to increase the stores at Genoa and to lay in sufficient for the whole army in case it marched through Genoa *en route* for Bobbio". In his note to Melas on June 9th, Genoa is spoken of as a fortress which "affords the only communication with our provinces" (Hüffer, "Quellen," II. pp. 163, 286).

[1] The Consular Guard, according to Napoleon's new statute, consisted of 1200 soldiers, each of whom had been through four campaigns.

French along the road their courage had won. Melas had handed over the command to Zach and had ridden back to Alessandria thinking all was over, when suddenly, towards evening, at San Giuliano, the Austrians came upon Desaix and his division. Owing to Napoleon's first order to continue the march south being long in reaching Desaix, the counter-order arrived in time. "What a hopeless muddle," was Napoleon's greeting. "We are quite fresh," answered Desaix, "and if need be, ready to die." There and then, within range of the enemy's guns, a brief council was held and the plan of action settled. Desaix' division, their slender stock of ammunition replenished, reinforced by Kellermann's dragoons, who till then had covered the left wing, formed up immediately and by the unexpected volley of artillery with which they began the fight, paralysed the Austrians. Zach, however, quickly got together an infantry regiment and a few grenadier battalions who held their ground and advanced in spite of the suddenness of the attack under which the infantry had given way. But a new and terrific onset from Kellermann's dragoons scattered the grenadiers, while two cavalry detachments turned and fled without even waiting to receive the charge. Then followed an indescribable panic, the infantry surrendered in thousands to the French cavalry. Zach was taken prisoner, and the remaining troops fled in headlong rout through Marengo to the Bormida, the two bridges across which were blocked by surging crowds. Many sought escape by fording the river, nor did the fugitives halt till they were safe within the walls of Alessandria. At five o'clock the French had lost the battle; two hours later they had won it.

No impartial critic can arrive at any other conclusion than that it was lost by Napoleon and won by Desaix who had valiantly begun the struggle afresh. Yet at the very outset of the attack that was to redeem the fortunes of the day, he was struck down by a ball from the enemy, and the laurels of victory crowned a forehead cold in death.

For a long time Napoleon could not bring himself to admit that he had been surprised on this occasion and a memorable

victory gained almost without his assistance. At various times, even as late as 1805, he had official reports drawn up of the battle of Marengo in which ultimately the great services of Desaix and Kellermann were completely overshadowed by the fictitious deeds of the commander-in-chief. Although in the end the unanimous testimony of eye-witnesses revealed their falsity, these tales long found credence. The retreat of the army was described as a feint. Kellermann was said to have acted upon orders from Napoleon who, it was solemnly asserted, had already foreseen the retreat to Pavia; and troops belonging to the divisions of Lannes and Victor were stated to have marched eastwards, right on till the evening of the 15th. Austrian officers who took a leading part in the battle declare that things might have taken a different turn even at the last if their strong left wing under Ott, which had suffered very little, had attacked the French in flank, which was not done, "as in any case everything was lost"; or even if the cavalry detachment, 2000 strong, posted idly on the road near Acqui, had been called up; but no one had thought of that. Thus it was not always his own genius but only too often also the inefficiency of his opponents which raised Napoleon to such lofty pre-eminence. The panic of the Austrian troops on the evening of the 14th, and the pusillanimity of their generals in not renewing the fight as expected next day, contributed in no small degree in leading Napoleon to think slightingly of his opponents and to shape his policy towards them accordingly.

Although the victory of Marengo on June 14th was not of Napoleon's achieving, yet the results of that engagement and the entire credit of the daring campaign by which the enemy was reduced to such a precarious plight, are justly due to him. At Marengo the Austrians lost over 9000 out of their 30,000 troops. That fact and the heavy loss of officers, which made the task of restoring order so much harder, led Melas at a council of war on the 15th to advocate overtures for an armistice, so as to save the army for the State, a reason Napoleon afterwards praised at St. Helena. In the contemporary records which have recently come to light we see with what

skill Bonaparte exploited the enemy's overtures, dictating his terms at once, sending Berthier to Melas the same evening (the 15th), and signing a convention which stamped the previous day's battle as a great historic event, of European significance. Melas was granted both an armistice and an unmolested retreat, but only on condition that he withdrew with his troops beyond the Mincio, and surrendered to Napoleon all the territory to the west of that river. Thus in one day the fruits of Austria's victories in 1799 were swept away, and Austrian garrisons remained for the time being only in Tuscany and Ancona. What was perhaps even more important than the turn of events in Italy was the fact that the decisive blow which the Coalition had hoped to deal, and on which England's royal pensioner was counting to restore him to France, was no longer forthcoming. In London the convention of Alessandria was felt like a defeat.

After the battle Napoleon had handed over the command to Masséna and had gone to Milan there to transform his military success into ready money. A monthly tax of 2,000,000 francs was imposed on the Cisalpine Republic (which was to be restored), a similar tax of 1,500,000 francs on Piedmont, while Church property and public domains were confiscated and sold for what they would bring. The army, of course, lived on the country. Moreau, who had meanwhile penetrated farther into Germany and had occupied Munich, received orders to levy contributions where he was. Southern Germany was likewise compelled to support an army and furthermore to pay 40,000,000 francs. The financial aim of the campaign was thus realized. For Napoleon it was a twofold success. His position in France was now firmly secured, which had not been the case previously, as is seen from the letters and references of that time. The question as to what would happen if he lost his life in Italy[1] or even failed to win in war, was privately discussed by

[1] The mere rumour that Napoleon had narrowly escaped falling into the hands of an Austrian detachment while crossing the St. Bernard caused "rentes" to fall on July 8th from 33 to 30. *Vide* Boulay de la Meurthe, "Correspondance de Talleyrand avec le Premier Consul pendant la Campagne de Marengo," "Rev. d'hist. diplom.," 1892, p. 286.

Sieyès, Carnot, Lafayette, Fouché, and others in Talleyrand's house at Auteuil, and opinion was still divided between Carnot and Lafayette as the next First Consul, when news came of the victory at Marengo and ended the discussion. But Napoleon learned of it, and it probably influenced him in his decision to leave the theatre of war in June. Early in July he was back in Paris, firmly resolved not to leave it again for a long time, and to turn to account the success at Marengo by speedily concluding peace.

While at Milan, Napoleon had written a second letter to the Emperor Francis in which he again talked of peace, this time in all seriousness, and proposed negotiating upon the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio. But at Vienna they were not yet willing to treat on such unfavourable terms. Besides, only shortly before this they had pledged themselves to the British Government, in exchange for large subsidies, not to enter into a separate treaty with France before February of the following year, 1801. Then, too, there was always the chance that Bonaparte might modify his demands and make proposals to which England might accede.

Such was the point of view from which the Emperor Francis replied to the First Consul. The letter was entrusted to Count St. Julien, an Austrian general, who had just arrived from Italy with Bonaparte's letter. On reaching Milan and finding the First Consul had left, St. Julien followed him to Paris, accompanied thither by young Count Neipperg, afterwards husband of the Ex-Empress Marie Louise. Here St. Julien was made the victim of a strange intrigue. Talleyrand was instructed to persuade him that he had full powers to negotiate for peace and that if he failed to use them war would immediately break out. And so, before the week was over, in spite of the fact that Thugut had expressly warned him against letting himself be inveigled into negotiations, and had told him merely to gain time as much as possible, St. Julien actually signed the preliminaries of a peace based on the terms of the treaty of Campo Formio, although

this was directly counter to the spirit of the Emperor's letter, and not only ignored England's claims but closed all Austrian ports against that Power.[1]

No sooner was the treaty signed than Napoleon sought to make use of it without even waiting till it had been ratified. Never for a moment did he lose sight of his great adversary across the Channel. If there was to be peace, as the French nation so ardently desired, then he was resolved it would not merely be peace on the Continent, where he was and meant to remain victor, but also peace on sea, so as to help the depression in trade, put fresh life into the deserted French seaports, and last, but not least, maintain France's position in the East, where England, by her supremacy on sea, kept her closely blockaded. Otto, a French diplomatist, then in London negotiating for an exchange of prisoners, was therefore commissioned by the First Consul to obtain an immediate cessation of hostilities in return for the truce France had granted to England's ally on the Continent, for at Parsdorf on July 15th, Moreau had signed an armistice with Kray. Otto was to lay special stress on the fact that as the conclusion of peace with Austria left Britain isolated, she herself must now be desirous of peace, for which the way was being paved by a truce valid also for Spain and Holland.[2] Otto was to stipulate, however, that the French would be allowed to replenish their blockaded positions, especially Malta and Alexandria, with stores and ammunition, just as in the Parsdorf treaty where the German fortresses of Ulm, Philippsburg,

[1] My treatise on St. Julien's mission in "Historischen Studien und Skizzen" has been supplemented by Neipperg's notes recently published in Hüffer ("Quellen," II.), where (p. 134) part of the text of Thugut's brief instructions to St. Julien is given.

[2] It almost looks as if the whole negotiation with Austria and the intrigue with St. Julien had been got up in order to use the peace with Austria as a lever against England. It is characteristic of Bonaparte that his Adjutant, General Duroc, who was sent to Vienna with St. Julien to await the ratification of the treaty, should there bring forward fresh demands, viz., the demolition of the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera, and the transference of the Grand Duke of Tuscany to the Legations conditions to which St. Julien had refused to agree at Paris.

and Ingolstadt were allowed to revictual.[1] But the value of the negotiations was very considerably diminished when the Viennese Court, out of consideration for its English ally, declined to ratify the preliminaries, and proposed instead to hold a congress at Lunéville at which Britain would have a delegate to represent her interests. Although annoyed at the failure of his ruse with St. Julien and of his calculations on the Emperor Francis' love of peace, Bonaparte accepted this offer on condition that the London Cabinet granted the truce at sea on his terms. These negotiations, however, proved fruitless.[2] Ultimately the English Cabinet agreed to the truce, provided their representative took part in the peace negotiations, and they also consented to allow fourteen days for provisioning Malta and Alexandria. Thereupon Napoleon, who was more concerned about increasing the forces than the food, immediately requested that six French frigates should be allowed to sail from Toulon to Alexandria and back unmolested. On September 5th, however, Malta fell, and he straightway broke off the negotiations. But he still wished to conclude a separate peace with Britain, although well aware that this Power was no more free to do so than was Austria to sign St. Julien's preliminaries. The war against the two Powers therefore continued its course.

Austria, meanwhile had been making vigorous preparations for continuing the struggle. New troops were levied, and Kray, who had not proved equal to his task and by July had retreated as far as the Inn, was replaced by the youthful Archduke John, who relates in his memoirs that at this time he had but recently learned how to saddle a horse. He was bound down to follow implicitly the instructions of General Lauer, his chief-of-the-staff, and had to bear the blame of his appalling blunders. In Italy, Melas was replaced by Bellegarde, a somewhat more capable soldier. But these changes were so far from improving the condition of the army that on September 20th, 1800, the Emperor Francis was obliged to sue for an extension of the armistice con-

[1] *Vide* Appendix, note for Talleyrand in connexion with Bowman's "Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens," p. 49.

[2] *Vide* Appendix, Talleyrand's note of September 2nd, 1800.

cluded with Moreau in July. This he obtained, but at the price of abandoning the three important fortresses of Philippsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, and of withdrawing his army across the Inn; for such were the terms upon which Moreau had received orders to insist. These bloodless conquests, which were further augmented by the illegal occupation of Tuscany, induced Napoleon to consent to an Austrian diplomatist coming to France to arrange a new basis for a peace. At Passariano in 1797, Cobenzl had served his country well, but at Paris he was destined to ruin her cause utterly. His once pliant mind seemed unable to adapt itself to the sudden change of circumstances produced by the recent reverses. He insisted upon conditions which were no longer reasonable, considering the actual position of the two armies, nor did he abate his demands until it was too late and Napoleon had resolved to continue the war. Here again the contrast between the new revolutionary and the old conservative methods was strikingly apparent. Cobenzl, bound by his treaty with Great Britain, requested that a British diplomatist should be present at the negotiations; Bonaparte, on the other hand, insisted on a separate agreement, so as to isolate Britain from her allies. Cobenzl was not unfavourable to such an arrangement, provided France was willing to pay a sufficiently high price for it, especially in Italy. In this policy of conquest, ancient Austria and the youthful Republic met as competitors. Each wished to exclude the other. What France offered—the Chiese and afterwards the Oglio as boundary, Ferrara as increase of territory, and Bologna and Romagna as compensation for Tuscany—seemed too little to Austria, who entrenched herself behind the demand that England should take part in the congress. But more Napoleon would not offer, and so the only possible solution seemed to be the complete overthrow of one or the other of the claimants, which was precisely what Napoleon was determined to bring about. In the middle of November, 1800, he withdrew the armistice, and although Cobenzl and Joseph Bonaparte still carried on the negotiations at Lunéville on the French frontier, the decisive questions were not settled there but elsewhere.

When hostilities were resumed the French were posted on the Isar, while the Austrians occupied a strong position behind the broad waters of the Inn, where, had they used their advantage skilfully, they might have held their opponents in check longer than would have been agreeable to the autocrat in Paris. However, on December 1st, just as Moreau was preparing for the difficult task of forcing the passage of the Inn, his left wing was suddenly attacked on its way thither and beaten back. It seemed incredible that the enemy should have given up such a strong position, yet so it was. Moreau immediately seized the advantage so unexpectedly offered, united his centre with his left wing at Hohenlinden, where he took up a strong position and now in his turn awaited the enemy. The Austrians then advanced, thinking the French in retreat on the Isar. Moreau met them in front while two French divisions succeeded in interposing themselves between the Austrian main body and their left wing, which had got out of touch. Caught thus unawares in flank and rear, the Austrians broke and fled, leaving their artillery behind them, as well as thousands of prisoners; the Archduke John only escaped with great difficulty. By their victory at Hohenlinden on December 3rd, 1800, the road to Vienna was thrown open to the French. At Steyer on December 25th, Moreau concluded an armistice which was the forerunner of a peace. On the 26th, General Brune, who had succeeded Masséna in the chief command in Italy, crossed the Mincio and a few days later the Adige. So much for Austria and her policy of conquest!

At Lunéville the success of the French arms had quickly made itself felt. Cobenzl at last agreed to treat for peace separately. He was even prepared to sign it for the German Empire as well, and on Joseph Bonaparte's suggestion, to partition Upper Italy with France. Now, however, the events of the war overruled all these deliberations, and Austria's diplomacy, like her army, was fated to be driven back relentlessly point by point. In November, Cobenzl had demanded the Oglio as the boundary of Austria's territory in Italy, in December he had already consented to withdraw to

the Mincio, and by January he had to be content with the Adige. When at length the final peace was signed on February 9th, 1801, it contained stipulations which not only shattered Austria's hopes of conquest but even injured her position as a great Power. In France, however, the new treaty lent added strength to the revolutionary system of expansion, for the terms of the treaty of Campo Formio had not only been confirmed but made even more rigorous. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, who was related to the Austrian Imperial family, was deprived of his territories in Italy and was to receive as compensation a grant of land in Germany, just as had happened previously with the Duke of Modena, who had been given the Breisgau. Austria had thus lost her last foothold in Central Italy and the entire Italian peninsula was now subject to French influence.

In Germany also this influence was now making itself felt. As had been stipulated at Rastatt, the Rhine throughout its course was henceforth to form the boundary line of France, and those secular princes who had been dispossessed on the left bank of the river were to be compensated out of the ecclesiastical domains on the right bank. This was simply the old scheme of secularization, and Austria, although her power in Germany was largely dependent upon these ecclesiastical princes, was obliged to acquiesce. Moreover in the new treaty Napoleon had secured for himself the right to supervise the execution of these changes, so that France's intervention in Germany had the sanction of the head of the Empire. The possibility of Austria receiving indemnification in Bavaria as far as the Inn, for which provision had been made in the treaty of Campo Formio, was now out of the question. Vanquished in Italy and threatened in Germany, Austria had perforce to relinquish all hopes of territorial aggrandisement, and on Napoleon's demand, Thugut, the Minister who represented Austria's policy of expansion, was deprived of his office. On March 6th, 1801, the Reichstag ratified the treaty for the Empire.

Although this peace, which confirmed France's supremacy on the Continent, was mainly the result of military successes,

it was also partly due to skilful diplomacy by means of which the First Consul obtained at the same time some valuable advantages with regard to England. He also sought to end the dangerous friction with the United States which had begun under the Directory, and at Mortfontaine on September 30th, 1800, he signed a treaty with the United States' representative, recognizing the complete independence of neutral flags. At the same time he endeavoured to break up the coalition by detaching Russia both from Austria and from Britain. He even hoped to win over the Czar, and Prussia, for whose alliance he was scheming as the Directory had done before him, was to be the intermediary. But King Frederick William was unsuccessful in his efforts at St. Petersburg, and declined to commit himself. Napoleon then went forward alone. Prior to the last campaign he had offered to release the Russians taken prisoner at Zurich and in Holland—some 7000 men, whom he now had fitted out with new clothing and accoutrements—and also to restore the Island of Malta to the Czar, offers which the latter accepted. Then came the victorious campaign in Italy, and Paul I, believing he saw in this powerful general the destroyer of the abhorred Revolution, hailed his new triumphs with delight, and for the time being was as prejudiced in favour of Napoleon as he had previously been against the Directory.

The First Consul had carefully weighed the consequences of this step. Malta could not hold out much longer against the English blockade, while, if it surrendered, he had thrown an apple of discord between the two allies. And so it proved. In September, 1800, when the French garrison at Lavalette capitulated, and the English, heedless of the rights of the Grand Master, took possession of the island, the Czar then cut himself adrift from his ally, seized all British ships in Russian ports, and even went the length of concluding a "league of armed neutrality" with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, against Britain's arbitrary proceedings at sea. As early as 1795, France had been pressing for this, but since Marengo, Prussia had been more accessible, and now, owing to Russia's attitude, she was coming into line with French

policy. King Frederick William even let himself be induced to close the Elbe against the English, and in April, 1801, to occupy their principality of Hanover, a result partly due to jealousy of Austria's impending acquisition of German territory. This coalition against Britain further confirmed France's supremacy on the Continent, now represented in the personality of the man who was already being regarded as the "Master of Europe".[1] Napoleon immediately sought to turn his successes to account by having France's sphere of influence clearly defined. Batavia and Helvetia were occupied by French troops and the coasts of Italy made as inaccessible as possible to British vessels. The independence of the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics was again recognized and guaranteed. The former had been considerably increased by the inclusion of Modena and the Legations. Both republics were occupied by French troops and were simply tax-paying French dependencies in which the will of the First Consul was supreme as in France. The fate of the intervening province of Piedmont was not yet settled except as regarded Savoy, which had been annexed by France, but no one had any doubt as to what would happen. It was soon afterwards made into a French military division with General Joubert as administrator.

Napoleon took advantage of the acquisition of Tuscany to place Spain under obligations to himself and to bring her policy under the control of France. After the battle of Marengo he had contrived to get an anti-French Ministry in Madrid turned out of office and the Queen's lover, Godoy ("the Prince of Peace"), who was friendly to France,

[1] It was at this time that the Queen of Spain was vaunting the beauty of her daughter Isabella to Lucien Bonaparte, who drew the inference that an alliance was being thought of with the man who was then called at Madrid, "the Master of Europe". "You are regarded here since the Russian *rapprochement* as Master of Europe . . . and at every conference the King's Ministers speak to me of the universal monarchy," so wrote Lucien to Napoleon on April 4th, 1801 ("Mémoires," II. p. 68). "Their (the Consuls) intention is to land us in difficulties and subjugate Europe" (Kolytschew's report of March 9th, 1801, Martens' "Recueil," XIII. 254).

placed at the head of affairs. Napoleon gained his point by means of the treaty of Ildefonso signed on October 1st, 1800, according to which Tuscany under the name of the Kingdom of Etruria was promised to the Spanish Queen's daughter who was married to the Bourbon Prince of Parma.[1] After the peace of Lunéville this promise was given effect to, and in return, on March 21st, 1801, Spain declared herself ready not only to hand over to France Parma and the Island of Elba, formerly belonging to Tuscany, and to relinquish Louisiana, but also—what was far more important for Napoleon—to force Portugal to desert her ally Britain, and to close all her ports against British vessels. A Spanish army crossed the Portuguese frontiers and by the end of May the greater part of the country was in the hands of the Spaniards.

Meanwhile on the eastern shores of Europe, Naples and the Papal States were still accessible to the English. The Directory had converted these two States into Republics, and the question was now whether these should be re-established. Napoleon, it is true, followed the course of development already in progress in France, but he did so by moulding it in accordance with his own individuality and to suit his own purposes. He was far too practical a man to act solely on the principles of the "*idéologues*" whom he openly ridiculed, and it is abundantly clear that he himself, as an autocratic ruler, was little concerned for the up-keep of the republican form of government. He gained his ends without it. In the last war Russia had intervened zealously on behalf of Naples, and the First Consul, out of consideration for his newly acquired friend, was forced to spare the royal house of the two Sicilies. On March 28th, 1801, he concluded the Peace of Florence with Ferdinand

[1] Lombardy had originally been thought of, in which case Napoleon would have abandoned the idea of restoring the Cisalpine Republic. But owing to the increasing friendliness of his relations with Russia and to Paul I's growing aversion to Austria, the First Consul thought he might venture to seize Tuscany, and the victory at Hohenlinden clinched matters. (Cobenzl's report from Paris, March 4th, 1801, Vienna State Archives.)

IV, whereby the latter consented to evacute the Papal States which had been occupied by Neapolitan troops during the war, to cede to France his share of the Island of Elba and the principality of Piombino, and pledged himself not only to close his ports against British ships but also to support at his own expense, in and around Taranto, a French army corps destined for Egypt.

The Papal States, when once evacuated by the Neapolitan troops, were not again placed under French administration. Napoleon was not religious, nor did he profess any definite faith. The most he admitted was a vague Deism, although Ménéval, his secretary, affirms that he saw him in critical moments quite involuntarily making the sign of the Cross.[1] "I once was a believer," said Napoleon at St. Helena, "but as soon as I began to understand and to judge, my faith received a shock and became insecure. That happened fairly soon, when I was about thirteen." Among his youthful compositions there is a "Parallèle entre Apollonius de Tyane et Jésus-Christ" (written probably in imitation of Voltaire) in which he decides in favour of the Greek philosopher.[2] Yet Napoleon never undervalued the political significance of the Papacy, and herein he differed radically from his predecessors. We have seen how, in 1797, he had spared the Papal States contrary to the express wishes of the Directory, the reason being that in the previous year the great majority of the French nation had openly declared their allegiance to the Catholic faith. "People in France have again become Roman Catholic," wrote General Clarke to Napoleon, in December, 1796, "and perhaps we shall even need the Pope himself in order to maintain the Revolution by means of the priests and the peasantry over whom they have regained their control. Might it not prove that, by overthrowing him now,

[1] Ménéval, "Souvenirs," III. 114.

[2] When Lucien reminded him of this treatise in after days, Napoleon ordered him not to mention it, as, if it became known, it might utterly undo the result of all his labours in effecting a pacification with the Roman Church. It was not among the writings of his youth which Napoleon himself burned, for Fréron had borrowed it, and never returned it. (Lucien, "Mémoires," II. p. 114.)

we were alienating from our Government a number of Frenchmen who might quite well be retained?"[1] Napoleon was so firmly convinced of the justice of these remarks that, after the Peace of February, 1797, he sought to induce the Pope to exhort the priests to submit to the laws of the State. The events of the 18th Fructidor, however, had upset these plans, and now in 1800 the reason for his treatment of the Pope was again to be found in the internal situation. Everywhere in Paris, as well as in the provinces, the churches of the priests who had refused to take the oath of allegiance to the laws of the State, were crowded, while those of the priests who had subscribed to the oath were practically deserted. The significance of this fact was not lost upon Napoleon. A great deal of the hatred inspired by the Directory was due to their hostile disregard of the religious needs of the people. Napoleon did not intend to repeat their mistake. "We certainly have not much religion," said he to one of the Royalist leaders whom he wished to win over, "but the people need it." And he hoped by satisfying the wants of the great bulk of the nation to attach them the more firmly to himself. "I restore religion," he remarked on the same occasion, "not for you but for myself." Linked with this idea was another which he expressed as follows in 1806, "As for me, I regard religion, not as the secret of the incarnation, but as the secret of social order; it lends to heaven an idea of equality which prevents the rich being slain by the poor". In 1800 he had said: "Mankind cannot exist without inequality of property, and inequality of property is impossible without religion". Hence he was convinced that in dealing with the social disorders in France and in his task of regeneration, he must reckon with religion; but he meant to do so with it as his servant, not as his master. "The nation requires religion and this religion must be in the hands of the government."[2]

With this end in view he hoped to secure the help of the new Pope, Pius VII, who had been elected at Venice on

[1] "Correspondance inédite," II. 430.

[2] Thibaudeau, "Mémoires," p. 152; Taine, "Le régime moderne," II. 8, 19.

March 13th, 1800. In 1795, the insolvency of the Revolution had led to the separation of Church and State because there had been no money with which to pay the clergy, and their property had been taken from them. Now, however, when the finances had improved, it was but right to provide for their maintenance, in return for which the priests, as they had done under the Monarchy, were to swear fidelity to the Government from whom they would receive their appointments. But this arrangement depended on an agreement being come to between the State and the Pope, for the great majority of the Catholic priests in France, owing to the sequestration of their property, had been cut adrift from the land. Such an arrangement, too, would not have been without political advantages; for if Pius recognized the new government in France the Bourbon pretender, Louis, would lose much of his support from the French clergy and through them from the French people, and the civil war still smouldering in La Vendée would then die out. On the other hand the Pope would need to surrender those former ecclesiastical possessions which had passed into the hands of countless private individuals. By his doing so the present owners would then feel secure in their property and would show their confidence in the Government by their willingness to pay the taxes.

Soon after the victory at Marengo, Napoleon reassured the Pope through Cardinal Martiniana, Bishop of Vercelli, as to the continued existence of the Papal States—without the Legations—provided that the Holy Father lent a helping hand to establish a peace in France acceptable alike to Church and State. Ecclesiastical affairs being at this time in a deplorable condition, Pius willingly agreed and sent Cardinal Consalvi, his Secretary of State, to Paris, where on July 15th, 1801, a concordat was signed abolishing the Church laws of 1790, declaring the Catholic religion to be that of the majority of Frenchmen, and recognizing the Pope as head of the Church. Pius, on his part, acquiesced in the loss of the Church property and consented to ecclesiastical dignitaries being nominated and salaried by the Government like State

officials; the Curia was to retain its canonical institution. (The fact that this institution was not bound down by any restrictions afterwards led to serious conflicts.) The papacy also consented to the appointment of parish priests being subject, through their bishops, to the approval of Government, to the redistribution of the dioceses, and, for financial reasons, to a reduction in their number.

It required no small courage on Napoleon's part to sign his name to such a document, for all those about him, with a few exceptions, were against it, and in the army especially there was a strong prejudice against any pact with the Church; perhaps partly because Napoleon excepted seminarists and all ecclesiastics engaged in teaching from the conscription lists. He did not allow himself to be turned from his purpose by this opposition, indeed he even took the new conditions so far into consideration as to go regularly to Mass on Sundays, and often in conversation to put in a good word for religion and confession—facts which were afterwards wrongly adduced as evidences of his personal piety. The Concordat was accepted by the Legislature but was supplemented by a comprehensive appendix, "Les articles organiques," which was promulgated simultaneously with the treaty in April, 1802. In several important points these articles went so far beyond the agreement of July 15th, that the Curia protested. But Pius hoped great things from the settlement with France, and so the protest came to nothing. Moreover, as Napoleon was now all-powerful in Italy, the Pope in his capacity of a temporal prince was necessarily in a position of dependence towards him. Napoleon had thus obtained what Kaunitz, Joseph II, and Thugut, with all their schemes of conquest, had striven for in vain. Long afterwards at St. Helena, when talking over his attitude towards Rome at this time, Napoleon made the significant remark: "Catholicism secured me the Pope's interest, and by means of my influence and my power in Italy I did not despair of, sooner or later, guiding the Pope according to my will. What an influence that would have been! What a lever against the rest of Europe!"

Such was the way in which, after the peace of Lunéville,

Napoleon built up his commanding position in Western Europe. Holland, Portugal, and Italy, sent in their contributions to the French exchequer. Everywhere, even in the heart of Germany, the French troops lived at the expense of their dependent neighbours; and from Holland to the two Sicilies, the coasts of Europe were closed against the powerful rival across the Channel and her commercial policy. The allied Danes, Swedes, and Russians were now arming against England, and the Czar Paul, carried away by his fantastic imagination, even contemplated a march through Khiva and Herat on India, there to deal a fatal blow at their common enemy. In the end of February, 1801, a Cossack Army under Orloff actually crossed the Volga.[1] In Napoleon's brain projects of universal domination now rose clearer than ever. The French troops were still in Egypt, able, therefore, to combine effectively with Russia in an expedition against the Punjab. On January 15th, he had written Menou: "The Oriental army at the Red Sea, in Syria, and Africa quickens all sorts of hopes".

[1] Whether Napoleon instigated the Russians to this measure, as Montgelas relates in his "Memoirs" (p. 51), remains to be proven. The French agent, Guttin, who was long resident in Russia and unwearied in advocating an alliance between that Power and France, records in his reminiscences that the project of a combined expedition formed the subject of a private correspondence between the First Consul and the Czar, but this statement lacks corroboration. (Cp. Buchholz, in den Preusz. Jahrb., 1896.) Traces of such a correspondence, which Thibaudeau among others describes as a "daily" exchange of letters, cannot be identified beyond possibly the passages quoted by Tratschewsky in the "Sbornik der hist. Gesellschaft," vol. 70, from the official collection of documents, pp. 24 and 38, and there is nothing about the project, which seems not to have thriven on its unstable basis of vague schemes. (Cp. the plan given by E. Paul in the "Deutsche Revue," 1888, with note in Rose's "Napoleon I.," p. 262, of another in the London Archives.) Martens ("Recucil," XIII.) does not mention the subject. On the other hand the Russian Ambassador, Kolytschew, certainly demanded that France should evacuate Egypt, which does not fit in with the idea of a combined expedition to the East. In January, 1807, when Napoleon was in communication with Persia and his intentions against British India had thereby become more feasible, he wrote Marmont, "What was once a chimera is at the present moment tolerably simple". ("Corr.," XIV. 11734.)

But it was only a fleeting vision ! On the night of March 23rd, 1801, the Czar Paul was assassinated. His despotic arrogance had of late degenerated into intolerable brutality towards his immediate *entourage* and he fell the victim of a palace intrigue. His son succeeded to the throne of Russia as Alexander I. It is said that Napoleon was overwhelmed with despair on receipt of the news. All his magniloquent plans were ruthlessly shattered, for almost immediately it became known at Paris that the new Czar had set free the English vessels on which his father had laid an embargo, and had renounced the post of Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, which was tantamount to renouncing Malta. And so the goal which had seemed so near—thanks certainly to the friendship of a man quite half-mad—had suddenly receded and become a thing remote. Napoleon had perforce to accept the changed circumstances and to content himself with advantages somewhat less brilliant.

On March 14th, 1801, shortly before the Czar's unexpected death, Pitt had resigned office as Prime Minister of Britain and had been succeeded by the peace-loving Addington, who at once made overtures to Napoleon, now that Britain's continental ally was prostrate and that there was little hope of saving Belgium from France. Napoleon hesitated as to what course he should pursue. Every day the demand for peace was growing louder, and as the public had got wind of the English offer, the First Consul was no longer able, as in the previous year, to conceal his war policy by alleging England's refusal to come to an understanding. He agreed to the English proposals, but only with a view to gaining the utmost possible advantages from his opponent's manifest desire to end the war. During her long maritime struggle Britain had made important conquests. From the French she had taken the Antilles (with the exception of Guadeloupe) and the settlements of Pondichery and Chandernagor in India ; from the Dutch, Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope; from the Spaniards, Trinidad; while in the Mediterranean she held Malta and Minorca, and it was highly probable that Egypt also would fall into her hands before long. Relying on the

support of the "neutral" Powers, Napoleon had considered himself strong enough to make Britain restore all these conquests, when suddenly the news came from St. Petersburg that the Czar was dead, followed hard by the tidings that General Menou, who on Kleber's assassination had succeeded to the chief command in Egypt, had been defeated near Alexandria and forced back into the city. It was now England's turn to show little inclination to make sacrifices for peace. The negotiations were broken off and both parties tried to gain the upper hand by successes in war and diplomacy. Britain cultivated the goodwill of the new Czar and sent a corps to Egypt to join forces there with the Turks and compel the French to capitulate. Napoleon on his side urged on Spain to conquer Portugal in order to have some territory at his disposal which he could offer as compensation—as he had done with Venice in 1797—and so conclude peace with Britain on terms as favourable as possible for France. He also sent his trusty aide-de-camp, Duroc, to the new Czar Alexander I, in order to further French interests there.

But the honours fell to England. Cairo surrendered in June, and its fall made the capitulation of Alexandria inevitable. At Badajos on June 6th, 1801, Spain concluded a separate peace with the Prince Regent of Portugal, who, in return for his country's independence being guaranteed, promised to close his ports to the English and to pay 15,000,000 francs to France. Napoleon was beside himself at seeing his plans thwarted in such wise. He refused to ratify the treaty, and sent an army corps under Leclerc to occupy Portugal; nor would he be appeased until the Regent, Prince John, had promised to cede part of Guyana to France, to increase the war indemnity to 20,000,000 francs, and to grant the most-favoured treatment to French fabrics (September 20th, 1801).

As the Czar had shown himself disinclined to form an alliance with France and had of late assumed an almost hostile attitude, Napoleon decided to resume negotiations with Britain. These were accompanied by much sharp fighting in which England was not invariably victorious. In July a British squadron was defeated by Admiral Linois off

Algeciras and Nelson failed in his attempt to destroy the flotilla of landing boats moored near Boulogne, and was forced to withdraw. For these reasons, and also to ease the financial strain, reduce the oppressive burden of the income tax, and, if possible, conclude a favourable commercial treaty with France, the English Government at last decided to surrender Malta, which was the real stumbling-block. Concessions were made on both sides, and on October 1st, 1801, the preliminaries were signed in London. Of all her conquests Britain was only to retain Trinidad, taken from Spain, and Ceylon from the Dutch; she was to evacuate the islands and harbours in the Mediterranean and to restore Malta to the Knights of St. John. France, on her part, pledged herself to restore Egypt to Turkey, to guarantee the integrity of Portugal, and to withdraw her troops from the Papal States and the Kingdom of Naples.

Britain would probably have obtained more favourable terms had not the peace been signed immediately, for shortly afterwards news reached Europe that Menou had been obliged to surrender Alexandria to a combined force of British and Turks. By this capitulation Egypt was lost to France and one of Napoleon's proudest dreams was at an end—at least for the time being. He now definitely concentrated his plans upon the Continent of Europe. Yet it was no small triumph for him to have forced England, who for a century back had strenuously combated all French aggression on the Continent as a direct infringement of her own interests, to sign such a treaty, and that too at a time when Napoleon had far surpassed even the most ambitious schemes of Louis XIV.

After the signing of the peace with England, the negotiations at Paris with Markoff, the Czar's new representative, were quickly concluded. On October 8th, 1801, peace was signed with Russia, and on the 10th a secret treaty between France and Russia. In the first treaty the most important stipulation was that both Powers bound themselves not to tolerate the hostile machinations of *emigrés* against their countries (Article 3), which meant that Napoleon renounced the Poles, as Paul I had previously requested him to do, and the Czar

renounced the Bourbons. In the secret treaty, which determined the immediate future of Europe, the two Powers agreed to act in concert in apportioning compensations to the German princes, and in settling those matters in Italy which had not been dealt with in the treaties with Rome, Austria, and Naples. The Czar's demand that Piedmont should be given back to the King of Sardinia Napoleon declined, and reminded him that no mention of that had been made in the treaty with England. When Alexander suggested that Europe would resist the annexation of that province, Napoleon retorted: "Very well, then, let Europe come and take it".[1]

At the same time France signed an agreement with Turkey (October 9th, 1801), in virtue of which all the treaties previously concluded between these two Powers were again enforced, i.e. French goods received the most-favoured-nation treatment. Shortly before this, on August 24th, France had also signed a treaty with Bavaria full of high-sounding promises for the Elector, who, as Napoleon said, "had behaved so well at Rastatt". And so the last of the belligerent Powers was now pacified. Peace reigned on every side and the nations rejoiced that a struggle which had become an intolerable burden was at last at an end.

To his fame as a war-god Napoleon had now added the lustre of the peacemaker. Both at home and abroad he enjoyed unprecedented consideration. In France it was felt that the hopes built on him on his return had been fulfilled; and abroad the Governments of the old States welcomed him as the man who had mastered the Revolution, firmly believing that satisfied with what he had achieved, he would now throw his whole weight into preserving the peace of Europe. "This is no ordinary peace," said Addington, the English Prime Minister. "It is a real reconciliation of the two foremost nations in the world." Fox, who met Napoleon in Paris about this time, returned to London full of enthusiastic admiration for him. Nevertheless there were not a few far-seeing statesmen who did not share this unbounded confidence. There were ominous gaps in the peace. No provision had

[1] Martens, "Recueil," XIII. 488-90.

been made for Piedmont, Holland, and Switzerland; or for the commercial interests of the two countries, for the treaty of commerce which was to have made French markets accessible to British trade had not come about. Yet the Ministry silenced demur with the argument that in Ceylon and Trinidad much had been gained, that a fresh coalition was impossible in the meantime, and that although France had increased her territory, she had only been following the precedent set by the Powers of Eastern Europe in partitioning Poland, a formula which Napoleon at once adopted. In after days he often reminded the old Powers of the example of Poland when they sought to check his aggressions. For the time being, however, Addington was right, and peace was established. Parliament accepted the preliminary treaty. But on March 26th, 1802, when the preliminaries of the Franco-English treaty of the previous October were ratified in the Peace of Amiens, the members of the Opposition in the House of Commons significantly remarked: "We have just confirmed France in her possession of Italy and her mastery over the Continent," and characterized the treaty as an unstable and deceptive truce—and they were right.

Napoleon indeed scarcely troubled himself to conceal his ambitious aims. Only a few weeks after the battle of Marengo he said to the Prussian Ambassador at Paris, "I need peace to establish the present government in France more securely and to rescue the world from chaos". This was no mere piece of senseless rhetoric. Its true meaning is to be seen in an official pamphlet, "On the Condition of France at the End of the Year VIII," which appeared in 1800, and was written by Hauterive, one of the ablest members of the Foreign Office and Talleyrand's right-hand man. The principal arguments it develops are to the effect that when the Revolution broke out, the political system of Europe had long been undermined and was no longer worth maintaining, and that the war between France and the other Powers was only the result of this disorganization. As conqueror in the struggle, France had undertaken and already partly carried out a new system of federation instead of the old one of the balance of the Powers.

By reason of her military and her financial resources, as well as by her principles of government, France was destined to become the guarantee for peace and prosperity, the leader of the new federation of the European States, and it was to the interests of the remaining Powers to trust themselves to her guidance.

This was simply a plain unvarnished account of the political programme of the new France. In all essential points it was really that of the old Revolutionary Government; but where the convention had planned a federation of European Republics under French protection, Napoleon was now far less concerned to liberate the peoples than to subject their princes to the hegemony of the State governed by him. Gentz, the well-known publicist, in reviewing Hauterive's pamphlet, wrote in 1801 recommending the statesmen of the old school to lay to heart the following very pertinent remarks: "It is not enough to say that France has enlarged her boundaries by her conquests on all sides, and strengthened the ancient inviolability of her territory by new bulwarks, and increased her influence over the neighbouring States to a dangerous extent. The plain fact is that in her present condition France has really no frontiers. All the States surrounding her are, if not in name, at least in actual intention, her territory and her property, or they may become such as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself, or as her leading statesmen desire it." There was no disguising the fact that the peace then reigning throughout Europe was no "reconciliation" of the peoples, such as short-sighted statesmen lulled themselves into believing; it was only a stage on the road leading to universal power towards which Napoleon was incessantly striving, urged on alike by circumstances and his own ambition.

In view of the fact that Napoleon had resolved to maintain the Revolutionary policy in foreign affairs, a question here arises which is of paramount importance to the historian of the period, viz., in how far did this policy influence, as it was bound to do, the political and social conditions of the other nations of Europe, the internal structure of whose

governments differed so materially from that of the new France? During the last decade of the eighteenth century the Revolutionary armies had spread abroad little else than rebellion and disorder, for there was nothing else in France. It remained to be seen what Napoleon's armies would do, and that depended upon whether or not he succeeded in restoring order permanently in the home administration, in rescuing what was really good and valuable out of the chaos of revolutionary legislation and utilizing it, and so fulfilling the second of the great hopes France had built on him at his return. That task he undertook and fulfilled, not, however, from a sincere desire for the prosperity of the French nation —he never loved it enough for that—but in order to secure a firm basis for the towering fabric of his own power. That was why France was to become strong, powerful and rich; for only then would she be able to furnish such sacrifices as would meet his needs. That these sacrifices, made in pursuit of an experiment which shaped the history of the world, were to cost over a million lives, and after all not to answer the purpose,—on that neither France nor Napoleon had reckoned when they entered upon their policy of conquest. The Convention and the Directory, Napoleon's predecessors in office, had sacrificed almost as great a number of lives and without even restoring order and prosperity. That debt at least Napoleon discharged in full.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE NEW FRANCE AND HER SOVEREIGN.

On a beautiful winter day, February 19th, 1800, the Consulate removed from the Luxembourg Palace to the Tuileries, where Napoleon and Lebrun took up their residence temporarily, while Cambacérès preferred a mansion of his own to the official suite of rooms. That evening the First Consul remarked to his private secretary, "Bourrienne, it is not enough to be in the Tuileries, we must remain here". And he did. Here in the abode of the Kings of France, he lived in royal style.[1] And here, too, he carried through the immense task of reorganizing the State. In this he had the assistance of a large number of gifted and experienced helpers, some of whom, the members of the Council of State, deliberated upon the new measures and formulated them as decrees and laws, while the Ministers or Directors-General, saw that these measures when passed by the Chambers were promptly carried into effect. The Council of State, an institution which survives in France to the present day, supplied the First Consul with full and accurate information of the internal condition of the country; it placed at his disposal the wide experience of a number of men of marked ability who had held Government appointments not only during the ten troublous years of the Revolution but also before that time in the days of the Monarchy; and finally it gave him the services of men of shrewd practical minds whose native capacity for State affairs had developed as vigorously in the free air of the

[1] Cobenzl remarks of an audience of the diplomatic corps in March, 1801, "So the little Corsican squire who is virtually King of France holds his Court, a more brilliant one perhaps than that of the unfortunate Louis XVI".

Revolution as had the military genius of a Hoche or a Bonaparte. To the first members of the Council of State, Boulay de la Meurthe, Roederer, Chaptal, Berlier, Duchâtel, Defermon, Dufresne, Fourcroy, Cretet, Barbé-Marbois, Regnault de Saint Jean d'Angély and others, belongs the credit of having finally reorganized the finances, reformed the home administration, codified the laws, and placed public worship and education upon a sound basis; in brief, of having provided all the useful materials out of which, under the eye of a master-builder, the domestic structure of modern France was reared. These men represented all shades of politics. Dufresne, for instance, was a Royalist, Defermon a Girondist, Fourcroy and Berlier Radicals and ex-members of the Convention, Regnault, Thibaudeau, and Roederer Moderates of the Directory days, Portalis and Marbois exiles of the 18th Fructidor. Napoleon had purposely selected his men from opposite camps so that his reforms might not seem the work of a party. The members of the Council were divided into various commissions—Finance, Justice, War, the Navy, and the Interior—all of which met daily in one of the rooms in the Tuileries, generally under the presidency of the First Consul, whose vast intellect could enter into the smallest details of the Administration not only without confusion but with the faculty of being able at any moment to recapitulate the whole matter and judge of it from the ruler's point of view. Some of the councillors of State were sent on special missions into the departments and forwarded their observations direct to the First Consul, a valuable supervision which frequently led to useful reforms. It was little wonder that the Council of State stood high in public estimation, especially as at that time it possessed certain powers of arbitration in administrative matters.[1]

When once the laws and the Consular decrees formulated by the Council of State had been passed, the second task of

[1] According to Article 52 of the Constitution, "the Council of State under the guidance of the Consuls deals with the drafting of laws and ordinances of the public administration, and with the solution of difficulties in administrative matters".

the public administration began. This lay with the Ministers, whose labours were as absolutely under Bonaparte's control as were the deliberations and decisions of the Council of State. They, too, had been chosen with studied care from diverse political parties.[1] As Napoleon once remarked to his brother Joseph, "What revolutionist is there but would believe in an order of things in which Fouché is Minister of Police? What nobleman but would expect to be able to live under a Government that includes the ex-Bishop of Autun? The one defends my Right, the other my Left. I have opened up a broad highway where there is room for all." To certain departments of the Ministry Napoleon attached *directions générales*, an institution which still forms part of the administrative organization of France. These *directions* were for roads and bridges, for Public Worship, Education, the Treasury, the Customs, the national domains, the liquidation of the national debt, etc., and several of them were afterwards formed into independent Ministries.

All communications between the First Consul and his Ministers passed through the State Secretariat, at the head of which was Maret, an able and loyal man, who held this post from 1799 till almost the close of the Napoleonic regime. No one understood so well as he did how to formulate instantly the ideas Napoleon threw off with such extraordinary rapidity, or how to follow his impatient dictates. Like Bourrienne, Maret was really a Cabinet Minister kept at the leve of a secretary by his master's consummate superiority. Into the Secretariat the various Ministers sent their reports, which Maret daily submitted to Napoleon for his decision and signature. From it the will of the First Consul passed supreme into all departments of the public administration. From it, too, were issued all the letters to the different administrations, as well as countless others to public bodies and private individuals which now fill the many quarto volumes of Napoleon's Correspondence and bear silent witness to the inexhaustible labours of both master and servants.

The laws and decrees which the Ministries were charged

[1] Their names are given in the previous chapter.

to carry out were transmitted by them to newly created subordinate officials in the departments. On February 17th, 1800, there appeared the law which still forms the basis of the whole administrative apparatus of France. In accordance with it, there stands at the head of the administration in each department a prefect, at the head of each *arrondissement* a sub-prefect, of each commune a mayor, all three officials being appointed by the head of the Government and subordinate to the Minister of the Interior. During the Revolution the administration in the provinces lay in the hands of elective councils, a system which gave rise not only to partiality and manifold irregularities, but even to flagrant disobedience to the central authority. So much was this the case that in 1795, the Directory abolished these autonomous local councils. Napoleon now revived these communal municipalities, but their officials were no longer elective as before and independent of the State. The Mayor was now a magistrate appointed and salaried by Government, and was assisted by a municipal council the members of which were advisers merely without votes and were appointed by the prefect from the list of notables. In like manner the sub-prefect had his district council and the prefect his general council, both of which were appointed by the First Consul for the purpose of assessing the direct taxes throughout the department, of voting its expenditure, and bringing its needs and interests before the Government. On the other hand, a considerable number of official posts were suppressed as they had proved of no real service and were filled by men drawn from the very dregs of society. "What had been submitted, since 1789, to the collective council was now entrusted to the decision of one individual," says Pasquier in his souvenirs. "The administration of the departments and the communes has now become the administration of the prefects and sub-prefects. The results of this change were highly beneficial. The principle of unity in action with the corresponding responsibility quickly restored order in the administration." In contra-distinction to the decentralizing principles of the early years of the Revolution, this was a strongly centralized

system, "an hierarchy," as Napoleon himself said, of "First Consuls in miniature," a bureaucracy like that introduced by Richelieu and Louis XIV, with the fundamental difference that its mechanism was not trammelled and checked by the various immunities and local tariffs of the provinces, nor by the exceptional position of privileged classes and corporations. Furthermore, this bureaucracy was governing a nation no longer consumed with theoretical aspirations for Liberty, but disenchanted by its hard experience of such.

Early in March, 1800, the first prefects were appointed, the same studied impartiality being shown in their selection as in that of the various Ministers and Councillors of State. The Royalist Count Larochefoucauld appears on the list alongside the Girondist Doulcet de Pontécoulant and De Bry, a violent Jacobin but an upright and impartial official. The majority, however, were drawn from the ranks of the Constitutionals of 1789, and the Moderates of Fructidor, their selection being entrusted by Napoleon to Consul Lebrun and not to Lucien Bonaparte, who was Minister of the Interior, but who soon resigned his office to Chaptal and was appointed Ambassador to Madrid. The more Radical elements which also had to be pacified were mostly given judicial appointments, in which capacity they caused least obstruction to the Consular Government.

There was no lack of work for the new Prefects. In 1800 scarcely any taxes were collected, and it is almost impossible to estimate the sum due from the departments. The State was owing half a year's salary to its humblest officials, some of whom died of starvation. Out in the open country the lack of security was appalling. There was an average of over 3000 beggars to each department. The highroads were badly kept and infested with bands of robbers who carried their depredations even into the outskirts of Paris. Their misdeeds form a constant theme of complaint in the official reports of the time. During 1801, in a single department, that of Vaucluse, there were no fewer than ninety deaths from robbery and murder. Many communities were driven by terror into making terms with the brigands and affording them a refuge.

In the large towns things were no better. One of the councillors of State speaking of Toulon says: "There are no police, no lamps in the streets, every night shops are broken into and robbed, no foot-paths, no cleanliness, no bread in the hospitals". It was only with the utmost difficulty that the new Government succeeded in fulfilling its primal duties of protecting the lives and property of its citizens. By means of special tribunals established in February, 1801, and the better organization of the police (whose professional zeal Napoleon had quickened by placing them under the command of a distinguished general), the country was finally rid of these pestilent criminals; and by 1802 cases of murder and robbery had already become rare. A law passed on February 17th, 1800, had provided for the security of the towns by instituting police commissaries in all communes of over 5000 inhabitants, and police *directions* where the population exceeded 100,000. By a decree of July 1st, 1800, Paris received a special Prefecture of Police which included Government agents and political spies as well as the municipal police. The hospitals were reorganized by Chaptal on a more humane system than had hitherto prevailed, the Sisters of Mercy were made available as sick nurses, and a school of midwifery established. The town was improved by building the quays along the left bank of the Seine, opening up the Rue de Rivoli and other new streets, and the restoration of the Louvre. An abundant supply of drinking water was provided and large depots of grain established as safeguards in times of scarcity.

Once these measures for life and property had been carried out, the next thing was to promote the prosperity of the nation or rather—for it had all but vanished—to build it up anew. Commerce and industry had been ruined by the arbitrary financial measures of the Revolutionary Governments and the constant fluctuation of the paper money, while the incessant wars had proved disastrous to the export trade. The Paris manufacturer who had previously employed from sixty to eighty workmen now only required ten; the once flourishing lace-making of the North, the linen trade of Brittany, and the famous paper factories of

Charente were practically extinguished, and the Lyons silk trade reduced by half. The fashion for the antique had revived the popularity of soft materials which at that time England almost alone was able to manufacture, owing to her newly invented machinery and her superior methods of production. In Marseilles the returns for the month did not equal those for the week at the beginning of the Revolution. In the seaboard towns the harbours were buried in sand, their defences in ruins, their populations dwindled. Whoever had business to do, transacted it on the Stock Exchange, where the enormous and constantly fluctuating difference between real and fictitious values was a direct incentive to gambling. Others again speculated in army supplies, thereby enriching the contractors and those corrupt officers who were their accomplices, at the expense of the ordinary private, who was condemned to bitter and often fatal privations by the unscrupulous conduct of the Government. Interest on money lent which had amounted to 60 per cent and upwards under the Directory, was still at 36 per cent in 1800. The new Administration sought to facilitate traffic by constructing canals and by laying out good roads in co-operation with the local authorities. Manufacturers received special consideration. Napoleon had English mechanics brought over to Paris, and in a single year fifty textile factories were fitted out with new machinery. French engineers studied the new inventions, improved upon them, and thereby enabled home manufacturers to compete elsewhere. Every week Chaptal made a point of visiting some industrial establishment. He founded a society for the promotion of industries which published an instructive report once a month; he instituted the keeping of statistics in regard to production which proved of invaluable assistance to Government; he offered prizes for a new machine for making woollen fabrics, passed a decree that only materials of French manufacture were to be employed for official purposes, and that textile wares must bear trade marks that were protected. Napoleon even pressed fashion into his service. Dress had become more modest, and owing to

Josephine's example light foreign materials were discarded in favour of home-made velvets and silks. The occupation and subsequent annexation of Piedmont secured an abundant supply of raw silk for the Lyons' manufacturers. French industries shot up rapidly, and, thanks to French policy, their products soon found their way into the neighbouring countries, to the no small annoyance of England.[1]

With regard to the finances, nothing short of a thorough reform in their administration could secure respect for the Government, fill its coffers, restore its credit, and thereby procure the means of effecting a radical improvement in the lot of the well-to-do classes of the population. It is a most interesting study to watch the way in which France, after narrowly escaping shipwreck in the flood of worthless paper money under the Convention and the Directory, worked her way back in a comparatively short time to normal economic conditions and to a sound standard of values. The Revolution had sought to restore the national credit, which had been exhausted by countless debts contracted under the old Monarchy, by declaring Church property and the estates of the nobles who had emigrated the property of the nation, and by issuing assignats, or bonds, on this property. Owing, however, to the general feeling of insecurity, landed estates went down in value and became for the most part unsaleable. The war against the various European Powers into which the country had plunged in the intoxication of a liberty hitherto untasted, had swallowed up enormous sums of money, and eventually the assignats, which were constantly being added to, became worthless. But as the State was not receiving the taxes due to it, it had to keep on issuing more assignats. "It cannot be denied," declared a member of the Five Hundred in 1796, "that for some years past the habit of not paying taxes has grown in favour." Five years later Gaudin

[1] Here is an instance of Napoleon's attention to such matters. In a letter to Talleyrand on February 13th, 1801, he says: "Linens and batiste do not pay duty in Spain, but both have edgings of bright-coloured cotton on which account they are very highly taxed at certain custom-houses whereas at others they are allowed to pass. . . . The King ought to draft a clause making an exception in their favour."

showed that although the State was paying interest on its income only in assignats, it was suffering from a permanent deficit of over 200,000,000 francs.[1] In 1795 the louis d'or rose in value from 24 francs, in assignats, to 1800, and in February 1796 to 8137, so that one livre in gold was equivalent to nearly 340 livres in paper. The Directory resorted to violent measures to extricate itself. The twenty-four milliards of assignats then in circulation were withdrawn in March, 1796, the holders receiving in exchange only a thirtieth part of their face value in so-called "territorial bonds," which were simply mortgages upon the national property; and the forced currency which had put these bonds on the market did not prevent them falling only a few weeks after their issue to a twentieth part, and in the following year to a hundredth part, of their nominal value. When Government was at last compelled to abandon this forced currency, these bonds disappeared from circulation, the only purpose they had served having been to allow a number of speculators to buy from the Directory in the course of a year the greater part of the national property. The State had thus lost most of its domains and had received in return in actual money scarcely a hundredth part of their value. In this way the estates belonging to the convents and the old aristocratic families had passed into the hands of sordid usurers, scoundrelly speculators, and hosts of small brokers. The number of new proprietors was reckoned at 1,200,000 and henceforward there was a landed middle-class. Even the nineteenth century with its rapid social and economic changes can offer no parallel to so sudden and vital a change of ownership.

At the outset the Government had intended to pay the national debt with the price of the national property, but under such conditions that idea was soon given up. As early as 1793 the Convention had found itself forced to enter the national debt in the "Grand Livre" of the Public Debt as irredeemable consolidated stock at 5 per cent interest per annum. In 1797 this stock had risen to over 250,000,000 francs, only one-fourth of which was in hard

[1] Stourm, "Les finances de l'ancien régime et de la Revolution," I. 168.

cash, the remainder being in bonds on the national property which had again been augmented by the confiscation of the Belgian convents. Even then the burden was too heavy, and the Directory eased it somewhat by retaining only a third of the national debt on the Grand Livre and paying the creditors the remaining two-thirds in bonds. But in 1798, the Government credit then being nil, these bonds fell to 1½ per cent of their nominal value and the transfer of the national debt was simply a bankruptcy by which the country's creditors were robbed of two-thirds of their claims. Even the remaining so-called "consolidated" third was not paid in money, but in assignats. Under such conditions no respectable business man could put any faith in the State. The people retaliated by refusing to pay the taxes, and the Directory then resorted to forced loans. In 1800 the arrears, according to some authorities, amounted to over 600,000,000 according to others to over 1,000,000,000 francs.

Only an iron will could have brought order out of such chaos. Gaudin, the new Minister of Finance, in order to secure the State's existence for another year, fell back on the old device of dear loans and of extorting money from neighbouring States.[1] Some of his operations were suspiciously like bankruptcy. He immediately forbade the revenue officers to accept the bills of assignment transferred by the Directory to contractors. Holders of such bills were to await payment till after the war; but if they insisted on immediate payment—some 65,000,000 francs were involved—they were at once to place the whole amount at the disposal of the State as a loan. No less arbitrary was the method of dealing with the floating debt of 110,000,000 francs, 90,000,000 of which dated from the years 1797, '98, and '99, and 20,000,000 from the year 1799-1800. Payment was now made in "rentes," the debt for the last year being paid in 5 per cent

[1] The people of Hamburg, for instance, had to purchase French protection against Prussian greed of annexation by a loan of 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 francs (Napoleon to Talleyrand, January 13th, 1800, "Corr.," VI. 4520). In 1801, Holland paid 5,000,000 guldens to have the French garrisons in the country reduced, etc.

rentes which early in 1801 stood at 50, but the previous bonds were only paid at the rate of 3 per cent—i.e. 90,000,000 francs rentes at 3 per cent was reckoned as 54,000,000 francs rentes at 5 per cent. And as the 5 per cent stock only stood at 50, in this way the 90,000,000 francs owed by the State was converted into 27,000,000 francs, a proceeding which even the desperate plight of the new Government could scarcely justify. By the same law provision was made for the liquidation of two-thirds of the "unconsolidated" debt, which had fallen to a value of from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 francs per 100 francs of debt. Gaudin offered 5 francs in 5 per cent rentes for 100 francs of the other, i.e. $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent for nominally 100 francs, so that 1,000,000 francs in the budget represented 400,000,000 francs of "mobilized" national debt.

But although such methods were pressed into service, at the same time effective steps were taken to prevent any recurrence of such conditions. On November 24th, 1799, Boards of Management for the direct taxes, such as exist till the present day, were established in every department, and the assessment of taxes, which had hitherto varied from year to year, was put on a sound basis. "There is no security of property," said Napoleon, "except in a country where the taxes do not vary every year." He again considered the question of making an exact survey of all real estate in the country. In September, 1801, the "Direction Générale" for customs and registration of landed properties was founded; and within the space of one year the newly organized Administration of Forests raised its revenue to double that of the previous year. As in the case of the revenues and the income from public property, both of which had been handed over to the Minister of Finance, so now the expenditure and the debt were carefully overhauled and entrusted to a special department, that of the Treasury, at the head of which was Barbé Marbois, a member of the Council of State.[1] This

[1] This division of the financial administration between two Ministers continued till 1815. Napoleon sought to justify it by saying that one Minister did not afford the same guarantee as two Ministers, as the one was a check upon the other.

department also controlled the "Caisse d'Amortisation" (the sinking fund) which under Mollien's capable management contributed more than anything else to restore the national credit. The Directory had left the Consulate a legacy of unsold national domains worth 300,000,000 francs. Instead of squandering this like his predecessors, Napoleon sought to increase its value. He assigned 70,000,000 francs worth to the sinking fund to be disposed of gradually, and the proceeds used to buy back Government bonds, so that these should continue to circulate at 50 and upwards, to which figure they had risen after the peace of Lunéville. A further 120,000,000 francs of this national property was allotted with its proceeds to the administration of Public Instruction, while 40,000,000 francs were set aside for the maintenance of disabled soldiers, thus relieving the budget.

Ere long the interest on the national debt could be paid in hard cash, which had a wonderful effect in increasing confidence in the Government and greatly augmented Napoleon's popularity. Thus success showed itself in the unexpectedly high revenue from the taxes, especially after the Peace of Amiens, which confirmed the new proprietors in their possession of the emigrants' estates, just as the Concordat had soothed the qualms of those who had acquired Church domains. And so the financial year of 1802 closed with a surplus.

Napoleon was careful to avoid jeopardizing his increased prestige by imposing new indirect taxes, as Gaudin advised him to do.[1] Not that he disapproved of the principle—far from it. He knew that it worked advantageously in England and it had this much in its favour, that "the hand of the tax-gatherer remained invisible". It had hitherto worked well in the French budget also. But it was only towards the close of the consulate that he decided to impose a tax on wines as an

[1] By this means the revenue for 1801-2 might have been raised from 480,000,000 to 600,000,000 francs. But Napoleon declared the former sum would suffice, because, as he said to Cobenzl, it would "bring the people nearer to him". As a matter of fact the revenues amounted to 500,000,000 francs, while the expenditure, by the management of the finances alone, had been reduced by 15,000,000 francs. (Cp. Stourm, p. 292; Cobenzl's report of March 26th, 1801.)

article of consumption. On January 18th, 1800, in order to promote trade and commerce, the Bank of France was founded. It started with a capital of 30,000,000 francs, 5,000,000 of which were held by the State and were taken from securities furnished by the Treasury. Napoleon himself took thirty shares (of 1000 francs) and induced those about him to follow his example. In 1803, in addition to its other functions—discounting bills, granting advances, dealing in stocks, etc.—the bank received the sole right of issuing notes. Discount then fell to 6 per cent, which made money considerably easier and benefited trade and commerce and ultimately also the State finances. Ordinances were passed regulating the affairs of the Stock Exchange, re-establishing the Chambers of Commerce which had been suppressed by the Revolution, and providing for a more frequent holding of exhibitions throughout the country. The State was thus exerting itself to the utmost and the nation supported it loyally. The taxes were punctually paid and the financial undertakings of the Government again met with hearty support in business circles.

But all this organization would have lacked permanent value if at the same time the rights and duties of the citizens had not been clearly defined and made known to each and all. There was pressing need for a Code to give definite and authoritative form to the law of the land, which had been completely changed by the Revolution. Until 1789 there had been no such thing as uniformity of law in France. In the North the old "*Coutumes*," or right of custom, drawn up in the sixteenth century were still in force; in the South the Roman law or "*droit écrit*" prevailed; and there were numerous local laws. Even before the Revolution, Maupeou (who was then Chancellor), had called attention to the necessity for a reform of the judicial system, and for a codification and simplification of these multifarious forms of law. Then came the Revolution, with its fundamental principle of "Equal Rights for all," and put an end to the diversity of French jurisprudence. The Constitution of 1791 promised a new national Civil Code, and in 1793 the promise was not only repeated but included a Criminal Code as well. In 1799,

however, neither the one nor the other had come to pass and on the night of November 10th, when Napoleon obtained the supreme power, the two commissions were again instructed to formulate a code. Now at last, the firm will of one individual was able to accomplish what the intentions of the many had hitherto failed to effect. On August 12th, 1800, Napoleon appointed a committee of four distinguished jurists, Tronchet, Bigot de Préameneu, Portalis (an ex-member of the "Ancients") and Malleville as secretary, to draw up the Civil Code. These again subdivided the task among themselves, following a plan which Cambacérès had once submitted to the Convention, and in four months they had come to an end of their labours. Their proposed code was then discussed in the Council of State and revised by the jurists, Boulay de Meurthe, Berlier, Abrial, and the two consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, Napoleon himself frequently taking part in the debates and settling disputed points. Those present bear witness to his shrewd observations and his vigorous and lucid views, although these were often highly unorthodox from a legal point of view.[1]

But as certain claims were rejected by the two Chambers, it was not till March, 1804, after revision and amendments, that the Civil Code in its complete form actually became law. Much in it was borrowed from the old "*Coutumes*". Still more from the "*droit écrit*" or Roman Law, though only in so far as these squared with the Revolutionary spirit of Liberty and Equality which dominated the whole of this monumental work. Not infrequently, however, Napoleon favoured the autocratic spirit of the Roman law, for just as he wished the governing power in the State to be absolute, so too in the family the will of the father and the husband was to be unfettered. The clauses restricting the facilities for divorce, bearing unfavourably on the wife, and those relating to the obligation of parents to provide for their children, are among the laws supposed to be directly attributable to Napoleon. The Revolution had abolished hereditary nobility

[1] The published protocols often differed widely both in text and sense from what he actually said. Thibaudeau in his "Mémoires sur le Consulat," p. 426, gives a list of such instances.

and the Code did not restore it. In the matters of inheritance the Revolution had laid down the law that children of different age and sex had equal rights, and the Civil Code confirmed this principle. The Revolution had admitted Jews, though not without some hesitation, to full civil rights, and this also the Civil Code unreservedly confirmed. It had instituted for all religions and all classes of society the registration of civil status and civil marriage, both of which the Civil Code retained. It had declared that marriage could be dissolved, and the Civil Code confirmed this decision. So at last France possessed a system of laws embracing the whole range of civil life. The merit of this belongs indisputably to the First Consul, and hence in France the Book of Civil Law is rightly named the "*Code Napoléon*".

Criminal law, the laws of procedure and those relating to trade were also codified. The scope and value of these labours is too immense even to be indicated here, but the fact that these laws have been adopted in so many countries amply testifies to their worth.[1] It was not only in France that these codes were in use. Wherever Napoleon's power made itself felt the new laws went with it, and although a time came later when France was driven back within her ancient boundaries, these laws remained a lasting tribute to her former greatness. Down almost to the present day the "*Code Napoléon*" remained in force in Rhenish Prussia, Rhenish Bavaria, Rhenish Hesse, and

[1] The deliberations on the "Code Pénal" and the "Code d'Instruction criminelle" began in March, 1801, but were not completed till 1810. This was due to Napoleon's aversion to juries, in which he saw a restriction upon the authority of the Government and too little protection against the attacks on his own person. He would have preferred to suppress juries altogether, although they were guaranteed under Article 62 of the Constitution. But as he could not carry this through either in the Legislative Body or in the Council of State, in 1804, he inhibited the discussion on the penal law, which was not resumed till 1808. The jury was then retained but seriously restricted in its power by permanent special courts of justice. The Code of Civil Procedure was drafted in 1802, submitted to the Legislature in 1806, and put into operation in 1807. The Code of Commerce was under consideration from 1801 till 1807, and became law in 1808.

with slight modification in the Grand Duchy of Baden, in Holland, Belgium, Italy, etc. French Criminal Procedure, with its public and oral proceedings and its jurymen, was used in the Rhenish provinces until quite recently. The Code du Commerce with slight modifications is still in force in Belgium, Italy, Greece, and the principalities of the Danube, and has almost invariably served as a model wherever commercial laws have been drawn up. These codes carried with them into foreign countries the principles of equality on which they were founded, and so in a short time a transformation was begun, a transmission of culture so to speak, which, in spite of all reaction soon changed the face of the world. Who can deny the greatness of the man whose mighty hand wielded such a lever?

From the rights and welfare of the present generation Napoleon turned to the instruction and education of the coming generation. In Public Instruction as in all the other departments of the administration, the Revolution had put aside what was useless and laid down good principles, but it had not succeeded in accomplishing much that was sound and permanent. It had even applied its axiom of equality to public instruction in the Constitution of 1791, where it provided that—"Public Instruction shall be organized, made accessible to all, and free of cost in those subjects of instruction which are indispensable for all". In spite of the excellent schemes submitted by Talleyrand and Condorcet, it was long before a general statute was passed. Nothing further was done till October, 1795, when a new regulation appeared establishing primary schools for parishes, central schools for the departments, and special preparatory schools for ten different professions. But the disturbed state of the country was unfavourable to such schemes and the local authorities grudged the money. Even in 1800 primary schools were very rare, both scholars and teachers being lacking, and the Councillor of State in his report on the subject suggested that primary education should be handed over to the parish priests, as the absence of religious instruction was held largely accountable for the emptiness of the schools. At the

central schools, which in accordance with the spirit of the times neither held examinations nor granted diplomas, only the mathematical and technical courses were well attended, the other subjects found no pupils. A similar state of things prevailed in the special schools. The splendid schemes planned in 1794 under the Convention could not be given effect to in such stirring times. The Polytechnic had only a few scholars, the Normal School for training teachers did not last a year, the Medical School was still awaiting the projected reforms, and the Arts and Trades Institute intended for educating artisans by developing their faculties of observation, was, even at the close of the Directory, in utter neglect. Here again the Consulate had both to plan and to build up.

In December, 1799, a special department for Science and Art was attached to the Home Office, and two years later formed into a separate department under the title of the "Direction générale de l'Instruction publique". On May 1st, 1802, a fresh law appeared placing the primary schools in every country parish under the supervision of the sub-prefect. The mayor appointed the teachers, the parishes provided them with a modest salary and the necessary accommodation. The education consisted entirely of reading, writing, arithmetic, and catechism. In the towns the secondary schools were placed under the supervision of the prefect. Private schools were also allowed, provided they were sanctioned by the Government authorities. Thirty-two *lycées* were founded, affording both a scientific and a classical education, and to these were promoted the best pupils in the secondary schools, one-fifth of whom, on completing their studies at the Lycées, passed on to the special schools.[1] Inspectors were appointed to superintend the whole system of

[1] The law of May 1st, 1802, recognized these special schools, viz. : 1, Law ; 2, Medicine ; 3, Physical and Natural Sciences ; 4, Mechanical and Chemical Technology ; 5, Higher Mathematics ; 6, Geography, History, and Political Economy ; 7, the Art of Design ; 8, Astronomy ; 9, Music and Composition. The judicial faculties amounted to nine ; the medical faculties replaced the "écoles de santé" of the Convention. Later on eleven theological faculties were founded, nine of them Catholic, two Protestant.

education, and in order to put the new scheme at once into operation, Government offered 6400 free scholarships, 2400 of which were reserved for the sons of deserving Government officials and military men. Urgent representations were made to the First Consul to allow the teaching orders (*les frères ignorantins*) to resume their old vocation, although all the congregations had been disbanded after the Concordat. As a result of this, private schools sprang up both of lower and of higher grades, conducted by the clergy. The education of girls, which like all other women's interests, met with scant favour from Napoleon, was handed over to the nuns. Of especial importance was the revival of the plans of the previous decade for technical education. The "École Polytechnique" was remodelled on better lines, mining colleges were founded in the Eastern counties, the "École des Ponts et Chaussées" received a new charter, the "Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers" was reorganized as a purely educational institution, and a good artisans' school was established at Compiègne. Education was thus brought into the service of the national prosperity and so helped forward the economic development.

In making these laws Napoleon was actuated not so much by a noble zeal for the advancement of knowledge as by the desire to raise up subjects who would be fairly well educated and thoroughly obedient, but whose education had not been carried to such an extent as to embarrass his Government by impartial criticisms of its transactions. In 1802, when Fourcroy, the Director-General of Public Instruction, showed him a carefully graduated course of school instruction, he refused it as being much too comprehensive, remarking that a little Latin and some mathematics was all that was necessary. Yet he invariably showed respect for accurate scholarship and its representatives. He delighted to associate with the great painters and savants of the day, and was always ready to bestow honours and rewards upon those whose talents and achievements had won his esteem—except the "*ideologues*," among whom he reckoned the "moral-political" members of the Institute. On May 19th, 1802, when he founded the

"Legion of Honour," as a means of recognizing services rendered to the State either by soldiers or civilians, he made Lacépède, the famous naturalist, Grand Chancellor of the new order.[1]

In this system of utilizing and combining all the energies of the State, it seemed highly regrettable that any one part of the nation should be excluded by law from their native land. Yet so it was. There were emigrants who had left France of their own free will at the beginning of the Revolution, while others again had been forced to flee by the proceedings during the Terror and the threats of the extreme party in the Radicals. Even under the Directory the law had again been enforced punishing with death all who returned. As a convincing proof of the stability of his new regime Napoleon now repealed this law. The only difficulty lay in the fact that the property of the emigrants had meanwhile been confiscated by the State and that the Constitution, in order to secure the new proprietors in their possessions, had forbidden the return of the emigrants. Undeterred by these difficulties, Napoleon pushed his project little by little till it had been carried into effect. In February and March, 1800, edicts appeared closing the lists of the emigrants and dealing with the requests of those who wished their names

[1] After the law of 1802, the members of the Legion had to swear on their honour that they would resist every attempt to restore the feudal system with its attributes and titles. To staunch Republicans the decoration of the Order was an eyesore, and some of them remonstrated with Napoleon on the subject. "I doubt," he replied, "if there ever was a Republic without such distinctions. You call these decorations 'baubles'. Well, then, it is with 'baubles' you manage men." Moreover it was not merely a question of baubles but also of money; for of the members of the Order, the one hundred grand officers received 5000 francs yearly; commanders, 2000; officers 1000; legionaries 200; each of the fifteen cohorts received national land equal in value to a revenue of 200,000 francs. Here, as in the free scholarships in the intermediary schools and other matters, Napoleon was seeking to secure for himself as much personal backing as possible in the army and among the official class so as to counteract the unfavourable effect of the Concordat. (*Vide* Remach, "Rélations secrètes des agents de Louis XVIII sous le Consulat," p. 50; Thibaudeau, "Mémoires," p. 130.)

withdrawn. In October, women, children, certain industrial classes and thousands of priests who had been driven from their homes by the law, were allowed to return. Finally in 1802, immediately after the Peace of Amiens, a general amnesty was granted with the restriction that those returning should not plot against the Republic nor with her enemies. Scarcely was this law passed when 40,000 families, nearly 140,000 souls, returned to France! Thanks to this measure and to the Concordat, by which the disputes at home were settled, the reorganization of the country in all its essential points was now complete.

This task, however, was not carried through without serious opposition. The autocratic nature of Napoleon's Government was constantly becoming more apparent and raising up fresh enemies both in the Chambers and out of them. The Constitutional Liberals led by Benjamin Constant, the intimate friend of Madame de Staël, warmly combated the absolutist tendencies of the First Consul in the Tribunate and in society. But as they attacked at the same time his useful and necessary constructive works, such as the laws relating to finance and jurisprudence, they only urged him the faster along his self-appointed path. Then there were the irreconcilables, the Jacobins and the "Anarchists," who at their secret meetings did not hesitate even at the idea of assassinating Bonaparte, so Fouché learned through his agents. In October, and again in November, their attempts were frustrated just as they were on the verge of completion. Lastly there were the inflexible Royalists, who remained faithful to Louis XVIII in spite of all, and who regarded Napoleon as the stumbling-block in their path. They hated him also for his answer to the Pretender who had written two letters assuring him of distinguished favour from the restored monarch. Napoleon, in reply, had told the Prince he "ought not to desire to return to France, for his path would be across the dead bodies of over 500,000 Frenchmen; let him therefore sacrifice his interests to the peace and prosperity of France, and history would esteem him highly for it".

These irreconcilables achieved what the Jacobins had only

planned. On the evening of December 24th, 1800, as the First Consul was driving, on his way to the Opera through the narrow Rue St. Nicaise, which then ran between the Tuileries and the Louvre, an infernal machine filled with powder, bullets and explosives, burst behind his carriage, killing several passers-by but leaving him untouched. This shameful deed was at first thought to be the work of the Radicals, and, with the consent of the Senate and of the Council of State, Napoleon sentenced 130 of them to deportation.[1] The real perpetrators of the deed were not discovered till afterwards when most of them had succeeded in escaping. Only two were captured and executed. The plot had been hatched under the guidance of the "Chouans" leader, Georges Cadoudal, then living in exile in England. The terrorists were also deported, "for," said Fouché, "it is not merely a question of punishing what is past but of protecting society". They were sent to Guyana, but nearly all of them perished in a shipwreck off the Seychelles. The same reason of State was also alleged as a pretext for removing a number of deputies in the Seine department as "September" men and "Anarchists," and for summoning others before a special court of justice, although no adequate evidence against them could be produced. Napoleon declared in the Council of State that advantage must be taken of the opportunity to cleanse the Republic. A few days later he wrote to his brother Joseph: "I did not secure peace in France, nor confidence in the well-disposed, until I had seized 200 conspirators and had sent them to the Colonies". After that the feeling in the capital suddenly changed.[2]

Napoleon had thus become an arbitrary ruler, a circumstance largely due to his constant fear of assassination, to

[1] The Tribunate and the Legislative Body refused to act in the matter.

[2] *Vide* "Mémoires du Roi Joseph," ed. Du Casse, vol. v. In January, 1809, Napoleon wrote advising his brother to proceed briskly with executions. "The *canaille* loves and respects only those whom it fears, and it is only the fear of the *canaille* that makes you loved and respected by the nation." These letters are naturally omitted in the official "Correspondance de Napoléon I". Lecestre has published them in his collection of "Lettres inédites de Napoléon I".

the espionage of agents in the pay of England, and to the secret disaffection of those in intimate association with him who were calculating on the chance of his being superseded. Talleyrand and even his brothers are not free from complicity in this matter. Napoleon had already acted arbitrarily in January, 1800, when he suppressed sixty out of the seventy-three political newspapers and forbade the founding of any new ones.[1] Again, in 1802, he acted in arbitrary fashion in his resistance to the Opposition in the Tribunate. When that body, who had repudiated the law against anarchists, rejected certain portions of the Civil Code in which Napoleon had collaborated, he thought of attempting another *coup d'état* and of dissolving the Chambers, but Cambacérès persuaded him to gain his ends by less direct means and to keep up the appearance of Constitutional methods. Article 38, of the Constitution of the year VIII, required that from 1802 onwards one-fifth of the members of the Tribunate and the Legislative Body should be renewed every year, and the time for this renewal had now come round. Since the Constitution said nothing definite as to how this election was to proceed, instead of casting lots to settle who was to leave, it was decided to prevail upon the Senate not only to nominate the in-coming fifth but also to name the out-going fifth; and fearful of losing Napoleon's favour, the Senate complied.

[1] This decree was base ingratitude towards those papers which, only four years previously when he left for the campaign in Italy, he had ordered to "write about him and about nothing else but him," and which as a matter of fact had contributed in no small degree to his fame. It was really only the first step along the road which led, three years later, to the revival of the censorship. An order issued on September 27th, 1803, runs as follows: "In order to secure the liberty of the Press (!) no bookseller shall henceforth expose any book for sale without having previously submitted it to a Revisions Committee, who will return it if there is no cause for censure". Similar restrictions were placed upon new plays at the theatre. The First Consul was encouraged in these proceedings by the general public, who were anxious for peace at home and not ill-pleased at these measures against a contentious and often corrupt Press. (*Vide* Welschinger, "La Presse sous le Consulat et l'Empire," p. 17, and Portalis' Report of November, 1802, on the Press in "La Révolution Française," 1897.)

The Tribunate and the Legislative Body were thereby rid of the elements obnoxious to Napoleon,—Benjamin Constant, Chénier, Chazal, Daunou, and others. (January, 1802.) Their places were filled by more pliable characters who voted obediently for all those measures so hotly contested by their predecessors, as well as for others concerning emigrants, the Concordat, and the Legion of Honour which had not hitherto been brought before the Chambers. On this occasion the brothers of the First Consul called his attention to the necessity for an Opposition and cited the example of England. To this he replied: "I have never yet seen the advantages of opposition of any kind. No matter what its nature, it only serves to diminish the power of the Government in the eyes of the people. Let anyone else govern in my place, and if he does not do as I do and silence the talkers, he will see what happens to him. I tell you absolute unity of power is indispensable in governing."[1] This the new Chambers certainly granted him.

But Napoleon was not nearly satisfied with the extent of his power. According to the Constitution he was only elected Consul for ten years, which was far from suiting his wide-ranging schemes, and accordingly he hated the Constitution of 1799, just as for similar reasons he had hated that of 1795. He intended to rule over France as other monarchs ruled over their kingdoms, not cribbed and confined by a miserable paragraph that mortified his vanity and limited him to a period he could calculate almost to a minute. The more passionately he cherished this hope, the more careful he was to conceal it. But in the end of March, 1802, after peace had been concluded with England, relying on his increased popularity, he ventured to drop a hint. Cambacérès then undertook without delay to obtain a "reward" for Napoleon from the Tribunate. But when the tribunes merely talked of offering some honour on behalf of the nation, Napoleon then turned to the Senate expecting from its members a readier comprehension. But there the majority failed to grasp his point, and contrary to the motion

[1] Lucien, "Mémoires," II. 408.

brought forward by Lespinasse, proposing to make him Consul for life, they simply decided, "in recognition of the great services he had rendered to the State," to prolong his term of office as First Consul for other ten years. Napoleon was indignant. He was on the point of flying into a passion and refusing their proffered honour when Cambacérès (some say Lucien) devised a way out of the difficulty by suggesting an appeal to the nation. Napoleon therefore replied to the Senators that he could not accept their offer until the nation, who had already conferred upon him the highest power, had again been asked. But the question addressed to the people differed widely from the vote put to the Senate, for it ran, —"Is Napoleon Bonaparte to be made Consul for life?"

Once again Napoleon's calculations were verified. There were three and a half million "Ayes" and only a few thousand "Noes". The Senate now grasped the situation and in a decree of August 2nd, 1802, it hastened to express the thanks of the nation to the man whom the people had chosen, and to proclaim him ruler for life. The returned emigrants, grateful for the amnesty, had largely voted for him. Two days later, by the Senatus Consultum of August 4th (dictated by Napoleon himself), his sphere of power was considerably extended. The Senate had thus usurped a right belonging to the Legislature, by over-riding which body they had to a certain extent created a new Constitution. And of this they were perfectly aware. Why was it that on the day the Senate receive the completed draft with the hint to pass it without long debates, the courtyard, passages, and ante-rooms of the Luxembourg Palace, where the sittings were held, were filled with grenadiers? According to the new law of the State, Napoleon had the right to nominate his successor by proposing a name to the Senate, and, if it were declined, a second or a third name, but the third must be accepted. In the same way the First Consul had the power of nominating his colleagues in office, who now also held their posts for life. The First Consul was further granted the right of recommending candidates for the judgeships in the Court of Appeals, of pardoning criminals, of ratifying treaties with

foreign Powers and appointing Senators. The significance of this last prerogative becomes plain when the importance the Senate itself had acquired is borne in mind. For by means of its special decrees,—Senatus Consulta—the Senate could now interpret and amend the Constitution, and even suspend it entirely in certain departments; it could dissolve both Chambers, suspend the courts of Assizes temporarily, and reverse the verdict of the courts if it imperilled the safety of the State,—all this at the beck of the man who was now absolute Master of France. As a concession to the citizens of the State, the electoral bodies in the communes and the departments whose members were appointed for life were each allowed to propose two candidates for the Senate and the Legislature. Yet of what value was this miserable remnant of the "Sovereignty of the People" in comparison with the overwhelming weight of personal government indicated in Article 63: "The First Consul has a right to nominate to the Senate, without submitting the appointment to the electoral colleges of the departments, citizens who are distinguished by their services and their talents, provided they have attained the requisite age and that the number of Senators does not thereby exceed 120"? He was monarch in all but name. "Henceforth," said Napoleon, "I stand on an equal footing with other Sovereigns, for after all, they too are only for life. It is not right that the authority of a man who guides the policy of Europe should be precarious, or should even appear to be so."[1] Two years later, when he placed the Imperial Crown of France upon his head, he was only adding the outward symbol of a power he had long been wielding.

Napoleon's final step to absolute power was greatly facilitated by the attitude of those who had unconsciously been his allies on the 18th Brumaire,—the great mass of the nation who belonged to none of the political parties, whose sympathies were wholly with the man who had crushed anarchy,

[1] Thibaudeau, "Mémoires," p. 263. Even now they did not hesitate to use the term "Monarchical". Roederer in his semi-official "Journal de Paris," talked of the "Republican Monarchy" early in 1803.

restored order and prosperity, and made peace with all the world.[1] This last benefit outweighed all the others. But how little they understood the man into whose hands they had entrusted their country's fate! He was no man of peace. With tireless effort and unrivalled energy he had made France strong and powerful—not for peace, however—but for a struggle for dominion far beyond her boundaries. For the current on which he had embarked swept him out on to a boundless ocean whence he was destined only to reach port after long and tempestuous years,—far, far from France.

[1] One of the articles in the Statute of August 2nd, 1802, runs as follows: "A statue, bearing the laurels of victory in one hand and the Senate's Decree in the other, shall testify to posterity the gratitude of the nation".

CHAPTER IX.

THE LAST YEARS OF THE CONSULATE. THE EMPEROR. (1802—1804.)

THE general peace of 1802 brought France both prosperity and respect. Crowds of foreigners, most of them English, flocked to Paris to visit the places immortalized by the Revolution, and to see the great man who had stilled its angry waves. For the time being Paris seemed to have become the centre of the universe, a scene of orderly life, work, and social pleasure. Instead of the wild carnival of the early days of the Directory, when people were still uncertain what the morrow might bring forth, there were now temperate pleasures enjoyed in peace; instead of reckless gambling for dishonourable profits, steady toil for honest earnings. The well-to-do law-abiding citizens felt more secure under the new regime than ever before, although it was precisely this class whom Napoleon had mown down so mercilessly in Vendémiaire that he declared even yet his dreams were haunted by the memory of it. By his unjust deportation of the Jacobin deputies he had purposely produced the impression that the man who had been guiding the affairs of the nation since Brumaire, had no longer anything in common with the general who commanded the troops of the Convention in 1795. Some wanted his personal power confirmed as a check on revolutionary excesses, others as a security against the return of the Bourbons, and all, in order that they might be allowed to work and enjoy themselves in peace.

What did it matter if, in opposition to these powerful

material forces and interests, a handful of faithful Republicans lamented the loss of their unrestricted political liberty, or if the haughty circles of the Faubourg St. Germain preferred to bow to a legitimate King rather than to a rough-mannered parvenu? To the majority of the nation politics had become a burden and they willingly submitted to the yoke of the new regime which had both restored order and maintained it. Unbounded confidence in the man who had vanquished France's foes abroad as well as at home, was a marked characteristic of the Consulate days. Under the Monarchy the peasants had been taxed and burdened almost beyond endurance. Now, however, free and reasonably taxed, they owned willing allegiance to a regime which let them live on their land in peace, allowed them religious liberty, safeguarded them from any re-imposition of tithes and compulsory service, and made it possible for them to take their produce to market along good roads and to bring home the proceeds in safety. Merchants and manufacturers trusted Napoleon because of his zealous endeavours to further their interests, and the fact that the rate of exchange of "rentes" never rose above a certain level was simply the result of the new order depending solely on one life, and that an oft-threatened one. The so-called "*nouveaux riches*," who had bought up large tracts of State property through speculation and stock-jobbing, felt secure in their possessions when it became increasingly evident Napoleon had no intention of playing the rôle of "Monk". It was thanks to him that workmen were once more able to earn a livelihood, and his refusal to increase the indirect taxation had further lightened their lot. He had won over the studious youth of the country by the special favours he granted them in March, 1800, with regard to military service. "We are no Spartans," said he, "we must think of Art, Science, and Industry." The only sons of widows and of aged parents, brothers of soldiers already on active service, and orphans, were all exempted from military service. Such consideration earned him the grateful tears of many a mother and strengthened his authority. The rising generation placed their hopes on him, for it was he

who had opened up a path for all careers, independent of party jealousies. Thus it was that the absolute power of One now proved quite as popular as the Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity of All had previously been. France's new Sovereign could risk a good deal on that sentiment; but in the end he risked too much, and that proved his undoing.

Anyone leaving Paris at the beginning of the Consulate and returning two years later, as did Miot de Melito, a member of the Council of State, was amazed at the changes which had taken place during the interval. The last vestige of the Revolution had disappeared. Instead of the half-military, half-civilian dress, which had been fashionable at the close of the eighteenth century, the costumes of the old regime had been revived. A sword of ceremony now took the place of the old-fashioned sabre, and stockings and buckled shoes the place of boots. The returned aristocrats alone retained the frock-coat and trousers of the Bourbon regime, as if to call attention to their poverty. Velvet and silk were used for ladies' dress, which had become much more costly and elaborate. Already many lacqueys were to be seen wearing handsome liveries in the family colours. Men no longer addressed one another as "*citoyen*" but as "*monsieur*". Even the official almanac for 1803 employed the term "*madame*" instead of "*citoyenne*" as before. Although the Revolutionary calendar was still in use, the decadi had already been dropped, the Sunday had resumed its rightful place as of old, and no one, least of all the First Consul, failed to attend Mass on that day. The streets had exchanged their Republican names for their former ones. The "Palais d'Egalité" became once more the "Palais Royal" and the "Place de la Révolution" the "Place Louis XV". In the popular literature of the day Voltaire and Rousseau, the most brilliant exponents of the new culture in France, were now decried as the intellectual instigators of the Revolution, while Châteaubriand met with unbounded applause both from the old and the new elements in society.

But the greatest change of all was in Napoleon's immediate entourage. The Tuileries which he had occupied as an

official residence since January, 1800, had been transformed into a veritable Royal Court where everything was regulated according to rule and a rigid etiquette observed. Under the democracy, women had received no recognition, but now they resumed their former place, and since March, 1802, Josephine held her Court like her husband.[1] Everything except the words "Consul" and "Republic" was monarchic, personal, focused upon one dominating individuality. Yet although the customs of the old Monarchy had been revived (by command) and although Palace appointments were given by preference to aristocrats and men of the world, there was much in Napoleon's Court to remind one of his sudden rise to fortune. There were people there, as Talleyrand sarcastically remarked, who did not know how to walk on polished floors, clumsy officers' wives of humble birth and homely looks, generals better drilled than mannered, whose presence was a sign of their servile obedience to the caprice of a man who made it a principle to stimulate zeal by inspiring fear. Napoleon's despotism brooked no contradiction, his conduct recognized no restraints, not even those which are observed by all. "I am not like any other man," he said, "the laws of morality and decorum do not apply to me," a statement which throws its sinister light on certain dark passages in his family life.[2] In

[1] The days were long past when she was accused of accepting presents from all sides in order to pay her debts for dress, for the First Consul had now an annual income of 6,000,000 francs, and drew besides large sums for secret purposes. Nevertheless in a letter of April 11th, 1801, Cobenzl wrote to Vienna, "Madame Bonaparte, the First Consul's wife, accepts money from everybody, for it is only thus and by not paying her debts that she is able to defray her immoderate extravagance in dress, which far exceeds that for which they reproached the late Queen. This is a well-known fact, Joseph Bonaparte told me so himself, and added it was the only subject of discord between the First Consul and his wife and often disturbed their good relations. Talleyrand declares the First Consul only allows his wife to accept such gifts as cannot be elsewhere procured; a diamond brooch offered her recently he had sent back." (W. St. A.)

[2] *Vide* "Rémusat Mémoires," I. 204, 206. As for his relations with his step-daughter Hortense, *vide* Mounier, "Souvenirs intimes" (éd. Herisson), p. 305. With regard to Josephine's accusations against Napoleon, it is necessary to bear in mind that Josephine was not a woman who

disposition he remained sombre and moody as in his young days. Success had not made this dreamer any more cheerful. There was a vein of sadness in his character which in later years degenerated into galling discontent. "I was not made for pleasure," he used to say, and what we learn of his amusements confirms his own statement. "I have seen him," says Madame de Rémusat, who since 1802 had been lady-in-waiting to Josephine, "brighten at the rustling of the wind, and talk with enthusiasm of the raging sea. At times indeed he seemed tempted to believe that nocturnal apparitions were not wholly incredible, and was even inclined to be superstitious. When he left his Council Chamber and came to his wife's salon of an evening, he sometimes had the candles shaded with white gauze, enjoined us all to keep silence, and amused himself by telling ghost stories or listening to them. At other times he had slow sweet music performed by Italian singers to the strains of a few instruments very softly played. He would then fall into a brown study, during which no one dared to move. This seemed to have a soothing effect on him, for when the mood had passed he generally emerged brighter and more sociable." During the early Consulate days Napoleon indulged frequently in various forms of recreation. At Malmaison, where the summers of 1801 and 1802 were spent, comedies were played by members of the household under the guidance of Talma, the famous actor. Napoleon often indulged in a game of rackets; and sometimes, with more zeal than grace, he joined in dancing the "Monaco".[1]

weighed her words. She once accused Lucien of poisoning his first wife (Pingaud, "Un Agent Secret," p. 267). One of her intimate friends says, "You feel baffled when you see that she does not in the least realize the seriousness of what she says." (Pingaud, *vide* also Mounier Thiébault, "Mémoires," v. 305. Cp. Pellet, "Révolution Française," 1904.)

[1] The tale that Napoleon was taking lessons in attitudes and gestures at this time from Talma is a piece of English gossip of 1814. Cp. Desclozeaux' "Indiscrétions," p. 179, where Talma declares he never coached the Emperor in elocution, but that he himself had successfully adopted some of Napoleon's attitudes and had received good advice from him.

Since the attempt on his life, Napoleon had withdrawn more and more from the outer world, till now the only time when he could be approached and a petition presented was on Sundays, when he reviewed from 5000 to 6000 troops in the courtyard of the Tuileries. This picturesque ceremony, which foreigners especially flocked to see, was no mere parade, but a very thorough inspection lasting for several hours, in the course of which Napoleon frequently dismounted and paced the ranks, spoke to individual soldiers, listened to their requests or their grievances, examined their uniform and accoutrements, awarded praise or blame, and so kept himself in immediate touch with his army. He was always accompanied by a strong escort of mounted troops when he drove through the town; and when he went to the theatre, which he did regularly, the most elaborate precautions were taken, even the wings opposite his box being lined with soldiers. When at Malmaison or St. Cloud, to which he had given the preference since the autumn of 1802, the alleys were patrolled by strong detachments of soldiers, and he never returned to Paris without the police having first searched all the streets through which he was to pass. He viewed every one with profound distrust, and sometimes even refused to see his Ministers, who had then to receive his commands from an adjutant. As all his actions were carefully calculated, he was constantly trying to discover the motives underlying other people's conduct. Nothing appealed to him more strongly than Machiavelli's saying that in our conduct with our friends we must always bear in mind that they may become our enemies. Nobility of heart was utterly foreign to him. He did not believe in any one being actuated by noble motives. One day Bourrienne, his secretary, lost his watch. It was found and returned, and so amazed was Napoleon at the finder's honesty that he released the man from military service and exerted himself to help his family. Such was his opinion of honesty, and his respect for truth was very similar. In his opinion truth was not always profitable, and so he did not trust entirely to the official police, but, especially after 1802, when Fouché went out of office, had

also several secret police agencies conducted by his most devoted generals, Duroc, Davoût, Moncey, Junot, and others who spied on one another.

At Bonaparte's Court it was Josephine, herself an aristocrat by birth, who formed the connecting link between the French nobility and the Consular regime. Thanks to her and her former connexions, many a bearer of an ancient name became reconciled to the existing conditions and linked his interests with those of the new regime. On the other hand, Lucien and Joseph Bonaparte displayed marked Republican tendencies, not very deeply rooted, however, as they were ultimately overcome by the despotic energy of the new Cæsar. Such at least was the case with Joseph who, from his seniority of birth, had evolved a sort of claim on the commanding position Napoleon had won, and felt much aggrieved that the Constitution of 1802 spoke of the First Consul's right of adopting his successor and said nothing about the Consulate being hereditary. Moreover, as we have seen, he had already been trafficking with those who were counting on the chances of Napoleon losing his life or his position, in which case his brother-in-law, Bernadotte, was to provide the requisite military support. Joseph was also aware of a plot by which Bernadotte and some generals who were dissatisfied with the Concordat, meant to kidnap Napoleon at the fête of the restoration of the Catholic faith which was to be held in the Church of Notre Dame during Easter 1802.[1] But the plot became known and was rendered abortive by the presence of a strong detachment of loyal troops, several battalions being posted in the interior of the church. The effects of the attempt, however, were soon evident. General Simon, Bernadotte's chief-of-staff to the West Army, had proclamations printed at Rennes announcing that certain dissatisfied demi-brigades were to march on Paris "to defend the Republic from the tyrant Bonaparte". This matter also

[1] Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," II. 112, is very positive about Joseph's complicity. But it is doubtful if the latter's mere refusal to stand immediately alongside his brother in the church can be regarded as sufficient proof.

came to the knowledge of the authorities, and several of the officers were arrested and the troops sent to the colonies. As for Bernadotte, Napoleon remarked to General Rapp, he deserved to be shot. But that fate he escaped, for it would never have done to let the public know that there were malcontents and rebels in the army of France. Nevertheless the truth leaked out and the exaggerated reports which reached foreign countries gave rise there to the belief that a military revolution was imminent. The influence of these reports was seen in the war of 1805.[1]

Lucien, who had amassed a large fortune while ambassador at the Court of Madrid, quarrelled with his brother because instead of offering his hand to the widowed Queen of Etruria, as Napoleon wished him to do, he insisted on marrying a little bourgeoise and refused to divorce her, a circumstance which ultimately led to his being exiled from France. Later in life he made a great parade of democratic views. Louis, the third brother, married Hortense Beauharnais, Josephine's beautiful daughter. This marriage, which was brought about by Josephine, and to which both parties had consented reluctantly, was not a happy one, and afforded a glaring proof of the animosity between the Bonapartes and the Beauharnais. The original cause of this rift was Napoleon's marriage having proved childless, which gave Josephine's children an importance which irritated the Bonapartes and thwarted their ambition. Already several members of Napoleon's family, especially Lucien, were talking of a divorce and declaring that Josephine, in her anxiety, was even advocating the Bourbon cause. Jerôme, Napoleon's youngest

[1] Fresh light has been thrown on these military conspiracies in the "Mémoires" of Pasquier, I. 157, and of Thiébault, III. 335—Marbot (I. 154) is unreliable—who set right various details in Gaffarel's study, "L'opposition militaire sous le Consulat". Chaptal relates in his "Souvenirs" (pp. 219, 250) that Napoleon had spoken to him about the intention of several generals to divide France into twelve provinces among themselves. "They generously gave me Paris and its boundaries. The compact was signed in Rueil, and Masséna was to bring it to me; but he refused, remarking that he would be shot by the Guards the moment he left the Tuileries."

brother, who was at this time leading a rather wild life in North America, had married at Baltimore a pretty American girl, Eliza Patterson, whom he afterwards deserted in Europe at his brother's bidding. He was destined for an important post in the navy, but finally rose much higher.

Of the Consul's sisters, the eldest, Elise, was married in 1797 to Pascal Bacciochi, an Italian of noble birth who was serving in the French army and in 1803 was appointed commander of Fort St. Jean at Marseilles. Elise was a woman of fine intellect, and along with her brother Lucien she gathered around her in Paris a circle of distinguished men of letters, among them Fontanes and Châteaubriand, whom she brought under Napoleon's notice. Pauline, the second sister, was a woman of great beauty but of loose morals. Her first husband, General Leclerc, died of fever at St. Domingo in 1803, and shortly afterwards, on her return to Europe, she married Prince Borghese. Caroline, the youngest sister, a clever ambitious woman, married in 1800 to General Murat of the cavalry, was the keenest of the whole family in intriguing against the Beauharnais. Murat, who was intellectually far inferior to his wife, was the son of an innkeeper in La Bastide, Cahors, and had been a divinity student before the Revolution. During the time he was in command of the troops in the North of Italy he accepted gifts of money from all the towns and had lined his pockets well. Like his brothers-in-law he had a palatial residence in the capital and a château on the outskirts. He also had the finest *chef* in Paris, and had all his meals served on gold plate. The old mother, Laetitia Bonaparte, lived in a splendid mansion of her own at Paris, sunning herself in her son's glory, but like a wise woman not too dazzled by her present prosperity to neglect the opportunity of laying past against the possibility of evil days to come. She was the same as of yore, even her Corsican accent remained unchanged, to the intense disgust of her son, who disliked to be reminded of his foreign origin. Uncle Fesch proved more helpful. He had originally been an abbé but had thrown his cassock to the winds for a time and had acted as commissioner of supplies to the Army of

Italy. Now, however, when Napoleon had made his peace with the Church, an ecclesiastical dignitary in the family was distinctly useful. Uncle Fesch accordingly donned his cassock once more, and after the signing of the Concordat, he was appointed Archbishop of Lyons and made a Cardinal.

Such was the Court of the man who claimed—and it was no exaggeration—to guide the policy of Europe. Wherever opposition threatened, he immediately crushed it by force of arms. He had concluded a general peace because public opinion and the desire of the whole nation had compelled him to do so, and because it was necessary for his own interests. To have maintained it, however, would have been running counter to the Revolutionary system which he had made his own, and to his private inclination. There exists on trustworthy authority the account of a conversation between a member of the Council of State and Napoleon, shortly before he was made Consul for life. The councillor advocated the view that the maintenance of the peace of Europe was of paramount importance for France. To this Napoleon replied by asking if he did not believe in the enmity of the Powers who signed the peace? The councillor admitted that England, Austria, and others would always remain the enemies of France. "Very well, then," said Napoleon, "draw your own inferences. If these States are always cherishing war in secret so that it must break out again some day, then the sooner the better, for with each day the impression of their last defeat grows fainter and the prestige of our victories becomes dimmer, and thus all the advantage is on their side.[1] I have shown that even in war I neglect nothing which affects the home administration and the preservation of order, and I cannot remain stationary for there is still much to do. But are not military successes necessary to dazzle and satisfy the country?

[1] How accurate this reasoning was we see in a dispatch of Lord Whitworth's (the English Ambassador) dated December, 1802. "Every fresh year of peace," he writes, "by weakening the Consular Government, lends strength and courage to those whose aim and interest it is to disturb it. In fact, by maintaining peace we are keeping up a state of war against this Government far more decisive and dangerous to her than actual hostilities" (Browning, "England and Napoleon in 1803," p. 18).

Bear in mind also that a First Consul is on an entirely different footing from those Kings by Divine Right who look upon their countries as an inheritance. To them traditions are a help, to us only a hindrance. Surrounded by neighbours who hate her, obliged at home to hold in check various classes of malcontents, and at the same time to impress her enemies abroad, France requires brilliant victories—and therefore war. She must either be first or else succumb. I shall put up with peace so long as our neighbours preserve it, but I shall consider it an advantage if they force us to take up our arms again before they have grown rusty through neglect and want of use. Between ancient Monarchies and a young Republic there must always be a spirit of hostility. Situated as we are, I look upon any treaty of peace as a mere truce, and during my term of office I shall consider almost constant warfare a certainty. Nevertheless I shall not play the rôle of aggressor, for it is far more to my interest to allow others to take the initiative. I know them well enough; they will undoubtedly be the first to take up arms, or else to give me sufficient cause to do so." [1]

These remarks were made during the summer of 1802—the actual words may not be perfectly accurate—and any one reading them carefully will conclude that Napoleon meant to carry out by force of arms the programme Hauterive had drawn up in 1800 for France's supremacy in Europe. But it is doubtful if that was his sole motive. Was he really seeking only to secure this hegemony for the French State as he professed, or did his purposes lie deeper than he cared to reveal to a member of the Council of State? Possibly he was even then secretly cherishing ideas he expressed two years later to a circle of intimate friends: "There will be no peace in Europe till it is under the command of a single leader, under one Emperor with Kings for his officers, who will distribute kingdoms to his generals, making one King of

[1] Thibaudeau, "Mémoires," p. 391; cp. Talleyrand's anecdote of Napoleon's annoyance on learning of the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens in Pasquier's "Mémoires," I. 161. Another version is given by Hérisson in "Le cabinet noir," p. 192.

Italy, another King of Bavaria, one Landamman of Switzerland, another Stadtholder of Holland, and giving them all official posts in the Imperial Household, such as Grand Cup-Bearer, Grand Chamberlain, Grand Master of the Hounds, etc. You may say this plan is only an imitation of the system on which the old German Empire was founded and by no means new; but there is nothing absolutely new. Political institutions revolve in a circle and often bring us back to what has been done before."[1] At heart Napoleon was no true Frenchman in spite of his fondness for calling himself such, especially during his Consulate days. Had he been a Frenchman he would have rested content to see France play a leading part among the Powers of Europe, but neither his ambition nor his patriotism were French. Corsica had disowned him, and henceforth his ambition lacked the wholesome restraint of national boundaries and had become a thing at once gigantic, embracing the whole world in its sweep, and infinitely paltry—the selfish greed of an individual.[2]

Certainly he meant to avoid open war so long as he could compass those "dazzling" successes which he considered necessary for the consolidation of his power and the internal peace of the country, without drawing his sword; so long, too, as the other States acquiesced in the dictates of his imperious will. But should they rebel—an expression Napoleon used with regard to one of the Continental Powers at this time—then the appeal to arms would decide matters, and the odium of breaking the peace would thus fall on the others. As a matter of fact Napoleon's conquests in peace were what

[1] Miot, "Mémoires," II. 214.

[2] Lucien in his memoirs (ed. Jung, II. p. 165) leads us to infer that even in 1802 Napoleon was thinking of the conquest of Europe, not so much for France as for himself alone: "I am not one of those who believe that my brother ever at any time made war against his will. I am too well acquainted with his line of thought on this subject, especially at the time I am speaking of. It was ambition rather than patriotism which made war a personal necessity for him." Joseph expressed himself in similar terms to Miot: "Believe me, he is not yet near the goal he has set himself. The depth, breadth, and daring of his plans dazzle me anew every day" (Miot, "Mémoires," II. 49).

proved most effectual in preparing the way for war and in finally bringing it about.[1]

In the autumn of 1801, after the preliminaries had been concluded with England and the Convention signed with Russia, a general peace was established; and Napoleon spared no effort to obtain such conditions as suited his policy and to draw the utmost profit from the fact that the other nations needed rest. At the close of the recent struggle the various States engaged had been so exhausted that the balance of power had been disturbed in favour of the victor, and Napoleon took advantage of this opportunity to mould the internal administration of the countries within the French sphere of influence in such a way as brought them completely under his control. Most of these States had Republican Governments modelled on the Directorial Constitution of

[1] On August 20th, 1804, he wrote to Talleyrand: "It is not merely madness for Austria to raise the standard of revolt, it is impossible for her, even in co-operation with Russia" ("Corr.," IX. 7946, Criticism No. 16). "I can only accustom the Princes of Europe," said he about this time to his Minister of the Interior, "to regard me as their equal by keeping them under the yoke" (Chaptal, "Souvenirs," p. 217). Méneval, who succeeded Bourrienne in 1802, as private secretary, sometimes heard him muttering to himself: "Whoever wants to conquer the world must begin with his own country" ("Mémoires," I. 426). In 1815, on his return from Elba, in the manifestoes he issued at Grenoble and Lyons, he frankly acknowledged the aggressive tendencies of his previous policy, which he meant henceforward to replace by a policy of peace (Thiers, XIX. 91). At St. Helena he declared he would willingly have been a sort of crowned Washington, but "I could only attain that along the path of a universal Dictatorship, and that is what I pretended to do". The recent attempts to depict Napoleon as a peaceful and peace-seeking man whose wars, victories, and conquests were thrust upon him by the other Powers (cp. Lévy, "Napoléon et la paix") is an absurd view, devoid of evidence to substantiate it. People are apt to confuse war with conquest, and the desire for the latter with Napoleon's consuming thirst for power and mastery, because he considered his commanding position indispensable to his prestige with the world and with posterity, and feared to imperil it by any appearance of yielding. Hence, also, to regard his "system" only from the historical point of view of the struggle between France and England, would be circumscribing the activities of his genius within too narrow confines. His policy was not national enough for such limits.

France, but owing to the incessant fluctuations of party power they did not prove very reliable tools, and hence it was thought advisable to remodel them in harmony with the French Constitution of 1799.

A beginning was made with Holland, the new Batavian Republic. With the connivance of its ambassador, a new constitutional law was drafted in Paris, according to which the five directors were superseded by an executive body of twelve regents, a different member being elected President every three months, and the two Chambers were replaced by a legislative body composed of deputies with very limited powers. The new Constitution was imposed upon Holland by its own directors, who had been bribed by French money and were powerfully supported by French troops (October 16th, 1801). When a plebiscite was taken, and out of 400,000 electors only 17,000 voted in favour of the new law, while 52,000 voted against it and the remainder were silent, Napoleon interpreted this silence as consent and described the new Constitution as the voluntary act of the Batavian people. This he did only as a matter of form, in hollow compliance with the terms of Article II in the Treaty of Lunéville, according to which "the contracting Powers mutually guarantee the independence of the Batavian, Ligurian, Helvetian, and Cisalpine Republics, and grant the aforesaid peoples the right to adopt whatever form of government seems good to them". Napoleon would have liked only one man at the head of the Government, but on account of the above article he did not dare to show his hand too openly, and so he waited till 1805, when a change in the Constitution gave him the chance he wanted. Till then 11,000 French troops were quartered in Holland, in spite of the fact that by the terms of the Treaty of August 29th, 1801, they were to evacuate the country on the conclusion of the general peace. Nevertheless, under the pretext of being destined for Louisiana, they had remained. "I do not want any political disturbances there," wrote Napoleon to his ambassador at the Hague in October, 1802.

What had not proved feasible in Holland, however, came

to pass in the Cisalpine Republic. Here, too, was a Republican Government under a Directory. This was now to be changed, and the governing power transferred from the deliberative bodies to an executive which could be much more easily controlled from Paris than the fluctuating factions in the Chambers. In September, 1801, Napoleon discussed matters with Marescalchi, the ambassador of the Republic, and thereafter Maret drafted a Constitution in conformity with Napoleon's views. It was then submitted to certain confidential parties in Lombardy, by whom it was forwarded to Milan to be discussed in secret by the Provisory Consulta instituted by Napoleon after the battle of Marengo. According to the new Constitution, at the head of the Government there was to be a president with sovereign powers, elected by a Council of State which directed the foreign policy and drafted the laws. These again were passed on to a legislative body drawn from the three representative classes, landowners, professional men, and tradespeople. This body, which was constituted by election, possessed no initiative, and did not debate but merely voted. The Milan Consulta accepted the new Constitution, and on receiving a hint, even begged Napoleon to nominate suitable men for the various offices of State. "In order to see how the wind blew," the First Consul invited some 500 Lombard notables to Lyons in January, 1802, where, acting in concert with them, nominations were made to all the highest offices except that of the President, which Napoleon intended for himself, and Talleyrand was to work the oracle. While a review of the troops home from Egypt was in progress in the neighbourhood, this astute diplomatist took the opportunity of summoning a meeting of the Italian delegates, two-thirds of whom had gone to see the review. They proceeded to elect a candidate for the Presidency, and when their choice fell on Melzi d'Eril, Talleyrand let them understand that they might have made a better choice. They took the hint and decided to offer the Presidency to Napoleon, making Melzi Vice-President. On January 26th, 1802, Napoleon declared his willingness to accept office. His first official act was to change the name of

the State to that of the "Italian Republic," a clever stroke, for Alfieri's appeal for an "*Italia virtuosa, magnanima, libera, et una,*" had already fired countless hearts. A whole programme of national unity and independence seemed to lie behind this chosen name, and who was better fitted to accomplish it than the Conqueror of Marengo?

Yet, after all, it was only a brief illusion, as the fate of Piedmont plainly showed. Piedmont lay at the portals of France and formed a sort of bridge to the Lombard Republic. It had been occupied by the French troops after their victory over the Austrians and had not been evacuated on the conclusion of the peace of Lunéville. Indeed Napoleon had sent word to General Jourdan (for the Jacobin of the 18th Brumaire was now a useful tool in the new monarch's hands) to announce to the Piedmontese that their country formed a French military division and would be divided into six prefectures. The Convention in its time had proceeded in exactly the same way with the German territories on the Rhine. Napoleon dallied over the formal annexation till peace with England had been definitely concluded, and during the negotiations his plenipotentiaries had strict injunctions not to suffer the slightest intrusion in Continental questions from Britain; and, as a matter of fact, the Peace of Amiens does not say a word on behalf of the King of Sardinia. As soon as things were safe in this quarter, Napoleon proceeded to take formal possession. On September 4th, 1802, a Senatus Consultum from Paris declared Piedmont a French province with six departments, one of which bore the proud name of Marengo.

At the Viennese Court this sudden extension of France's power in Italy caused the utmost consternation. Count Louis Cobenzl, Thugut's successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to the ambassador at Paris: "How can any territory in Italy not yet belonging to France escape her domination? Where is this rushing torrent to end, that hurries on, even more rapid and devastating in peace than in war?" The "torrent" was destined to rush a long way farther. To the south of Piedmont lay the Ligurian Re-

public, the ancient territory of the Doges. Its Constitution had also grown out-of-date and on June 26th, 1802, the French Ambassador at Genoa (the Saliceti of Napoleon's early days) brought forward a plan for a new Constitution (prepared in Paris) which the Genoese Government gratefully welcomed, declaring to their subjects that "It was fitting that the man who gave peace to Europe should give our Republic a new Constitution". The first Doge, Durazzo, was appointed by Napoleon and devoted to his interests. Already in December, 1801, the little Republic of Lucca had received a new Constitution, likewise from the Tuileries, with a Gonfaloniere at its head, who only held office for a very brief period and consequently never acquired any lasting influence. The real authority was the French political agent. No less dependent on France was the Kingdom of Tuscany and Etruria, where through his generals, Clarke and Murat, Napoleon held the incapable young King in tutelage, and on the King's death, the Queen also, superintending personally even the details of the military administration of the kingdom. He considered it entirely his own possession, and as early as May, 1801, he had assured Cobenzl he would never give back Tuscany, as that would be tantamount to handing over Leghorn to the English. All Lower Italy would thus fall within Napoleon's sphere of influence, and Cobenzl was justified in replying as he did: "That is to say, you mean to keep Rome and Naples in complete subjection". Finally in August, 1802, Elba was ceded by Tuscany, and as soon as the British troops left the island, it was declared a French province. In order to create the impression that he was acting entirely in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants a deputation from Porto Ferrajo was invited to Paris, where they were entertained by the Minister of the Interior and each member of the deputation presented with several thousand francs, whereupon these gentlemen, in a carefully prepared speech, expressed their delight and that of their fellow-countrymen at being united to France.

By midsummer of 1802 all Upper Italy, except the Austrian province of Venice, lay directly or indirectly under the sceptre

of France. Piedmont alone was not sufficient to provide uninterrupted and adequate communications between these territories. In the last campaign Napoleon had learned the value of lines of communication over the Swiss Alps, and he meant to secure these permanently, for he had now resolved to renew hostilities.[1] He therefore requested the Helvetic Republic to cede to him the canton of Valais through which ran the road over the Simplon, in exchange for the Frickthal which Austria had surrendered at the Peace of Lunéville. But the inhabitants of Valais, whom the French general Turreau had treated with great harshness, hoping to force them to surrender, would not hear of union with France, and Napoleon was too wise to insist. But as he never scrupled to try unfair means if he could not gain his end by fair means, he now contrived to get Valais separated from Switzerland and formed into a Republic by itself with a President of its own (August 30th, 1802). Real independence was out of the question, for the second article of the new Constitution placed the new Republic under the protection of the French and the Italian Republics, while Article 7 relieved her of the duty of guarding her passes, and Article 9 forbade the inhabitants of Valais to open up any road into foreign territory without the consent of France. Article 8 entrusted the French with making "all the necessary arrangements throughout the country, so that their troops might meet with no obstructions in their marches."[2] Valais was to be governed by a State Council of three members, one of whom, the High Bailiff, occupied a position resembling that of the First Consul in France. The legislature was entrusted to a Cantonal Council, but the laws required to be sealed and

[1] Two months after the conclusion of the Peace of Lunéville, he commissioned Berthier to have good maps of Italy drawn up, particularly of the district traversed by the rivers Po, Adige, and Adda, "which will be the theatre of the new wars". These maps were to be ready for use in the year X (up till Sept., 1802) ("Corr.," VII. 5501).

[2] This article was transferred from a Treaty with France of August 28th, 1802, ordering the new Free State to allow representatives only from France, Italy, and Switzerland.

promulgated by the Grand Bailiff, who, of course, was absolutely under the control of France.

Nor was the rest of Switzerland any more independent. The Directory in their day had found Switzerland indispensable as the connecting link between its positions in Italy and those on the Rhine; and if Napoleon was to maintain the offensive tactics of the Revolution—he had no choice in the matter,—he could not afford to lose control of the Swiss Alps. During the Consulate it was generally believed in Europe that he would treat Switzerland as he had done Lombardy, and place himself at the head of the Government. It is said that for a time he even contemplated this, but the Treaty of Lunéville, which guaranteed the formal independence of Switzerland, blocked the way. Also Russia had sent a warning note requesting the Consul to respect the independence of his neighbours and thereby allay the apprehensions of Europe. Napoleon was thus compelled to renounce his intention of being nominated President of Switzerland, but he secured his powerful influence in that country's affairs by widening the breach between the partisans of the aristocratic Federal regime and the advanced Liberals. For by withdrawing his troops, the animosity of these rival factions broke out into active hostilities and so allowed him to come forward as an interested party and armed mediator. The Federalists had previously begged help from England and Austria, and an English agent (Moore) had already reached Berne to work on behalf of the old Swiss party, when Napoleon suddenly intervened. He compelled the Helvetic Government "as they alone were unable to quell the disturbance," to request military aid from him; then in a manifesto to the Cantons in the end of September, 1802, he publicly withdrew his decision not to interfere in their affairs, sent forward 30,000 men under Ney, and summoned a deputation of upwards of sixty Swiss representatives to meet him in Paris, where he granted them, with many threats against England, an "Act of Mediation". "Switzerland," said he in an address on December 10th, "must be French wherever France is concerned, like all the other countries adjoining France.

History shows that Switzerland was always ruled by the influence of France." Later on he says: "All Europe expects France to restore order in Switzerland; it recognizes that Italy and Holland are at the disposal of France, like Switzerland".[1] The new Constitution took both parties into account; it satisfied the Federalists by granting each canton its own Constitution, and the progressive party by maintaining the principle of equality among all citizens. Foreign affairs were entrusted to a diet composed of representatives from each canton presided over by a Landamman. (February 19th, 1803.) By this clever move Napoleon brought Switzerland completely under France's control, made her inaccessible to foreign influence, and secured internal peace in the country all the time he governed France.

Napoleon had thus crossed the Alps and extended the frontiers of France far beyond the boundaries Nature had set for her. It remained to be seen if he would respect that other great natural frontier, the Rhine. After the Peace of Lunéville, as after that of Campo Formio, the question arose in Germany of the indemnification of those Princes whose territories on the left bank of the Rhine had been ceded, either partially or wholly, to France. The matter was to have been settled at the Congress of Rastatt, but the decisions arrived at there had been rendered invalid by the renewal of hostilities. The question now came up afresh. At Rastatt it had been resolved that the dispossessed secular Princes should be compensated out of the territories of the ecclesiastical Princes on the right bank of the Rhine. This the Lunéville treaty had confirmed. The plan followed by Napoleon was therefore strictly that of the Revolution, which had destroyed the political value of "*main-morte*" in France and had carried into other countries the principle of secularizing Church lands. In Germany there were ecclesiastical and consequently non-hereditary Princes who had no dynastic interests, as in the case of secular Princes, to urge them to raise their house to independence and sovereignty. Hence

[1] "Corr.," VIII. 6483, 6560.

they had always been strong supporters of the feudal system and, being Catholics, they were also partisans of Austria and of the Hapsburg dynasty. To break up these principalities therefore into temporal, i.e. dynastic territories, meant that the ancient Constitution of the Empire would be shaken to its very base, Austria would lose some of her staunchest supporters, the tendency to disintegration would be strengthened, and as a result of this subversion of the established order, the old Empire would give place to a mere confederation of States. The ancient Imperial Constitution could only be maintained by secularizing just so much ecclesiastical property as would suffice for compensation—and no more. If all the Church lands were secularized the Constitution was doomed. The various revolutionary Governments of France had insisted upon complete secularization. At Paris in 1795, when the idea of a general peace was momentarily entertained, Sieyès had defended this principle in the Committee of Public Safety, and there is no doubt that at a later date Napoleon and his Ministers entertained his plan for re-allotting the ecclesiastical principalities of Germany among the secular Princes. On the former occasion Sieyès had advocated the theory that the two German Powers, Austria and Prussia, should be kept as distant as possible from the Rhine, upon the banks of which there were only to be small States loyal to France, who would defend them from the aggressions of either Power. For this Sieyès held the ecclesiastical principalities were unsuited, as these Princes being elective were without dynastic interests, and there was therefore no guarantee for them proving permanent allies. Hence the principalities were to be secularized, as had already been done with a number of them after the Peace of Westphalia.

Such was the French point of view, and the two great German Powers were not directly opposed to it. As regards Prussia, it was by the secularization of Westphalia that Brandenburg had been so largely increased, and the strength of that State in the past was founded upon the very principle now being promulgated by the Revolution. Furthermore, Prussia just then had an interest in seeing the dispossessed

Hereditary Stadtholder of Holland receive compensation on German territory. Austria, on the other hand, at the time of the Peace of Campo Formio, had asked for herself an ecclesiastical principality, the Archbishopric of Salzburg, and had thereby furnished France with an excuse for helping her to obtain it. In the Treaty of Lunéville it was arranged that the Grand Duke of Tuscany should be compensated in Germany, Salzburg and Berchtesgaden being again put aside for that purpose. Even at Vienna the interests of the Austrian States were allowed to prevail over those of the Germanic Empire, just as had happened in the days of Joseph II, when the question of secularizing all the ecclesiastical principalities of Germany had been mooted. Neither of the German Powers therefore was opposed on principle to this solution of the problem, a point of vital importance, as was also the fact that the question had now ceased to be a purely German one. By assigning German territories to non-German Princes, such as the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Stadtholder of Holland, and thereby introducing the subject into international treaties, the whole question of the German indemnifications passed into the sphere of European politics. It is therefore scarcely surprising to find that France, who had won for herself the first place in the concert of Europe, now assumed the leading rôle and settled the question at the Tuileries and not at the Ratisbon Diet. The various German Princes were eager to treat direct with the First Consul. They vied with one another in courting favour with Talleyrand and his functionaries, and bribed and bargained for favours and concessions. It was a disgraceful sight to see the dignity and respect of an ancient Empire sacrificed for the sake of a few paltry acres. On May 20th, 1802, France signed a separate treaty with Württemberg granting it a considerable extension of territory from ecclesiastical lands. The Württemberg dynasty being related to the Czar, it was hoped by this means to win Russia's consent for the other secularizations. On May 23rd, a similar convention was signed with Prussia, promising Frederick William III an extensive "in-

demnification" taken from Church possessions.[1] On the strength of these agreements a comprehensive scheme was then brought forward at Paris for a general secularization, leaving untouched only the Archbishopric of Mainz of which Dalberg was Archchancellor. On June 3rd, 1802, Napoleon received Russia's consent to this scheme, and her promise to assist France in securing its adoption by the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon.

Austria had purposely been left in the dark. The Austrian Ambassador learned of the agreement with Russia and of the plan for indemnification from the "Moniteur". The Emperor Francis protested—not, however, because as head of the Empire it was his duty to defend her Constitution and to uphold her dignity against foreign intervention, but because Prussia's share of the booty was too large and Austria's too small. Austrian troops were sent to occupy the lands belonging to the Bishopric of Passau, which had been allotted to Bavaria; but all in vain. The German Princes had for once made common cause with France, and Napoleon's categorical summons compelled the Court of Vienna to yield. Austria had to be content with Salzburg, and Berchtesgaden with also Brixen, Trient, and part of the Bishopric of Eichstadt, in exchange for Tuscany; and in return she signed a treaty with France on December 26th, 1802, giving her sanction to all the changes which had supervened in Upper Italy. Meanwhile the Franco-Prussian plan of indemnities had been accepted at Ratisbon, and on February 25th, 1803, it was ratified by a formal enactment. The temporal power of the ecclesiastical Princes of Germany had ceased to exist, and the ancient Constitution of the Empire had been shaken to its very foundations.

Napoleon had thus made his power felt by the nations across the Rhine, and he had brought the smaller German neighbouring States, particularly those in the South, into a

[1] Among the ecclesiastical territories named in this treaty are Hildesheim, Paderborn, Eichsfeld, Essen, Werden, Quedlinburg, all of which had already figured in Sieyès' plan in 1795 as Prussia's share.

certain dependence on his system. In the diplomatic campaign against Austria he had come off victor all along the line. Austria was completely isolated, and the treaty of December, 1802, amounted in substance to a decisive defeat. France, however, was prevented from following up her successes over her vanquished foe by new complications elsewhere.

Although the treaty with England, signed at Amiens, created a situation which allowed swords to be sheathed, it afforded no guarantee of lasting peace. In the English Parliament the terms of the treaty had been severely criticized, some members boldly declaring that Italy had been abandoned to Napoleon and with it the control of the Continent. But the nation at large, exhausted by long and costly wars, had welcomed the preliminary peace of October, 1801, with loud rejoicings. The ratification of the treaty, however, on March, 1802, was received with greatly diminished enthusiasm. And for good cause. It had been thought that with peace trade would improve, but a few months of truce quenched that hope. Not only had Napoleon refused his consent to the much-desired treaty of commerce, but, with a view to increasing French trade, he had imposed heavy duties on English goods and had thus kept them out of the ports of France and those States dependent on her—Italy and Holland. Across the Channel, therefore, manufacturers and merchants were again wishing for war, which had proved less prejudicial to them than this ruinous peace. Besides, there was also the danger that Napoleon might succeed in extending his Federative system and so further restricting the Continental markets for English goods. There was also the possibility that the French colonies which had been restored might again become productive and market their goods in France and the countries dependent on her. Hence it seemed a matter of vital importance to Britain to combat her rival's aggressions and to curtail her preponderance at all costs.[1]

[1] After the conclusion of the preliminary treaty, a well-known member of Parliament, Edward Cook, had published a letter to Castlereagh in which he observes: "We are allowing France, now augmented

Napoleon on his side was convinced of the probability of a break with England; at least in May, 1802, he had spoken in that strain to the Austrian Ambassador. Yet, as England had not intervened at the conclusion of the peace, either on behalf of Holland or of Italy, he considered her need of rest so absolute that he reckoned on a long spell of peace on that side. At least it was only on such a supposition that he could expect success in the comprehensive economic policy he now put into operation. He intended to build up a great colonial system with one base at St. Domingo and another at the Antilles and the American territory of Louisiana, lately ceded to France by Spain. At the same time, by means of an expedition to the East Indies, he aimed at regaining Mauritius, Reunion, the coasts of Pondichery and Chandernagor for French trade, and at colonizing Madagascar, keeping a sharp look-out on England's ascendency in the Punjab, and entering secretly into relations with the native princes. Then, should there be an Indian expedition they would already possess a sort of base of operations. Serious difficulties supervened, however, both at home and abroad.[1]

During the last war a talented negro, Toussaint Louverture, had distinguished himself at St. Domingo as a leader of the blacks and had offered such a vigorous resistance to the English that they had been obliged to withdraw. Toussaint had then seized the power and had set up a despotic but efficient form of government. According to the Constitution

by Belgium, to found a commercial and political system with Holland, Spain, Switzerland, and Italy. We have given back to France its trade with the Antilles, and with it vanish £70,000,000. We had treaties of commerce with all these countries—we have only one now with Naples. France will monopolize the trade we are losing, and our industries will be ruined. War, on the other hand, would maintain our monopoly of trade, our supremacy in the colonies, and distant markets for our produce." (Quoted by Sorel, VI. 168.)

[1] Already in 1800 an expedition had been dispatched to Australia to explore the southern coasts of that continent and Van Diemen's Land and if possible gain them for France. This enterprise, however, was ruined by the Maritime war. But in the Australian maps of 1807 "Spencer Gulf" appears as "Golfe Bonaparte," "Kangaroo Island" as "Ile Decrès," etc., names which soon disappeared (Rose, I. 379).

which he gave to the island, France's sovereignty was to be purely nominal, whilst he himself, as President for life, was to exercise his power independently, therein proving himself an apt pupil of the First Consul. The island revived under his rule, and, thanks to his authority, the negroes, though released from slavery, continued to work. Commercial liberty brought the island great increase of wealth. But all this was hopelessly out of line with Napoleon's colonial plans, and he therefore refused to sanction the new Constitution, and sent his brother-in-law, Leclerc, with an army of 25,000 men to make the island once more commercially dependent upon France. The army assigned to this distant theatre of operations in a deadly climate was composed, and probably not unintentionally so, of troops who had served under Moreau during the last campaign, and who numbered among their ranks the staunchest partisans of Moreau and of the Republican system.[1] Leclerc, like Richepanse who was sent to La Martinique, was to re-establish slavery among the negroes. But Toussaint, placing himself at the head of his people, resisted this attempt; and although the French performed prodigies of valour and endurance, it was only after promising an amnesty to him and his followers that Toussaint was prevailed upon to surrender. Nevertheless the expedition was a failure, and afterwards at St. Helena, Napoleon bitterly regretted it. Every day hundreds of brave soldiers

[1] There were also those who were "suspect" in spring, 1802, and a demi-brigade home from Egypt, "because they had been adopting ignorant popular opinions". General Thiébault ("Mémoires," III. 305) and others declared the whole aim of the expedition to the West Indies was simply to get rid of the doubtful elements in the army, a view which finds some support in a remark of Napoleon's at St. Helena. There he once said to his suite: "The Bourbons could only maintain themselves in France by terror, they had to send 100,000 troops of the old army to St. Domingo to be killed there by the climate or the negroes, so as to get rid of them and recover a valuable colony." (Gourgaud, "Journal inédit," I. 351, 403.) This passage cannot be used as conclusive evidence of his intentions at this period, but the probability that he aimed at keeping the unreliable troops away from France at the time of the peace, should nevertheless not be wholly dismissed. Certainly, as was to be expected, vast numbers of them died—50,000 in two years.

died from yellow fever, and in July, 1802, after having been seven months on the island, Leclerc had only 8000 troops left. Dreading a fresh rising under Toussaint, who had retained his rank of general, Leclerc advised Napoleon to summon the latter to France and there put him under arrest. This was done, and in the end of March, 1803, Toussaint died at Fort Joux, a victim to the harsh climate and cruel treatment. Away across the ocean Leclerc too died—of fever—and his successor, in spite of large reinforcements, was unable to re-establish the supremacy of France. Before the close of 1803 the French abandoned the island altogether.

Napoleon's second base for his colonial policy also failed him entirely. For early in January word came to Paris that the United States of America were opposing France's aggression on the Mississippi with a threatening veto, and so the projected expedition to Louisiana was abandoned. Napoleon had also to relinquish his hope of capturing Guadeloupe and Martinique exclusively for French trade, for in order to obtain the needful provisions from America, they were forced to admit American goods. As for the East Indian Expedition, owing to the dearth of transports it had not set sail even in the beginning of 1803, and by the time it ultimately reached its destination, the relations with England had again become strained. The peace, too, was interrupted sooner than Napoleon had counted on, thus robbing his plans of a vital condition—the safety of his merchant ships at sea.

During the expedition to St. Domingo, public opinion in England had been steadily growing more hostile to France, till finally the peace-loving Addington Ministry was compelled to yield to its pressure. The conditions of the treaty of Amiens had not yet been all fulfilled, and one important pledge still lay in Britain's hands, viz., Malta, a valuable halting-place on the route to India. In consequence of France's encroachments on the Continent, Britain had delayed restoring this island to the Knights of St. John as promised, and was inclined to regard its possession as a desirable compensation for Napoleon's aggressions. The situation was further aggravated by the scathing denunciations

of the First Consul in the English newspapers and the refusal of the English Government to put an end to these journalistic attacks, the reason alleged being the freedom of the press in England. Each day the hostile tension became more acute. Napoleon then resolved to try what threats would do. If he succeeded in intimidating England his prestige in France and Europe would be so much the greater; if England insisted on war, he would certainly have to drop his colonial programme, but then, as Britain would not remain without allies, there was the alluring prospect of the profitable Continental war which was never absent from his thoughts.[1]

Napoleon found his opportunity in the autumn of 1802 when England lodged a complaint against the violation of the neutrality of Switzerland by the entry of the French troops under Ney. Otto, the French Ambassador in London, demanded an explanation as to why Malta had not been evacuated, and why an agent had been sent to Berne? He was informed in reply that much as England disliked war, she would prefer it in any case to a humiliating peace; for now France had not only annexed Piedmont, she also controlled the fate of Germany, Holland, and Switzerland; whereas the treaty of Amiens was based on a system of compensations. Otto thus learned that England had no immediate intention of surrendering Malta.

The instructions which Napoleon then dictated to his Foreign Minister for Otto's immediate guidance contain the germ of his whole future policy. So far as Switzerland was concerned, the subject was closed, nor would he tolerate English emissaries in the Alps. Should they threaten war on the other side of the Channel, the question arose, what kind of war? Maritime war meant for England paltry prizes and small advantage; England would of course blockade French harbours, but she herself would also be blockaded, for after the outbreak of hostilities all the coast from

[1] Already in May, 1802, Napoleon had announced to the Austrian Ambassador that a rupture with England would necessarily entail a war on the Continent.

Hanover to Taranto would be guarded by French troops. But what if the First Consul collected all the flat-bottomed boats from Flanders and Holland and provided transport for 100,000 troops to keep England in constant dread of a possible and even probable invasion? On the other hand if the London Cabinet set war alight on the Continent, Napoleon would then be compelled to conquer Europe. "The First Consul is only thirty-three," so the dispatch concludes, "as yet he has only destroyed States of the second rank. Who knows in how short a time, if he were forced to it, he might change the face of Europe and re-establish the Empire of the West?"[1] The French Ambassador repeated this in London in a very much diluted form, and so, for the time being, the peace remained unbroken.[2] Talleyrand and the

[1] The text of the letter in Thiers, IV. 187, which I am here following, seems like a first rough draft by Napoleon to enable his Minister to feel his way; in any case great modifications were made in his instructions to Otto of October 23rd, 1802. For instance, no mention is made of a "blockade of England," nor of "Taranto". On the other hand, the landing in Britain in the event of war is regarded not merely as a possibility but as a certainty. The First Consul, so it runs, desires peace, because he considers the advantages France could obtain through its trade as important as those to be gained by an extension of territory; but should war be forced upon him, he would annex Switzerland and Holland, the Italian and Ligurian Republics, and withdraw Hanover and Portugal from English influence. He wished the peace of Amiens and nothing but that. (For complete text vide Oechsli, "Geschichte der Schweiz im 19 Jahrh.," I. 768.) In my pamphlet, "Zur Textkritik der Correspondenz Napoleons I," I have shown that Talleyrand not infrequently altered Napoleon's written or verbal instructions, generally with the latter's subsequent approval. What Sorel relates (VI. 259), after a conversation with the First Consul, agrees even to some divergencies with Talleyrand's version of the instructions as given in Oechsli and probably represents the Minister's rough draft.

[2] Otto's statement of France's demand for the "Treaty of Amiens and only that," brought forth England's demand for "The status of Europe as before, and only that," and so reopened the whole question. Sorel is wrong when he assumes that Otto communicated "cette terrible note" to the English Minister, Hawkesbury. In his dispatch of October 29th, as given by Oechsli (I. 777) he says, "I have given him a resumé of your dispatch and said, the whole Treaty of Amiens," etc. Talleyrand reported to Napoleon on November 3rd about the fate of "the dispatch

other Ministers as well as Napoleon's brothers were strongly against any open rupture. But irritated by Britain's persistent refusal to evacuate Malta, and by the provocative tone of the English press, Napoleon remained bent on war. He practically abandoned his colonial policy and precipitated a crisis. He published a dispatch in the "Moniteur" from General Sebastiani (whom he had sent to Egypt on a secret mission), stating that the English had not yet evacuated Alexandria, and that owing to the hostilities between the Turks and the Mamelukes, and the sympathy of the latter with France, 6000 French troops would be sufficient to reconquer the country; furthermore, the inhabitants of the Ionian Isles were only awaiting a favourable moment to declare for France.

If this dispatch was published with the express design of exasperating England it fully accomplished its purpose.[1] The thought that the high road to India was again in danger was intolerable to Britain, and to withdraw from Malta was now out of the question. But this breach of the treaty made

which I sent him at your command". (Bertrand, "Lettres Inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon," p. 24.)

[1] Sebastiani himself bears witness that this was Napoleon's intention, for he afterwards relates that when he had finished making his report the First Consul exclaimed, "Well, that will surely make John Bull want a fight. I am certainly not afraid of one" ("Mémoires de Lucien," II. 165). But the report Sebastiani read was no longer really his own but one which had been fundamentally altered and worked up by Napoleon himself; for Sebastiani records the remark of one of his companions that the mission had not been well received by the Egyptian populace, and that in Cairo they had been obliged to seek shelter from the mob. (Markoff an Woronzoff, February 4th, 1803, Sbornik, 77, 31.) It is highly improbable that Sebastiani told the First Consul the opposite, and moreover he spoke to Lord Whitworth, the British Ambassador, in high terms of General Stuart, who was in command at Alexandria, while the printed dispatch accused Stuart of attempting to murder the members of the French mission (*vide* Rose, I. 413). The diplomatists at Paris could not understand Bonaparte's behaviour, for the naval war was not to France's interest, and they talked of madness. This came to Napoleon's ears. "They call me mad," said he to the Russian Ambassador, but as peace was not secure he declared he had to prepare for war and it was only by such means he could keep the French in readiness (Sbornik, Vol. 77, p. 212).

Britain appear the aggressor, which was exactly what Napoleon wanted. Nor did he stop there. In the Annual Report which he laid before the Legislative Body in February, 1803, he alluded to the struggle between the two parties in England, those for peace and those for war, and stated that in the event of the latter party gaining the upper hand France must be ready with half a million combatants. Britain would then find no allies, and she alone, so ran the report, was unequal to cope with France.[1]

Napoleon misjudged the national temper in Britain if he thought that his menacing allusion to Britain's isolation would strengthen the hands of the peace party. Two days previously, in talking to the English Ambassador, he had touched on the same topic and had sought to demonstrate his love of peace by pointing out the personal danger to himself in an invasion of England, which he would only undertake if forced to do so. But all in vain. In London the statements in the Annual Report only served as a fresh insult to the national pride, and the war party, who were never wearied of harping upon the French occupation of Holland, contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Lunéville, now gained the ascendancy. Under the pretext of the French armaments in Dutch ports George III called out the militia, and even the peace-loving Fox talked of the "wounded national honour". In Paris, Napoleon admonished the English Ambassador in full audience, that all Europe held England accountable for the war by her disregard for treaties, and that France's honour would not allow her to let such pass unheeded. Yet he was far from desiring immediate hostilities, for the East Indian squadron had only then set sail (March 6th). In order to gain time, he prolonged the negotiations with Whitworth and sent a special messenger to St. Petersburg to request the Czar's intervention. Meanwhile he decided to hand over Louisiana to the North American States for a sum of 80,000,000 francs, the treaty being signed at Paris, on April 30th, 1803. The East Indian Expedition being by this time near its destination, Napoleon changed his attitude and no

[1] "Corresp.," VIII. 6591.

longer deprecated war, for "sooner or later," as he remarked to some councillors of State, "it must come to that. The English might capture a couple of our frigates and a few colonies, but I would carry the terrors of war to London. For two months past I have tolerated their arrogance. They think it weakness. But if need be I can call out two million troops, and if the first war has brought in Belgium and Piedmont, the second will establish our federative system even more securely."[1] On the same day, May 1st, Talleyrand received orders not to engage in long conversations with the English Ambassador, but to be "cold, proud, and even rather arrogant," to demand a written ultimatum, as such was necessary in order to know definitely how things stood. The English Ambassador was to be made to feel that such an ultimatum might entail war. For the rest, Talleyrand was to avoid any sudden rupture of the negotiations and to propose handing over Malta to one of the guarantee Powers, preferably Russia. England, however, demanded either Malta in perpetuity or for ten years, provided they were then granted the Sicilian Island of Lampedusa; also, France was to evacuate Holland and Switzerland and compensate the King of Sardinia for Piedmont, in return for which England was prepared to recognize the Italian Republics and the King of Etruria. This ultimatum was rejected in Paris. France would not evacuate Holland until England had quitted Malta. Whitworth then modified his proposals; England would retain Malta till Lampedusa had been fortified, provided France would evacuate Holland within one month. Indeed in London, the French Ambassador Andréossy was assured that the British troops would leave Malta immediately the French troops crossed the Dutch frontier. But even this offer found no acceptance at Paris, and so Lord Whitworth left the capital. To convince France of his good will Napoleon sent after him a proposal that England should retain Malta for ten years, France Tarent and Otranto for the same period, well knowing from the close relations between England and Naples, and the fact that Holland had not been evacuated, that it

[1] Thibaudeau, "Mémoires," p. 405.

would find no reception.[1] Parliament rejected the proposal by a large majority, and on May 16th, King George announced to the Commons that the negotiations had been broken off.

War was declared. England immediately gave chase to all French merchantmen which had set sail relying upon peace being maintained; Napoleon replied by arresting all British subjects then in France. Shortly afterwards British squadrons blockaded the French ports, whereupon the First Consul proceeded to carry out to the letter the plan of campaign he had drawn up in his instructions to Otto. It consisted, as we have seen, of three main lines of action: first, to blockade Britain by excluding her ships from all continental ports from Hanover to Taranto; second, by concentrating an expeditionary force in the Channel, to keep Britain in dread of an invasion; third, in case Britain should succeed in kindling a coalition war on the Continent, to make himself master of the Continent in so far as French arms could do so. As a significant illustration of his programme, he now revived the fête of the Maid of Orleans in order to foster a Chauvinistic spirit towards their ancient hereditary foe.

In May a French army corps under Mortier invaded the Hanoverian territory of the King of England. The Electoral troops offered a feeble resistance and then capitulated. In June Napoleon issued decrees forbidding all imports from England and the Colonies in the ports of France and her allies. The mouths of the Weser and the Elbe were closed against the enemy's ships, and English trade thus deprived of its most valuable means of communication with North Germany. The consequences of this move were soon apparent. "You have dealt England a heavy blow. . . . Several firms have already failed," wrote Napoleon to General Mortier, and he enjoined the latter to give his personal attention to see that no British goods were allowed to enter the country.

[1] As early as January, Canning in a letter to Malmesbury had described "Malta and Holland" as the two pivots on which events turned. (Malmesbury, "Diaries," IV. 166.) Coquelle in his "Napoleon et l'Angleterre," p. 69, has recently shown the importance attached by England to the evacuation of Holland.

Soon after this, in June, a French army corps under St. Cyr entered the Kingdom of Naples, and, contrary to the terms of the treaty, occupied the ports of Taranto, Brindisi and Otranto.

The two extreme points of the cordon being thus secured, all that lay between was inexorably bound to France's policy. The Batavian Republic was compelled by treaty to support a French corps of 18,000 troops, to furnish a corps of her own of 16,000 troops, in addition to five ships of the line, a hundred gunboats, and numerous transports and flat-bottomed boats for the landing in England. In return for this Napoleon guaranteed the integrity of the Republic and undertook to restore all the colonies she might lose during the war, besides promising her Ceylon should circumstances prove favourable. (June 25th, 1803.) Switzerland had also to sign a "defensive alliance" with her powerful neighbour, pledging herself to furnish 16,000 troops, but if France was attacked this number was to be augmented to 24,000, i.e. the greater proportion of the military strength of Switzerland was to be made available for interests wholly foreign to the country. (September 27th, 1803.) Finally, Spain and Portugal were also drawn in. In the former country things had reached a somewhat critical pass. In her treaties with France, the Spanish Court had reserved to herself the right to resume possession of Louisiana, which Napoleon had recently sold to the United States. But at Madrid the resentment roused by the violation of this right was so intense that Godoy, the Prince of Peace, had thought for a moment of resistance, all the more so when Napoleon, instead of adhering to the terms previously agreed upon, demanded the heavy subsidy of 6,000,000 francs per month, three ports as refuge for his vessels and free transit for French goods to Portugal, and backed these demands by assembling an army at Bordeaux. According to the treaty of 1796, in the event of war, Spain pledged herself to furnish France with 28,000 troops and twenty-five ships, so that Napoleon's demands were therefore far in excess of his rights. Nevertheless he did not intend to be gainsaid. He lodged a complaint with the King against the Prince of Peace, and even stooped to refer to the latter's scandalous relations with the

Queen. The expedient succeeded. The Prince of Peace apologized, and on October 19th, 1803, the treaty was concluded according to Napoleon's wish. Spain had thus entered the list of Britain's enemies. In October, 1804, a silver fleet having been captured by a British squadron, the Court of Madrid declared war against Britain, and on January 4th, 1805, it signed a treaty with France. These changes told inevitably on Portugal, which was compelled to purchase its neutrality by paying France 16,000,000 francs and admitting French exports duty free (December 19th, 1803). In February, 1804, Genoa[1] was obliged to furnish her powerful neighbour with 4000 sailors for his naval warfare.

While the First Consul was thus organizing the blockade against England, he had assembled in the Channel near Boulogne an imposing army, admirably equipped, with which he manœuvred either as a mere demonstration or in actual preparation for crossing to England. A great number of flat-bottomed boats had been built and the soldiers trained in the management of them. It was a gigantic apparatus intended to frighten John Bull. But the time for action had not yet come. Foreign foes were not the only foes Napoleon had to contend with. There were enemies within his gates against whom armies and fleets were of no avail. He now turned his attention to them and, like a clever parvenu, made his vanquished foes a stepping-stone for his own advancement.

As the Jacobin party had been virtually destroyed by the proscriptions in 1801, there remained only two political groups who pursued the system of personal government and its representative with unrelenting animosity. The first of these groups consisted of Moderate Republicans, the bourgeois of the 13th Vendémiaire, with General Moreau as their leader; the second group was composed of ultra-Royalists who had been driven into exile and who looked upon the capitulation of La Vendée in 1800 as a truce which they were resolved to break on the first favourable opportunity. The leader of this

[1] *Vide* De Clercq, II. 69, 76, 82, 84, 86.

party whose head-quarters were in England, was Count Charles d'Artois, brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, and Pichegru and Dumouriez were its most active agents. During the peace these two parties had lain quiet, but now on the outbreak of the war their hopes revived. Napoleon had long been endeavouring to render them both harmless, on the one hand by winning over Moreau, on the other by inducing Louis XVIII to renounce the throne of France. But Moreau proved inaccessible; he declined the proffered hand of Hortense Beauharnais, and the higher Napoleon rose, the more hostile he showed himself. As for the Bourbon King, early in 1803 Napoleon made overtures in the greatest secrecy to the King of Prussia (in whose territories Louis was living), soliciting his help in the matter. But King Frederick William's efforts at Warsaw proved fruitless. In March, 1803, in a dignified letter to the Courts of Europe, Louis proudly rejected compensation for the surrender of his royal rights, which only intensified the zeal of his more devoted followers.[1] These two parties now attempted to form a sort of coalition, and with this object in view Pichegru came to Paris in January, 1804, and made overtures to Moreau. The latter, whose co-operation was indispensable, was to be granted the power for the nonce in order that he might play the rôle of Monk and pave the way for the return of the Bourbons. Through Moreau, Pichegru hoped to win over the other generals who were dissatisfied with Bonaparte, Macdonald, Reynier, Dessoles, perhaps even Bernadotte. The plot was based on the assumption that it would be possible to get rid of Napoleon. They hoped to make surer of him this time than on that Christmas Eve in the Rue St. Nicaise when the infernal machine had missed its mark. In August, 1803, Georges Cadoudal, one of the generals of La Vendée, came secretly to

[1] *Vide* Bailleu for Napoleon's transactions with the Bourbons, 1803, "Révue Historique," 74, 130, and the exchange of letters between Frederick William III and Alexander I, p. 26, also Hüffer, "Die Cabinetsregierung in Preussen," p. 185. Hardenberg's statement ("Memoirs," I. 85) that Napoleon wanted to hand over Louisiana to Louis finds no further support.

France to plan the deed with some trusty partisans who had become veritable bandits in the domain of politics during the long years of civil war. Their plan was to fall upon the First Consul in a body as he was driving through the town escorted by his guards, to secure him and—the "Moniteur" affirms—kill him, and so overthrow his government. Several English Ministers knew of the plot and approved of it, at least in so far as it related to the downfall of their hated enemy.[1] However, before even one of the conspirators had set foot on French soil, Napoleon's agents in London had warned him of the plot. The conspirators were arrested as they arrived and with a little coercion the whole extent of the conspiracy was brought to light. After a long trial Cadoudal and twelve of his accomplices were shot; Pichegru was found strangled in his cell, and Moreau, whose complicity with Pichegru could be proven, but not with Cadoudal, was condemned to two years' imprisonment, afterwards commuted by Napoleon to banishment to America.[2] As a result of all

[1] In one of Protel's studies on "Russia and the Rupture of the Peace of Amiens" ("Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques," 1897, p. 98) there are two letters from the Russian Ambassador in London, Count Simon Woronzoff, one to Hawkesbury, and one to his secretary, dated September, 1803, which contain sure evidence of the connivance of the Cabinet with Pichegru and Dumouriez. In Malmesbury's "Diaries," vol. IV. p. 287, early in February, 1804, it is stated: "About this time the measures agreed upon by Pichegru, Moreau, etc., were communicated to me; they were described as unfailing. . . . Pichegru left England about the middle of January. . . . As soon as anything like a successful step had been taken, Lord Hertford was to appear in France in the double character of messenger of peace and restorer of the old dynasty."

[2] The question as to whether Pichegru died by his own hand or by violence has not yet been finally settled. Pasquier in his valuable "Memoirs" (I. 171) from his subsequent research in the prefecture of police, favours the theory of suicide, and observes that Pichegru was the only one who could have implicated Moreau, hence Napoleon would not have desired his death. On the other hand he was the only man whose evidence would have exonerated Moreau. It is well also not to overlook the passage in d'Antraigues (Pingaud, "Un agent secret," p. 286) according to which Pichegru during four examinations compromised no one and was only found dead after the written statement of his defence had been taken from him. The faithful Gourgaud believed in his murder and dis-

this the Bourbon cause was seriously compromised, while Moreau, Napoleon's only dangerous rival, lost his prestige in the army through his connexion with the conspirators. On the other hand, Napoleon's popularity was heightened by the danger he had escaped, and with the great majority of the nation he stood higher in favour than ever.

He himself, however, partly destroyed this favourable impression by a deed which nothing can justify. During his cross-examination Cadoudal had said that one of the Royal Princes of France knew of the plot and wished to be present when it was carried out. He had meant the Duc de Berri, younger son of the Count d'Artois, on whose presence in Paris the conspirators were reckoning; but the inference was that certain members of the Bourbon family were accomplices in the deed. Not all, however. The Condés, for instance, disapproved of the conspiracy and refused to have anything to do with it. To this branch of the Bourbon family belonged the young Duc d'Enghien, the last scion of his race. His love for his cousin, Charlotte de Rohan-Roquefort, to whom he was said to have been secretly married, had led him to Ettenheim in Baden where Cardinal Rohan and his niece had resided since the Revolution. Here the young Prince lived on a pension from the British Government and now that war had broken out he was anxious to serve Britain, either as a soldier in her army or by making himself useful to her on the Continent. With this in view he had offered to raise a volunteer regiment drawn from the malcontents in Alsace and the local garrisons, but the British Government had declined his offer, and so he had to while away his exile in idleness. Britain was at this time seeking to create a strong feeling against France in Switzerland and Southern Germany by means of secret agents whose doings

approved of it as of that of the Duc d'Enghien ("Journal," I. 63). According to the same source, Napoleon assured his suite at St. Helena that he had intended to pardon Pichegru and the other accomplices (Rivière, Polignac, etc.) but Pichegru had forestalled him. "Only fools kill themselves." This remark is confirmed by Réal. ("Monier-Desclozeaux," p. 75.) The impression produced is that it was a case of suicide.

were greatly exaggerated in the accounts which reached Paris. One of these rumours was to the effect that young Condé was in league with these emissaries among whom was said to be a certain notorious emigrant, Dumouriez. Napoleon concluded therefore that d'Enghien too, must have been involved in the plot, and the idea occurred to him, as he had not been able to lay hands on d'Artois, to seize d'Enghien. It was a matter of indifference to him that in order to do so he would need to invade foreign territory and violate the laws of the rights of the nations. On March 15th, 1804, General Ordener crossed the Rhine with a few hundred dragoons, seized the Prince as he was leaving for the hunt, and brought him to Strassburg whence he was taken to Paris.

While the prisoner was on his way thither his fate was being discussed by a select council. Napoleon wished to have him brought before a court martial; Cambacérès was against this course, Lebrun evasive, Talleyrand and Fouché strongly in favour of it. Napoleon therefore adhered to his plan, although he could easily have convinced himself from the Prince's papers that he had no connexion whatever with the conspirators, while the hated Dumouriez turned out to be quite an insignificant person named "Thumery". But Napoleon had made up his mind to sacrifice a Bourbon so as to strike terror into the others and dissuade them from further attempts on his life. On the evening of d'Enghien's arrival at Vincennes, the officers who were to form the court martial were summoned thither. They had been selected with great care from the colonels in the Paris garrison. The accused was subjected to a cross-examination during which he denied all intercourse with Pichegru and the others, and telling the truth proudly and fearlessly he declared that since the renewal of the war he had sought to serve in the English army and to combat openly the regime of the First Consul, adding that it was well known he had already borne arms against France. This was sufficient for the judges. They pronounced a sentence which they knew would please their master and which indeed had a certain appearance of justice; for the Revolution in all its phases had punished with death any French citizen

found bearing arms against his country, and that law had not been repealed. It was to it Napoleon was referring when he rejected Josephine's appeal for mercy on the ground of the exigencies of State, and when he said to those about him, "I am the head of the State. I am the French Revolution and I shall maintain it." On March 20th, 1804, in the dead of the night, while the colonels composing the court martial had scarcely finished signing the sentence, the Prince was led down to the Castle moat, placed in front of a grave which had been dug in readiness for him, and shot by a file of soldiers. According to all authentic reports the last of the Condés died like a hero.[1]

This infamous deed struck people dumb with horror. A member of the family who had reigned over France for centuries had been condemned and executed in the capital of the country, at the beck of a foreigner. So then the bloody tribunals of the Revolution had not yet come to an end, even under this Government which had drawn up such excellent codes of law? If the Prince had been found guilty of conspiring against the head of the State, there would have been a reason for his sentence, but that had not been so. In order to kill him, they had had to seize him by stealth. And what was worse, the deed had been done, not in the blind fury of indignation at a criminal attack, but after long and serious consideration, like some official act. Napoleon expected to silence all objectors with the words "my policy," which he himself describes: "At least they (the Bourbons) will see what we are capable of and henceforth they will leave us in peace". He did not succeed in convincing anyone, however. Even those classes who were closely bound to him by material

[1] Just before his end he handed to the commanding officer a ring and a lock of his hair for Princess Charlotte de Rohan and sent her a farewell greeting. This last wish of the condemned man was never fulfilled. His requests for an interview with Napoleon and for the services of a priest were also disregarded. The relics were deposited with the records of the trial in the archives of the Paris Police, where they lay till they were transferred by Napoleon III, at the beginning of his reign, to the Imperial Chancery. Since then both papers and relics have disappeared (Lalanne, "Derniers jours du Consulat," p. xii).

interests were offended. On the Exchange, stocks fell so considerably that the First Consul was obliged to sacrifice millions of francs in order to keep up the prices and allay the excitement. Hitherto, besides the respect felt for his genius, Napoleon had to a certain extent enjoyed the sympathies of the people; these he had now forfeited, and henceforth his regime was only tolerated from utilitarian motives. He could still reckon on obedience, but not on affection; and on obedience only so long as the nation believed its interests to be best safeguarded by him. This belief had not been destroyed by the murder at Vincennes. Madame de Rémusat remarks in her memoirs: "Moreau's trial and especially Enghien's death, outraged people's feelings but did not shake their opinions". Lucchesini, the Prussian Ambassador at Paris, observes in his admirable description of these events: "If the national character of the French had not always borne the imprint of vivacity rather than of constancy, one might have expected that by the violent death of the Duc d'Enghien, the First Consul would have forfeited a great deal of the confidence, enthusiasm, devotion, and attachment on which his present authority rests and on which his future greatness should be founded. But possibly he understands the character of the French better than they do themselves, and has learnt from the example of Cardinal Richelieu, who executed a Montmorency, that in France daring acts of statesmanship consolidate supreme power rather than shatter it." [1]

This supposition on the part of the Prussian Ambassador was not without some foundation. We have traced the various stages of Napoleon's progress towards the monarchy. Two years previously he had attained the Consulate for life, and he had no intention of stopping short there. In May, 1802, the Austrian Ambassador had written to Vienna that the highest power in the State was to be conferred upon Napoleon for life with the title of "Emperor of the Gauls," and on the same date the Prussian chargé d'affaires stated that the Consul not only intended to change his title but also

[1] Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich," II. 252.

to make the sovereign power hereditary in his family. In March, 1803, the Englishman, Jackson, entered a similar remark in his diary, and from this time on the idea of an "Empire of the Gauls" was never lost sight of. Napoleon behaved exactly as he had done on previous occasions, he let them come and seek him. Again a suitable intermediary turned up. Fouché, who was still smarting under the loss of his lucrative post as Minister of Police and hankering after reinstatement, hoped to accomplish this by gratifying the First Consul's secret wish. The conspiracy against Napoleon's life and the danger to the peace of the country which that involved, brought him the desired opportunity. Napoleon was at that time receiving a great many congratulatory addresses from the provinces and from the various corporations, and Fouché, who had become a senator, took advantage of these demonstrations to ally himself with certain other senators and draw up an address to the First Consul, suggesting a new amendment to the Constitution. Since 1802 the Senate had been empowered to carry out such changes, and it had been deeply impressed by the danger the Consul had just escaped; for any change of system would have deprived the senators of their lucrative posts by putting an end to Napoleon's corrupt generosity. Besides this selfish consideration there was also the indisputable fact that a *coup d'état*, and the dislocation it would entail throughout the country, could be much more easily managed while the system in force depended on one man and while there was only one individual to be got rid of. It was quite another affair if the power became hereditary and there was a legitimate follower ready to step into Napoleon's place and carry on his traditions. The fact of the succession becoming hereditary guaranteed greater stability and rendered attacks on the ruler's life abortive. In making this revolutionary monarchical power hereditary, the senators were serving the interests of the general public as much as their own, and consequently the Vincennes tragedy did not cause them to abandon their projected modification of the laws. In less than a week after that unhallowed deed a deputation from

the Senate appeared before the First Consul and advised him to establish a Court of Justice for high treason. "It is not enough," said the leader of the deputation, "to punish a crime which threatens the peace of the State, it is also necessary to destroy the hopes of those who venture to follow such an example and at least to render their misdeeds fruitless. You have founded a new era; you must perpetuate it. Success is useless if it does not last. We cannot doubt but that this great truth has already received your consideration, for your creative genius embraces everything and forgets nothing. But delay no longer. The state of the times, recent events, conspirators, ambitious men, the unrest that agitates the nation, all urge you to take this step. You can rule time and circumstances, disarm the ambitious, and tranquillize France by providing the conditions which will consolidate the structure you have reared and which will continue to the children what you granted to the fathers. The vessel of the State should not run the risk of losing her pilot without having an anchor to protect her from shipwreck. Receive our assurance that the Senate now speaks in the name of all the citizens."[1]

The senators were right, for when their proceedings became known they received more approval than the reverse, especially among the new proprietors whose possessions would have been endangered by the return of the Bourbons. "Not that any increase of affection marked this new honour to Napoleon and his family," says Miot de Melito. "At no time had he been more disliked than now. But the need of peace and stability was so imperative, the future so disquieting, the fear of terrorism so great, the return of the Bourbons, with much to avenge, so threatening, that people snatched greedily at anything that could avert these dangers from which they saw no other way of escape."[2]

[1] Cp. the text in Miot, II. 156, and Mignet, "Histoire de la Révolution," II. 241, which supplement one another.

[2] What Miot here says is confirmed by other witnesses. "This event is generally expected," the Prussian Ambassador writes to Berlin, "and however great the number of people dissatisfied with the enterprise,

But Napoleon was not satisfied to have the new dignity conferred upon him by the Senate. The submission of this department of the Legislature was too evident. He wished his honours offered him by those who had formerly striven against the Monarchy, evidently calculating that he would thereby secure himself against opposition and prevent the possibility of confusion between his rule and that of the Kings of France; for he could not with good grace kill a Bourbon one day and usurp his inheritance the next. The offer must, therefore, come from the Tribunate. Hence he merely promised the senators to give the matter his consideration. Meanwhile, the report was secretly spread that the army meant to proclaim the First Consul Emperor, which aroused the desire to forestall this and so prevent a regime of a pronounced military character. Cambacérès then persuaded Curée, a member of the Tribunate, who had been won over by the prospect of a lucrative post in the Senate, to submit the following proposals, which were formulated in the First Consul's Cabinet: (1) The Government of the French Republic is bestowed upon Napoleon Bonaparte with the title of Emperor of the French. (2) The Imperial dignity is declared hereditary for his descendants. A Tribune who had been in exile since the 18th Fructidor was to second this motion. On April 30th, 1804, Curée brought forward his petition in the Tribunate. Only one member, Carnot, spoke against it, all the others voted for it. The Legislative Body, convoked in great haste for a special sitting, also gave a favourable vote. The Senate, with few exceptions (Sieyès, Volney, Grégoire, and two others), had already declared in favour of it. A Government committee which included Talleyrand, Fouché, and the Consuls, and acted under Napoleon's guidance, drew up a new Constitution which was discussed in the Council of

which is as contrary to the wishes of the Royalists as to the principles of the Republicans, yet Paris and France scarcely show their true feelings in this matter. Everywhere the craving is for tranquillity, they want guarantees for their present possessions and the prospect of an undisturbed future, and the new order gives them ground for hope" (Bailleu, II. 259).

State, and thereafter transmitted to the Senate for sanction. On May 18th, 1804, it was passed almost unanimously, only five voting against it,—Sieyès absented himself—"as the interests of the French people demand this step". The newest of the Constitutions was then sent "*ventre à terre*," as the wits said, to Napoleon, who was at St. Cloud at the time, and on the same day it was published as a fundamental law of the State.

The constitution of the year XII imposed no limits on the monarchical power; there had been no intention to do so when it was drafted. In the Senate only a few mild protests were made; all the emphasis was laid on the fact of the supreme power being hereditary. Napoleon would have liked to have had the right of adopting his successor, as was the case with the Roman Imperators, but his brothers, Joseph and Louis, were so much opposed to it and so insistent on their family rights, that he gave way. The plan favoured by Josephine that her grandchild, the son of Hortense and Louis Bonaparte, should be named successor, failed owing to the father's opposition. And so Napoleon was only granted the right, so long as he had no family of his own, of adopting the children or grandchildren of his brothers. In the event of him neither having a son nor adopting one, the Imperial dignity was then to pass to Joseph and Louis and their descendants. They were accordingly declared French princes.[1] The Emperor's civil list was fixed at 25,000,000 francs yearly, the amount named in the royal Constitution of 1791. Surrounding the imperial throne were six high dignitaries who enjoyed the same honour as princes and like them were addressed as "Highness" and "Monseigneur". They were the Grand Elector (representing the Senate, the Council of State, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate); the Arch-Chancellor of the Empire (who represented the Courts of Justice, etc.); the Arch-Chancellor of State (Foreign Affairs); the Arch-Treasurer (Finance); the Constable (the Army), and the High Admiral (the Navy). Then came the high

[1] Lucien and Jerome on account of their humble marriages were, the former permanently the latter temporarily, excluded from the succession.

officers of the Empire, sixteen marshals, eight generals, and a number of high civil officials. In accordance with the Constitution, the princes over eighteen years of age and the six high dignitaries were members of the Senate. The remaining Senators were appointed by the Emperor partly from the electoral lists and partly by free choice. Certain powers which the Constitution had entrusted to the Senate, were now put into operation and two commissions were established, one for the liberty of the press, and one for that of the individual; and moreover, if Ministers were accused of having infringed either of these forms of liberty, the Senate itself was to form a competent tribunal of Justice. Indeed it was even granted a sort of legislative veto, for it could object to a law being promulgated if a Senator showed it to be contrary to the Constitution. This looked liberal, but only from a distance. On closer observation it turned out that the liberty of the press was limited to papers "published by subscription and issued periodically," that the clause relating to the liberty of the individual contained restrictions which rendered it largely inoperative, while Article 72 allowed the Emperor the right of having the veto of the Senate revised by the Council of State and the law promulgated notwithstanding. The Senate was certainly not representative of the nation.[1] Alongside this House of Lords there still remained the Legislative Body and the Tribunate. The former even recovered its lost right of speech, but was only allowed to exercise it behind closed doors and in the privacy of the three sections into which it was divided—judicial, administrative, and financial. No inkling of its transactions was to reach the public. But the activity of the two Legislative Bodies was of little importance, as almost everything was done by Senatus Consulta and Imperial degrees.

Soon after the proclamation of the new Constitution the nominations were proceeded with. The two Consuls, Cam-

[1] "The Senate errs," said Napoleon to the Council of State, "if it assumes a national or representative character. It is merely a constituted authority proceeding from the Government like any other." ("Pelet de la Lozère," p. 63.)

bacérès and Lebrun, were appointed respectively Arch-Chancellor of the Empire and Arch-Treasurer; Joseph Bonaparte, Grand Elector; Louis, Constable; Eugene Beauharnais, Arch-Chancellor of State, and Murat, High Admiral. Talleyrand, who had played a leading part in bringing about the new Statute and had hoped to receive one of the high dignities (principally for the sake of the splendid emoluments they carried with them) [1] was disappointed in this. He remained Foreign Minister and was given a Court appointment. According to the new Constitution a Ministerial appointment and a high dignity could not be held simultaneously. It is possible that Talleyrand's zealous instigation in the Enghien affair (which he now attempted to deny) was still rankling in Napoleon's mind. Fouché, on the other hand, got the reward he wanted. He was again made Minister of Police and stood henceforth in the front rank of the Emperor's counsellors. Fourteen generals were appointed marshals of France; Jourdan for his victory at Fleurus in 1794, Berthier for his services as chief of the general staff, Masséna for Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa; Lannes and Ney for various engagements; Augereau for Castiglione; Brune for his victory in Holland (Helder, 1799); Murat for his brilliant leadership of the cavalry; Bessières for his command of the Guards; Davôut for his services in Egypt; Bernadotte, Soult, Moncey, and Mortier also received this honour. Kellermann, Sérurier, Lefebvre and Perignon were made marshals only.

The Court of the new Emperor was organized with as great splendour as the State. It was in all respects that of the old Bourbon dynasty, but without its degrading personal services—hand-kissing, etc., and without its boundless extravagance. Louis XVI had spent 45,000,000 francs on his household, which numbered 15,000 persons, so that Napoleon effected a very large saving yearly on his civil list. But the new Empress never found her allowance of 3,000,000 francs sufficient. The office of Grand Almoner was revived, and given to Uncle Fesch, who had two almoners in attendance. On high festivals he accompanied the Court to church and

[1] These amounted to over a third of a million francs yearly.

handed the prayer-books to their Majesties. At dinner he blessed the foods, just as the Court Chaplain had done in the days of Charlemagne. He was also supposed to receive their Majesties' confession, though that never happened. Once, in 1809, at the close of a long speech against the aggressions of the clergy, Napoleon remarked to his Councillors of State: "They will see where they are when they have an Emperor to confess". It was not till shortly before his death that he expressed a wish to make his confession. Duroc, the Grand Marshal, was responsible for the purveying, and at state banquets he handed his Majesty his table-napkin and poured out his wine. The prefects of the palace were under his supervision, the pages and couriers under that of Caulaincourt, the Master of the Horse, who was also responsible for the Royal Stud. The pages were from fourteen to eighteen years of age and all of them sons of high military or civil officials; they marched first in church processions, accompanied the state carriages on gala days, and delivered their Majesties' letters. For the bearer of a letter to the Emperor both of the folding doors were thrown open, an honour otherwise accorded only to the highest personages. The Grand Chamberlain, Talleyrand, superintended and arranged the Court receptions, and was responsible for the theatres, the music, the library and the wardrobe. Berthier, the Master of the Hunt, had to make 400,000 francs suffice for his department, instead of the 7,000,000 francs required under the old regime. Napoleon, indeed, was no 'mighty hunter before the Lord,' and only pursued that noble sport as a means of physical exercise. The costly pastime of hunting with falcons was abandoned. There was also a Grand Master of Ceremonies who superintended the arrangements at the Court festivities, and an endless array of prefects of the palace, ladies-in-waiting, and minor officials, for all of which posts Napoleon preferred the bearers of old historic names; and, what is more, he succeeded in getting them. Scions of many of the great families were eager applicants—just as the Frankish nobles had thronged the Court of Charlemagne 1000 years before. Not that they were enthusiastic for the new order, but rather, for its own

sake, supporters of the throne which might some day become another's, and this other, being the legitimate King, would thus find himself surrounded by those suitable in rank. Salm, Arenberg, Larochefoucauld and Montesquiou, are among the names of those who held posts at the Court of the little Brienne cadet who had once been the butt of their aristocratic sneers. Now, however, when he was their absolute master, Napoleon cherished no rancour.

Of the various high offices the most important was that of the Master of Ceremonies, for during the first years of the Empire Napoleon took an increasing pleasure in the magnificence of his Court. This post was bestowed on M. de Ségur, a returned *émigré*, who had formerly represented Louis XVI at the Court of St. Petersburg. With his knowledge of Court life under the old regime, Ségur soon became the most sought after and the most worried of all the officials. For etiquette had now become an object of serious study at the Tuileries. Large volumes on the Court ceremonial of Louis XVI were looked out, copious extracts were made and regular rehearsals held. At these lay figures were used, that of the Emperor being modelled after a painting by Isabey, whose portrait of Napoleon during the Consulate was considered the best likeness. Madame Campan, once lady-in-waiting to Marie Antoinette, and now principal of a young ladies' college, was brought to Court to give her advice. Talleyrand, too, was much consulted about former customs.[1] The external splendour of the Imperial Court was largely due to the military retinue. The four generals of the Garde—Davôut, Soult, Bessières, and Mortier—who equalled in rank the highest Court officials, accompanied the Emperor with their suites at all military functions; there were also twelve adjutants who were changed daily, and one of whom always slept at night near the Emperor's bedchamber. A touch of the picturesque was lent to processions and reviews by the presence of two Mamelukes in native costume, one of whom, Roustan, was

[1] The Court etiquette was soon regulated by a torrent of Imperial decrees which were afterwards collected and arranged in a comprehensive code containing several hundred paragraphs.

in immediate attendance on the Emperor and proved a faithful servant. Close by this busy Court was the Emperor's study where, till 1802, his private secretaries Bourrienne, and after him Ménéval, Mounier, and Fain, plied their swift pens, transcribing the rapidly thrown off thoughts and commands of their master. Here he dictated letters to other Sovereigns, to his Ministers and ambassadors; here he threw off those notes which Talleyrand had to recast into diplomatic language, and which are in themselves records of the history of Europe. From here, too, issued the countless decrees dealing with the internal administration of the country, and innumerable letters to the various members of the Bonaparte family. Close at hand were valuable maps and the tables, drawn up every month, of the military forces of the country; from here, too, endless directions were sent out to Berthier and the other generals, and, after careful study, campaigns were planned for the conquest of the world. Not infrequently the Emperor sat up half the night, and his secretaries had to answer his summons at any hour; for alongside his marvellous power of work was an equally marvellous capacity for accomplishing it.[1]

Napoleon's change of title made no difference in his habits

[1] Immediately after the departure of the English Ambassador he worked for three days and nights consecutively with three or four secretaries engaged at the same time. "On the evening of the fourth day he took a warm bath to counteract his excitement and remained in it for six hours, during which time he dictated important dispatches. Finally he went to bed, giving orders to call him at three in the morning, so that he might see four or five couriers whom he was expecting. Such was the way he dispatched his business" (Remacle, "Relations secrètes des agents de Louis XVIII" (1802, 1803) (p. 328). This description becomes more easily credible when we reflect that during the engagement at Castiglione, which lasted several days, Napoleon took no rest. Furthermore he had the faculty of being able to sleep when he wanted to. He himself remarked that his activity was very methodical, the various matters occupying his mind having each its own place like the drawers in a desk. "If I wish to put aside a subject—I close that drawer and open another. So the various matters never get mixed nor disturb and tire me. If I wish to rest, then I close all the drawers and go to sleep at once" (Ménéval, "Mémoires," I. 423).

of work and manner of life. By seven o'clock in the morning, before he began his toilet, he was busy reading through his correspondence as well as the letters to Ministers, diplomatists and other high personages, which were opened with the connivance of the Postmaster General, and handed to the Emperor for his private perusal,—a practice which did not originate with Napoleon, but which developed greatly under him and was in vogue at almost all the other Courts.[1] While he was dressing his doctor paid him a visit and his private secretary read aloud the newspapers. A little later, about nine o'clock, dressed in the uniform of the "Garde," he received his gentlemen-in-waiting. He then breakfasted, generally alone and very hastily, so as to get to work again immediately. Sometimes, however, he received distinguished representatives of art, science and literature, such as Berthollet, Monge, Talma, the famous actor, Fontanes, then a popular author, and others. Once a week his librarian, Barbier, submitted a report of recently published books which Napoleon then glanced through, and any which interested him were retained for further perusal. In the afternoon he presided at the Council of State and received Maret, and every Wednesday a Council of the Ministers was held under his presidency, the meeting often lasting far into the night. On those occasions he rose early from dinner, at which he usually joined Josephine and some guests, leaving the Empress to proceed without him to the reception rooms. Naturally enough in Paris it-

[1] Napoleon talked quite frankly at St. Helena about this shady practice of his Government. He declared this practice of intercepting letters originated with Louis XIV, and remarked: "The letters of those I mentioned by name, especially Ministers in attendance on me, were opened. Fouché and Talleyrand did not write, but their friends and hirelings did, and so one could learn from a letter of the one what the other thought. This reading of posted letters required a special department whose officials remained unknown to one another. Among them was an engraver who had all kinds of seals in readiness. Coded letters, no matter what language they were written in, were deciphered. In forty lines of coded text each word was deciphered. This department cost me 600,000 francs yearly." (Gourgaud, "Journal," I. 398; cp. also Barante's "Souvenirs," I. 400.)

self people laughed privately at the parvenu Court and made all sorts of jokes at its expense. Liberty, they said, had only paid a fleeting visit to Paris, arriving by the "*barrière de l'Enfer*" and leaving by the "*barrière du Trône*". A cartoon appeared representing a well-known lady who had been condemned for the theft of a tiara, appealing to the new Emperor and asking him if such a crime really deserved punishment, and begging him to grant her a new trial. Yet these were but solitary voices and awakened scarcely any echo. When the nation at large was asked, not whether Napoleon was to be Emperor—that seemed to be taken for granted—but whether the Imperial dignity should be made hereditary in his family, there were only 250,000 Noes against 3,500,000 Ayes.[1]

France had thus declared herself unmistakably in favour of the principle of hereditary power and the permanence of the revolutionary monarchy with all the consequences it entailed. The most important of these was war. In the Constitution of the year 1804 the distinction between "Empire and State" is clearly marked. The new Constitution required the Emperor on his oath to maintain the integrity of the Empire, to rule France, not only for her interests and her happiness, but also for the glory of the French nation. Every one knew what the State was, the Revolution had prescribed as its frontiers the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; as for the Napoleonic Empire, no one knew how far its boundaries extended or if it really had any.[2] And this vagueness betokened war instead of the ardently desired peace. For the Empire was destined to continue so long as

[1] Such are the figures given by the "Moniteur". Out of the 200 lawyers in Paris only three voted Ayes.

[2] In a letter to Joseph on January 27th, 1806: "I told you it is my intention to have the Kingdom of Naples in my family, along with Italy, Switzerland, Holland and the three German Kingdoms, that really completes the 'French Empire'." ("Corr.," XI. 9713.) After the campaign of 1813, Napoleon declared in one of his speeches that the Empire could not dispense with Holland; it required the estuaries of its rivers, otherwise it would relapse into a monarchy again (Molé, "Revue de la Révolution," 1888).

it waged war and to disappear when it had ceased to do so victoriously.

A new Imperial Seal of State was now required, and when the commission to whom it was entrusted submitted as the heraldic device "a lion resting," Napoleon ran his pen through the words and wrote above them, "an eagle soaring!"

CHAPTER X.

THE WAR OF 1805.

A FEW weeks after his elevation to the Imperial dignity, Napoleon visited the camp at Boulogne for the purpose of conferring the Cross of the Legion of Honour upon those who had distinguished themselves during the last campaign. The private received the same decoration as his commanding officer, a shrewd proceeding which upheld the old Revolutionary tradition of Equality and flattered the ambition of the humblest. From the Memoirs of Captain Coignet, who received the Cross while a trooper, we see with what respect this popular decoration was regarded by the whole country. Indeed this feeling of pride soon outweighed every other. Instead of the enthusiasm for Liberty which had inspired the armies of the Revolution, the soldiers were now possessed by the love of glory and a desire for distinguishing themselves and receiving distinctions. And the Emperor who moulded the rank and file to his will, found their leaders no less pliant. Now for the first time he began to talk to them of the Empire of Europe, the various countries of which were to be allotted as fiefs among his generals, to whom he held out glorious prospects of splendour and wealth. In these schemes they seconded him willingly, and so the Republican army became Imperialist, and such it loyally remained as long as the "*petit caporal*" had even a gleam of victory. "It is this great fighting machine, constantly fed by the hope of fresh laurels and riches, that forms my brother's real power and safety," said Joseph Bonaparte about this time to the Prussian Ambassador.

The Army of the North, one of the finest and best equipped Napoleon ever had at his disposal, was commanded by Mar-

shals Ney, Bernadotte (who occupied Hanover), Soult, Davoût, Augereau, and General Marmont who was in Holland in command of a division. The infantry were constantly drilled in the handling of flat-bottomed boats at sea, and everything seemed to indicate that Britain was about to pay dearly within her own shores for the hard blows she had dealt the French and Dutch merchant marines and colonies since the renewal of the war. In the army itself opinion was divided as to the advisability of an invasion of Britain, some, Berthier among them, considering it extremely risky, others again, Marmont says the majority, maintaining that it was practicable. The vital point, however, is whether Napoleon was in earnest, or whether, as stated in the instructions to Otto in 1802, he merely wished to keep England in constant dread of an invasion. The latter supposition is strongly supported. We have already seen how gladly he availed himself of the enormous difficulties involved in this enterprise to evade attempting it in 1798, and these difficulties still remained, as he well knew. He once remarked to his brother Joseph that he himself had no intention of undertaking the expedition in person; he meant to entrust that to Ney and to send him, not to England, but to Ireland, which island was to be conquered, and, when peace was restored, exchanged for Malta.[1] In his letters he shows the greatest uncertainty as to the time required for the passage.[2] In after days he declared he never was in earnest about the English expedition. In the Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat, Miot de Melito, General Hulot, and the diplomatists Lucchesini and

[1] Miot, "Mémoires," II. 121.

[2] During the year 1805 he estimates it as follows: three days (to Villeneuve, May 8th, Corr., X. 8700); six hours (to Decrès, June 9th, Corr., X. 8870); four or five days (to Villeneuve, July 16th, Corr., XI. 8985); three days (to Ganteaume, July 20th, Corr., XI. 8998); twelve hours (to Decrès, August 4th, Corr., XI. 9043); twenty-four hours (to Villeneuve, August 13th, Corr., XI. 9073); fourteen days (to Decrès, September 13th, Corr., XI. 9209), after the enterprise had already been declared impracticable. Decrès (Minister of Marine) and Ganteaume had always declared fourteen days absolutely essential. *Vide* also Desbrière, "Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux Iles Britanniques," IV. 641.

Metternich, all of them shrewd observers, there occur various passages expressing doubt as to whether there was any real intention of putting this plan into execution in spite of the elaborate preparations and the rhetorical pomp with which it was announced. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1803, and even later, Napoleon appeared to have seriously contemplated the invasion. Originally, before the Egyptian expedition, he thought of making the attempt in the long foggy winter nights with the transport flotilla alone, and in July, 1803, he issued an instruction to that effect. Nothing came of it, however, for it was only in January, 1804, that there were 70,000 troops assembled on the coast; it was found necessary to enlarge the harbours of Boulogne, Ambleteuse, etc., where the flotilla was to be moored; the new ships were not ready, and the concentration of so many flat-bottomed boats proved full of difficulty. So this plan had likewise to be abandoned. Furthermore, during the whole winter there was not one week of continuously favourable weather, and in these days they were dependent on weather conditions. In the summer of 1803, Fulton had sought to give a practical demonstration at Paris of propelling ships by steam, but his attempt on the Seine was a failure, his submarine boat for torpedoes proved unserviceable, and Napoleon is said to have dismissed the man as a charlatan.[1] The English expedition was therefore postponed till the summer of 1804. Then in the short clear nights, there was the chance it might be mistaken by the English for mere manœuvring by the flotilla alone and pass unchallenged; for the English fleet was to be engaged in an encounter elsewhere, so as to keep their men-of-war away from the Channel and leave it free for the crossing. This is what Napoleon was now contemplating, although in 1802 he had remarked of the French naval forces: "It is a chimera to imagine that France could have a fleet equal to

[1] *Vide* Rose, I. 483 (from Colden's "Life of Fulton"), cp. also Desbière, III. 308, and Pascal, "Napoléon I, contre les torpilleurs". ("Revue bleue," Febr., 1904, Delpeuch, La navigation sous-marine.) Napoleon's letter quoted by Desbière cannot have been sent to Champagny either on July 21st, 1803, nor on the same day of the following year, for the latter did not come from Vienna to Paris till later.

that of England within ten years".[1] A French squadron lying off Brest was to engage the English Channel fleet, and meanwhile the remaining French warships on the French and Spanish seaboards were to concentrate in the English Channel to protect the transport flotilla assembled at Boulogne. But this concentration never took place, for Napoleon convinced himself by personal inspection that to assemble several hundred ships in the Straits of Boulogne was to court disaster when any sudden change of weather occurred. Nor did the other warships succeed in uniting during the course of the summer. These insuperable difficulties and the death of Admiral Latouche-Tréville, with whom all these projects had been discussed, induced Napoleon to alter his plans. He next thought of sending the Brest squadron to Ireland, but this project was also abandoned, as the co-operation of the rebel faction in Ireland proved unreliable. Shortly afterwards the whole project for an invasion was secretly dropped; the warships were sent to the Antilles to stir up unrest among the British colonies, and the flotilla was reduced.[2]

Napoleon was now in no small embarrassment. For more than a year past a great deal of money had been lavished on the "*descente*" and nothing had come of it. The army had to be maintained meanwhile in France, and that made very serious inroads on the finances. The vanity of the French had been flattered by the prospect of humbling the English in their own country, and now it looked as if they would have to confess that was not possible. Napoleon sought eagerly for some escape from this awkward predicament. There was only one way,—war with the continental Powers.[3] But this the Emperor could not provoke by any arbitrary step without bringing down on himself the odium of having disturbed

[1] To the Minister of Marine, February 19th, 1802, "Corr.," VII. 5968.

[2] Desbrières ("Projets et tentatives," IV.) leaves no doubt about the fact that this project was definitely abandoned in the autumn of 1804.

[3] In May, 1804, Lucchesini wrote home: "I cannot repeat often enough that in the present circumstances a continental war is the First Consul's secret wish; it relieves his honour from being compromised by so much talk about the invasion" (Bailleu, II. 264).

the peace and thereby justifying the reproaches of all Europe for his insatiable aggressions. He required the assistance of the Powers themselves to enable him to reach his ends. Just then, however, the general condition of European affairs furnished him with the opportunity he needed, although he himself carefully prepared the ground.

Napoleon's first political moves after the rupture with England were distinctly provocative. The occupation of the German principality of Hanover was a significant sign of the breach within the German Empire, and had this empire not then been in a state of dissolution this deed alone would have provoked war. But the head of the German Empire had become impervious to all attacks not immediately affecting Austria. In Prussia, which had hitherto regarded itself as the protector of all Northern Germany, Haugwitz had advocated forestalling the French by occupying Hanover. But the other counsellors in the Prussian Cabinet disapproved of this plan, while King Frederick William III declared he would not abandon his neutrality so long as no German subject was killed on German soil. "His Majesty," wrote the French Ambassador at Berlin, "is timid and surrounded by timid people." A German Empire there still was, but not a German policy.

The occupation of Hanover was viewed in Russia with serious misgivings. For, since Napoleon had become First Consul for life and had thus virtually entered the ranks of European sovereigns, the Czar had ceased to be one of his personal admirers, and moreover Russia's wishes in Italy had been disregarded. Woronzoff, the Chancellor of State, had never been in favour of Napoleon and had long held that Russia's true policy lay in co-operation with England, the greatest consumer of her national products, and in trade with the Hanseatic towns whose commerce had been crippled by the French advance on the mouths of the Weser. Vital interests were thus at stake. The Czar had yet another cause of complaint against Napoleon. The French occupation of Naples affected Russia in more ways than one, for Napoleon had now violated the secret agreement of October 11th, 1801,

by which he pledged himself to maintain unimpaired the kingdom of Queen Charlotte, while the occupation of Taranto not only held the English in check at Malta but also the Russians at Corfu where the Czar's troops had been stationed, with the exception of a brief interval, since 1799. Owing to the excitement in Russia caused by Sebastiani's mission and the dispatch relating to it, the Corfu garrison was now strengthened.[1] Finally, the French position on the Adriatic was of special significance, as it supplied Napoleon with a base for his Eastern plans, which were diametrically opposed to Russian interests.

Here again Napoleon was only continuing the policy of the Directory, who by their secret relations with the disaffected elements in the Balkan peninsula were largely responsible for the last war with Russia. Diplomatists were now aware of the Emperor's designs upon Morea, and the fact that this information was well-founded is shown by his letter of February 21st, 1803, to Decrès (Minister of Marine), in which he gave orders to have a ship equipped with arms and ammunition for the rebel Suliots and the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus who were at war with Turkey. At Ragusa, whose Senate had established relations with Napoleon during the Italian campaign and had since remained devoted to his interests, the French Consul, Bruyère, had orders to persuade the Bishop of Montenegro, in return for a certain sum of money, to deliver the mountains and the Gulf of Cattaro into the hands of the French. This plan was discovered by Austria in June, 1803, and communicated to Russia.[2] Meanwhile the Czar had reverted to the policy of the Empress Catherine, whose aim had been to conquer Constantinople and gain an ascendant position in the Mediter-

[1] Woronzoff's colleague and successor, Czartoryski, specifically mentioned the occupation of Naples to the French attaché as the cause of the increase of Russian troops at Corfu (Sbornik, 77, p. 742).

[2] A native of Ragusa, Bratchevich by name, was employed by Napoleon as a Turkish dragoman, and was in constant communication with the Senate of his native town ("Geheimer Bericht des Agramer Domherrn Vlatkovich," August, 1805, "Wiener Archiv. des Minist. d. Innern").

ranean, and he now felt himself seriously affected by Napoleon's machinations.[1] The latter, who was then First Consul, had no wish to break with Russia, on whose neutrality he had reckoned from the outset. He chose the Czar as arbitrator in the dispute with England and declared himself willing to submit to his decision with regard to Malta, although in conversation with Markoff and also in Talleyrand's instructions to the ambassador at St. Petersburg, he stated that he expected the Czar's sense of justice would never allow him to promise that island to England.[2] However, when England refused to submit to arbitration unless it included not merely Malta but all the disputed points,—Holland, Switzerland, Upper and Lower Italy, etc.—and when Napoleon would concede nothing to England beyond the Island of Lampedusa, and would only withdraw his troops from Holland and Switzerland on condition that Britain recognized the Helvetic Republic, the Czar then declined to arbitrate, and offered his services instead as mediator. But the terms he proposed in August, 1803, both in Paris and in London, showed very plainly his alienation from France. He certainly demanded that the English should evacuate Malta, receiving in exchange the Island of Lampedusa; but at the same time as a preliminary condition of the treaty, he demanded that the French should evacuate Hanover, Holland, Switzerland, and Upper and Lower Italy, retaining only Piedmont, for which the ex-King of that territory was to be indemnified. These countries and Turkey were to be declared neutral. This was a programme of resistance unmistakably directed against Napoleon's encroachments and in favour of Britain's commercial interests. Napoleon refused these terms, and in December Markoff, the Russian Ambassador, left Paris. A rupture between the two Powers was now inevitable.[3]

[1] *Vide* "Gentz und Cobenzl," p. 79, also Meynert's "K. Franz," I. p. 82.

[2] Sbornik, 77, 212, 220.

[3] In the memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski, Russian Foreign Minister in 1804, there is a document which gives a clear outline of

At the first symptom of trouble with France, Russia had taken steps to win Austria and Prussia to her side, but without any immediate success. Prussia remained neutral for the reasons already stated, and it was not till the following year (May 24th, 1804), that she consented to form a defensive alliance with the Czar, and that only in the event of Napoleon reinforcing his troops to a dangerous extent and advancing from Hanover on the Weser. To avert either of these contingencies, King Frederick William sent assurances to Paris on the same day—May 24th,—that provided Napoleon did not seek to extend his power in Germany, the Russian troops would be refused permission to march through Prussian territory. Austria, on the other hand, was still too much exhausted by the recent war to think of taking up arms again so soon. Although at Vienna this new development in Russia's policy was hailed with delight, the Austrians were resolved not to be led into assuming an offensive attitude towards France, and showed themselves in every way accommodating and deferential to Napoleon so as to deprive him of all pretext for resuming hostilities. At the outset of the Anglo-French war the Emperor Francis closed his ports against the ships of both Powers, a measure particularly disadvantageous to the English. Madame de Staël, an enemy of Napoleon, was refused permission to reside in Austria, and the Prince Enghien, who wished to travel via Vienna to England in the winter of 1803, was likewise refused.[1] Books in which the French Emperor was adversely criticized were prohibited, French *émigrés* were forbidden to wear Bourbon orders or to

Russia's Eastern programme of that date. "The European territories of Turkey were to be divided into small States united among themselves into a federation, over which the Czar, under the title of Emperor, or Protector of the Slavs or of the East, would exercise a commanding influence. Should Austria's assent be necessary, she was to be appeased by the acquisition of Turkish Croatia, part of Bosnia, and Wallachia, Belgrade, and Ragusa. Russia would have Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu, and above all, Constantinople and the Dardanelles with the adjacent ports, which would secure us the ascendancy there" (11, 64).

[1] *Vide* the correspondence between Cobenzl and Colloredo quoted in "Gentz und Cobenzl," p. 91.

approach within fifty miles of the French or Swiss frontiers. When the Princes of Southern Germany proceeded to annex the territories of the Knights of the Empire, the latter appealed to Austria for protection, and a reinforcement of Imperial troops had actually reached the Austrian frontier when France categorically demanded the abrogation of this measure, and the Vienna Cabinet instantly complied. When German territory was violated at the arrest of the Duc d'Enghien, the Emperor Francis only entered a feeble protest, and that too at Russia's bidding, and when the Prince was executed they remarked at Vienna that there were "stern necessities" in national policy, and after all, it was purely a French affair. Even Napoleon's Imperial title was willingly recognized, although on the condition that he, on his part, acknowledged the newly constituted "Empire of Austria" (August 11th, 1804), declared it equal with France, and yielded the political precedence to its Emperor, Francis II, as supreme head of the German Empire. After some hesitation Napoleon consented. He knew better than anyone how short a time the German Empire had still to live, and as if to show how slight a value he attached to this formal concession, in the following month, September, 1804, he set out via Belgium for Aix-la-Chapelle. There, in the old Imperial palace of Charlemagne, he held his Court among his German subjects and received their homage. There too, he demanded that the letter should be sent, in which the new French Empire was recognized by the Emperor Francis, the wearer of the ancient crown of the Carolingians. Even to this Austria condescended for the sake of peace, and punctually to the appointed time her ambassador arrived in Aix-la-Chapelle.

Against such servility, all pressure from England and Russia was futile. In vain Frederick Gentz called attention to the revolutionary and aggressive nature of French policy, and showed that the Empire was only the Revolution in another guise. Napoleon had not reached his new dignity in opposition to the revolutionary party, but solely by their aid. He had not been proclaimed Emperor by the army; he had founded his elevation on the sovereignty of the people as

proclaimed by the Revolution, so that to recognize the new Empire was to sanction the Revolution. This called for the most determined resistance, and for a close alliance between Prussia and Austria. But at Vienna they were not yet prepared to accept this view of the facts, and although both there and in Berlin there were those who saw clearly that an alliance either for peace or for war would be best for both Powers, yet on the other hand the many causes of estrangement and distrust of recent date frustrated all attempts at a better understanding. At Vienna they were quite satisfied so long as Austria's specific interests were not violated. The occupation of Hanover might probably prove a source of difficulties to Prussia, but Austria was not ill-pleased to see her ancient adversary in trouble; nor after all was it to her disadvantage if Russia's Oriental plans were upset. But when at last Austria approached Prussia with a view to an understanding, Prussia turned a deaf ear.

Austria, however, was not destined to enjoy this neutral peace for long. Soon after his elevation to the rank of Emperor, Napoleon attacked the Austrian sphere of influence in its most vulnerable point—Italy. Austria still owned territory in the northern part of the peninsula, and hence each fresh encroachment there was a menace to her. In May, 1804, the new Emperor of the French had told the chargé d'affaires of the Italian Republic that he could not well be Emperor and President of a Republic at the same time, and if he were to continue to this Republic the benefits of his government, the Consulta of Milan might consider the matter and submit their proposals to him. Melzi communicated this news to the Austrian Ambassador, and now at Vienna they were wondering what Napoleon was meditating for Italy. Soon it became evident that here too a hereditary monarchy was to be founded which would bind the Italian State all the more securely and permanently to France. This was directly counter to the policy of Austria, who would not at any cost renounce her hopes of regaining her lost prestige in Italy. In the convention with France on December 26th, 1802, she had recognized Napoleon as President for life of the Italian

Republic, but that was not incompatible with her plans for the future, whereas the founding of a Bonaparte dynasty in Italy would be fatal to them. So great was the anxiety to which this news gave rise, than Cobenzl described the ultimate fate of the Italian Republic as the touchstone by which Napoleon's real aims would be revealed. If he destroyed the independence of the Lombard State, he would then proceed to subjugate the rest of Italy, attack North and South Germany, and conquer Morea and Egypt.[1] Such were the fears which now alarmed Austria out of her tranquillity and urged her to draw closer to Russia, whose aid would be indispensable in case of need. So strained were the relations of Russia and France after the execution of the Duc d'Enghien, against which the Czar had protested, that in October, 1804, both Powers withdrew their ambassadors, and in the following month, November 6th, 1804, Austria and Russia signed a treaty purely defensive in character which was only to be enforced if France ventured on fresh encroachments either in Germany, Italy, or the East. In the event of the Allies proving victorious, Austria was to obtain the extension of her boundaries to the Adda, the return of the Archdukes to Tuscany and Modena, and the restoration of the Kingdom of Piedmont. The vexatious question of the Papal Legations was left to an agreement between the two contracting parties. To guard against sudden invasion, the Austrian garrisons in Venetia and the Tyrol were reinforced on the pretext of establishing a sanitary cordon. Austria was still too weak to cherish any intention of abandoning her defensive attitude, and Napoleon was right when he wrote Talleyrand in August that even in alliance with Russia she was unfit to offer resistance. Now, however, when the English expedition had been abandoned, Napoleon was again seriously considering the possibility of

[1] As a matter of fact, in August, 1804, Talleyrand betrayed to the Prussian Ambassador that they were willing to make concessions in Bosnia and Servia to Austria, provided she would cede Venice to them in Italy. In September, 1804, Napoleon arrived at Mainz and conducted himself then as if he were already the Protector of the German Princes who two years later bowed their necks to his yoke.

a continental war, and was carefully feeling his way with Austria. In the interval, he provided the French with a dramatic entertainment quite as flattering to their vanity as distant victories.

While the two Eastern European Powers were arming against further aggressions from France, Pope Pius VII was making preparations at Rome for his journey to Paris, to crown the new Emperor. Napoleon had deemed this ceremony indispensable as a means of lending dignity and splendour in the eyes of the world to his self-imposed rank, and of giving to it that consecration which all the old monarchies possessed. Reluctantly, after long disputings as to the form of the oath, Pius had consented to undertake the toilsome journey in the depth of winter to anoint this man whose hands had only recently been stained in blood, and whose power even then was pressing heavily on the Order of the Jesuits.[1] Fear and hope had driven Pius to consent. He was afraid lest by refusing he might incense the all-powerful Emperor and end by seeing the Church despoiled of her lands. He hoped to win fresh territory, perhaps even to have the long-coveted Legations restituted, and to show Europe the most powerful of all her Sovereigns, the Apostle of the Koran in 1798, kneeling before the Bishop of Rome. The majority of the College of Cardinals and Consalvi, the Secretary of State, a man of great ability, were in favour of the journey, and so in November, 1804, the Pope arrived in Paris. Once there he soon found that even in trifling matters Napoleon studiously avoided the faintest appearance of deference.[2] On one point, however, Napoleon gave way. Josephine

[1] On October 7th Napoleon ordered Talleyrand to obtain security from Spain that monks would not again be allowed, and the same from the Queen of Etruria. "I will never tolerate them in France nor in the republic of Italy" ("Corr.," x. 8103).

[2] Savary relates in his Memoirs that on meeting the Pope at Fontainbleau and driving with him to Paris, Napoleon occupied the right hand seat, a statement which Lanfrey accepts ; but there are other sources in which the reverse is maintained. Consalvi, in his Memoirs, only speaks in a general way of Napoleon's omission of little courtesies towards his guest, so as to prevent the latter from cherishing any illusion as to his supremacy.

who had long been dreading a divorce, informed the Pope that she had only gone through a civil marriage with Napoleon, and she obtained a promise from His Holiness that he would make a religious celebration of the marriage a condition of the Coronation. The Empress hoped in this way to bind her husband irrevocably to her—a hope that proved vain. For the time being, however, she was successful, and the religious ceremony was privately performed by Cardinal Fesch the day before the Coronation. On December 2nd, 1804, the Emperor and Empress were crowned in the Cathedral of Notre Dame. It was remarked that Napoleon kept the Pope waiting, and after all did not receive the crown from his hands as had been arranged, but lifted the golden laurel wreath before Pius could reach it, and crowned himself. Even in this mere formality he would recognize no superior. The Pope saw that not only were his expectations doomed to disappointment, but that the part he was playing in Paris was more likely to prejudice his prestige than to heighten it. One thing he did achieve. Those French Bishops who had taken the oath under the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and had on that account been declared heretics, were now received back into the fold of Rome. Of his other demands only one was granted, and that a minor one. It was arranged that from January 1st, 1806, the Revolutionary Calendar was to be abandoned and the Gregorian Calendar used as before, and that the Saints of the Roman Catholic Church and their days would again be recognized in France. To this Napoleon offered no objection.

Now that the Papal benediction had given the finishing touch to the establishment of the Empire, Napoleon turned with renewed zeal to the various matters of international importance still awaiting solution. He was aware of England's transactions with the continental Powers; indeed England had made little secret of them. On January 2nd, 1805, Napoleon sent a letter to George III advocating peace, similar in style and contents to the one which had preceded the war of 1800. The letter he received in reply stated as curtly as its predecessor, that England must first come to an understanding

with the continental Powers, especially with the Czar Alexander I, "who had always shown a warm interest in the integrity and independence of Europe". This was an unmistakable hint that a new coalition of the European Powers was already contemplated. Russia had herself given the lead in London in May, 1804, when she had proposed a treaty for subsidies to which Pitt, then Prime Minister, replied in June, expressing the wish to see Russia, England, Sweden, Austria, and perhaps Prussia, forming a league.[1] Now it seemed as if Napoleon himself were desirous of furthering this scheme, although he excepted Prussia, whose King received a highly flattering letter from him at this time. Shortly afterwards another letter was sent, this time to the Emperor Francis, with news which caused deep dismay in Vienna. Lombardy had declared herself in favour of a hereditary Monarchy under the Bonapartes on condition that the country remained separate from France, that, if possible, no further tribute be exacted, that no territory be alienated, and that French officials be replaced by Italians. To all of this Napoleon agreed, and the newly constituted Kingdom of Italy was offered to Joseph Bonaparte and accepted by him. Napoleon sent word of these proceedings to Vienna with the assurance that the two Crowns would never be united; and at the same time, bearing in mind her reinforcements in the Tyrol and Friuli, he exhorted Austria to maintain the peace and warned her against any breach of it. If the Hapsburg reply proved as hostile as that of George III, the continental war would then be within sight, and Napoleon could proceed to march his Army of the North, which he had increased to over 150,000 troops, to fresh victories in Eastern Europe. This is evidently what he was counting upon. At a meeting of the Council of State on January 17th, 1805, when the budget was under discussion, Napoleon justified his great expenditure on the projected invasion by disavowing it and declaring it to have been a feint. "For two years past," he declared, "France has been making the greatest sacrifices. A general

[1] *Vide* Ulmann, "Russo-Prussian Policy," 143. Also Rose, "Life of Napoleon," II. 5.

war on the Continent would entail none greater. I now possess the strongest army, a highly developed military organization, and I am at present situated exactly as I would need to be if war should break out. But in order to amass such forces in time of peace—20,000 artillery horses and complete baggage-trains—I required a pretext which would allow all this to be prepared and collected without rousing the suspicions of the other continental Powers. The plan of the invasion of England afforded this pretext. Two years ago I could not have spoken to you thus, but it was constantly my one aim. I am well aware that it is simply throwing 30,000,000 francs into the sea to maintain all these artillery horses in time of peace, but to-day I have twenty days' start of all my enemies, and I shall be a month in the field before Austria has had time to buy horses for her artillery.[1] If I see that the developments in Italy set things moving, I shall declare war against Austria as soon as she begins buying." A few days later he sent orders to Italy to make preparations for maintaining 60,000 troops, and to provision the fortresses.

Keenly as they felt in Vienna the founding of a Bonaparte monarchy in Italy, they were not yet prepared to "move". On January 23rd, the Emperor Francis replied to Napoleon's letter in a tone distinctly hostile; nevertheless his letter made it abundantly plain that unless Napoleon himself deliberately broke the peace, Austria would remain in neutral inactivity. Just then things in Italy took a new turn. Joseph refused to renounce his rights, as required, to the throne of France and declined the Crown of Lombardy. Napoleon then decided to adopt his little nephew, Louis Bonaparte, the son of his brother Louis and Hortense Beauharnais, and to assign to him the throne of Italy, while retaining the power for the present in his own hands.[2] But to this the father refused

[1] Miot de Melito, who heard this speech, quotes it in his Memoirs, II. p. 245. Cp. also Ulmann, "Zur Würdigung der Napoleonischen Frage" ("Deutsche Revue," 1900).

[2] In the document concerning this the following passage occurs: "The Emperor Napoleon is King of Italy. He is adopting Prince Louis, the son of his brother Prince Louis Bonaparte, and cedes to him all rights to

his consent. Napoleon then took a bold stride forward and declared he himself would wear both crowns—only "temporarily," so he wrote the Emperor Francis—and only until Malta and Corfu were evacuated by the Russians and the English, to hasten which the Emperor of Austria was begged to use his good offices.[1] In thus running counter to his previous explicit assurances Napoleon threw upon Austria the onus of the disturbing the balance of power. But at Vienna the cry for peace still prevailed; the Archduke Charles was urgent at all costs to avoid war. Hence the reply sent by the Austrian Emperor on April 16th was accommodating in the extreme, and Napoleon was still without any colourable pretext for inaugurating the continental war.

Meanwhile the tidings from Spain afforded an opportunity of reviving the projected invasion of England. Spain, it was said, was prepared to oppose England on sea in the coming war with stronger forces than had been hitherto assumed in Paris; the French ambassador spoke of thirty-one warships. As it was indispensable for France that this maritime succour should be under her direction, a fresh plan was drawn up. The Boulogne flotilla was to be completely equipped and reinforced by a new squadron. Admiral Villeneuve (Latouche-Tréville's successor) with a combined fleet of French and Spanish ships, was to sail for the West Indies, and after a certain time to return to Europe and drive the English from the harbours they were blockading; then, reinforced by the squadrons thus set free, he was to avoid the enemy and sail for Ireland, after conquering which he was to proceed to the Channel to cover the passage of the fleet to England. It was a very complicated and hazardous enterprise, for there was always the possibility of Nelson and his fleet coming on the tracks of the French admiral and compelling him to give battle at the Antilles; or later on he might intercept his return to Europe where the disparity in the fighting powers

the kingdom, only retaining the regency until the Prince has attained his majority" (Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," III. 18).

[1] "Corr.," X. 8445.

of the French and the British navies would be seriously felt.[1] On learning from the English papers that the destination of the combined fleets was known at London, and consequently that Nelson was sure to follow, Decrès, the Minister of Marine, urgently reminded the Emperor of this disparity as well as of other untoward circumstances, whereupon the Emperor taunted him with lacking the initiative to attempt a big undertaking.[2] But in spite of this rebuff it is doubtful if Napoleon was really convinced of the feasibility of his plan. He knew that his navy was far inferior to that of his opponent, that of the Spanish ships more than half the number had put to sea for the first time, and that they were badly manned and under inexperienced captains. He knew how difficult large operations were with such materials, for the experience with the flotilla in the previous summer had not been lost upon him, otherwise he would not have abandoned his projected invasion in the autumn. Hence it is difficult to believe that with his wide-glancing, clear-sighted view of facts he would have risked his whole policy and his high authority on such an uncertain throw. The more likely supposition is that, as usual, he had now a second scene ready to put on the stage.

The letter to Decrès is dated from Milan, whither Napoleon had gone to show himself to his new subjects. For on learning of his final intentions a deputation of Italian delegates had proceeded to Paris, where on March 5th, 1805, they had officially and formally offered him the supreme power. On the following day Napoleon announced to the Senate that he accepted the office. In April he proceeded to Upper Italy, and on May 20th, within the Cathedral of Milan, he proclaimed himself King of Italy, placing on his head the ancient iron crown of Lombardy, and repeating in threatening tones the historic formula: "*Dio me la diede; guai a chi la tocca!*"[3]

[1] In naval circles in France this disparity was reckoned at four to three; if the Spanish fleet co-operated, at three to two; cp. Desbrière.

[2] "Corr.," x. 8847, *vide* Desbrière, iv. 596. Decrès' Dispatch of 1 June, 1805.

[3] "God gave it me; woe to him who touches it."

What Austria had dreaded so much had now come to pass, and no one doubted but that Napoleon meant by "Italy," much more than was comprised within the limits of the Cisalpine Republic. The Principality of Piombino, which had been ceded by Naples in 1801, he bestowed on his sister Elise, as a French Imperial fief (!); soon afterwards he extended its boundaries at the expense of Etruria, and in June he added to it the Republic of Lucca. The Princes of Piombino thus became subjects of the Emperor, to whom as their feudal lord they would have to swear allegiance on their investiture.[1] The French code of laws was introduced into Parma and Piacenza and the independence of the Ligurian Republic abolished by simply incorporating the town and territory of Genoa in France, a proceeding which raised great excitement throughout Europe; for on March 18th, the Emperor had solemnly declared in the Senate that "he would henceforward incorporate no new province in France". All these acts were directly opposed to the treaty of December 26th, 1802, to which Austria had been obliged to give her consent. The union of the Kingdom of Italy with France and the incorporation of Genoa were, moreover, flagrant violations of the peace of Lunéville which had guaranteed the independence of the Italian Republics, and had expressly stated that the territories of France and Austria should remain separated from one another by intermediary States. The Emperor Francis now trembled not only for his future ascendancy in Italy, but for what remained of his present possessions—Venice. Soon tidings came from Milan that Napoleon contemplated annexing it and offering Austria compensation in the Balkan States. In the coat-of-arms for the new kingdom (which was chosen by Napoleon) the Venetian lion adorned the pommel of the royal sceptre.[2] As reply to Austria's "Sanitary Cordon," Napoleon assembled two armies, each numbering 30,000 troops, at Verona and at Alessandria and made them manœuvre over the battle-fields of Castiglione and Marengo. On examining the ground along the Adige

[1] Cp. the letter to Talleyrand of May 23rd, 1805, in the appendix.

[2] Lucchesini's dispatch of May 12th, 1805, Bailleu, II. 345.

and finding that it required to be fortified at places, he remarked to those accompanying him that there was not sufficient time to do that, and it would be much quicker to exclude the Austrians altogether from that territory.[1] To an Austrian general who came with greetings from the Emperor Francis, Napoleon in reply alluded to the Austro-Russian alliance, adding that for himself "he had no fear of war as he knew how to conduct it".

While Napoleon was thus challenging Austria in Italy, with a view to forcing her to take up arms, or failing that to keep open the prospect of a continental war, Russia and England were zealously urging the Emperor Francis to resume hostilities. In December, England had come to terms with Sweden, whose King, Gustavus IV, was one of Napoleon's bitterest enemies; and shortly afterwards, on April 11th, 1805, Sweden and Russia signed an offensive treaty which was based upon a general uprising of the continental States against the empire of "*le petit Corse*". An attempt was to be made to induce Austria and Prussia to join the coalition. Frederick William, however, considered the peace in Northern Germany sufficiently guaranteed by the defensive treaty of May 24th, 1804, and he refused to attack France. Indeed at Hardenberg's suggestion, he even went so far as to enter into negotiations with Napoleon with a view to annexing Hanover. With Austria the two Powers were more successful. It was certainly hard lines for that State that she should need to abandon her defensive policy, and assume the offensive against Napoleon at a time when she had barely 40,000 men under arms, not a single battery with a full team of horses, and her finances in a deplorable condition.[2] But France's unrelenting aggressiveness counteracted the Archduke Charles's influence with the Emperor, while England and Russia sought to overcome his scruples, the former by promising large

[1] Rémusat, "Mémoires," II. 147.

[2] "Gentz und Cobenzl," p. 154. Angeli ("The Archduke Charles," III. 10) estimates the number on leave at the beginning of 1805 at 97,000, and the number of cavalry without mounts at 37,000; facts which should be borne in mind in considering the political situation.

subsidies, the Czar by offering the co-operation of his army and undertaking to make Prussia join with them even against her will. Things reached a climax when Pitt declared that the English subsidies would only be available if the war were undertaken within four months or before the close of 1805, and when the Czar threatened to withdraw entirely if there were any further delay. In a certain sense Austria had been confronted by a diplomatic surprise which compelled her to choose between the alternatives of trying to win back her Italian position, her Bavarian territories, and perhaps even Silesia (if Prussia proved obstinate), with the help of these powerful allies, or to do without their aid and cope with Napoleon single-handed. In this desperate plight the Emperor Francis decided, on July 7th, 1805, to enter the coalition, and orders were given to mobilize.[1] The supreme command was given to General Mack, who was regarded as a genius in organizing, and who, in opposition to the Grand Duke Charles, had undertaken to get the army into fighting trim within the given time. For Britain the war meant that she was relieved from her constant dread of a French invasion; for Russia, that Napoleon was obliged to suspend his Oriental schemes; for France, that her ruler got a war he ardently desired, and which enabled him to exchange the perilous project of a landing in England for assured triumphs elsewhere; but for Austria it only meant sanguine hopes of victory and reconquered possessions.

Meanwhile having ascertained through the complaisance of Lombard, a member of the Prussian Cabinet, that Russia was forming a coalition against France, Napoleon followed carefully by means of special scouts all the movements of the Austrian troops in the Tyrol and Friuli, till he made certain that Austria was at last "moving". He then left Italy secretly for Paris, where he arrived in the middle of July and remained till the end of the month. Thinking it

[1] The treaty of 1802 in which the changes in Italy had been sanctioned had hitherto been respected; now, however, the coalition reopened all these questions. But as Napoleon himself had no scruple in disregarding even written agreements, no notice was taken of this at Vienna.

probable that Austria would not begin hostilities till the following spring, he reckoned that there was still time, provided it were otherwise practicable, to undertake the English invasion. But should those difficulties supervene which Decrès and Napoleon himself had foreseen, he now had it in his power to bring about a continental war as soon as he liked, dispatch his Boulogne army to the East, and be in the field before his ill-equipped opponents—all this moreover without appearing the aggressor. For as they had armed to oppose him while he was in the act of preparing to invade England, he now held himself justified in standing upon his guard.

Learning in Paris that Nelson had actually sailed for the West Indies and that Villeneuve, escaping him there, had returned ahead of him to Europe, on July 16th, the Emperor ordered Villeneuve, after relieving the squadron blockaded at Ferrol, to pick up the squadrons at Rochefort and at Brest also, if possible, and proceed direct to the English Channel. He was then to sail via Ireland and Scotland to Texel and there join with the Dutch fleet and make for Calais. The letter contained a remarkable postscript, viz., should the situation be altered by unforeseen circumstances the admiral was then to return to Cadiz.[1] Such a sentence to any conscientious commander, not exactly cast in heroic mould, was a warning to be careful, and it is difficult to escape the impression that the Emperor himself was leaving open a door of escape.

Before he had time to hear of Villeneuve's further pro-

[1] Here are the actual words: "If, owing to engagements you had fought, or to considerable gaps in your fleet, or other accidents we had not foreseen, your situation be considerably modified, . . . in that case, which with God's help shall not happen, we wish that after having released our squadrons at Rochefort and Ferrol, you should anchor by preference in the harbour of Cadiz" ("Corr.," XI. 8985). The accompanying letter from the Minister to the Admiral runs as follows: "The Emperor has provided for the contingency that owing to events impossible to foresee the fleet might not be in a position to carry out the projects which would exercise so great an influence on the fate of the world, in which case only he wishes to assemble an imposing array of forces in Cadiz" (Desbrière, IV. 646).

gress Napoleon ordered Talleyrand, on July 31st, to dispatch a note to the Austrian Government, requesting them to replace their mobilized troops on peace establishment, and from that time on he systematically attempted to force Austria into war. On August 2nd, the Prussian Ambassador, Lucchesini, mentioned that the French newspapers were denouncing Austria and Russia and that the Emperor—as he had long suspected—seemed to be provoking war. On the following day Napoleon arrived in Boulogne, "not so much," writes Madame de Rémusat, who was then on intimate terms with Talleyrand, "to inspect his fleet as to review the great Army of the North which he is sending off very soon".[1] On August 4th, Napoleon instructed his ambassador at Vienna to request the Emperor Francis to withdraw the Austrian garrisons in Venice and the Tyrol "immediately" to their cantonments in Bohemia and Hungary, otherwise he could not believe that His Majesty was desirous of keeping the peace with France. The demand was repeated a few days later in stronger terms, and on August 13th in the most peremptory manner. Not only were the regiments to be recalled from the Tyrol and the number of troops reduced in the western provinces, but Austria's attitude towards England was to be strictly neutral. On the same day Napoleon wrote Talleyrand that he was determined to attack Austria and to be in Vienna before November, so as to meet the Russians there, unless the Vienna Government complied with his demand to disarm. "The explanations which M. de Larochefoucauld (French Ambassador) had at Vienna, and my first note (of the 5th inst.) opened up this question; the note (of the 7th inst.) which I sent you shortly afterwards, continued it, and the one which I send you to-day (the 13th) will close it. You know I act upon the same principle as the poets, and work up my plans to a dramatic conclusion. Had the note which I send to-day been delivered at the outset, they would have thought at Vienna that I wanted war, and I do want it, but only on one condition." But was not that

[1] II. 173; Madame de Rémusat was firmly convinced that the Emperor had dropped the idea of the projected invasion while he was still in Paris.

condition already in existence? Did he then still believe in the feasibility of his maritime schemes? One must think so, reading his August letters to the Minister of the Marine and Villeneuve. Yet, without acknowledging himself in error, he could scarcely write otherwise so long as the situation was not cleared up, and as there was no news from Villeneuve. On the latter point he could be in little doubt, knowing as he did the limitations of his navy and the conscientious character of his admiral. Hence it is hard to palliate Napoleon's treatment of Austria at this time. On August 13th, although Villeneuve's answer was due at an early date, Napoleon wrote Talleyrand that in two weeks he must know Austria's decision, otherwise the Emperor Francis would not hold Christmas at Vienna.[1]

[1] "Corr.," XI. 9032, 9038, 9055, 9070. Napoleon's drafts of the three notes drawn up by Talleyrand (afterwards published in the "Moniteur" of September 26th, 1805) I have published in my "Textkritik der Correspondenz Napoleon I," pp. 62-87. From the increasing severity in the tone of these notes it looks as if the continental war had been decided upon, not as Sorel (VI. 451) thinks, in Boulogne on August 12th, but before that in Paris. G. Roloff in his article on "Napoleonischen Politik 1803-1805" in the "Histor. Vierteljahrschrift" has lately controverted the view maintained by Max Duncker, that Napoleon had voluntarily renounced the invasion and helped to bring about the war with Austria as a welcome substitute. I myself was and still am of this opinion, with this modification, that during 1805 Napoleon really contemplated the landing if maritime circumstances proved specially favourable and if Austria remained docile in spite of all provocation. The former condition was extremely unlikely, and Nelson's return to Europe, which Napoleon learned of in Paris, put it out of the question. The same fate befell the second condition, after the crisis in March, in the conduct of military affairs in Vienna, tidings of which speedily reached the Emperor, who then knew that his demands to disarm fell upon hard ground. How much of Napoleon's intention could then remain? That it was not frustrated by Villeneuve's return to Cadiz has been shown to be more than probable by Desbrière's statements. Desbrière, whose knowledge of French naval affairs during these years is probably unsurpassed at present, comes to the following conclusion in his comprehensive work on the projects of invasion: "To keep England in terror, and the political advantage of having a great army at home ready at any moment for service abroad, was perhaps all that Napoleon really wished" (IV. 830). "Perhaps." But those who do not regard Napoleon as a blind fatalist who thinks everything possible

On the day on which the third note left Paris for Vienna (August 16th) Napoleon notified the Minister of Foreign Affairs to terminate the negotiations with Bavaria which had been begun after his return from Italy. On August 24th a treaty was concluded at Munich by which, in the event of war, Bavaria was to furnish 20,000 troops to be placed under command of a French general ; and if the Elector lost his land temporarily, France undertook to subsidize the troops. A marriage was arranged between Eugène Beauharnais, whom Napoleon had made Viceroy of Italy, and one of the Bavarian princesses. Undoubtedly the treaties with Bavaria and with the princely houses of Württemberg and Baden, in spite of their relationship with Russia, proved helpful to the French Emperor. Hesse-Darmstadt alone, relying on Prussian aid, refused Napoleon's offer of an alliance.

Nor was Berlin overlooked. Duroc travelled hither in the greatest secrecy with an offensive and defensive treaty in his pocket. According to it, Hanover was to go to Prussia, but the territory of Cleves on the right bank of the Rhine was to be included within the French sphere of influence in order to keep Prussia away from the French frontiers and leave France master of the important fortress of Wesel,—so Napoleon wrote Talleyrand. But Prussia did not consent. At Berlin they were as little inclined to fall in with the Emperor's bellicose plans as to be lured out of their neutrality by Russia, and so they broke off the negotiations with both parties, and by their selfish inactivity at the expense of others courted the disaster which shortly overtook them.

Preparations, both diplomatic and military, had been proceeding in France since the middle of August. Three regiments from the interior were sent to Alsace, Berthier had the fortifications on the Rhine strengthened, and 4000 troops were secretly despatched from the North of Italy to Naples,

which he wants and because he wants it, will not overlook the careful preparations made for the second alternative. Roloff (p. 503) even admits that Napoleon presumably cherished the intention of " fanning the discord between Austria and France so as to bring about a conflagration all the more easily should the landing prove impossible ".

all of which movements were entirely out of keeping with the idea of a landing. Indeed, in Government circles it had long been considered impracticable. On August 2nd, Talleyrand had written the Emperor to Boulogne, that the British navy on Nelson's return had been increased at sea to fifty-four or fifty-five men-of-war, which undoubtedly made the landing impossible.[1] Villeneuve's conduct corresponded exactly with this view. On July 22nd, off Ferrol, he had had to encounter fourteen of the enemy's fleet before he succeeded in relieving the blockaded harbour. As his ships had suffered considerable damage from storms during the long voyage, while his position had been vitally affected by Nelson's return to Europe, he had then steered for Cadiz in compliance with the order issued on August 16th, a decision in which he was cordially supported by Decrès, the Minister of Marine. In a note to Napoleon the latter described the return to Cadiz as a fortunate chance, sparing the French fleet for operations later on, whereas the distant northern voyage would certainly have ended in misfortune. This was certainly also Napoleon's secret conviction. On August 23rd, he ordered Talleyrand, "as the Viennese Court will only answer by further evasions," to draw up his declaration of war against Austria; he directed Bernadotte to concentrate at Göttingen, and Marmont to proceed to Mayence. On the 24th, the cavalry under St. Omer advanced on Strassburg, and Murat reconnoitred as far as Eger; on the 26th Berthier received the command to issue marching orders, and on the 27th the whole army was moving on the Rhine and the camp at Boulogne was broken up. The continental war had begun.

A couple of weeks later, when Napoleon vented his wrath on Admiral Villeneuve for his failure to appear in the Channel, and blamed him for the collapse of his great projected invasion, there was little sincerity in the outburst, for Villeneuve's conduct could not be a cause either of surprise or dismay but only of satisfaction. Until recent times wide credence was given to General Daru's statements that the

[1] Bertrand, "Lettres Inédites de Talleyrand," p. 121.

idea of a continental war only occurred to Napoleon after receiving Villeneuve's dispatches, and that he then dictated the plan of campaign on a sudden flash of aspiration. But this is only part of the Napoleonic mythology. The struggle had long been foreseen and the time and mode of procedure decided upon after mature deliberation. "The war is a big affair. People must not think that I wished to undertake it because I was sure of success," wrote Napoleon on August 25th, to Talleyrand, who was instructed to tone down a letter to the Ratisbon Diet, recapitulating the causes of complaint against Austria, and to refrain from further proceedings. As a matter of fact Napoleon was sure of success. To King Frederick William he wrote, "Austria cannot offer me opposition," especially if he now forestalled an attack which he did not consider possible before the following spring, thus acting "as did Frederick the Great in his day before the First Campaign," a remark which Duroc was to repeat to the King. Napoleon's penetration and forecast of events in this case proved amazingly accurate. By November, 1805, he had reached the heart of Austria, and the Emperor Francis did not spend Christmas in his capital.

The matchless precision with which Napoleon could measure his forces against the rest of the world gave rise to the belief in his own day that there was a supernatural element in his character. Yet he was no exception to the rest of mankind. But the abnormal development of certain of his faculties lent to his commanding personality an air of almost Titanic power. He could see where others only peered with baffled sight. What to them loomed dark and confused revealed itself to him in clear outlines. General Rapp in his memoirs relates the following characteristic incident: One day Cardinal Fesch wished to remonstrate with Napoleon as to the policy he was pursuing. He had scarcely begun, however, when Napoleon took him to the window and asked: "Do you see that star?" It was broad daylight. "No," said Fesch. "Very well, so long as I am the only one who sees it, I shall hold on my way and tolerate no comments." So he pursued his plans for the future, resolute

and inflexible, shaping his projects in secret, oftenest without others even suspecting them.[1]

Whilst the French army was advancing on the Rhine with the greatest secrecy, by forced marches which, even under Napoleon's leadership, had never been paralleled, Austria too was preparing for the struggle. On September 3rd, 1805, she issued her declaration of war against France. The same day the Austrian Minister, Cobenzl, notified the French Ambassador that the troops were concentrating "in order to aid in establishing a state of affairs in Europe conformable with the treaties which France had broken in violation of international law". On September 8th, the Austrian troops crossed the Inn. One would naturally suppose that by this time Austria would have obtained accurate information as to the strength of the Boulogne army, and knowing it was certain to choose the most direct route, would have concluded that Germany would be the principal theatre of war. But this was not so. In Vienna, even in military matters, Italy was still the first consideration. In July the Archduke Charles had drawn up a plan of operations according to which three armies were to be established, one for Italy, one for the Tyrol, one for the Inn, and of these, the strongest, the Army of Italy, was to begin operations. It numbered 94,000 troops, and, under the command of the Archduke Charles, it was to establish itself securely in Lombardy, while the Army of the Inn, about 60,000 strong, was to co-operate with the Russians in Southern Germany, and the third army, 40,000 strong, under the Archduke John, was to advance from the Tyrol through Switzerland and threaten Burgundy.

[1] Madame de Clermont once said so to him, and he admitted that he kept his plans screened until they were completed (Bourrienne, "Mémoires," III. 114). Cp. also Metternich's report to the Emperor Francis in 1811: "The French Sovereign keeps his plans secret at their origin and during their first development, and they remain his exclusive property till their practical application finally excites general attention, which cannot longer be diverted. But by then he has already carried out what seemed to the crowd only in embryo" ("Nachgelassene Papiere," XI, 247).

A great effort was to be made to press forward as quickly as possible through Bavaria and across the Iller, so as to carry the war into a foreign country and secure the services of the Elector Max Joseph, who was friendly to France. On no account was any engagement to be risked till the Russians had arrived; if need be, they were rather to fall back on the Inn. According to a military convention signed by the two Powers, the Russians were to advance towards Austria in three separate armies, in such manner that the van of the first column, 50,000 strong, would reach the Inn by October 16th. Thus, at the decisive point, the division of their forces constituted a vital defect. The Archduke John, who had taken part in the deliberations, remarks in his memoirs: "Austria was relying on the Russian auxiliaries already on the march, and although aware when they were due to reach the Inn, she failed to take proper precautions in the intervening time during which her active and indefatigable opponent might appear with his mobile, well-appointed troops". Another cardinal mistake was that, instead of placing the Army of the Inn under the Archduke Charles, who had repeatedly defeated the French on German soil, the conduct of operations there was entrusted to Mack (who was Quartermaster-General to the Emperor) and the Archduke was sent to Italy. Owing to his talent for organizing, Mack at this time enjoyed his Sovereign's entire confidence, in spite of the fact that he was rash, irresolute, and inordinately vain, imagining himself superior to any foe. When at Paris in 1799, as a prisoner of war, Napoleon had made his acquaintance and spoke of him thus to Bourrienne: "Mack is one of the most mediocre men I have ever come across in my life. He is presumptuous, conceited, and thinks himself equal to anything. It is to be hoped some day he may be sent against one of our good generals; that will open his eyes for him. He is certainly one of the least capable of men, and besides he is generally unlucky." Such was the man who was now about to measure himself against the greatest general of the age.

Mack based his plans on the supposition that Napoleon

would leave a strong army on the shores of the Channel to protect the country from an invasion from England, and that a second army would be left behind to cope with a threatening Revolutionary movement in France itself. Hence he concluded Napoleon could not bring a large force into Germany nor arrive at the theatre of war before the advent of the Russians.[1] Building on these conclusions, he pushed rapidly forward with his hastily summoned, badly armed troops, in the hope of perhaps being able to invade France before the enemy had time to concentrate; and profiting by Napoleon's example, he decided to make his army live by requisitions, which from the very outset produced the greatest confusion. Instead of waiting behind the Inn till the Russians arrived, he led his troops across the river and entered Bavaria in the expectation of gaining fresh auxiliaries there. But this proved another delusion. Maximilian Joseph, the Elector of Bavaria, though related to Russia, was bound to France by his interests, and misleading Austria as to his political attitude he marched his troops northwards, so that they could join Bernadotte who was advancing on Würzburg. The first half of Austria's plan had thus failed utterly. Nevertheless, under the belief that the enemy would advance through the Black Forest, Mack hoped to catch him on the march and therefore pressed forward eagerly to reach the line of the Iller and fortify it, and gain the town of Ulm which, as it commanded both banks of the Danube, he considered invaluable as a base of operations.

On September 19th, when the Archduke Ferdinand took over the chief command, he found the bulk of his army marching between the Inn and Munich, while from trustworthy sources he learned just at that time that Napoleon had left Boulogne with the entire army of the coast, 150,000 strong, and that he might reach the Iller by October 10th.

[1] Britain in fact did plan a landing at Quiberon, and offered to make General Radetzsky of the Austrian Army head of the general staff. False rumours of a rising in France against Napoleon had long been circulated by Britain's political agents. According to Radetzsky's Memoirs, this was one of the causes of Mack's premature advance into Germany.

This was very different from what Mack had reckoned on. Under the circumstances the Austrians could not continue to advance without incurring the risk of being even more widely separated from the allies who were following them, and of being overpowered while in their isolated condition. Realizing this danger to the full, the Archduke ordered a halt. Mack, however, persuaded the Emperor Francis, then present with the troops, to countermand this order, and by the last week of September he had actually concentrated the main body of the Austrians on the Iller, intending to fall back on Ulm if the enemy advanced from Stuttgart, or on Memmingen if they came from Strassburg through the Black Forest. It never seemed to enter his mind that if the French troops stationed in Hanover and Holland marched south, they were bound to threaten his line of retreat.

At the time the Austrians were concentrating on the Iller, the main body of Napoleon's troops was crossing the Rhine between Kehl and Mannheim. They had marched by night as well as by day, almost without a sound. The French newspapers had been strictly forbidden to give any news of their movements. In addition to the Imperial Guard (from 8000-9000 strong) there were seven divisions of cavalry under Murat, and four army corps commanded by Ney, Lannes, Soult, and Davoût, while two others, under Marmont and Bernadotte, advanced from the north on Würzburg. A seventh under Augereau formed the reserve in Alsace.[1] This army was further increased by the presence of over 30,000 South German auxiliaries. Altogether Napoleon had over 200,000 troops at his disposal, a brilliant army whom he could not sufficiently praise. The commanders of the various corps were mostly men of his own age; Davoût was a year younger, Marmont indeed only 31,

[1] Napoleon had done away with "demi-brigades," and restored the old name of "regiment". A division no longer stood by itself; two or three were combined with a cavalry division in forming a corps. Each corps had its own general staff. At the head of the general staff for the army was Berthier, who, in the Emperor's name, issued the orders to the heads of the corps.

but all of them were experienced soldiers and devoted to their chief. The Italian Army, cut off as it was from the Grand Army, was to carry on its operations independently under Masséna. On September 4th, Napoleon had returned to Paris and had remained there deliberately in order to maintain the secrecy of the army's movements. Learning by telegraph and "good scouting" that Mack was marching on Ulm and that the Russians were still a long distance from the Inn, he at once decided to pass the Black Forest on the left, cross the Danube below Ulm, slip in between the two allies, and defeat each separately. Murat with the cavalry reserve was to make demonstrations in the Black Forest, so as to confirm Mack in his delusion that the French were advancing from that quarter, and at the same time to cover the march of the four corps on the left bank of the Danube, a manœuvre which was carried out with the utmost precision. The Emperor then went to Strassburg. Here, before parting from Josephine, he was temporarily prostrated by a violent nervous attack, brought on by the immense strain and excitement of these last weeks.[1] In the beginning of October he rejoined the army, and on the 7th Davoût, Soult, Ney, and Lannes had reached the Danube, their corps forming a line extending from Heidenheim to Ottingen. Bernadotte had marched direct from Würzburg through the Prussian principality of Ansbach to Ingolstadt, west of which, at Neuburg, Marmont was posted. Two days later the army had crossed the river and was marching on Ulm from the east. Bernadotte and Davoût remained

[1] Talleyrand describes the scene at Strassburg at follows: After dinner on the day he was leaving, the Emperor had called him into his room. There Talleyrand found him suddenly gasping for breath. "I tore off his cravat, for he seemed like to choke. He did not vomit but sighed and foamed. M. de Rémusat, first gentleman-in-waiting, who had also come into the room, handed him water, and I sprinkled him with eau-de-cologne. He was suffering from some sort of cramp which passed off in quarter of an hour. We laid him in an arm-chair; he began to speak, put his dress right, commanded us to observe the strictest secrecy, and half an hour later he was on his way to Karlsruhe" ("Mémoires," I. 295). *Vide* also Mme. de Rémusat, "Mémoires," II., 195.

behind to await the Russians, who were not yet in sight. In order to prevent the enemy escaping by the Tyrol, Soult received orders to capture Memmingen with his corps.

Mack was not ignorant of these movements. He was kept informed by a spy named Schulmeister, who served both sides, and who acquired a certain notoriety during the Napoleonic wars. Instead of realizing that the French army was manœuvring to capture him, Mack believed implicitly in his "dream," as he afterwards termed his absurd notion that Napoleon would retreat to France, recalled thither by the danger of a new Revolution, and the fear of an English invasion.[1] Under these circumstances Mack considered it best for the Austrian troops to remain concentrated at Ulm, so as to fall upon the flank of the French as they hurried past and pursue them. Pursue Napoleon!!! A man like Mack, with such an army—obliged by haste to forego even the most essential things, exhausted by incessant forced marches and counter-marches, with a miserable artillery reserve, and an utterly inadequate supply of ammunition, while some of the regiments were actually marching barefoot, with no cartridges beyond what they had in their pouches! In vain the Archduke Ferdinand denounced this foolhardy project, and although all the subordinate generals likewise protested, Mack obstinately maintained that the French were in retreat.

Meanwhile the various corps of Napoleon's army were closing in upon the enemy like the fingers of a grasping

[1] The oft-repeated view that Schulmeister led Mack to believe that the enemy would retreat to France has been proved erroneous. French discontent with Napoleon was an *idée fixe* in Austrian Government circles, and had serious political consequences. (Cobenzl to Kutusoff, October 12th, 1805, Angeli, "Ulm und Austerlitz," Milit. Z., 1878, 302.) Schulmeister's reports were correct, and it was not till Mack sent him to Stuttgart to report on the rising of the French against the Emperor that this shrewd man deemed the Austrian cause lost and thenceforth devoted his services exclusively to Napoleon. (*Vide* also Paul Müller, "L'espionage militaire sous Napoleon I," and Alombert, "Revue d'histoire," 1902, p. 1331, Oct. à Dec.)

hand; and thrusting each advanced Austrian division back into Ulm, they finally bombarded the town and forced it to surrender. Ney's victory at Elchingen on October 14th, and Dupont's resistance at Haslach, had made this inevitable. Acting on his own initiative the Archduke Ferdinand with two battalions and eleven squadrons, fought his way through, after infinite difficulties, by Göppingen to Nördlingen and thence to Bohemia. Then only did Mack renounce his "dream". On October 16th he declared himself ready to begin negotiations, and on the 17th these were completed. The terms were that if no relief came within a week the army of Ulm would then be prisoners of war, except the officers, who would be released on parole; one gate was to be thrown open to the French to enable them to station a brigade within the fortress. As if this ignominy were not sufficient, Mack, in an interview with Napoleon, let himself be persuaded into allowing the capitulation to take effect as early as October 20th. On that day three Austrian corps, numbering 25,000 men, laid down their arms in presence of their foes. "The shame which overwhelms us," writes the Austrian Captain de l'Ort in his journal, "the mire which covers us, can never be wiped out. While the battalions were marching past and laying down their arms, Napoleon, in the plainest of uniforms, stood in the centre of a group of his gorgeously arrayed marshals, chatting with Mack and several of our generals, whom he sent for after they had marched past. The Emperor himself was dressed like an ordinary private in a grey overcoat, singed in front and at the elbows, a hat without any distinguishing mark pulled down on his head, his arms crossed behind his back, warming himself at the camp fire. He was talking with animation, and appeared to be in a genial mood." He had won an almost bloodless victory. "I have gained my point," he wrote Josephine on the previous day; "I have destroyed the Austrian army solely by keeping them marching." Indeed, with the exception of Kienmayer's corps which was advancing on the Rhine, the reinforcements on their way from the Tyrol (and now re-

treating), and the cavalry which had escaped with the Archduke, Austria had lost everything at this seat of war.[1]

The catastrophe at Ulm reacted inevitably upon the other Austrian armies. The Archduke Charles was compelled to abandon his strong position behind the Adige in order to withdraw his troops from Italy as nearly intact as possible. A victory over Masséna at Caldiero on October 30th and 31st, allowed him to retreat in good order, though not without considerable losses, and to effect a junction at Marburg on November 20th with the Archduke John, who could no longer maintain his position in the Tyrol. Mack's fate had thus completely destroyed the Austrian plan of operations. The Emperor Francis was obliged to abandon the offensive and fall back on the defensive, and all his hopes were now centred on the Russians, for the Archduke Charles was thrice as far distant from Vienna as the enemy, lack of supplies having compelled him to advance towards the Hungarian frontiers. It was a hard fate to be dependent on foreigners for the defence of one's country, and the alliance between Russia and Austria was none too close, for the Czar Alexander resented Austria's pretensions in Italy quite as strongly as did his predecessor, Paul I. For the present, however, a common danger held them together.

Almost at the time the coalition against France suffered this reverse on the Continent it won an immortal victory on sea. Villeneuve had remained since August stationed with the Franco-Spanish fleet in Cadiz harbour, a constant butt for Napoleon's displeasure. "Villeneuve," wrote Napoleon to his Minister of Marine, "is a contemptible fellow, who deserves to be ignominiously cashiered. He possesses neither any skill in planning, nor courage, nor general interest; he would sacrifice everything to save his own skin." He now

[1] Mack afterwards tried to justify himself by blaming the conduct of the Archduke and of the generals, and the violation of the Ansbach territory by the French. But investigation soon showed the fallacy of these excuses and made it plain that he alone was the culprit. He was deprived of his rank and his honours and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, a verdict which history has unreservedly confirmed.

ordered this admiral, whom he ought to have deprived of his command if he had really thought him so incompetent, to set sail from Cadiz and make for Naples, where he was to support St. Cyr. On his way thither he was to attack the English on every opportunity when his ships outnumbered theirs. Villeneuve expostulated, saying that his squadron was in a deplorable condition, that the Spanish ships were manned by sailors who had never taken part in a manœuvre at sea, and that his chance of success in a fight would be small. He was ordered nevertheless to set sail and prepare for battle, as Nelson had only twenty-seven ships of the line against his thirty-three. But the English ships were splendidly equipped, manned by experienced sailors, and commanded by the greatest admiral ever produced by a nation that had long been the first naval Power in the world. There could be no doubt as to the issue. Nelson varied the usual plan of attack by forming his fleet into two attacking columns, so as to break the long line of the enemy's ships into three by piercing it in two places, and then overpower them singly. Villeneuve did not fail to notice this, but with his indifferent material he could do nothing to parry the blow, and so on October 21st, 1805, the fight off Cape Trafalgar was lost to Napoleon. Of the French ships eighteen fell into the hands of the enemy, among them the admiral's flagship with Villeneuve on board, eleven escaped and returned to Cadiz, the others put out to sea and were all eventually captured. Over 7000 Frenchmen were killed in this terrible fight. The English lost scarcely a fourth of that number, but amongst them was one who in himself was more valuable than a fleet—Nelson. Villeneuve, who was taken prisoner of war, did not long survive him. Tortured by a sense of his Sovereign's implacable displeasure, and overwhelmed with the responsibility of a disaster for which Napoleon would not forgive him, he laid violent hands on his life and died, shortly after his release, on his return to France. It is said that Napoleon would not allow the 21st of October to be mentioned in his presence, and that the sacrifice that fight cost him was always a bitter recollection. For at Trafalgar he lost more than a battle

—Nelson's victory had saved Europe. Henceforth England was undisputed mistress of the sea, and all talk of attacking her within her own shores was at an end.

This disaster dimmed the success of Ulm. It meant that new victories must be gained to restore the glory of the Empire. While still unaware of the destruction of his fleet, Napoleon had started in pursuit of the Russians, who had meanwhile reached the Inn and joined Kienmayer's corps, but had immediately beat a retreat on learning of Mack's fate. Napoleon hoped the enemy would oppose him either on the Traun or on the Enns, where he intended to defeat them, march in triumph on Vienna and there dictate the terms of peace. But Kutusoff, the Russian general whom the Emperor Francis had made commander-in-chief, dominated by the idea of effecting a junction with the second Russian Army, then advancing from the east under Buxhoewden, did not let himself be overtaken; he crossed on to the left bank of the Danube by the bridge near Krems, and from there proceeded to Brünn, marching in a north-easterly direction by way of Znaim. Murat and the cavalry, incessantly urged on to greater speed by Napoleon, had kept closest to the enemy, but instead of following the Russians across the river and continuing the pursuit, they galloped off to Vienna. Napoleon's reproaches were bitter and unsparing. On November 11th, he wrote Murat from the Convent of Melk: "Your orders were to follow close on the heels of the Russians. . . . I cannot understand your conduct. You have made me lose two days and have thought of nothing but the glory of entering Vienna. But there is no glory where there is no danger." Just then the Emperor discovered one of his divisions, under Mortier, in imminent peril, marching without cover on the other bank of the river, and that same day, near Dürrnstein, it was well-nigh exterminated by the Russians. Meanwhile an Austrian corps under Merveldt, which had separated from Kutusoff at Steyer in order to protect the Alpine Passes, was attacked near Leoben by Davoût and driven back in headlong retreat towards Gratz. But even this success could not compensate for Dürrnstein.

Yet in spite of all, Napoleon turned the new situation to his own advantage. As Murat was now marching on Vienna, it was of paramount importance that he should secure the passage of the river there, and then, followed by two army corps, advance to the north-west on Znaim so as to block Kutusoff's passage into Moravia. There was no time to be lost, for much depended on the Tabor Bridge being reached before the Viennese had destroyed it. Murat, however, was quite equal to his task. On the 13th he entered the town and immediately marched through it to the bridge which spanned the river and its arms in three sections. The Vienna garrison, 13,000 strong, under the command of one of the Auersperg Princes, was posted on the opposite bank of the river and had received instructions as soon as the French came in sight to set fire to the supports of the bridge, which were covered with inflammable material. But Murat succeeded in persuading the commanding officer that a truce had been concluded, and that there was an immediate prospect of peace; and Auersperg and his officers, with the exception of Kienmayer, accepted the enemy's assurances all the more willingly as General Bertrand pledged his word of honour for their truth. The bridge was therefore not destroyed, the French passed over it, and it was only with the greatest difficulty the Austrian general succeeded in getting his troops away along the road to Brünn. Murat's talk of a truce was simply a ruse. On November 3rd, the Emperor Francis had certainly opened negotiations, but these had come to nothing, owing to Napoleon's demands that Austria should cede Venice, the Tyrol, and Upper Austria. Once more Austria's hopes centred on Kutusoff effecting a junction with the second column, and, by inflicting a decisive defeat on the French, compelling them to moderate their demands.

On the other hand, for Napoleon—who had made his triumphal entry into Vienna on November 13th—everything depended on placing the Russians between two fires, and so, while one division was sent in pursuit of them, Murat with the corps of Davoût and Lannes, operated against their right flank. It looked for a time as if this manœuvre would succeed, and a

decisive battle were imminent. Kutusoff who fully realized the situation, had retreated by forced marches. But his troops were thoroughly exhausted, and rest for a couple of days was now indispensable. Nevertheless, although he had a long start of his pursuers, he was in imminent danger of attack from the south, which had to be averted at all costs. He therefore sent General Bagration with a few thousand troops along the road by which Murat was advancing, in order to intercept and detain him, and so cover the main body while resting and when it resumed its march. North of Hollabrunn, Murat came upon the enemy, but having at that moment only part of Lannes' corps with him, and believing himself face to face with the main body of the Russians, he did not wish to begin the attack till he was reinforced. In order to gain time he sought to deceive the enemy by proposing a truce. Nothing could have been more opportune for Kutusoff, who after some feigned reluctance gave his consent. A document was drawn up in which the Russians (now deceiving in their turn) pledged themselves to evacuate Austria as soon as Napoleon had ratified the treaty. Thus the Russians won their needed rest. When Napoleon, who was at Schonbrünn, learned of their successful ruse, he was beside himself with rage. For by leaving Bagration behind, Kutusoff succeeded in escaping to the north and effecting a junction with the garrison of Vienna at Pohrlitz near Brünn, and with the second Russian army at Wischau. At Hollabrunn, on November 16th, Murat with greatly superior numbers inflicted a severe defeat on Bagration and compelled him to retreat. But his success had come too late, and Hollabrunn is not among the victories inscribed upon the Arc de Triomphe at Paris.

After all, Napoleon had not succeeded in carrying out his design. Kutusoff had evaded him, and protected by the cannon of Olmütz, he could afford to wait for the reinforcements under General Essen, which were not far off, while a division of 45,000 troops under General Bennigsen was advancing from Breslau. In Bohemia the Archduke Ferdinand had collected a corps which served to a certain extent

as the right wing of the Russo-Austrian position, while the Archduke Charles was marching upon Marburg with a view to reaching Vienna via Kormend and Raab. Furthermore, the political situation of the allies had materially improved. At last Prussia seemed about to join the coalition. The utter lack of consideration shown by the French on their march through the Ansbach territory had induced King Frederick William III to change his mind. They had violated the neutrality on which he had prided himself as a masterpiece of policy, and he was correspondingly mortified. He now yielded to the pressure from Russia, who wanted free passage for her troops. In the end of October the Czar Alexander arrived in Berlin where he persuaded the King, not indeed to take any active share in the war, but to discuss the question of armed mediation and to consent to a convention in which Prussia was to demand that Napoleon should respect the liberty of Naples, Holland, and Switzerland and should indemnify the King of Sardinia; in short, that France should renounce her policy of expansion. In the event of a refusal, Prussia was to join the Coalition and furnish an army of 180,000 troops. According to a secret clause, English subsidies were to be provided, with Hanover in exchange or as compensation, and for this Austria and Russia undertook to use their influence (November 3rd, 1805). Count Haugwitz was dispatched to lay the matter before Napoleon. An answer was to reach Berlin not later than December 15th, and meanwhile the Prussian army was to hold itself in readiness to join the war. This treaty offered one great advantage to the Russians. If they were defeated in Moravia, they would be able to retreat into Silesia and there be met by a friendly army nearly 50,000 strong.

Napoleon's position was therefore by no means favourable. He had hoped to dictate the terms of peace in Vienna, instead of which he found himself obliged to extend his line of operations far beyond what he had intended, and to break up his forces into several detachments in order to protect his flanks. Ney was marching on the Tyrol, Marmont on Steiermark, Davoût on the Hungarian frontiers, Bernadotte on

Bohemia, and the only corps at his disposal were those of Murat, Lannes, and Soult. While thus situated the news reached him of the defeat at Trafalgar and of Prussia's defection, and forced him to consider anxiously how he could extricate himself and divide his enemies. Although the Emperor Francis had refused to conclude peace on the terms previously mentioned, Napoleon had not broken off all communication with the Austrian head-quarters. After the taking of Vienna he had again addressed the Emperor Francis, this time so far with success, for the Austrian diplomatist Stadion and General Gyulai came to the French head-quarters at Brünn to negotiate a peace. They were to act in concert with the Prussian negotiator, Haugwitz, who was now travelling thither with deliberate slowness. Napoleon's skill in defeating this co-operation well repays a close study. First of all he sent the Austrian envoys to Talleyrand at Vienna, under the pretext that he himself was going thither. Meanwhile he detained Haugwitz in Iglau, and at the same time sent his adjutant-general, Savary, to the Czar Alexander I (who had joined his army) to request an armistice and an interview, in which—so he hinted to the Czar's adjutant—he would offer to surrender Turkey to Russia. If Alexander consented and concluded a peace, they could impose what burdens they liked upon Austria; if he did not consent, Austria would then need to be treated on a different basis. The Czar remained firm; and so, on November 30th, Napoleon wrote Talleyrand not to insist any longer upon all Venetia and the Tyrol, but only on Legnago and Verona for the Kingdom of Italy, and to ask Augsberg, Eichstädt, the Breisgau, and Ortenau for his South German allies. Venetia in all probability would fall to the Elector of Salzburg, whose territory would pass to Austria.[1] But Stadion also refused, at least he would not negotiate terms without the co-opera-

[1] In a copy of the letter in the State Archives at Vienna there occurs the following decisive sentence: "The Austrian troops would not be allowed to enter Venetian territory and the Elector would find himself in the greatest dependence; if desired it could be called the Kingdom of Venice." The "dependence" was on France of course.

tion of Haugwitz. The latter, as he afterwards told the French Ambassador, had received verbal instructions from his Sovereign to maintain the peace between France and Prussia whatever the circumstances, and having noticed at Brünn preparations for a conflict, he evidently meant to await the issue before committing himself. Hence he merely asserted unofficially that Prussia would remain the friend of France, even though all her conditions were refused, and in a conversation with Talleyrand, on December 1st, he expressed his Sovereign's ardent love of peace and his wish to do his part in re-establishing it.[1] In spite of this favourable circumstance Napoleon's position was no better but the allies themselves helped him out of his predicament. With his reduced forces he had not ventured to follow the Russians beyond Brünn and attack them in the strong position they had taken up protected by a fortress. But the Russians did what he had always hoped for; they came to him. To their misfortune, the Czar had placed himself at the head of his troops. This young Prince was consumed with ambition and thirsting for the glory of defeating Napoleon in a pitched battle. He wished to assume the offensive, whereas the only rational course was to remain on the defensive till reinforcements had arrived, till the Archdukes were nearer, and till Prussia had actually entered the lists. There was no lack of warning voices at the allies' head-quarters to protest against this proposal, although there were others again who favoured it. Kutusoff counselled delay, but he was too much of a courtier to offer strenuous opposition to his Sovereign's wishes, and, glad to be relieved of the responsibility, he acquiesced in the Czar's plan.

[1] *Vide* Bertrand, p. 287, and Stadion's letter to Metternich in the supplement. Many have doubted if the King actually made the remark attributed to him by Haugwitz, which was contrary to the treaty of November 3rd. Laforêt maintained he had it from Haugwitz himself (*vide* an Talleyrand, 5 Janner, 1806, bei Bailleu, II. 354). Lehmann considers it probable (*vide* his Stein, I. 392). In a Memoir of April, 1806 (Ranke, Hardenberg, V. 369), Stein described Haugwitz as a "shameless liar". Sorel is wrong (VI. 488) in ascribing duplicity to Haugwitz's attitude before Austerlitz. It was only fear, "pusillanimité qui explique tout," as Talleyrand described it (Bertrand, p. 205).

Amongst those who supported it was the Austrian colonel, Weyrother, who had been appointed chief of the general staff to the Czar, a man whose vanity and presumption rivalled Mack's. His advice was to attack the enemy, fall upon his right flank and cut off his communications with Vienna. In a secret conference with the Czar—the Emperor Francis was absent through illness—he elaborated a plan of battle which the Czar forwarded to Berlin on November 28th.

Napoleon's interests, on the other hand, lay in attacking the allies at the earliest possible opportunity, before the Russian reinforcements arrived and the Archduke Charles was any farther north, and before Prussia decided, as he now feared she would, to join the coalition.[1] Great was his astonishment therefore when he learned that the enemy had anticipated his wishes. At first he refused to believe the news which was brought on November 28th, by a deserter from the Russian advance guard. "Berthier," Ségur relates in his memoirs, "considered it so improbable that he ordered the bearer of the news to be put under arrest, but an orderly from Soult coming in almost immediately confirmed the tidings." The unexpectedness of the manœuvre and their temporary numerical superiority offered the allies an advantage, had they turned it to account by making a rapid advance, as Weyrother seems to have intended. But both troops and leaders were too slow. They allowed Napoleon time to recall his advance guard and summon back Davoût and Bernadotte's divisions. On December 1st these arrived, 23,000 strong, and took up their position between Brünn and Austerlitz, where the Emperor had posted his army on either side

[1] "Bonaparte's interests required him to lose no time, ours to gain time. He had every reason to risk a decisive engagement, we to avoid one. Your Majesty will remember that at the time I made repeated representations to this effect and communicated it to whoever would listen. The enemy ought to have been harassed by small engagements, the main body of the army kept out of range, Hungary reached, and communications established with the Archduke" (Czartoryski to the Emperor Alexander, April, 1806). After the defeat, the Czar told the King of Prussia that hunger had forced him to take the offensive, which was not so (Bailleu, "Briefwechsel," p. 88).

of the high road, extending in a southerly direction to Sokolnitz and Telnitz.[1] In order to gain a brief respite, and also to find out the enemy's intentions, Napoleon sent Savary, who was at the head of the Intelligence Department, to the Czar to request a conference. The Czar thereupon sent his adjutant, Dolgoroucky, but the conditions he proposed (the surrender of Belgium was one of them) were impossible. "Then," said Napoleon, "we shall fight," and he too drew up his plan of battle.[2] He was not long in detecting the enemy's movement against his right wing, and on this he based his plan of action. It was no "ordinary battle" he meant to win, so he told his generals, but a decisive action which would not allow the enemy to retreat and concentrate anew; for as he was unable to improve his situation, any retreat of the Russians in good order with their troops still in fighting form, might prove ruinous to him. Hence, instead of occupying the plateau of Pratzen, where he could have taken up an assured position, he would leave it to the enemy, and even invite attack by advancing his right wing and exposing its flank so that Alexander would be confirmed in his intention of surrounding it, and induced to make a wide circuit, thereby weakening his centre which Napoleon would then attack and pierce, and so decide the battle.

With inexpressible delight on December 1st, he beheld the Russians preparing to carry out this flank manœuvre. "A

[1] "When you are about to offer battle," said Napoleon about this time, "collect all your forces; leave none out; a single battalion often decides the day."

[2] Lettow-Vorbeck in "Der Krieg von 1806 and 1807," p. 9, connects Savary's second mission, and also the modified demands for Austria in the letter to Talleyrand on November 30th, with the advance of the Russians, and uses both to illustrate Napoleon's unfavourable position, a view for which there is not adequate evidence. The choice of Savary is too significant, and with regard to the conduct of the battle which Napoleon and Talleyrand expected on the following day, the conclusion of the negotiations with Stadion had no effect upon it. On December 1st, Talleyrand drew up a treaty on a basis suggested by the Emperor, sending it beforehand for approval to Brünn. Napoleon's chief concern after the arrival of Haugwitz on the 28th was to prevent the Triple Alliance being formed.

disgraceful movement," he exclaimed, quivering with joy and clapping his hands. "They are walking into the trap! They are playing into our hands! By to-morrow that army will be mine." And truly on December 2nd, "the sun of Austerlitz" saw the allied armies annihilated. Soult pressed his attack on the enemy's centre, entirely denuded of cavalry, with great vigour and complete success. The heights of Pratzen were captured, the enemy's lines broken, their left wing isolated and thrown into confusion, their right wing driven back on Austerlitz. The Russians lost upwards of 20,000; Liechtenstein's Austrian Corps nearly 6000. The Russians, cut off not only from the Austrians, but also from their line of retreat on Olmütz, their artillery, munitions and baggage lost, fled in wild confusion along the road to Göding and Holitsch. "There were neither regiments nor army corps left in the allies' army," says Czartoryski, "nothing but hordes of men fleeing in disorder and marauding as they went. As we passed through the villages on the road to Holitsch, we heard nothing but the hoarse shouts of people seeking to drown their sorrows in wine." Even the Czar was in danger of being taken prisoner, and only escaped by a ruse.[1] France had gained one of her most brilliant victories.[2]

"Soldiers," said the conqueror to his troops, "I am well

[1] *Vide* Ménéval, "Mémoires," I. 445, 227, the note in which the Czar declares that a truce had been concluded, although it had not even been discussed.

[2] Military writers date a new era in the history of battles from Austerlitz. Jomini says the great battles of our century date from 1805, and a later historian of the Napoleonic wars expresses this idea in the following way: "In this first Napoleonic battle one immediately notices all the characteristics which distinguish modern battles from those of the time of Frederick the Great. In the latter period the whole army moved in a compact body. It remained during the entire engagement in the leader's hands, capable of carrying out the manœuvres he directed. But if this compact body was pierced at any point, it was defeated. In modern battles the centre can be broken whilst the enveloping wings gain the victory; one wing may be destroyed whilst the other wing crushes the enemy. Indeed in a well-managed battle some such success is always allowed the enemy in one part of the field in order to strike a decisive blow with overwhelming forces at a chosen point." (Yorck, I. 241.)

pleased with you! In the battle of Austerlitz your intrepid conduct has justified all my expectations, and you have adorned your eagles with immortal glory. When the people of France placed the Imperial Crown upon my head, I relied on you to maintain it always in that glory which alone gives it value in my sight. When everything necessary to secure the happiness and prosperity of our country has been obtained here, I will lead you back to France. There your welfare shall be the object of my tenderest care. My people will behold you again with delight, and it will be sufficient for one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' for every one to exclaim, 'This is a brave man'."

Napoleon was right in saying the victory of December 2nd would be no ordinary battle. It brought about the peace. A few days earlier we saw him moderating his demands in consequence of his critical position. Now, however, the state of affairs had altered completely, and on December 3rd he wrote to Talleyrand at Vienna: "All the negotiations are null and void as they were palpably only a ruse of war to mislead me. Tell M. Stadion that I was not deceived by their stratagem, and that now, as they have lost the battle, the terms can no longer remain the same."

At the allies' head-quarters it was agreed that the Emperor Francis should request a conference with the victor and ask for an armistice. The request was granted, and the interview took place on December 4th, at Nasiedlowitz, on the high road between Austerlitz, where Napoleon had taken up his residence, and Holitsch, whither the allied Monarchs had withdrawn. Much that is false has been circulated about this meeting. The French Emperor was not brusque and overbearing throughout, as has been said. On the contrary he was courteous and conciliatory, ready to agree to the desired armistice, provided the Russians would immediately return to their own country. The question of peace was also discussed. If Russia were willing to join with Austria in concluding peace at once—on condition that it closed its territory against the English—Austria would not be required to cede any of her possessions. If Russia did not consent, Austria would

be compelled by a separate agreement to surrender Venetia to the kingdom of Italy, and the Tyrol to Bavaria. The latter demand Napoleon withdrew on the Emperor Francis' urgent entreaty. On his return from the interview, the Austrian Monarch immediately acquainted his ally with Napoleon's terms, stating also that he was ready to continue the struggle, provided Russia would support him. But to that the Czar was wholly opposed. Inconsiderate as he had been in entering into the danger, he was just as little inclined to bear the consequences it entailed, and he could speak of nothing but quitting the scene of the disaster. Nor would he accept peace on the terms offered; for English trade was a matter of vital importance to Russia, and a similar restriction had earned for Paul I in his day the active hatred of the English. There was nothing, therefore, for the Czar to do but to secure the safety of what remained of his army. He sent word to the Emperor Francis not to count on him any longer, and on December 6th he left. On the same day the armistice between France and Austria was signed.[1]

In the negotiations for peace Austria had to rely entirely on her own resources, except for the good-will of Prussia, and even that she was doomed to lose. Napoleon had taken the precaution of making it a condition of the terms of peace that during the armistice foreign troops should not be allowed

[1] Even in recent publications Austria is accused of having parted from Russia immediately after the battle, whereas it was the Czar who left his allies in the lurch. This fact is corroborated even by Russian authorities, e.g. de Maistre and Czartoryski. The bitter reproaches afterwards made by the Russians in official form against the Austrians, that they had not fought well at Austerlitz, Napoleon disposed of with scathing irony in the "Moniteur". "Those who have seen the battlefield," runs the report, "can bear witness that wherever the shock of battle had been fiercest, the ground was covered with Austrians, while elsewhere there were only Russian knapsacks." Prince Dolgorucky and the Czar's brother, Constantine, were sent to Berlin in order to place Alexander's conduct there in as favourable a light as possible, and throw the blame on the Austrians, which they accomplished only too successfully, as witness the King of Prussia's letter to the Czar on January 7th, 1806, in which he extols the Czar's conduct when "the allies failed to show their courage". On the question of the Russian retreat *vide* letter in Appendix.

to enter Austrian territory, and forthwith he proceeded to negotiate at Vienna with Haugwitz alone. In this he was materially aided by Austria insisting on the somewhat inexplicable condition that the Archduke Ferdinand should receive Hanover as compensation for the loss of Salzburg. This passage in Talleyrand's dispatch had only to be shown to Haugwitz to touch Prussia on her most sensitive spot.[1] Napoleon then insisted on Prussia abandoning her neutrality and forming with France a close offensive and defensive alliance, according to which King Frederick William was to cede the principality of Neufchâtel to France, the Margravate of Ansbach to Bavaria, and the Duchy of Cleves to a Prince nominated by Napoleon; he was to retain Hanover, then occupied by French troops, to recognize the new "Kingdom" of Bavaria in its reconstructed form, after annexing the Austrian concessions, and to guarantee the "States of France with all the accessions in Italy". To this treaty Haugwitz subscribed on December 15th, 1805, although 250,000 combatants had already been assembled in Prussia. Austria, too, had still the army of the Archduke Charles at her disposal, while the Czar Alexander, although he had come to an "arrangement" at Berlin with France, had nevertheless placed two army corps at the disposal of the King of Prussia in case of need. Even Napoleon's skill would have been scarcely a match for such superiority of numbers. It was as Bismarck afterwards described it, a "brilliant piece of folly".[2] Austria had thus lost Prussia's support and, isolated and defenceless, she had to bow to the conqueror's will.

It now remained to be seen whether Napoleon would himself strive to bring about peace, or whether, taking advantage of favouring circumstances, he would prosecute the war and permanently cripple his antagonist. Among the officers of his entourage there were several who counselled the latter plan, chiefly the self-seeking Murat. Talleyrand, on the con-

[1] *Vide* Bertrand, pp. 214, 216, Talleyrand to Napoleon, December 13th, 1805. Talleyrand had been negotiating at Brünn with Liechtenstein and Gyulai, but without arriving at a settlement.

[2] Ulmann, p. 302.

trary, was strongly opposed to it, and being greedy of gain and knowing that the signing of peace meant large sums of money for himself, he persuaded the Emperor to terminate the war and treat Austria with less rigour. "You lower yourself," said he to Napoleon, "in taking the same point of view as your generals. You are too great a man to be merely a soldier." Talleyrand succeeded. Moreover, it was also the more prudent course to take advantage of the situation created by the treaty with Prussia before they had time to change their minds at Berlin. Napoleon therefore declared himself ready to conclude peace. Mild terms he would not even consider. "Peace is an empty word," he wrote Josephine on the 13th, "we want a glorious peace." Talleyrand now received instructions no longer to ask merely the Italian territory of Venice, but Venice as it was when ceded to Austria in 1797, i.e. with Istria and Dalmatia. Shortly afterwards, in flagrant disregard of his promise to the Emperor Francis on the Austerlitz highroad, Napoleon demanded the Tyrol for Bavaria. He next insisted upon the Innviertel and upon Austria giving her consent to the expulsion of the Royal house of Naples. Before Austerlitz he would have accepted an indemnity of 5,000,000 florins, now he demanded 50,000,000 francs, and it was only with difficulty he was persuaded to rebate 10,000,000 francs. "Every hour brings fresh demands," wrote Prince Liechtenstein from Pressburg, where he had been negotiating with Talleyrand since December 20th. At Holitsch, baffled and dispirited, the Emperor Francis and his entourage had even thought of taking up arms again.[1] But

[1] *Vide* Stadion to Metternich, Holitsch, December 27th: "Peace is not yet signed and Napoleon might demand even further sacrifices which our Sovereign ought not to grant". For this, help, or at least a demonstration on Prussia's part, was desirable. Napoleon subsequently declared to Montgelas, the Bavarian Minister, "that his army, weakened by its victories, was in a very precarious position, lying as it did between the fortress of Olmütz, any siege of which, during winter, with the enemy's army close by, was out of the question, and the hostile population of Vienna, who were hard to hold; that his positions were insecure and badly protected, all the more so as Russia, still hostile, might at any moment make her army advance; and finally that Prussia had signed but not yet

the Archduke Charles, who after the capitulation of Ulm was convinced Austria's successes could only be won by paper and pen, strongly deprecated such a step, and the Emperor Francis yielded to his arguments. Cobenzl, who was popularly regarded as the stumbling-block in the way of peace, was compelled to resign office and Count Stadion was appointed in his place. Soon after, on December 26th, the peace was signed at Pressburg.[1] Before it was ratified the Archduke Charles obtained a personal interview with Napoleon, in which he sought to gain some amelioration of its harsh conditions, but without success; and on New Year's Day, 1806, the Emperor of Austria signed his name to one of the most oppressive treaties ever concluded by that Power. Austria had to cede the territory of Venice with all the dependencies obtained by the Treaty of Campo Formio. Venice, Istria, Dalmatia, and Cattaro were incorporated in the Kingdom of Italy. Trieste alone was left to Austria and that very reluctantly, for, as Joseph Bonaparte declared, Napoleon had meant to make it his base of operations in a new expedition against Egypt and India. Austria, further, gave her sanction to all the innovations in Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, Lucca, and Piombino, recognized the Electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg as Kings, and ceded to the former the Tyrol with Voralberg, Brixen, Trient, Passau, Eichstadt, Burgau, Lindau, and some smaller territories; while to the latter it relinquished five towns on the Danube with their territories, the counties

ratified a treaty, and that any alliance on her part with the two Emperors would have had the most serious consequences for him. Hence, on due consideration of the circumstances, it was a matter for congratulation that the Viennese Court offered so little resistance and so eagerly desired the termination of the war" (Montgelas, "Denkwürdigkeiten," p. 124). Radetzky in his reminiscenees also describes Vienna as being in a state of ferment.

[1] We have a characteristic glimpse of Napoleon in his letter of December 25th, 1805, to Talleyrand, in which he instructs the latter to sign the peace on the following day. "If this is not possible, wait and do not sign till the new year, for I have my little prejudices and I would like that the peace should date from the restoration of the Gregorian Calendar, which I hope will bring me as much good fortune as its predecessor."

of Hohenberg and Nellenburg and part of the Breisgau. Another portion of the Breisgau, the Ortenau, the town of Constance, and the island of Mainau were given to the Elector of Baden. The King of Bavaria was to cede Würzburg to the Grand Duke of Salzburg, who again was to give up his territory to Austria, while the latter was to pay a war indemnity of 40,000,000 francs.[1]

France had thus extended her sphere of influence as far south as the Balkan Peninsula, while Austria had been thrust out of Italy and Germany, had lost over 1100 square miles of territory, more than two and a half million subjects, and nearly 14,000,000 florins of annual revenue. For these enormous losses she received barely any compensation. On this point Talleyrand was not at one with his master. He had pleaded for some consideration for Austria, and at the beginning of the campaign he had written Napoleon, "To-day the Turks are no longer dreaded in Europe and they themselves have much to fear. But the Russians have taken their place. Austria is still the surest bulwark that Europe can oppose to them, and it is against them it must now be fortified." Later on, during the negotiations, he proposed to the Viennese Court as compensation Moldavia, Walachia, Bessarabia, and Northern Bulgaria, but without success.[2] Austria rightly foresaw in this proposal a fruitful cause of contention and bitterness with Russia, and she was not yet prepared to renounce finally her position as a great central European Power. Nor did the plan find favour with Napoleon, who already cherished the design of bringing the Orient also under his sceptre. Indeed he looked upon Europe as his own personal domain, and this was the deep cleft that divided him from Talleyrand and from all patriotic

[1] De Clercq, II. 145. That it was not even higher is due to Talleyrand. Napoleon afterwards accused him of bribery, and in 1809 characterized the peace as an "infamous treaty," a "piece of corruption," and Talleyrand as a "thief". Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," II. 275; Pasquier, "Mémoires," I. 358. Talleyrand himself afterwards boasted of having procured more favourable terms for Austria.

[2] *Vide* Bertrand, pp. 161, 211.

Frenchmen who wished to see France strong, national, and pre-eminent, yet but one among the other great Powers, her equals. In France the Revolution was extinct. No one was any longer in sympathy with its spirit of conquest. But in Europe this spirit was still abroad, incarnate in a single individual who thought himself strong enough to dominate a Continent.

CHAPTER XI.

THE NAPOLEONIC STATES.—THE RIFT WITH PRUSSIA.

The victory of Austerlitz on December 2nd, 1805, is one of the four battles which stand out from all the others as decisive events in Napoleon's career. Marengo established his power in France, Austerlitz secured him the preponderating influence in Europe, while Leipzig destroyed the latter and Waterloo the former. In Moravia his whole scheme of universal domination had been temporarily imperilled. For the skilful manœuvres of the Russians in persistently retreating had damaged Napoleon's prestige in the army, upon whom alone he depended for the realization of his plans. The genius displayed in the Ulm manœuvres, the surprise and capture of Vienna, and the seizure of the bridges over the Danube, were only so many premises still lacking a conclusion, and already the critics in the army were making themselves heard. Then came the victory thrust upon him by the astounding folly of his adversaries, and the danger threatening his prestige suddenly vanished.

Not merely with the army but also at home, the triumph of Austerlitz turned the tide of popular opinion again in the Emperor's favour, for in France no war had been so unpopular and the people had borne the harsh measures accompanying military conscription with ill-concealed displeasure. Added to this, a financial crisis had stirred up slumbering doubts as to whether the prevailing system, and the man who represented it, afforded any permanent guarantee for material interests. The nation now began to look back upon the expedition to St. Domingo as a costly experiment in which 50,000 lives and 60,000,000 francs had been sacrificed; they reckoned up the injury to the trade with the East

caused by the naval war, and the deficit accruing to France from the loss of her colonies, and their speedy occupation by the English, till even the most zealous advocates of the new regime were not averse to the prospect of Joseph assuming the power, should Napoleon fall in battle. But all such calculations were effectually silenced when tidings came of victories in quick succession followed by a truly "glorious" peace. The French as a nation were too proud and too vain not to claim for themselves a man who could impose his commands upon Kings, who made and unmade monarchs, and who had raised the prestige of France higher than any former Sovereign had done. "The French," says an eye-witness, "carried away by the news of such a victory, which, as it ended the war, left nothing to be desired, felt their enthusiasm revive, and there was no need to stimulate public expressions of joy. The nation identified herself with the triumphs of her army and the majority of the people endorsed the successes of their Sovereign." The national governing bodies congratulated Napoleon in the most extravagant terms, telling him all other immortal names grew pale beside his own, etc.

In acclaiming thus the conquests of their Emperor the nation was acting under a twofold delusion. In the first place, far from suspecting that Napoleon had long had a continental war in view, that he had carefully matured a plan of campaign and had himself rendered the conflict inevitable, they really believed what the servile Press announced, that Napoleon had been attacked and threatened when on the eve of carrying out his great invasion of England, and they were filled with admiration for the ready skill with which he had defended himself against this European coalition. Their second error was in regarding Napoleon as their Emperor, who would defeat their enemies in order to secure the prosperity and peace of the country, whereas he had long ago ceased to be the Emperor of France except in name. Those who are cognizant of Napoleon's secret views previous to this campaign, will not be surprised to find that instead of using his victories solely to consolidate the power of France and to

restrict that of Austria, he exploited them in a way that is incomprehensible, except from the point of view of an empire reaching far beyond the boundaries of France. During the negotiations with the Austrian plenipotentiaries the question of a change of dynasty in Naples had repeatedly been discussed. In the treaty of peace, however, no mention was made of the matter. Napoleon now considered himself strong enough to carry through his schemes in Italy without Austria's consent. The day after the signing of the peace at Pressburg he announced in characteristic fashion in the army orders, that the Bourbon dynasty had ceased to reign in Naples. The Neapolitan Court had indeed furnished a pretext for this proceeding. Urged on by England and Russia, Queen Caroline had decided to risk everything, and setting aside her promise to France in August to remain neutral, she threw open the port of Naples to Russian and British troops. As this was done while hostilities were in progress, Napoleon's conduct in sending a strong force under Masséna to invade the territory of Naples was therefore justifiable according to the laws of war. Here as elsewhere the effects of the victory at Austerlitz made themselves felt. For the Czar, smarting from his recent defeat, recalled his troops from Naples to Corfu; and the English, following his example, evacuated Naples and sailed for Sicily, abandoning those whose fate had been entrusted to them to the mercy of an embittered enemy. A letter from the Queen of Naples offering her submission to the French Emperor and pleading for mercy received no answer, and in February, 1806, Joseph Bonaparte (who had put in an appearance with the army) took immediate possession of the capital as Imperial Viceroy. The legitimate reigning family had recently fled to Palermo. A few weeks later, in the month of March, the Bourbon troops in the Italian peninsula were defeated and Sicily alone remained in the hands of Caroline and the English. On March 30th, 1806, Napoleon apprised the Senate by letter of his decision to raise his brother Joseph to the throne of Naples and Sicily. That this implied the inclusion of the country within the Napoleonic sphere of influence is evident from the fact that

the letter expressly stated that the new King of the two Sicilies should remain a Grand Dignitary of France. The promise that these two Crowns—French and Neapolitan—should never be united went for nothing. "I require Naples," wrote Napoleon in a letter to his brother on January 31st, 1806.[1]

This decree was submitted to the Senate along with several others concerning Italy, one of which dealt with the question of incorporating the territory of Venice within the Kingdom of Italy, while another assigned the principality of Guastalla to the Princess Borghese and her husband. The principality of Neufchâtel, ceded by Prussia, was given to Berthier, the Neapolitan Benevento to Talleyrand, and Ponte-Corvo to Bernadotte, as fiefs of the Empire, with Sovereign rights more or less restricted as to the lawful succession. The possessors were all required to take the oath of allegiance to the Emperor "as good and loyal subjects". Connected with these changes were two new developments in the imperial policy. Within the boundaries of the territory of Venice, Napoleon founded twelve Dukedoms: Dalmatia, Istria, Friuli, Cadore, Belluno, Conegliano, Treviso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo; four similar ones in the Kingdom of Naples: Gaeta, Otranto, Taranto, and Reggio; one in the principality of Lucca, and three in Parma and Piacenza. One-fifteenth part of the revenue from these lands was to be put aside to dower the new titles. Napoleon furthermore reserved to himself domains in Venetia amounting in value to 30,000,000 francs, and in Lucca to the value of 4,000,000 francs. In addition, 1,200,000 francs were

[1] Louis Bonaparte and Murat his brother-in-law now became European monarchs and remained at the same time Grand Dignitaries of France, i.e. subjects of the French Emperor. By a family statute of March 31st, 1808, the Imperial Princes who were Sovereigns outside of France, were strictly bound to the head of the family. All male children over 7 years of age were to be handed over to the Emperor for their education. He also reserved the right of controlling the associates of the family, and of punishing and banishing individual members, and even after a family council having been summoned, of ordering incarceration in a state prison for a term not exceeding two years (*vide* Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," III. 191).

to be furnished by the Kingdom of Italy, and 1,000,000 francs by Naples. These estates with their titles and their funds were intended for rewarding conspicuous services to the State. Those upon whom they were conferred (their names we shall learn afterwards) did not thereby acquire any special prerogatives, but the titles and the revenues were made hereditary to their heirs male. This new feudal system had scarcely more than its name in common with the old obsolete system, and it would be a mistake to confuse the two. But there was a special significance in the international element in this new scheme of affairs whereby the subjects of one State with their claims could be transferred to the territory of another State, and marshals of France and other French officials could acquire a share in the revenues of Italy,—ere long also of those of Poland and Germany,—another proof that the Empire of Napoleon extended far beyond the boundaries of France. Madame de Rémusat, talking in her "Mémoires" of the new nobility, remarks: "Napoleon soon came to regard our country merely as a great province of the Empire which he meant to bring under his sway."

Nothing, however, shows the real trend of the Imperial policy so clearly as Napoleon's attitude towards the papacy. After the expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples the whole of Italy lay at the mercy of the Conqueror, with the exception of the Papal States. Soon it became evident that they too were to share the common fate. All misgivings on the subject were speedily confirmed when the Neapolitan principalities of Ponte-Corvo and Benevento, in utter disregard of the Suzerainty of the Pope, were bestowed upon the French dignitaries, Talleyrand and Bernadotte. It remained to be seen whether Pius would consent to play the rôle of a vassal King, like Joseph Bonaparte. In that case it was still possible the Pope might retain his temporal sovereignty, otherwise he would fall a victim to the conqueror's schemes for a world-wide empire. In the recent war Pius had claimed for himself unconditional neutrality, and when the French violated this by occupying Ancona on their march to Naples, he

protested and showed that he would not be a docile tool in the Corsican's hands. He contended that as the Father of all believers, it was his duty to maintain an absolute impartiality in politics. Moreover he had refused Napoleon's request to annul the marriage of his youngest brother Jerôme to Miss Patterson, a young American, referring him to the decision of the Council of Trent (June, 1805). He had also opposed the introduction of civil marriage into Italy.

Napoleon was exasperated by this opposition, for compared with his republican predecessors, he considered he had been quite sufficiently accommodating towards the Pope. After his victory over the Coalition he announced in Rome that he had occupied Ancona because the Papal troops were not sufficiently strong to have held it against the English and the Turks, i.e. Protestants and unbelievers, and because he considered himself the Protector of the Church. But when Pius still refused to understand, and with conciliatory gentleness of language claimed the Papal Legations in return for his good services at the coronation, Napoleon became more explicit. In a letter of February 13th, 1806, he says: "All Italy will be subject to my law. I shall not interfere with the independence of the Holy See, but only on condition that your Holiness shows me the same consideration in things temporal that I show in things spiritual. Your Holiness is certainly Sovereign of Rome, but I am its Emperor." To Fesch, who now represented him at the Vatican, he sent orders to demand the expulsion of all British, Russian, Swedish, and Sardinian subjects, and to have the Roman ports closed against the ships of these nationalities, adding that Joseph had instructions to support him by force of arms. The Roman Pontiff, moreover, was not to trouble any longer about politics, as Napoleon would defend him against the world. "Tell him," ran the instructions, "that I keep my eyes open and that I am only deceived as long as it suits me; tell him that I am Charlemagne, the Sword of the Church, her Emperor, and that I mean to be treated as such." Miot de Melito, who happened at this time to be with Joseph, relates that Napoleon spoke frankly of his real aims in his correspondence with his

brother. He had thought of going to Rome to have himself crowned Emperor of the West; which would have meant that the Pope would then have been completely divested of the temporal power, and have been left with only the supreme spiritual power and a few million francs yearly income. This plan was confidentially communicated to the authorities at Rome, but the Cardinals were against it and ready to die rather than submit to such conditions. The whole affair was kept a close secret and only to the second letter did Pius reply. Napoleon, he said, was certainly Emperor of France but not a Roman Emperor, and any such close union with himself as he demanded would rob the Papal See of its authority in other countries. One concession the Pope did make, he dismissed Consalvi, his Secretary of State, whom Napoleon had described as the soul of the opposition to him. But the relations remained strained and finally ended in a rupture. For the present, however, the Emperor turned his attention to the development of his system in another direction, that of Holland.

Once this State had fallen under French influence it had been obliged to pass through the same changes in its internal administration as France herself. We have already seen how the Batavian Republic had arrived at a species of Consular government with a Grand Pensioner at its head. Since June, 1803, it had ranged itself on the side of France in all matters of war. Two years later, when the main army was fighting under Napoleon in Eastern Europe, Louis Bonaparte was deputed to defend Holland against the British and the Swedes. No battle was fought—Austerlitz had made that superfluous—and Louis returned to Paris to the no small annoyance of his Imperial brother, who was intending him for a throne, and was thinking of that of Holland. Already in January, 1805, it was rumoured at the Hague that the French Emperor intended to restore the Monarchy in Holland, and Louis, as unwilling to be King there as in Italy, had not wished to lend colour to this report by remaining in the country. But Napoleon would no longer tolerate such fractiousness from his brothers. Lucien's

banishment was a warning example. They must choose for themselves exile or implicit obedience. Louis, like Joseph, finally chose the latter and declared himself ready to accept the Crown of Holland. As for the Dutch, they had very little say in the matter, and as for the man who felt himself strong enough to disregard rights and treaties, all that he required was a pretext which would save appearances and allow him to get to work. The Grand Pensionary, Schemmilpennick, having learnt of the scheme afoot in Paris, sent thither a deputation of Dutch notables with Admiral Ver Huell at their head to avert the danger threatening. On March 14th, 1806, Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand: "I saw M. Ver Huell this evening. Here is briefly how I have summed up the matter; Holland is without an executive body; it must have one. I will give it Prince Louis. We shall make an agreement guaranteeing that the religion of the country will be respected. The Prince will retain his own religion, and each party in the country will do the same. The present Constitution of the country will remain in force, except that in place of a Grand Pensionary there will be a King, and all state affairs at home and abroad will be transacted in the name of the King. Make a draft of this for me and get some capable man to push matters at the Hague. I have made up my mind on this point; it must either be this or incorporation with France. If it is not done, at the conclusion of the Peace I shall not restore to them any of their Colonies lost to England; but in the other event, besides helping them to recover their Colonies I would also add Friesland. There is not a moment to lose." In vain the Deputies referred to the treaty of 1795, the first article of which was: "The French Republic recognizes the Republic of the States-General as a free and independent Power, and guarantees to her this liberty and independence". Napoleon remained obdurate. When they refused at the Hague to have anything to do with a monarchy, and the negotiations began to hang fire, Napoleon threatened severer measures, till at length the Dutch were obliged to give way. The nation which in other days had laid waste its country to

save it from the greed of Louis XIV, now submitted without attempting resistance. The Dutch Council of State authorized the Grand Pensionary to sign a treaty with France by which the throne was bestowed on Louis Bonaparte (May 24th, 1806), and on June 5th a deputation from Holland declared in the Tuileries that "after mature consideration" they had recognized that for the future their country would be best served by a constitutional Monarchy of which they begged the Prince to be the founder. The Emperor replied to this solemn address in language equally solemn, and the world was the richer for another King. After the interview Napoleon laid aside his mask and in presence of the Empress and her ladies he made his little nephew (Louis' son) recite the fable of the "Frogs who wanted a King". What better did the nations deserve than the scorn of this solitary parvenu who belonged to none of them and yet mastered them all?

Nor was Germany to escape the disgrace of joining the ranks of the vassal peoples. In his correspondence with the Pope, Napoleon makes repeated reference to Germany, and the impression produced is that he feels himself master of this nation too. In the letter dated February 13th, 1806, for instance, Napoleon blames the advisers of the Head of the Church for the anarchy in religious matters in Germany, and he proceeds as follows: "If your Holiness would bear in mind what I said to him in Paris, religion in Germany would be organized and not in its present miserable condition". It was in this same letter that Napoleon described himself as Emperor of Rome, Emperor of the West, and Charlemagne, who had likewise wielded his sceptre over Franks, Italians, and Germans. Was he not justified in his claims? In 1805, the Princes of Southern Germany had obeyed like feudal vassals the summons of a foreigner who had promised them protection and advantages, and had led them against their own Imperial Sovereign who was no longer able to afford them such protection. When peace was signed, Napoleon rewarded his German adherents by increasing their territories, augmenting their princely rank, and conferring

on some the title of Sovereign. So we find in the fourteenth Article of the Treaty of Pressburg: "Their Majesties, the Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg, and His Highness, the Elector of Baden, shall enjoy within the territories ceded to them, as well as in their former States, full Sovereignty and all the rights appertaining thereto, which have been guaranteed to them by his Majesty the Emperor of the French, in the same manner as such privileges are enjoyed by the Emperor of Austria and Germany, and the King of Prussia in their German lands. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria pledges himself not to obstruct, either as Supreme Head or as fellow-member of the Empire, the execution of their decrees." Certainly on this side they were now safe, but the overwhelming influence from the West soon made itself only the more oppressively felt. In February, 1806, when the King of Bavaria modestly protested against his troops being employed outside Germany and being drafted into the French Army in Italy, he received the humiliating reply that he need not flatter himself that Bavaria had been raised to a kingdom on his account; the change was simply the outcome of the French system. Consequently what looked like "sovereignty" viewed from one side, was vassaldom when viewed from the other.

Napoleon now proceeded to give stability to the new order of affairs, and to put the loyalty of his German vassals on a sound basis. Firstly he connected the princely families of South Germany with his own by marriage. In 1804, shortly after his coronation as Emperor, he had thought of an alliance with one of the ancient reigning families of Germany, and at the Court of the Elector of Bavaria he had proposed a marriage between his stepson Eugène, and the Princess Augusta, a project on which Josephine had evidently set her heart. In the Memoirs of Montgelas, the Bavarian Minister, it appears that Napoleon about this time had offered to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance at Munich and had held out hopes of royal rank to Maximilian Joseph in the event of the marriage taking place. The Bavarian Court, however, postponed the matter without either accepting or

declining the proposal. But once negotiations had begun at Pressburg, Napoleon immediately re-opened the question. The Elector could still temporize, but he could no longer refuse, and so on January 14th, 1806, Eugène married the Princess Augusta. The Hereditary Prince of Baden, who had previously asked this Princess in marriage, was then betrothed to Josephine's niece, Stephanie Beauharnais, who entered most reluctantly into this union, unwilling to leave Paris, where it was said Napoleon was her lover.[1] With the third South German Court Napoleon was also contemplating a family alliance, and since October, 1805, it had been arranged that Jerôme was to marry Katherine, the only daughter of Frederick, King of Württemberg, and in 1807, when the youngest of the Bonapartes himself became a King, the marriage took place.

The second means by which Napoleon brought Western Germany under his firm control had been prepared for him by the Government preceding his. It consisted in binding together the States of Central and Southern Germany in a special league, independent of Austria and Prussia, and in subjecting it by treaty to France's leadership. This had long been a cherished idea in France; it had been formulated as early as the seventeenth century, and had been adopted by the Revolution. In 1798, in the correspondence between Sieyès and Talleyrand, repeated mention is made of a third German State which was to be founded and controlled by France. Afterwards, when Napoleon was partitioning the German ecclesiastical lands according to his good pleasure, he reverted to this idea, and both he and Talleyrand had interviews at Mainz in October, 1804, with Archbishop Dalberg, the only one of the ecclesiastical electors who had escaped the general secularization. "They represented to him," wrote the Baden Minister Edelsheim to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, "that since France could not tolerate incessant encroachments from Austria and Prussia upon the

[1] Even till recent times the belief survived that Kaspar Hauser, the mysterious foundling of Nuremberg, was the son of Napoleon and Stephanie Beauharnais.

possessions of the other German Princes and States, it was an urgent necessity to found a strong and imposing league against such enterprises, a confederation composed of all the States of the Empire, exclusive of the two Powers already named, and able if need be to furnish 150,000 troops. If these Princes are so blind to their own interests as to be unable to come to an understanding on this matter, Napoleon would then hand over the whole territory between the Rhine and Austria to the Elector of Bavaria, as he preferred dealing with three Powers rather than with these little useless States rendered powerless by their disunion."

Many reproaches may justly be charged against the "little useless States," but not that their Princes were "blind to their own interests". So when the conqueror of Austerlitz renewed his demands, these petty Princes did not require much coaxing. Indeed they even made advances. In April, 1806, Dalberg sent a letter to Napoleon which partly helps us to understand certain hints in the latter's correspondence with Pius VII. "The worthy German Nation," writes Dalberg, "groans in her miserable state of political and religious anarchy. Be you the regenerator of her Constitution." Dalberg had a plan of his own to meet the case. His cure for the prevailing disorders in religion was to found a German National Church with himself as overseer, and he actually induced Napoleon to write to Fesch at Rome that if the Pope did not yield, Germany's religious affairs would be put on an independent footing with Dalberg as Primate. As for temporal affairs, the Electoral Arch-Chancellor desired, so he wrote the French Ambassador Hédouville, "that the Empire of the West should be restored by Napoleon as it was in the days of Charlemagne, comprising as it then did, Italy, France, and Germany". For the time being, even Napoleon wished nothing more! Talleyrand and Labesnardière were instructed to draft a federal Constitution, and on July 12th, 1806, it was signed by representatives of the various consenting States.

At Paris the German emissaries, just as had happened four years previously, vied with one another in seeking

favours and special consideration from the Minister, offering large sums of money to prolong a political situation that was utterly discreditable. They did not all succeed, for when the deed was signed it turned out that a long list of principalities and earldoms, once forming part of the Germanic Empire, had been detached and merged in the territories of the Princes of the Confederation—they had been mediatized; that is to say a foreign Sovereign without any right whatsoever, and acting entirely at his own good pleasure, had destroyed a number of political units for the benefit of others whose subservience to his will he thereby purchased. Among those most favoured were Bavaria, Württemberg, the new "Grand Duchy of Baden," Nassau, and Hesse-Darmstadt, while Dalberg, now "Prince Primate," received the town and territory of Frankfort-on-the-Main. Besides these, the Confederation included some minor principalities which, by bribery or otherwise, had escaped mediation; Arenberg, Liechtenstein, Salm, Hohenzollern, Isenburg, and Von der Leyen. Others, such as Furstenberg, paid for their attachment to Austria with the loss of their political independence. The North German territories of Brunswick, Saxony, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, and the smallest States held aloof out of consideration for Prussia and to give an appearance of plausibility to the suggestion that King William should form a North German league. The Elector of Hesse was among those who did not join the Confederation, but on the other hand a new Sovereign entered it, the "Grand Duke" of Cleve and Berg, whose territories, ceded in the previous year by Prussia and Bavaria, Napoleon had conferred upon his brother-in-law, Murat, in March, 1806. In the first two articles of the Act of Confederation these Princes declared that they had severed themselves for ever from the Roman Empire of the German nation, that as the "Confederation of the Rhine," they had formed themselves into a special league, that they would henceforth recognize no claim upon them from the ancient imperial Power, and that they were independent of foreign Powers, excepting France, in whose Emperor, as Protector of the Confederation, was vested the rights of admitting new

members, appointing the Prince Primate, and ordering levies of the Confederate troops.[1] Each of the Princes of the Confederation had to furnish a definite number of troops—Bavaria 30,000, Württemberg 12,000, Baden 8000, Darmstadt 4000, Berg 5000, Nassau and the remaining smaller States a total of 4000. All these forces were henceforth under Napoleon's absolute control and served in his wars, for Article 35 stated that between the French Empire and the Confederation of the Rhine, an alliance had been established by the terms of which any "Continental war in which one of the contracting parties was engaged would immediately become common cause to the others".

Napoleon's military strength was thus augmented by the addition of an army of 63,000 troops, and his political sphere of influence by a territory of 2500 square miles and 8,000,000 souls. On August 1st, 1806, the Confederation of the Rhine and its Protector communicated officially to the Diet of Ratisbon the deed of the Constitution along with the declaration that the ancient Germanic Empire had ceased to exist.

The question now arose what attitude the two great German Powers would assume towards this new development. The Emperor of Austria was also Emperor of Germany, and the dissolution of the Empire had been decided upon without his being consulted. At Vienna, indeed, they

[1] At Paris it was rumoured that Napoleon intended to become "German Emperor" just as he had become "King of Italy". "The German Imperial Crown," writes Floret, the German chargé d'affaires, in his diary on May 7th, 1806, "although surrounded by difficulties, is nevertheless Napoleon's secret wish. One of the well-informed declared as follows: If Austria consented it might get much from us; it would even get back the Tyrol, so I was told by two people in high places and of reliable authority" (*vide* Appendix). "He means to become the supreme head of the German Princes as he is of Italy," writes Dalberg to Edelsheim on May 24th, 1806 ("Obser. Karl Friedrich von Baden," v. 648). At Vienna they turned a deaf ear to these rumours. Napoleon himself declared he had no such intentions, nevertheless in the period immediately succeeding he was extremely harsh in his conduct towards Austria and ready for another war, for which, however, the political situation did not afford a sufficient pretext (*vide* Hardenberg's report of August 13th, in Wertheimer's "Geschichte Oesterreich," II. 132).

had ceased to attach any importance to this empty title since 1802 when foreign influence had made itself felt in German affairs, and by means of German help had outweighed that of the Emperor. Although Austria had zealously striven to retrieve her position in Italy, she would not have gone to war so readily for the sake of Germany. Moreover, in the Peace of Pressburg in Article 14, already quoted, the Emperor of Germany had indirectly expressed his abdication and the delay of the Viennese Court in admitting it was due to their desire to obtain some compensation for renouncing the Imperial Crown. But Napoleon had no intention of bargaining. He summarily demanded of Vincent, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, that the Emperor should abdicate without further ado and recognize the Confederation of the Rhine. And before the delegate from the Vienna Court had reached Paris to negotiate on the matter, the charter of the Confederation had already been signed, and the Austrian Cabinet found itself face to face with an accomplished fact. The Emperor Francis had no choice left, and on August 6th, 1806, through his envoy at Ratisbon, he sent in a note stating that the bonds which till then had united him with the Germanic Empire were dissolved, and that he renounced his Crown. The ancient Germanic Empire had ceased to be.

In his interview with Vincent, Napoleon had adopted a harsh and threatening tone, warning him that his army stood ready to support his demands at a moment's notice and overrun Austria. Nor were these words mere bluster. The French troops had not returned to France at the end of the campaign; they had not even entirely evacuated Austrian territory. The frontier fortress of Braunau was still strongly garrisoned by French troops, a circumstance due to the general political situation in Europe. As we have seen, Russia was indignant at Napoleon's intrigues in the Adriatic and the Ionian Seas, which ran counter to her schemes. But anger deepened into alarm when at the Peace of Pressburg Napoleon demanded Dalmatia and Cattaro in addition to Istria. Russia then withdrew her troops from Naples in order to guard Corfu more securely and to close the Balkan

peninsula against French influence. With the same end in view a Russian squadron, cruising in the Adriatic, received orders to occupy the Gulf of Cattaro. It was alleged that as the time fixed for the transfer of the gulf to France had elapsed, the coast was therefore no longer Austrian but French, i.e. unfriendly, whereupon the Austrian commander surrendered the place to the Russians. On learning what had happened, Napoleon's anger knew no bounds, and, insisting on his treaty with the Vienna Court, he ordered the Austrians to drive out the enemy and deliver the gulf into his keeping; until that was done he would neither evacuate Braunau, nor withdraw his troops from Germany. In vain Austria pleaded with Russia to surrender the gulf; nothing could be extorted from St. Petersburg but evasive answers. Meanwhile Napoleon was virtually in possession of southern Germany, a fact which contributed in no small degree to the rapid accomplishment of his plans for the Confederation of the Rhine States.

The real importance of this military occupation of southern Germany lay in the fact that it enabled Napoleon to hold in check not only Austria but Prussia as well. As we have seen, King Frederick William's selfish desire to preserve the peace and to profit by the changed circumstances caused by the victory of Austerlitz, had compelled Haugwitz to sign the Schönbrunn Alliance of December 15th, 1805. But this treaty had its inconvenient side. In the first place, an offensive and defensive alliance with Napoleon made Prussia appear too much like a mere vassal of France, which injured her prestige in Europe and placed her in an unfavourable light towards Russia; secondly, the immediate transfer of Hanover to Prussian administration would inevitably involve Prussia in complications with England. To avert these difficulties, on his return to Berlin, Haugwitz advised King Frederick William not to ratify the treaty as it stood, but to have certain modifications introduced. The offensive and defensive alliance was to be turned into an alliance pure and simple. Hanover was not to be annexed until peace had been concluded between France and England, and in the meantime

it was merely to be occupied by Prussian troops. In this way Prussia hoped to acquire the Guelph province without becoming involved in a European war on its account. Haugwitz took the modified treaty back to Paris, and Hardenberg, the Prussian Minister, was the more hopeful of its being accepted by Napoleon as at this time (it was towards the end of January, 1806) Laforêt, the French Ambassador in Berlin, received a letter from Talleyrand telling of the Emperor's willingness to come to an agreement with Prussia. On the strength of this letter Hardenberg advised the King to disarm, and before the close of January the majority of the Prussian troops had been disbanded. At Paris, however, things took a very different turn from what had been expected. Instead of accepting the Berlin modifications, Napoleon resolved to make Prussia come over absolutely to his side, so as to make her weight felt in the approaching negotiations with England. He not only rejected the modified terms, he declared the treaty of December 15th null and void, as it had not been ratified within the appointed time. In its place he forced upon the envoy a fresh document which, although it no longer contained the words "offensive and defensive alliance," imposed much harder terms than those of the Schönbrunn treaty.

Prussia was now to cede Valengin as well as Neufchâtel, to renounce all claim to compensation for the territory of Ansbach (ceded to Bavaria), to recognize and defend as before the integrity of Turkey, to take immediate possession of Hanover, and, in addition, to close the ports and estuaries of the North Sea and the harbour of Lübeck against the English. It was a dangerous treaty; for if the defence of Turkey might easily lead Prussia into a quarrel with Russia, the closing of the ports would infallibly lead to war with England. In spite of all, Haugwitz signed the treaty on February 15th, 1806, nor did King Frederick William refuse to ratify it; with his troops on peace establishment and a French army occupying Southern Germany he had no option left.[1]

[1] An Austrian officer, then on a secret mission in Southern Germany, wrote from Munich on March 31st, 1806: "Moreover, sufficient attention has not been paid to the admirable position occupied by the French army

The inevitable happened. England had allowed Prussia's occupation of Hanover to pass without any outward sign of hostility, but the closing of the ports on the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems, instantly aroused intense excitement. Early in April, 1806, without waiting for any formal declaration of war, and confident beforehand of the support of Parliament, the London Cabinet sequestrated all Prussian merchant vessels (numbering upwards of 300) in British ports and gave chase to those on the high seas. This alone represented a loss of several millions to Prussia, irrespective of the far greater loss to Silesian trade once all the Northern ports were closed. Later on, Britain announced a blockade of the estuaries of the Elbe, the Weser, the Ems, and the Trave, and formally declared war against Prussia. In vain King Frederick William remonstrated at Paris against the closing of the port of Lübeck as certain to provoke reprisals from Britain in the Baltic, and to draw down on Prussia the hostility of Russia and Denmark.[1]

with respect to Prussia. With his army extended so that the extremes touched Austerlitz at the one end and Bregenz at the other, Napoleon withdrew his troops from Austria in columns by a flank movement. By Augereau's move (on Frankfort) the army suddenly assumed a menacing position, with its centre at Frankfort, its two extremes on the high Palatinate and on the Weser, which gave it the control of all the rivers and heights from which it could threaten Prussia. It was calculated that Berlin could be reached in ten marches, and they reckoned on only one battle between Württemberg and Breslau. During these manœuvres Prussia's attention was diverted by means of negotiations; when it was too late, she awoke to the real state of affairs and was then obliged to subscribe to all the conditions imposed" (*vide* my "Historischen Studien und Skizzen," p. 269).

[1] Among the Talleyrand papers in the Vienna State Archives there is a copy of a letter from King Frederick William III to Lucchesini, his Ambassador in Paris, dated Berlin, May 19th, 1806, containing the above request, stating that all his obligations would be scrupulously fulfilled, and begging that secondary matters be not treated in such a way as must ultimately prove injurious to both Powers (*vide* Appendix). A similar sentiment finds expression in Haugwitz's dispatch to the King on the same date, viz.: that Napoleon ought to be satisfied with having attained his real aim, and as he could count on his alliance with Prussia for all important matters, he could therefore show himself accommodating in

Then, too, Sweden, instigated by Britain, declared war against Prussia; and all this for the sake of Hanover, the possession of which was not nearly so secure as the French party at Berlin pretended. Besides there was always the chance that France and Britain might be reconciled, in which case it was highly improbable that any consideration for Prussia would restrain Napoleon from restoring Hanover, should that be made the price of peace, and just then appearances seemed to point to such a consummation.

Napoleon's victories had naturally produced profound discouragement in London. The peace with Austria, the withdrawal of the Russians, and the collapse of the Coalition were viewed by Pitt with anguish of heart. Enfeebled by disease, he sank under these unexpected blows and died on January 23rd, 1806. Shortly before his end his eye rested on a map of Europe. He looked at it for a time, then ordered it to be rolled up, remarking with prophetic prescience, "It will not be wanted these ten years". In the Grenville Ministry, which succeeded that of Pitt, Fox, who was friendly to France, was made Foreign Minister. In former days he had been an enthusiastic admirer of the hero of the 18th Brumaire, and he now approached the Government of Paris in a somewhat extraordinary manner by proffering information of a conspiracy against the Emperor's life. Napoleon accepted the tale, which was a pure fabrication, as if it were genuine, and graciously expressed his thanks. The correspondence between the Ministers of the two countries led to *pourparlers*, and a few weeks later the Earl of Yarmouth, one of the Englishmen detained in Paris at the outbreak of the war, was commissioned by the London Cabinet to open negotiations with Talleyrand. In June, 1806, these began. As it was no longer possible to withhold Malta from the victors of Trafalgar, if they were to be asked to restore their conquests, Napoleon instructed his Minister to offer it to England, and in addition—just as if no Franco-Prussian Alliance had ever existed—the restitution of Hanover to her

matters of lesser importance affecting the well-being of many individuals, and also of French merchants and traders (Ranke, Hardenberg, v. 348).

lawful suzerain. Sicily was to be retained by the Bourbon dynasty provided England recognized Joseph as King of Naples.

Meanwhile no hint of what was passing reached Berlin. Yet King Frederick William could not stifle his distrust of an ally who had imposed such hard conditions. He turned to Russia for countenance and help, and sent Charles, Duke of Brunswick, to St. Petersburg on a secret mission, the real object of which was to obtain the Czar's promise to uphold the integrity of Turkey so as to prevent the chance of Prussia being involved in war with Russia. This assurance was not granted, but the two Sovereigns made an exchange of declarations, according to which the Czar pledged himself to use all his influence to preserve the independence and integrity of the State of Prussia, while King Frederick William promised not to take up arms against Russia should that Power be involved in hostilities in consequence of France attacking Turkey (July 1st and 12th, 1806). It was a new alliance in which the Prussian King aimed at strengthening their positions mutually by gradual and united efforts so as to place themselves on as formidable a footing as possible with regard to "their powerful and dangerous adversary". The immediate result of this alliance was that Russia intervened between Sweden and Prussia.[1]

The best guarantee for Prussia's tranquillity would have been a peace between France and Russia, and for a time that even seemed probable. For Alexander had heard of Napoleon's negotiations with England, and unwilling, in case of these two Powers coming to terms, to be left to cope single-handed with this redoubtable warrior, he sent d'Oubril, the Russian chargé d'affaires, to Paris to be on the spot. There on July 20th, d'Oubril concluded a treaty which, contrary to the terms of his instructions, bound Russia to relinquish Cattaro and to withdraw to the Ionian Isles, in return for which France was to evacuate Germany within three months and also to set free the recently occupied republic of Ragusa.

[1] *Vide* Bailleu, p. 109, letter from Friederich Wilhelm to Alexander.

Both parties recognized the independence and integrity of the Porte. King Ferdinand was to receive the Balearic Isles as compensation for Naples and Sicily. But this treaty, which was strongly reminiscent of the one which Count St. Julien had been inveigled into signing, required to be ratified by the Czar. Nevertheless the document had no sooner been signed in Paris than Napoleon became less accommodating towards England. He insisted on Joseph being recognized as King of Sicily. To this Fox was not averse, he even entertained the idea of compensation for the ancient dynasty and accordingly, in the end of July, a deed was drawn up in Paris settling this point, and in return granting to George III Malta and the Cape, and restoring to him "his kingdom of Hanover". Prussia was to receive territorial compensation and 400,000 new subjects. There was much in this agreement that roused dissatisfaction in London, and much which Napoleon viewed with disfavour.[1] Nevertheless England sent a duly accredited negotiator, Lord Lauderdale, to Paris. But Napoleon's separate negotiations with Russia had already put Fox on his guard, and when the Charter of the Rhine Confederation came to light, showing further territory surrendered to France's ascendancy, and fresh fields for French commerce, he too became more exacting. He rejected the Balearic Isles as compensation for Ferdinand IV, and suggested instead the West Indies, or territory in South America, and sought to safeguard Britain's commercial interests, though this Napoleon was as little inclined to allow as in 1802.[2] People in England gave up the idea of peace and the negotiations began to flag. Shortly afterwards Fox died, and with him passed away the only

[1] The drafting of this agreement was not the work of Yarmouth or, as Sorel assumes, of Yarmouth and the French negotiator Clarke, but of the French alone, as is evident from one of the notes of Goddard, an English merchant, given in the "Corr.," XIII. 10,604. Clarke's letter of July 31st, submitting the agreement to the Emperor, merely contains the remark that the projected treaty of peace was yesterday the subject of conversation.

[2] Floret writes in his diary, "The articles relating to commerce, to the Sicilies, and the Cape of Good Hope are the stumbling-blocks". France had requested a free port at the Cape.

statesman across the Channel from whom Napoleon could hope for conciliatory measures. Henceforth in all Britain he was destined to find no other. Just at this juncture the war party in Russia regained the ascendancy. The Czar himself would have been glad to see the French quit Germany and to conclude peace with Napoleon, but under pressure of the strong anti-French feeling in Russia he repudiated the treaty signed by d'Oubril.[1] This he did all the more readily, as owing to Prussia's declaration he knew that Power would not side with France. Besides he had been deeply affected by the news of the dissolution of the German Empire, whose guarantor he was pleased to consider himself. He had it announced in Paris that he would only conclude peace on condition that France renounced possession of Dalmatia and Albania, restored Sicily to King Ferdinand, and indemnified the King of Sardinia for the loss of Piedmont; and knowing well that Napoleon would not consent to such terms, he gave orders at the same time to the army to mobilize and to advance to the Prussian frontiers.

While the policy of the great Powers was suffering these fluctuations, Prussia was bearing in sorrow and anxiety the heavy burden of her alliance with France. Since signing this compact the King was said to have been frequently found in tears. He had indeed exchanged possessions which were

[1] It is not impossible, as Merveldt, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, relates, that d'Oubril had acted on verbal instructions from his master in concluding peace straightway (cp. also Vincent's remark to Talleyrand at Warsaw in March, 1807): "The presence of the French Army in Germany after the peace of Pressburg was the chief cause of anxiety to all the Powers. . . . The treaty signed by d'Oubril found many supporters in Russia. The Czar himself wished to ratify it, Austria would like to have seen it ratified, and an influential English intrigue was necessary to prevent it, all because the evacuation of Germany was one of the conditions" (Talleyrand to Napoleon, March 12th, 1807, Bertrand, "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 345). This further explains how it was the Russian answer did not arrive till September 3rd, and how the news originally reached Paris that the treaty of July 20th had been ratified in St. Petersburg, which Napoleon characterized as a Prussian manœuvre (*vide* "Zur Textkritik," p. 111; "Notes sur la situation actuelle de mes affaires").

certain for those which were uncertain. The territories relinquished, such as Ansbach, had been immediately occupied by the French, and yet his ally was not satisfied. In the immediate vicinity of the Grand Duchy of Berg lay three abbeys with rich coalfields. In 1802 these had accrued to Prussia and no longer formed part of the Duchy of Cleves, except as regarded the provincial representation. In spite of this, Duke Joachim I (as Murat was now styled) ordered his troops to occupy these territories, and only surrendered them on the peremptory demand of the Prussian Government, perhaps rather on being admonished by the Emperor, who cautioned his brother-in-law to proceed warily with Prussia. Since the month of March, Napoleon had been casting covetous eyes on Essen and Werden, which belonged to the abbeys. The Brandenburg county of Mark formed the connecting link between Cleves and Essen, and Napoleon's aim was to incorporate this county, so as to strengthen Murat's jurisdiction and to secure for himself as firm a foothold in the North of Germany as he already possessed in the South. With this end in view the French Ambassador in Berlin received explicit instructions to incite Prussia to war with Sweden, so as to despoil the latter of Swedish Pomerania, while Prussia was to cede Mark to the Duchy of Berg. The Court at Berlin had great difficulty in resisting the pressure brought to bear on it. Furthermore, instead of handing over to his brother-in-law the fortress of Wesel on the right bank of the Rhine, which really belonged to Cleves, Napoleon garrisoned it with his own troops and so secured a good military basis in the North. On May 7th, he wrote Dejean (who was Minister of War while Berthier was at Munich): "Wesel is the right and desirable position to flank Belgium and secure the north frontiers. In the event of us assuming the offensive, it is the best position for protecting an army fighting against Prussia."

France's attitude in this matter roused Prussia's fear that Napoleon was seeking for a pretext to break the peace, so as to extend his power even beyond the Prussian frontiers. Early in July, the advisability of making military prepara-

tions against such a contingency was under consideration. Certainly the alarming news from the south of Germany seemed to counsel such a step. Napoleon himself announced to the Berlin Court the founding of the Confederation of the Rhine, and sought to mitigate the impression produced by such tidings by advising King Frederick William to found a similar league in Northern Germany. The idea had no sooner been mooted in Berlin than it had to be rejected, for in the last week of July, Lucchesini wrote from Paris that Lord Yarmouth had told him in confidence that Napoleon intended to restore Hanover to England. Without Hanover, Prussia's supremacy in Northern Germany was gone. For its possession she had sacrificed land, wealth, and reputation, and only recently Napoleon had solemnly protested he had no intention of withholding it from Prussia! Just then, too, it transpired that he was endeavouring by means of promises to induce Kurhessen to join the Confederation of the Rhine, thus further impoverishing Prussia.[1] To make matters worse disquieting rumours came pouring in from all parts of the country. General Blücher sent word from Westphalia that the French had been reinforced at Wesel and on the Lippe, which clearly meant that Mark and Westphalia were to be taken from Prussia and bestowed on Murat. From Ratisbon and Munich came the news that French troops had occupied Wurzburg, and that the general belief was that they were advancing on Saxony. Whether all these tidings were true or not—the probability is that they were true—in presence of this relentless and unscrupulous Power advancing upon her, Prussia felt a helpless victim and struggled feverishly for some means of escape. Even Haugwitz advised—as he had done before in 1803—to arm and prepare for war, and this time, feeling insulted and deceived by France, King Frederick William yielded. On

[1] A letter from the Kurfurst Wilhelm to the King, to the effect that the French Ambassador had offered him Westphalian territory as an inducement to join the Confederation caused great depression at Berlin (Floret, "Journal," August 31st; cp. also letter from Frederick William III of September 6th to the Czar; Bailleu, "Briefwechsel," p. 121).

August 6th, Lucchesini's dispatch reached Berlin, and two days later Frederick William wrote the Czar that Napoleon had offered Hanover to England without any equivalent,[1] which plainly showed that he meant to annihilate Prussia. For by depriving her of Hanover he must be prepared to see Prussia in the next war in the forefront of his enemies, to prevent which he meant to take advantage of the present favourable opportunity when Russia had concluded peace with him, and Austria was prostrate and England opposed to Prussia through her interests with him, and destroy Prussia while she was isolated. Did Russia mean to stand idly by? On August 9th, orders were issued from Berlin to mobilize, and the French ambassador was notified that this step had been rendered necessary by Napoleon's various measures, which were unmistakably directed against Prussia. For although these might only be demonstrations, nevertheless they felt themselves bound to make counter-demonstrations, so that they might not be placed at a disadvantage, as had happened in February.

It is hard to determine whether Prussia's alarms were justified, and whether Napoleon really wanted war. War, indeed, was part of his system. Since the days of the Directory the policy of the Revolutionary Government had steadily aimed at thrusting Prussia and Austria as far east as possible. It was said that Napoleon had borne King Frederick William a grudge ever since his ambiguous behaviour in 1805, and that in February, 1806, he promised Bayreuth to the King of Bavaria, although it was certain Prussia would no more think of parting with it without a struggle than with Hanover. Talleyrand is probably not far wrong in his remarks in his Memoirs: "Peace between England and France was impossible without the restoration of Hanover. Napoleon said to himself, 'Prussia has taken Hanover from

[1] This is scarcely accurate, for as we have seen in Clarke's proposed treaty, Prussia was to receive German territory with 400,000 inhabitants as compensation. It is true Cleves, Ansbach, and Neufchâtel were to be ceded. Napoleon wished no mention made of this in the treaty ("Corr.," XIII. 10,604).

fear and will also return it from fear. I will give her compensation for it in promises which will satisfy the self-love of the Government and with which the country will need to rest content.'" Napoleon's army in Germany certainly occupied a strong offensive position with regard to Prussia, but its presence there, apart from the financial importance of making the troops live at the expense of a foreign country—was due to Austria. In his letter of July 16th, to Berthier, Napoleon wrote: "If the Emperor of Germany raises the slightest objection to my proceedings in Germany it is my intention to thrust forward my entire army between the Inn and the Linz". After the Emperor Francis had given his consent to the establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine and to the treaty with d'Oubril, which numbered among its conditions the evacuation of Germany, Napoleon did actually take measures for withdrawing his troops. On August 17th he wrote to Talleyrand and Berthier on the subject, and directed the latter to send home the Austrian prisoners of war. Hence, when news came that Prussia was mobilizing, he ridiculed her action as being prompted by a fear for which there was no justification. On August 26th he wrote to Berthier, who was at Munich: "the Prussian Cabinet is panic-struck. They imagine that in our treaty with Russia there are clauses despoiling her of several provinces.[1] That is the reason of her absurd armaments, which must simply be ignored, as I fully intend to let my troops return to France." A week later the situation had completely changed. News came from St. Petersburg that the Czar had not accepted the treaty of July 20th, and now, in Napoleon's estimation, these preparations suddenly assumed a special significance. From the coincidence of these two facts he concluded that there was an understanding between Russia and Prussia, all the more so when a courier from Russia and General Knobelsdorff from Berlin, arrived at the same time, the latter demanding in his master's name that the French troops should evacuate Germany. Knobelsdorff, who was to replace Lucchesini (recalled at Napoleon's request) was really sent to

[1] Lucchesini is responsible for having forwarded this false intelligence.

Paris purely to gain time. As it was assumed that Britain was no longer thinking of peace with France, it is not to be wondered at that Napoleon now concluded he was face to face with a new coalition, similar to that of the previous year, but with Prussia in place of Austria. In this mistaken supposition, he at once countermanded the marching orders issued to the army in Germany, made inquiries through Berthier as to the condition of the Elbe and the Saale, had maps prepared, and notified Knobelsdorff that he would not comply with King Frederick William's request so long as the Prussian army remained on war footing. Prussia must first disarm; then he would follow suit; indeed in the middle of September he even consented to postpone any decisive step until the return of a courier from Berlin, provided the Prussian Ambassador (Lucchesini had not yet left Paris) sent him a written request to that effect.[1]

The French Emperor surveyed the whole situation with calm, unerring glance. He saw that there were only two things possible for him, and these he explained in a letter to his Ambassador in Berlin on September 12th, 1806. "Either Prussia has taken up arms simply out of fear," so the letter runs, "in which case, there being no longer any motive for her fear, she ought to stop her armaments, especially as they are very costly; or, she wanted to be in readiness against the time when her engagements, whether actual or prospective, with Russia, Britain, and Sweden should come to light. In the latter case the Emperor's policy requires him to take advantage of the favourable time of the year, reach Berlin before the Swedes and the Russians, attack the enemies before they have time to co-operate, and defeat them singly. The whole question reduces itself to these two alternatives; there is no third. 'Possibilities,' 'Probabilities,' 'Secret Convictions,' are in his Majesty's opinion mere idle chimeras which will not deceive him. If there were any other feasible hypothesis than those already mentioned it could only be that

[1] *Vide* "Notes sur la situation actuelle de mes affaires," of September 12th, 1806, in Lecestre's "Lettres inédites," I. 124; also "Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleon I," p. 109.

Providence which has hitherto guided the Emperor, has destined Berlin to fall into his hands on the anniversary of his entry into Vienna." It was during these days that Napoleon proposed to the English negotiator to stay proceedings against Prussia provided Britain accepted the treaty drafted in the end of July, i.e. gave way as to Sicily. To this Lord Lauderdale would probably have agreed but as he could not sign without fresh permission from London, which was refused, the negotiations with England practically came to an end.[1] This Napoleon had expected. His last offer had merely been a feeler to find out if, as he believed, a new coalition was in progress. Private intelligence reached Paris from Berlin to the effect that war was extremely probable. "Everything points to war," wrote Talleyrand on September 19th, to Laforêt. "Everything announces it, so that it is impossible to escape the conviction that Russia is this time to be the advanced guard of a coalition. The Emperor must be ready for anything. He has now sent forward the Guards and ordered the army to assemble on the frontiers of Berg, Hesse, and Saxony in Germany."[2]

It remained to be seen if the King of Prussia would comply with Napoleon's demands. He had certainly taken up arms "out of fear," and this same fear now prevented him laying them down. In addition to fear there was anxiety for the political prestige of the State, which was being threatened in its newly acquired province of Hanover; respect for the honour and dignity of the throne; and finally the popular movement demanding resistance to France, had now to be

[1] *Vide* "Coquelle," p. 136, where this treaty, so favourable to France, is erroneously attributed to the English. Fox, on his sick-bed, declared negotiation to be any longer out of the question (Adair, "Historical Memoir," p. 416). England's refusal was afterwards cleverly turned to account in the French Press, a circumstance largely due to Napoleon's manipulation of the facts (*vide* "Corr.," xxi. 17,178 and 17,197, Champagny's Dispatch of December, 1810, on France's Negotiation with England). Unfortunately there is still no scientific edition of Napoleon's letters, so as to show how far Champagny's report was altered by Napoleon for publication.

[2] Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich," II. 571.

reckoned with. For there was no denying the fact that a reaction against Napoleon's system of international aggression was now fermenting throughout Germany. The arbitrary way in which the Emperor had rid himself of the Republican forms of the Revolution, had alienated the democratic party in South Germany and made them his enemies, although in the days of the Directory they had been enthusiastic admirers of France's "liberating" policy. His rapacious greed of power roused the indignation of those who valued the independence of their nation, who were loyally attached to their hereditary rulers and viewed their spoliation with displeasure. At the same time there were millions who troubled little about political considerations, who lived solely for gain and comfort, and who consequently preferred a servile peace under the iron hand of a foreign despot to a struggle for independence and national free government. Others again—strenuous souls in whom the principle of equality had kindled sympathies with France—saw their ideal in the world-wide citizenship of the nations and regarded Napoleon as the instrument by which this was to be accomplished. Then, too, there were those who viewed him merely as an expedient, to be used in the cause of national unity, and who looked upon the Confederation of the Rhine, the "Third Germany," as the material for constructing a stronger German State the consolidation of which had been hindered hitherto by the rivalry between Austria and Prussia with their conflicting interests elsewhere. But it was precisely against the holders of such views that early in 1806 some of the ablest thinkers in Germany entered the lists, e.g. Schleiermacher in his sermons on the "Value of Nationality," Fichte in his addresses to German warriors, and Ernst Moritz Arndt in his "Spirit of the Age," in which he passes a scathing condemnation upon the Corsican's thirst for universal dominion. So much for Northern Germany. In the South pamphlets and tracts were published, loudly deploring the ignominious position in which the nation was placed. It was felt both as a hardship and a disgrace, that even after peace had been concluded, Napoleon left his army, as a matter of course, to domineer

and support itself on German soil. Napoleon was aware of this new popular movement and did not undervalue it, but he hoped to scare it out of existence by one solitary example of inexorable severity. Consequently he ordered Berthier to take proceedings according to martial law against the publishers of these political libels, i.e. to summon them before a military tribunal and have them shot within twenty-four hours. The reason to be alleged was that "as it is the duty of a commander to secure the safety of his army, such individuals as incite the populace against this army are condemned to death" (August 5th, 1806.) There might have been some excuse for such conduct in time of war and in an enemy's country, but in time of peace and in the country of an ally, such a measure was sheer barbarity. A scapegoat was soon found. One of these pamphlets, "Germany in Her Deep Humiliation," written by Yelin, a councillor of the Consistory, related some shocking facts about the foreign troops. Palm, the Nuremberg publisher who had printed and circulated the pamphlet, was arrested, and as he scorned flight he was shot at Braunau on August 25th, 1806. A great wail of indignation and despair rose from every part of Germany. What d'Enghien's murder was to the nobility of Europe, Palm's was to the people. It was this event more than any other that fanned and fed the hatred of the French. Frederick Gentz wrote from Saxony to the Austrian diplomatist Starhemberg: "The war will be a national war in the fullest sense of the word; within a short time all Germany will be involved in it. The recent crimes of the French, especially that deed which has filled all minds with horror, have incensed the nation to such a degree that the very first success to the Prussian arms will be the signal for the new Sicilian Vespers."

Even the Court circles at Berlin had not been able to resist this strong current of popular opinion. For several years past the "Frenchmen," as the adherents to the peace-abiding neutral policy were called, had been opposed by a "war party," who had advocated a defensive alliance with Austria in 1804, and in the following year had strenuously

counselled joining the coalition. Now at last their time had come. Among the members of this party were Stein, the Minister of Finance, Generals Blücher, Ruchel, and Phull, the scholars, Johann von Muller and Alex. von Humboldt, while even in the entourage of the King it counted among its avowed supporters Queen Louise, the Princesses Wilhelm and Radziwill, Princes Louis Ferdinand, Wilhelm, Heinrich, and the Prince of Orange, all of whom urged that the State should rise in warlike defence, instead of supinely sinking into decay. But what produced the greatest impression upon the peace-loving King was the strong anti-French feeling in the army, manifesting itself sometimes in grave deliberation, at other times in presumptuous pride. The officers' corps turbulently clamoured for the dismissal of Haugwitz, and idolized Hardenberg, who had incurred Napoleon's hatred. So high did feeling run that there were even cases of insubordination, a thing hitherto unheard of in the Prussian Army, and which so disconcerted King Frederick William that he thought for a moment of abdicating. Disarming, as Napoleon demanded, was out of the question. On September 18th, Haugwitz wrote to the Duke of Brunswick who was assembling the army in Thuringia: "Whatever happens, the King has made an irrevocable decision as to his own conduct; an ultimatum is to be sent to Paris and its refusal will involve a rupture"? There could be no doubt as to the answer, and it was solely with a view to gain time for military preparations that the King wrote from head-quarters refusing Napoleon's demand and renewing the request for the withdrawal of the French troops,—this time in the form of an ultimatum requiring a decisive reply not later than October 8th.[1]

[1] *Vide* letter from Haugwitz in Bailleu, II. 570. Whether King Frederick William counted on a peaceful issue with Napoleon being still possible, cannot be definitely ascertained. He seems to have instructed Knobelsdorff to favour a treaty, just as he had done in the previous year with Haugwitz (*vide* Laforêt's report of August 26th, II. 540). Towards the end of September Scharnhorst wrote from the Thuringian head-quarters: "It seems to me that they are expecting news from the courier

The King had yielded to these measures with well-founded reluctance and anxiety. He could certainly count on Russia, but even in the most favourable circumstances the Czar's troops could not reach the theatre of war before the end of November. The breach with England must be healed before the indispensable subsidies could be received. The only ally was Saxony, and she was arming very slowly. The Elector of Hesse, for selfish reasons, remained neutral. Prussia had really to trust to her own strength, and that Frederick William did not exaggerate.[1] During a long period of peace the defects of the military administration had developed to a disastrous extent. The army was virtually without a leader, for the one man who was in any way qualified for that post, the Duke of Brunswick, was irresolute, old, and feeble, and as a contemporary justly remarked, "better fitted to receive orders than to give them". In such circumstances it was certainly the height of presumption for Prussia to measure herself against this victorious conqueror. Napoleon himself would not believe the news at first and declared Prussia's action was simply madness. On September 10th, he wrote to Berthier: "Tell the King of Bavaria privately that he will get Baireuth if I come to blows with Prussia, though I cannot believe that she will do anything so foolish". Secretly, however, his great anxiety was lest King Frederick William should disarm after all, and so deprive him of such a favourable opportunity of destroying Prussia before help had reached her. In Europe the Prussian army, especially the cavalry,

returning from Paris between October 8th and 10th, which might lead to the matter being settled," a remark which was not made without substantial foundation (Lehmann, I. 424).

[1] Montgelas relates: "The King in character and principle was opposed to all martial undertakings, and he was obeying outside influences rather than any firm conviction of his own. He dreaded Napoleon's redoubtable genius and had little confidence in his own troops, who did not seem to him to be in a condition to wage war successfully. It is almost beyond doubt that he joined the army expecting that he would lose a battle which would furnish a pretext for concluding peace and therefore convince even the most incredulous that resistance was impossible" (Montgelas, "Mémoires," p. 146).

enjoyed a high reputation. Napoleon shared this general opinion, and was not free from anxiety, but it only made him the more eager to attack this army and destroy it while it was still solitary. Hence he kept the Prussian envoy at Paris, waiting in suspense without offering any explanations, and sent instructions to the French Ambassador at Berlin not to allow himself to be drawn into any kind of agreement; rather, if need be, to feign illness. Meanwhile, for weeks past, all his available troops had been advancing on the Rhine and Aschaffenburg in the greatest secrecy, in order to reinforce the army in Germany by 100,000 newly levied troops. Finally, on September 25th, the Emperor suddenly left Paris without announcing his departure to the Senate, and travelled rapidly to Mainz, where he issued the final orders. The war had begun.

CHAPTER XII.

JENA AND TILSIT.

NAPOLEON'S high opinion of the Prussian army led him to proceed with far greater caution than he had shown in the previous year against Austria. For this army was the creation of Frederick the Great to whom he assigned so high a place, and if its generals had carefully observed the strategical manœuvres in the campaigns of 1800 and 1805 they might now be prepared to cope with such. "I expect," said Napoleon, "we shall have more to do than we had with the Austrians," and to Soult he wrote that he had made his numbers superior to the enemy's, so as to leave nothing to chance. Wherever his adversary made a stand he meant to attack him with double his numbers. With eight corps (including the Guards) under his most experienced generals, a strong reserve of cavalry under Murat, and a contingent of Bavarian auxiliaries, forming a total of over 170,000 troops, Napoleon proceeded to attack Prussia. He advanced from Southern Germany on a line between Bamberg and Berlin, which the French officers had been studying in detail for weeks previously. He counted on making the advance between the Thuringian Forest and the Fichtelgebirge with such rapidity and effect that he would be able to threaten the very heart of the Prussian monarchy and to compel the enemy, whom he supposed to be still in Thuringia, to fall back upon Magdeburg and hasten thence to the succour of the capital. So wrote Napoleon from Strassburg to his brother Louis, King of Holland. In the event of the enemy opposing him earlier than he expected, the Danube would form his line of retreat. Should they intercept him by advancing from the South, he would then pass over beyond them along

the line of Frankfurt-Leipzig, to the Rhine, which river was to be defended at Wesel by his brother Louis, and at Mainz by a special corps under Mortier. Prepared thus for every emergency, he could make his whole army advance east without needing to occupy the country between the Rhine and Franconia; for to him the essential point was to keep the entire force directly under his own control—as he had learned by experience in the previous year—and to handle it as a "major does his battalion". On October 5th, 1806, the various corps received their orders. They were first to march in three columns from Bamberg and Bayreuth where they were concentrated, towards Coburg, Lobenstein, and Hof, and thence under his direction they were to proceed to Gera, via Saalfield and Schleiz. Meanwhile the enemy's whereabouts and purposes were to be clearly ascertained.

Alas, the enemy did not know their own mind! At the Prussian head-quarters no definite plan of action had yet been decided upon. In the previous year an army of 250,000 men had been levied, but now an enumeration of the forces revealed scarcely half that number; in any case it was far below that of the French, for all the North German forces had not been obtained. The supreme command had been entrusted to the Duke of Brunswick, who had led the German Army in 1792 and 1793; but, unwilling to be absent from the field of honour, the King had joined the army in person, with disastrous results for it. The military officers in his suite prejudiced him against the dispositions of the commander-in-chief, who was of an irresolute and conciliatory nature, and soon no one knew whether "head-quarters" meant the King or the Duke. So wrote Colonel Scharnhorst, chief of the general staff at head-quarters on October 6th. Some weeks previously, he had elaborated a plan of attack to which later criticism has assigned high praise. According to this plan the army was to traverse the Thuringian Forest and gain the open country beyond, where their excellent cavalry could be used to advantage. They would thus have been two weeks ahead of their opponent, which in itself was an earnest of success. It accorded too with the

Duke of Brunswick's intention to concentrate the entire army at Naumburg and assume the offensive in the neighbourhood of Bayreuth, marching on Bamburg, Würzburg, and Ansbach. But for this it was already too late; for some of the divisions were still far from their destination, Saxony had only begun to mobilize in the end of September, and over and above all the King clung so obstinately to peace that he would not on any account appear as the disturber of it. He persisted in delaying till October 8th, the date on which he had fixed for receiving France's reply to his ultimatum. No answer came, but instead of it the French themselves; and Scharnhorst's plan was no longer possible. Meanwhile, on September 25th, it had been replaced by another, and the army divided into three independent commands in order that the "reigning" Prince Hohenlohe might not need to serve under the Duke of Brunswick. The right wing, under General Rüchel, was to leave Eisenach on the 7th, and advance towards the Fulda so as to facilitate the junction of the Hesse troops, and meet Blücher on his way from the North, while the main body of the army under Brunswick, and the left wing under Hohenlohe, were to march through the Thuringian Forest towards the Werra. But the plan miscarried. The French advance in the east nullified all these offensive movements and forced the Prussians back on the defensive, for which their position was extremely unfavourable, their centre under Brunswick being at Erfurt, their right wing under Rüchel at Gotha, and their left wing under Hohenlohe at Weimar. On October 6th, after long debating, the march through the Thuringian Forest was given up and Hohenlohe was sent forward to the Saale where on the 9th, at Schleiz, he fought an engagement with the French middle column, and on the 10th, at Saalfeld with their western column. During the latter engagement Prince Louis Ferdinand, who commanded the advance-guard, was killed by a French bullet, an event more demoralizing in its effect upon the army than the loss of the battle. Several generals summarily demanded the dismissal of the commander-in-chief, to whom they attributed all the mistakes in the conduct of the war, although the one charge of which he

was guilty was that of having obeyed when he ought to have commanded.

Whilst things were thus turning out as unfavourably as possible for Prussia, Napoleon during his march to Gera had ascertained pretty accurately the position of the enemy, whose main body he concluded to be at Erfurt. In reality the Prussians were between Erfurt and Jena. Recognizing at once the possibility of outflanking them, on October 12th he issued orders for the whole army to discontinue the march northwards and to wheel to the left towards the Saale, the same manœuvre as he had carried out in the previous year after crossing the Danube, and also in 1800, when beyond the Po. That same day Murat's cavalry and Davoût's advance-guard entered Naumburg. When this news reached the Prussian head-quarters the consternation was indescribable. The only chance for Brunswick to escape being surrounded by the enemy was to decamp that very night. As if such a necessity were not sufficiently obvious, many precious hours were wasted the following morning discussing it before proceeding to act.[1] And so Davoût, on his way from Naumburg to attack the enemy posted at Weimar from the rear, came upon the main body under Brunswick at Auerstädt while on the march, and at Jena, Napoleon, advancing from Gera with the bulk of his troops, overtook Hohenlohe, who was to conduct the rear-guard and cover the retreat to the North.

On October 14th, fighting began at both places, a result Napoleon had evidently desired for many days back. Thinking that at Jena he was in face of the main body of the Prussians, he concentrated all his available troops and attacked Hohenlohe with greatly superior numbers. He had 78,000 troops in all against 53,000 Prussians, but during the decisive hours of the battle he had only 54,000. Early in the morning, before day had dawned, the Emperor rode up to the

[1] Among the many valuable things the Prussian head-quarters might have learned from Napoleon, was to go to bed very early in war, so that at midnight, when all the reports for the evening had come in, they were ready to begin the next day's work.

troops under Marshal Lannes, who were to be the first to come under fire, and reminding them of the victories won in the previous year, he told them that they were now placed exactly as they had been when they captured Mack. Lannes' corps and the vanguard under Ney withstood the onslaught of the whole of the enemy's forces with such unflinching courage that the Emperor was able to hold the Guards in reserve until fresh troops arrived.[1] The enemy was then quickly overpowered. Hohenlohe contributed largely to this result by not pushing home vigorously the attack by his right wing on the village of Vierzehnheiligen, and by exposing his lines through his lack of decision to the fire of Augereau's tirailleurs against whom they were unable to make a stand. Meanwhile, on the other side, a Prussian division had been driven back by a French division belonging to Soult's corps. Hohenlohe had waited expectantly for the reinforcements promised by Rüchel, but by the time they arrived the Prussian battalions were already defeated; and instead of rallying them and withdrawing, Rüchel sacrificed the greater part of his own troops in a fresh attack, foredoomed to failure, and he too had to retreat.[2] Murat's cavalry then bore down upon the broken army, and in wild haste and confusion the Prussians fled towards Erfurt.

While this had been happening at Jena, Brunswick had been engaged with Davoût at Auerstädt, where the Prussians were again defeated in spite of their almost twofold superiority of numbers, 50,000 to the French 27,000. In the early part of the battle, after an over-hasty cavalry charge by Blücher, the advantage lay with the Prussians, but victory escaped them, for a thick fog which lasted several hours prevented them from rightly estimating their opponents' strength

[1] It was at this juncture that the cry of "Forward!" rang out from the ranks of the Guards behind Napoleon. Instantly the Emperor turned upon the audacious private whose nerves were unstrung with the excitement, and bade him wait till he had commanded in twenty battles before presuming to advise him.

[2] For the cause of Rüchel's delay, *vide* Bailleu, "Deutsche Rundschau," December, 1899, p. 394. Possibly the delay was partly due to Rüchel's hesitation whether to proceed to Jena or to Auerstädt.

and from prosecuting the battle vigorously. But the same fog did not keep the French from defending the hotly contested village of Hassenhausen victoriously against the successive attacks of the Prussian divisions, nor from steadily concentrating their forces. Moreover, the Prussian reserves, 18,000 strong, under General Kalckreuth, did not take part in the action, as no orders had reached them, for the commander-in-chief lay mortally wounded, and all unity in the conduct of the battle had ceased.[1] As it was impossible even to keep open a free route to Naumburg, the King, who now assumed the chief command, gave orders to retreat on Weimar, where he expected to find the troops of Rüchel and Hohenlohe still intact, instead of which, to his bitter disappointment and no small peril, he stumbled upon the victorious French. Ere long the head-quarters and the remnants of the army were fleeing in breathless haste before their pursuers. For the troops had not rallied, and now the army had almost entirely disbanded. Desertion was general, discipline there was none. Of the 120,000 troops, soon there only remained some 10,000 regulars, and these Hohenlohe led by a wide detour through Nordhausen, Magdeburg, and Neu-Ruppin to Prenzlau (in Brandenburg) where they capitulated to Murat, who assured Hohenlohe he was surrounded by 100,000 Frenchmen, a statement which was as far from the truth as his tale in the previous year, of peace having been concluded, when he wished to gain control of the bridges over the Danube at Vienna. Other smaller detachments likewise surrendered, that of Blücher forming a solitary exception by only doing so after heroic resistance. The principal fortresses were then thrown open to the enemy, and the unseemly haste with which this was done remains for ever an indelible disgrace. Such was the case at Erfurt, at Magdeburg (where a reserve army de-

[1] "As soon as the Duke was wounded," wrote King Frederick William, "all real command ceased, because no one was in a position to take over the command, or rather because the leading officials had lost their head." Further causes for the defeat were the defective shooting of the infantry, the absence of the reserves, and the total lack of good maps of the district (Bailleu).

feated at Halle had taken refuge), at Stettin, and at Custrin. "It was horrible," writes Captain von Gneisenau to a friend; "rather death a thousand times than live through it again. These will be strange pages in our history."

As there was nothing left to bar the way, on October 27th, 1806, Napoleon rode in triumph into Berlin, surrounded with great pomp and splendour and—what is hard to believe—greeted by the plaudits of the populace. "The Emperor looked proud," writes Coignet, "in his plain uniform, and his little hat with its halfpenny cockade. His staff, on the contrary, was in full uniform, and to foreigners it seemed strange that the poorest clad of all should be the master of such a fine army." On the previous day Napoleon had visited the tomb of Frederick the Great at Potsdam. But he sullied the homage he professed by taking away the dead hero's sword and sash and sending them as a gift to the Invalides at Paris.

At Berlin, Napoleon reckoned up the sum of his victories. Even on the day after Jena he had attached a very high value to that victory, and a decree issued on October 15th, imposing heavy contributions on the North German States, announced that "the result of yesterday's battle is the conquest of all the territories belonging to the King of Prussia as far as the Vistula". Now, on November 12th, from the Palace of the Hohenzollerns, the Emperor proclaimed to the world at large: "The entire kingdom of Prussia is in my power." The question was whether it would remain so. Prussian arms, indeed, could no longer avert the downfall of the fatherland, for with the exception of a small body of 15,000 troops and some fortresses in Silesia and on the Baltic, the fighting strength of the country had been dispersed and annihilated. But Napoleon had other foes. One of these, Russia, had already declared herself Prussia's friend and helper; another, Britain, might at any moment do the same. For it was characteristic of Napoleon's system that as his policy always affected the whole Continent, he was consequently never dealing with a solitary enemy.

On October 16th, two days after the battle, an aide-de-camp

of the vanquished King had presented himself at the French head-quarters with a request for a truce and peace. This Napoleon refused. The advantages he had won were too great for him to stop short of Berlin, where terms of peace could be more easily arranged. King Frederick William then dispatched Lucchesini with full powers to sign preliminaries ceding to France, Hanover, Bayreuth, the territory to the west of the Weser, and a large sum of money as a war indemnity. But Napoleon's terms were incomparably harder. He demanded all the country to the left of the Elbe as far as Magdeburg and the Altmark, 100,000,000 francs of an indemnity, as well as Germany's consent to Saxony and the German States beyond the Elbe joining the Confederation of the Rhine. Lucchesini and von Zastrow, the Prussian Minister, were about to consent to this, all the more readily as it was rumoured that Napoleon intended to restore the ancient kingdom of Poland, large tracts of which, including Posen and Warsaw, belonged to Prussia. Again Napoleon raised difficulties. Meanwhile Hohenlohe and Blücher had capitulated and the French troops were reconnoitring as far as the Vistula. Napoleon began to consider whether this immense success might not be exploited to greater advantage than by a treaty with Prussia alone, and whether he might not make it the nucleus of a general pacification. In his 30th bulletin on November 10th, he states: "The French army will not leave Berlin until the Spanish, Dutch, and French colonies have been restored and a general peace concluded". He thereupon increased his demands, and, abandoning altogether the idea of a separate peace, spoke of granting a truce merely, and that only on the hardest terms. The French were to occupy all the country as far as the river Bug; eight fortresses—among them Danzig, Kolberg, Thorn, Glogau, and Graudenz—were to be surrendered; King Frederick William was to order the Russians, who had already entered East Prussia, to leave the country. On November 16th, the Prussian envoys signed this treaty, and on the following day Napoleon published it in his army bulletin, so as to let this political success be known without delay and thus sow

discord between Prussia and Russia. But King Frederick William rejected the humiliating pact. Realizing clearly that the aim of such conditions was the complete disarmament of Prussia and the alienation of the Court of St. Petersburg, he resolved to rely on Russia's help and to resist his all-powerful adversary. When Napoleon learned of Prussia's refusal he drew up a proclamation declaring that the house of Brandenburg had ceased to reign—just as he had treated the House of Naples in the Schönbrunn decree. But there was a vast difference in the two cases. For in the end of December, 1805, the decisive victory had already been gained, whereas here it had still to be fought. And so, for the time being, the proclamation was not published.[1]

Napoleon's immediate concern was now to overpower the advancing Russians, who on October 23rd had crossed the frontiers of Prussian Poland. For this he did not trust to his army alone. He at once began to play off Poland against Russia. An insurrectionary committee was formed at Warsaw under his patronage, and on November 19th a deputation of the leading nobility of Posen appeared at Berlin, and was assured by Napoleon that France had never recognized the partition of Poland, and that he himself, as Emperor of the French, would feel the deepest interest in seeing the national throne restored; the Poles might always count on his powerful protection. At the same time he reminded them that he personally could not procure the restoration of their independence; that matter lay entirely in their own hands. In a similar way he had remarked on November 3rd: "I wish to see if you deserve to become a nation". On November 27th, he went in person to Posen in order to stimulate the insurrection to greater activity. He was welcomed enthusiastically as the liberator of the Fatherland, and he for his part was

[1] *Vide* Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich," II. 581, where it is all published except the clause relating to Prussia's fate, which remained unspoken. At St. Helena, Napoleon declared the greatest mistake he made at this time was sparing Prussia. "I could have driven the King from the throne, and I am certain Alexander would have offered no resistance provided I had retained the country for myself."

unsparing in his encouragement until good progress had been made with the enrolment of volunteers at Warsaw by which means thousands of National Guards were obtained. That was the one thing needful. When a deputation of the nobility approached Napoleon at Warsaw, offering to place the forces of the country at his disposal, he replied: "Once you have an army of 40,000 troops you will be worthy of calling yourselves a nation; then you will have every claim to my protection."[1] As a matter of fact Napoleon had not the slightest intention of furthering the ideal aims of the Polish nation. He had long ago lost all sympathy with such emotions, and soon, as his treatment of Spain will show, he even ceased to understand them. To him, Poland was simply a useful tool for furthering his ends with Russia and Prussia, to be discarded the moment it ceased to be of service. There is a significant passage in the 36th bulletin which runs as follows: "Will the throne of Poland be restored and the great nation regain its existence and its independence? Will it return from death to life? God alone, who keeps in his hands the moulding of all events, can decide this great political problem." And so, when it was to the advantage of his policy, this man did not hesitate to summon even Providence to aid him.

Napoleon's attitude towards the question of Polish independence is partly explained by the fact that Austria, like the other two States, possessed at this time extensive territories in Poland, reaching as far north as the river Bug. Any rising on the frontiers was therefore bound to cause friction with Austria, with whom Napoleon had every reason to keep on good terms in order to preserve his flank from attack. Before the opening of the campaign he had attempted to come to an understanding at Vienna, and after the battle of Jena he renewed his efforts; but Stadion, the Austrian

[1] The letter to Sebastiani on December 1st, 1806, saying there were 60,000 Poles under arms, was an exaggeration meant to impress the authorities at the Golden Horn. On the same day Cambacérès at Paris was also falsely told that the Poles would soon have 60,000 troops ready for service.

Minister, had held aloof. Now, however, through General Andréossy, his ambassador at Vienna, Napoleon proposed to Stadion that Austria should exchange her Polish provinces for the Prussian one of Silesia. But these overtures Austria declined, as well as those made by Russia, who had sent as her envoy Pozzo di Borgo, a compatriot of Napoleon's. She remained neutral and contented herself with sending a corps of observation 40,000 strong to work its way gradually forward to the Prussian frontiers, partly to guard against any rising in Galicia, partly to be in readiness against any fresh development in the North.

Napoleon held yet another trump to play out against Russia—the Eastern question. His intention of including Turkey in his system for the mastery of Europe has already been repeatedly indicated, and it proved the ultimate cause of hostilities with Russia. Now, after his victorious campaign of 1805, as was but natural, he resumed this design.[1] In January of 1806, the generals of his suite were already making conjectures that he was contemplating a Turkish expedition, and in the May following, the Prussian ambassador wrote that the Emperor was planning alliances with the Porte, the Republic of Ragusa, and with Persia, and that General Sebastiani had communicated to him Napoleon's view that Russia would need to be driven back behind a barrier running from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Shortly afterwards Sebastiani was sent on a special mission to Constantinople. In the event of Russia refusing peace with France, he was to incite the Porte against the Czar, and so far he was successful, for he persuaded the Sultan, Selim III, in violation of a previous treaty, to dispossess the Waywodes of Moldavia and Walachia who were partisans of Russia. Thereupon the Czar, who had long been waiting for such an opportunity, sent an army to the Lower Danube. Napoleon wrote from Berlin to the terrified Sultan that all Prussia was

[1] On March 11th, 1806, Stadion wrote to Starhemberg, the Austrian ambassador in London, that the possession of Dalmatia would be the prelude to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and a significant extension of Napoleon's monarchy in the South and the East (Wertheimer, II. 105).

subject to him, and that he was following up his advantages at the head of 300,000 men, that fate destined the continuance of the Turkish Empire and had chosen himself as its deliverer, and that now was the time to send a Turkish army to the Dniester, whilst he was himself operating against Russia from the Vistula (November 11th, 1806). Three weeks later he wrote from Posen that Prussia, Russia's ally, had succumbed, that the French armies were at the Vistula, that the Prussian and Russian Poles were revolting in order to regain their independence, and that the moment had now come for the Sultan to fight for his freedom; for continued submission to Russia would mean the dissolution of his empire. Napoleon's aim, of course, was simply to divide the Czar's forces, so that he would not have the entire Russian army opposed to him, and at the same time to rivet Austria's attention to the Danube, for the Viennese Court could not view with indifference any encroachment by Russia on Turkish territory. Napoleon gained both his ends. The Czar Alexander sent his army across the Dniester, and in December, 1806, Turkey was forced to declare war against him. Austria, on the other hand, owing to the progress of the Russian troops on the Lower Danube, was prevented from making a close alliance with Russia against Napoleon, and although the Vienna Cabinet had not been caught by the bait of Silesia, the rousing of her apprehensions with regard to Russia served the purpose equally well.

Now, however, the most redoubtable of all Napoleon's opponents—Great Britain—had awakened to the fact that he had laid one of the States of Europe in ruins. On November 21st, a decree was issued from Berlin announcing to all the world that Britain was in a state of blockade, and closing the Continent against her, so far as it lay within the sphere of the French ascendancy. In 1802 we have already seen the Emperor, at the first indication of a renewal of hostilities, tracing out his programme. "If England kindles war on the Continent," so he instructed Talleyrand to write Otto, "the First Consul will be obliged to conquer Europe." The Emperor was now busy doing so, and he meant to let

England feel the effects. "The British Isles," so runs the Berlin decree, "are henceforth in a state of blockade; all commerce with them is forbidden; letters and parcels bearing an English address shall be confiscated, as well as all English storehouses, whether in France or in the territory of her allies; also all English merchandise; all English vessels and also those coming to the Continent from English colonies and bonded ports shall not be allowed to enter any European port. Any English subject found on French soil shall be made prisoner of war." For this decree the reasons alleged were that as the English had arbitrarily extended the rights of war upon the sea to private property, the Emperor had resolved to pay them back in their own coin, on land. With indefatigable persistence he made straight for his goal; Europe was to be rendered submissive in order that he might close it against Britain, whose commerce and industries would then dwindle and perish. And if he ultimately succeeded in diverting from her the wealth she drew from India, the haughty Island Kingdom would then be conquered and he would thereafter wield his sceptre over earth and ocean.[1] But the ultimate goal was still far distant, and on the chessboard of Europe the pawns would need to be moved with skill and cunning until the last king had been checkmated. Nevertheless the goal was attainable, and full of these schemes Napoleon now proceeded to move against Russia. Only a year ago he had defeated her forces with little trouble, and since then the confidence of his troops had been further increased by new triumphs over the dreaded Prussian army. Little wonder that he now believed the "destinies of the world lay within his clenched fist".

On November 27th, 1806, the day on which Napoleon entered Posen, the advance-guard of Murat's cavalry came

[1] The Emperor's mind was constantly running on India, so Joseph told the Prussian Ambassador about this time. Afterwards at St. Helena, Napoleon told Dr. O'Meara that after the war with Austria in 1806 he had an expedition to India in view. During that year three French agents were sent to Persia.

upon the Russian troops at Blonje, to the west of Warsaw. As the French were advancing rapidly by forced marches, General Bennigsen, who commanded the more advanced of the two Russian armies, withdrew to Warsaw, and finally, crossing the Vistula and the Narew, to Ostrolenka, where he decided to wait till the second column under Buxhöwden had come up before resuming the advance. Early in December these two armies effected a junction, and the combined force then marched as far as Pultusk and the Ukra. The Russians were reinforced by a corps from East Prussia, 13,000 strong, under l'Estocq, who were posted east of Thorn and constituted a sort of right wing to the formation. The chief command of the combined force was entrusted to General Kamenskoi, and on his becoming insane it was then divided between the two generals. The French occupied Thorn and Warsaw and crossed the Vistula between these two points; the corps of Ney, Bessières, and Bernadotte marched from Thorn eastward; those of Murat, Davoût, and Lannes from Warsaw northward; while between them Soult and Augereau advanced upon the Ukra, which they crossed under fire from the enemy in presence of Napoleon, who had come up by way of Warsaw. Thinking the main body of the enemy was at Golymin, west of Pultusk, the Emperor decided to attack it in front at that point with two corps, while Lannes with his corps was to march to the right upon Pultusk and so prevent the Russians retreating across the Narew. Meanwhile Soult and Bernadotte, advancing upon Makow from the left, were to block the road to Ostrolenka. This plan, like all Napoleon's schemes, aimed at the annihilation of his enemy, but it failed completely. The Russian main body was not at Golymin, but at Pultusk, where it fought an indecisive battle against Lannes on December 26th, and succeeded in effecting its retreat across the Narew. The troops with which Napoleon was engaged at Golymin on that day proved to be only the rearguard of the Russian army, and although defeated, they were able to draw off to the north without being pursued. Soult's turning movement was consequently

rendered pointless.[1] The Russians had escaped the snares laid for them, and all the French had gained was a few square miles of barren country.

What a contrast to the victories of the previous month! Perhaps these had rendered Napoleon less wary, for it was imprudent to attack the enemy without first concentrating his forces as he usually did, and unwise to base a double turning movement upon a hypothesis which was not perfectly sound. Besides, there were other obstacles which the Emperor had not fully taken into account. The district in which these encounters were taking place had recently been occupied by the Russians, who on their departure had carried off everything portable, and had destroyed the rest. Consequently, on following their enemy, the French found themselves in a barren land where there was neither food nor shelter. Hunger now made itself felt. The system of requisitions had to be abandoned and storehouses established. It was at this crisis that the Jewish talent for speculation proved the means of saving the army from starvation.

To add to their misfortunes a sudden thaw softened the marshy ground, rendering the task of reconnoitring more difficult than before and hampering all the movements of the army. The entire district was transformed into a veritable sea of mud through which the brave troops waded knee-deep, exhausted by hunger, yet toiling forward laboriously. The artillery stuck fast in the bog and became useless. During the march to Pultusk there were fierce outbursts of despair, and many a fine soldier who had faced death bravely but a short time before now laid violent hands on his life. So bad was the road that even the Emperor's coach could make no progress, and a horse was brought to the carriage door to enable the Emperor to ride on to Pultusk, where a few days previously Lannes' corps, up to their waists in mud, had withstood the enemy's fire for eight hours. As he passed along the road the Emperor noted the great suffer-

[1] Both sides claimed the victory; the Russians because they had warded off the French attack and had driven back Lannes, the French because the Russians had retreated.

ings of his troops and he heard murmurs from even the most loyal of them all, the soldiers of the Guard.[1] He was profoundly impressed. A year previously, on the day before Austerlitz, he had talked of his former plans for an Oriental expedition to his generals, one of whom had then ventured to suggest that he should resume this scheme, seeing they were on the route to Constantinople. Napoleon evaded the question. "I know the French," said he. "Long expeditions are not easy for them. France is too beautiful; they do not like to leave it nor to remain away for long periods." And now here they were in desperate straits that baffled every manœuvre and defied all the arts of war.[2] In the Army Order for December 2nd (the anniversary of Austerlitz), he reminded his troops of the victory in Moravia. "Soldiers," he said, "we shall not lay down our arms until universal peace has secured the power of our allies and restored liberty to our trade and to our colonies. On the Elbe and the Oder we have gained Pondichéry, our settlements in the Indies, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish Colonies. Who gives Russia the right to thrust herself into the affairs of the world and to frustrate these wise schemes? Are we not both, they and we, the soldiers of Austerlitz?" But what was Pondichéry, or the Spanish colonies, to these brave soldiers struggling in the bogs of Poland? Was France in danger, or her fame or her power threatened? Moreover it looked as if the Russians of Pultusk were very different from those of Austerlitz! Had they not fought or suffered as bravely on December 26th as the soldiers of the Emperor? But Napoleon was well aware he must not bend his bow too far; it was his only weapon. Instead therefore of pursuing the retreating enemy, he with-

[1] It would be a great mistake to accept the assurances of Savary and Rapp that the reproaches of the troops overheard by the Emperor were mere barrack-room jests. Coignet, for instance, relates that the Guards on their return to winter-quarters were severely reprimanded for not having shown more courage in bearing these privations.

[2] The Duke of Fézensac in his recollections repeatedly mentions the impossibility of obtaining sufficient information, and depicts the extraordinary difficulties the orderlies had to contend with.

drew his army to winter quarters. Along the Vistula from Elbing to Warsaw, depots were established for each army corps, but the troops themselves remained on the farther side of the river, disposed in a line running through Frisches Haff and Willenberg to Ostrolenka. For the difficulties of the commissariat had necessitated a greater extension of the cantonments.

But their rest was not destined to be of long duration. The Russians had fallen back in two columns on Grodno and Bjelostok, and in the middle of January, at Bialla, they united their forces under the command of Bennigsen. Owing to the retreat of their allies, the Prussians under l'Estocq had been compelled to withdraw into the neighbourhood of Angerburg, so that the communications with Danzig were completely cut off and even the road to Königsberg lay exposed to sudden attack from the French. Such an attack was actually attempted. Early in January, 1807, Ney, whose corps encamped between Thorn and Wittenberg had suffered bitter privations, acting on his own initiative had set out with his troops towards the north in the hope of finding better quarters and, if possible, of capturing Königsberg. Napoleon was intensely annoyed at this move, recalled Ney, and sharply reprimanded him. Not without reason, for while on the march Ney had come upon the Prussian corps, with the result that Bennigsen moved out with the whole Russian army to overtake and annihilate him while on the march and in an exposed condition, and to drive Bernadotte, who was at Elbing, back across the Vistula and so restore the communications with Danzig. Then, protecting the fortresses and protected by them, the Russian commander hoped to take up a strong position. But in this he was disappointed, for Ney escaped, Bernadotte having warned him of his danger. The enterprise, however, entailed further consequences.

The news of this offensive movement on the part of the enemy reached Napoleon at Warsaw, whither he had come from Pultusk for rest and relaxation. The capital of ancient Poland did everything to flatter and please him, not least the

ladies, nor did they find him unresponsive.[1] But at the news of Bennigsen's advance he roused himself at once and decided without delay to assume the offensive. His plan was to strike northwards with his army in a compact body, break through the enemy's long line of march before they had time to concentrate for a battle, and scatter their various corps. Fortunately for Bennigsen, he learned of this plan through an intercepted letter from Bernadotte to head-quarters and with the utmost rapidity he collected all his detachments, with the intention of making a stand against the French. The Prussian corps which he had sent during his advance by a wide detour to Freistadt, west of Osterode, he now ordered to hasten northwards, so as to escape the French and rejoin the main body of the army. Napoleon's design was thus already frustrated; he might still overtake the enemy, but not surprise them; he might still defeat them, but no longer annihilate them. He hurried on through Willenberg with five corps, the sixth remaining behind on the Narew for observation, while the seventh, under Bernadotte, who as yet had received no instructions, could only follow far behind. On February 3rd, at Allenstein, he came upon the enemy, and some preliminary fighting led him to expect a battle on the following day. But Bennigsen changed his plan, for as the Prussians had not yet arrived he resolved to move northwards to meet them, and that very evening he set out. Napoleon followed him closely, detaching Davoût to the right in order to prevent the enemy diverging to the east; but it was not till February 7th, at Prussian Eylau, that he overtook Bennigsen, who now drew up his forces in battle order and on the same day drove back the foremost detachments of the French under Murat and Soult. Meanwhile, however, the main body of the French army came up, with the exception of the troops under Ney, who was pressing close on the heels of l'Estocq and his corps to prevent them effecting a junction with Bennigsen. On the morning of February 8th, the rival armies met face to face,

[1] Here it was that Napoleon's liaison began with the Countess Walewska; their son was afterwards Minister to Napoleon III *(vide* Masson, "Napoleon et les femmes," p. 189).

67,000 Frenchmen against 76,000 Russians, but the Russians were superior in guns. The snow, driven along by an icy wind from the north, had not yet shrouded the victims of the previous day's engagement, and soon the battle was raging anew, fiercer than before. After a long artillery duel, Napoleon proceeded to the attack. He was determined, if need be, to sacrifice his left wing so as to deal a decisive blow with his right. Here Augereau, who formed the connecting-link between the centre and Davoût's corps, advanced against the Russian centre, very much as Soult had done at Austerlitz, but with what different results! There the enemy had broken; here they stood firm and drove the assailants back with heavy loss. A hail of grape-shot met the French troops advancing through the blinding snow, and when they faced about, the Russian cavalry fell upon them and slew half their numbers. So impetuous was the Russian charge, heading straight for the cemetery of Eylau, where Napoleon had taken up his position, that his suite called out for horses to allow the head-quarters to escape. Rejecting this precaution with an impatient gesture, the Emperor ordered up a detachment of the Guard, whereupon the now breathless cavalry wheeled about. But it was only with the greatest difficulty and by using as a screen the eighty squadrons which Murat had combined for a colossal attack, that Napoleon was able to fill up the gap in his position. Davoût now brought his men into action, and pressing his attack with relentless persistence he forced the Russian left wing round till it faced northwards, and so got possession of the enemy's line of retreat. Bennigsen's army seemed lost, when suddenly Scharnhorst appeared on the scene with several thousands of l'Estocq's Prussians—the remainder were engaged with Ney—and falling immediately upon Davoût drove him back a long way. The order to take part in the battle was not received by Ney until noon, and by the time he reached the left wing darkness had already fallen and stayed the hideous carnage.

The losses mounted up into tens of thousands. Weeks afterwards there were still heaps of dead bodies unburied, and countless numbers of the wounded who had crept for

shelter into the roofless houses of Eylau, or into abandoned ammunition wagons, lay there suffering agonies from hunger as well as pain. Augereau's corps was so decimated that it had to be disbanded. And all this sacrifice for nothing! For the battle had remained indecisive, and for the first time Napoleon had failed to win. In the first few hours after the battle he had even thought of retreating, and he wrote Duroc that it might soon be necessary to transfer the head-quarters to Thorn, and ordered him to retain consignments of money at Küstrin and Posen, as it was possible he might cross to the left bank of the Vistula "in order to secure quiet winter quarters, sheltered from the Cossacks and that swarm of light troops".[1] Davoût, as he afterwards related, had already arranged to begin the retreat. But Bennigsen ordered it otherwise. Alarmed by Ney's appearance with fresh forces, the Russian commander marched out at midnight with his troops, and on the morning of the 9th the French found the field deserted. It was simply giving them the victory. Scharnhorst declared it was a "disgrace and a crime". Napoleon, of course, claimed the proffered laurels for himself, and in his bulletin with its garbled version of the battle, he announced his triumph to the world. With a view to confirming his account of the battle, rather than for any practical purpose, he sent Murat for several days in pursuit of the enemy.[2] This done, he then withdrew the whole army

[1] The letter was probably dictated in the early morning, and about the same time as another to Talleyrand, who was referred to Duroc, who "will give him the news" ("Corr.," xiv. 11,789). Later in the day the text was altered to "who will give him the news of the victory over the Russians" (*vide* Fournier's "Zur Textkritik der Correspondenz Napoleon I," p. 114). The various corrections in the letter to Duroc bear indisputable evidence of the Emperor's perplexed state of mind after the battle.

[2] We recognize the old Bonaparte in the Emperor's letters to Cambacérès, telling him to announce in the "Moniteur" that the Russian army had been completely disbanded, and again in Bulletin 61, where it states that Königsberg may congratulate itself that he had not intended to press the Russians hard; or again, when in letters written on the same day, he gives different figures for the losses, putting them to Cambacérès, Daru, and others, at 6000 in dead and wounded. The truth is they amounted to three times that number.

beyond the Passarge, where they resumed winter quarters, for he knew he was too weak to follow up the enemy. It was not only the loss in killed that had reduced the strength of the army. Thousands, demoralized by hunger and privations, had deserted and were now scouring the country, extorting from the wretched peasantry by craft or violence the few possessions they still retained. This practice of levying requisitions on their own initiative gained many followers, so much so that one of the generals estimated the number of marauders at close on 60,000.[1] Some were perhaps daunted by the death-defying valour of the Russians at Eylau which extorted even Napoleon's admiration, but there were others in the army, as Baron von Gagern relates, who openly protested against this scandalous butchery—all to feed one man's ambition. Under the circumstances the Emperor decided to establish himself in a strong position in districts where it would be easier to care for the troops and assemble reinforcements, so that once the cruel winter was past they would be able to march against the enemy with superior numbers. The Emperor would really have preferred to withdraw to the other side of the Vistula, as his generals and even the docile Berthier advised him to do, but that would have looked like defeat to the Russians, whose commander-in-chief had lost no time in proclaiming himself the victor at Eylau. Hence there could be no concessions. The army remained posted between the Vistula and the Passarge, facing east, with Ney's corps as vanguard, extended as far as Allenstein on the Alle, while another under Masséna remained on the Narew. This position had one advantage—the only gain from the last battle—the Russians were thereby cut off

[1] *Vide* Fézensac, "Souvenirs Militaires," p. 163. From Coignet's diary we see how terrible was the destitution. The Emperor himself wrote about it to Talleyrand and to Joseph, "Here we are living in snow and mud, without wine, brandy, or bread" (March 1st, 1807, "Corr.," xiv. 11,911). But France was not to know anything about that, and therefore in his letter to Fouché, he writes that "the army is in excellent health and had provisions for a whole year, and it was folly to imagine that in a country like Poland there could be any scarcity of bread, meat, and wine" (Fézensac).

from the route to Danzig, which fortress was now closely besieged.

Napoleon established his head-quarters at Osterode. Here, too, for long weeks the fare was scant and poor, and he and his officers were often thankful to share what the soldiers had brought in from their foraging. At first the Emperor had to live in a barn till a more suitable lodging could be found, and it was not till April, when he moved into the Castle of Finkenstein, that his surroundings became in any wise comfortable. Nevertheless his cheerfulness under the hardships of that cruel winter was an example to his officers, and his health, in spite of all the rigours of the campaign, remained excellent. He afterwards declared he had never felt better. There was no lack of life at Osterode and Finkenstein. Messengers were incessantly arriving and departing. The Emperor's activity was extraordinary, and there is undoubtedly some truth in Savary's remark that in a big town he would certainly have required three months for the business he conducted in one month in that hole of a place (Osterode), where he had the control of everything in his own hands and could set things agoing in less time than it took to give directions. Nor is it accurate to think of him as wholly absorbed in military and political schemes. The condition of the Paris theatres, new schools, especially a sort of Higher School for history, the teaching of which was to be brought strictly up to date, "as the youth of the country have more opportunities for learning about the Punic wars than about the war with America in 1783," the necessity of keeping Madame de Staël out of France, and the troubles of the various members of his own family, are among the many subjects that claimed and received his attention. There certainly was ample scope for his tireless energy, for at this time Napoleon's political situation closely resembled his military one, and was quite as unfavourable. Turkey had not succeeded in conquering Russia nor in compelling her to a greater display of military strength on the Lower Danube. On the contrary, all the advantage lay on the side of Russia; so much so that the Czar was thinking of sending half of the troops engaged on this expedi-

tion to the seat of war in the north. From Austria, hitherto uncertain, came news of armaments, which General Andréossy, the ambassador at Vienna, exaggerated in his reports into readiness to take the field. The only favourable circumstance was that some cover had been obtained for the flank by the capture of the Silesian fortresses of Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, and Schweidnitz. But the Swedes were now marching upon Stralsund, and it was imperative that their attack should either be parried or paralysed. Britain had announced to the world at large that she was sending an expedition to the northern shores of Europe, which made it necessary for France to place one of her armies under Brune at the threatened points. Even Spain, hitherto so docile, had become restive, as Napoleon knew from facts in his possession. Added to this, when the news reached Paris of the retreat on the Passarge, rentes had immediately fallen on the Paris Bourse and with them the confidence in the Emperor. Certainly Napoleon had his hands full, if he hoped to improve his position or even to preserve it from attack during the next few weeks while he was reinforcing his army.

Again he thought of making overtures to Russia. On March 14th, he wrote from Warsaw to Talleyrand: "I am still of the opinion that an alliance with Russia would be very advantageous"; but he continues, "if only it were not so unattainable and it were possible to win some influence over the Russian Court". So for the time being he dismisses the thought and turns his attention instead to Austria, an alliance with whom "would at least secure some time for rest"; for that he would willingly make some sacrifice. But the first step was to renew his advances to King Frederick William. Immediately after Eylau—as if Scharnhorst's intervention had suddenly brought his country to life again,—Prussia assumed new importance in her conqueror's eyes, and from the battle-field itself he wrote Talleyrand at Warsaw to re-open negotiations with Prussia. Indeed so eager was he that a few days later, as if the journey through Poland were too tedious, he sent his adjutant-general Bertrand, direct to Memel, to King Frederick William, offering

to restore all his country as far as the Elbe if he would consent to a separate peace. Bertrand also spoke about restoring the Polish territories which Napoleon had placed in January under a special government, as the Emperor was now convinced that the Poles were not capable of forming a State. But King Frederick William remained staunch to his ally, and sent a special messenger to announce his decision. Napoleon thereupon declared himself willing to take part in a congress to negotiate a general peace, provided —and this was the essential point—they would consent to a truce relegating the French behind the Vistula and the Russians behind the Niemen. This, too, he failed to obtain. Prussia and Russia drew closer than ever, and on April 26th, 1807, at Bartenstein, Bennigsen's head-quarters, they signed a treaty by which they agreed to invite Britain, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark to join with them in a great coalition with a view to driving Napoleon out of Germany and Italy. An active union was to take place between Austria and Prussia, to the exclusion of their mutual jealousies, and on no account was either Russia or Prussia to conclude a separate peace with France.

Rejected by Prussia, Napoleon turned to Austria. He commissioned Andréossy to request a definite declaration as to its intentions, and he on his part was to state that the French Emperor was still ready to conclude an alliance, for the sake of which he was prepared to surrender Silesia, which had been almost completely conquered by his troops (i.e. those of the Confederation of the Rhine), and, if need be, even to renounce Dalmatia for some suitable equivalent. But Austria turned a deaf ear to these proposals. The Vienna Court, where the Archduke Charles was strongly opposed to taking part in the war, was not prepared to go beyond mediation, as a basis for which it proposed: a readjustment of German affairs, the integrity of Turkey, the partition of Poland as before the war, and England's participation in the negotiations (April 3rd 1807). Even to this Napoleon was willing to consent, if only to free himself for the next few weeks from the danger of an Austrian attack. But Russia and Prussia answered Austria's

proposals for mediation (to which England had consented) by an urgent invitation for her to join the Bartenstein convention. This again the Emperor Francis thought it prudent to decline. It was an immense advantage for France that Austria remained neutral. "That was certainly the greatest service ever rendered Napoleon," writes Montgelas in his memoirs, "for it would have been impossible for him to have withstood an attack from the Austrian side." Napoleon himself could scarcely believe the news, and still refused to consider his right flank safe.

Nor was his left safe, for there the strong fortress of Danzig still held out and might only too easily form a base for either an English or a Swedish expedition, while as Napoleon himself admitted, demonstrations at the estuary of the Elbe or at Stralsund might lead to the loss of Berlin. Fortunately for France, England was not inclined to make great sacrifices for war. Grenville's Cabinet had contented itself with sending an expedition to Constantinople, where it proved a miserable failure, for Sebastiani had fortified the town with marvellous rapidity; it had then proceeded to Egypt, where it was no less unfortunate. But the Portland Cabinet, which succeeded that of Grenville in April, 1807, contained two members hostile to France, Canning and Castlereagh, and although the French and German seaboards were left undisturbed, the colonies were seized. Sweden, who had ventured across the Peene to attack the French, was driven back on April 16th by Mortier, and compelled to sign a truce. Four weeks later 10,000 Russians landed at the estuary of the Vistula, but were easily defeated by a single French division under Oudinot. The siege of Danzig thereafter proceeded without further interruption, and Napoleon was able to bring new troops from France eastward unmolested.

Meanwhile he was zealously endeavouring to rouse Turkey to fresh efforts and to organize a great coalition in the East against the Czar Alexander. He tried to bring about an agreement between the Porte and Persia in order to turn the latter Power also against Russia. To Sebastiani he wrote: "Persia must also be roused and her forces directed against Georgia.

Induce the Porte to order the Pasha of Erzeroum to march against this province with all his troops. Keep the goodwill of the Prince of the Abazes and prevail upon him to join in a great demonstration against the common foe." Nor was that all. At Finkenstein in the end of April he concluded a treaty with an envoy from the Shah, pledging himself to compel Russia to evacuate Georgia, and to send cannon and gunners to the "King of Kings". The latter in return was to break off his relations with Britain, to confiscate all British goods, to refuse to let British shipping enter his ports, to stir up the Afghans and the tribes of Kandahar against Britain, and to send an army against India. The idea of a treaty of commerce to open up these distant markets to French goods was immediately suggested. "And if the Emperor of the French," so runs Article 12, "should wish to send an army by land to attack Britain's possessions in India, the Shah of Persia would grant him free passage through his dominions, in which case a special agreement would be concluded with the French Government, stipulating as to the route to be taken by the troops, the means for their maintenance and transport, as well as the number of auxiliary troops." [1] It is truly a marvellous sight to see this man placed in such an embarrassing position that the attack of a single Austrian army corps might have involved him in a catastrophe, drawing up an agreement with an Oriental Monarch affecting the farthest aims of his policy. That is what constitutes historical greatness, the ability to hold fast to the ultimate goal in spite of disaster, and to look beyond present embarrassments far out into the future.

Napoleon's greatest need at this time was to get fresh reinforcements for his army so as to be numerically superior to his opponent (who was also making preparations) and to retain the advantage of numbers in the hostilities now imminent. He therefore withdrew all the military forces available from France and Italy, filling their places there with 80,000 men belonging to the levies of 1808, the Senate having granted

[1] For further details of these negotiations *vide* Driault's "La politique orientale de Napoléon," p. 170; also de Clercq, II. 201.

him in the previous autumn the levies of 1807. He demanded fresh auxiliaries from the Confederation of the Rhine and likewise from Spain, thereby depriving this unstable ally of her weapons. By this means he was able to form a reserve army in Germany to keep Austria under observation, to strengthen the besieging forces at Danzig, and to increase the main body of his army from 160,000 to 170,000 troops, which figure left the Russians far behind. On May 26th, Danzig fell, and the detachment which had been engaged there was then sent on to the Passarge, so that there were now 180,000 troops ready for battle, while farther back, the fighting strength of the second line had been increased to nearly 100,000 men.

While the French army was thus gaining in strength, winter drew to a close. It had been a bitter foe to the invaders, but a faithful ally to their opponents, who had failed to realize its value. During the long weeks of intense cold Bennigsen had done nothing worthy the name in the way of preventing his enemy from recuperating and reinforcing his army. In February he had followed up the French, and now he was advised to attack them and drive them back across the Vistula, or at least to protect Danzig by disputing their control of the Frische Nehrung. But he neglected everything of this kind and contented himself with devising plans of attack, sometimes against Ney who occupied an advanced position, at other times against Elbing, all of which were discarded in turn, so that Scharnhorst came to the conclusion that the Russian commander did not wish to risk losing his reputation of not having been defeated by Napoleon. But when Danzig fell and he found himself confronted with an enemy more powerful than ever, when the favourable season rendered the roads passable and the maintenance of the army less difficult, when the ground was again in good condition for reconnoitring and rapid manœuvres, when Napoleon had already formed his plan of attack—then at last, when it was too late, Bennigsen bestirred himself. He proposed to fall upon the advanced guard under Ney, annihilate it, and then proceed with his troops (he had in all rather less than 100,000)

to attack the main body of the French army. But the dauntless Ney, fighting his way back gloriously, rejoined the main body now advancing under the Emperor in person, and which, thrusting itself between Bennigsen and the Prussians, drove them both before it. The situation was again as before Eylau.

Napoleon's intention was to outflank the enemy on the left while holding him in check in front, and after gaining the victory to drive him back on the Russian frontier. There was one noteworthy feature of this plan, a point that has been condemned by the ablest military critics, it left the enemy a passage for escape, whereas if the enveloping movement had been carried out by the right wing, the only outlet for the Russians would have been the road to Königsberg, where they would have been annihilated by the superior numbers of the French. It is just possible Napoleon did not wish to destroy the Russian army, and it is not improbable that he was again entertaining the idea of a reconciliation with the Czar, for it was at this time, early in June, 1807, that his designs on Turkey failed utterly. The Sultan, Selim III, with a distrust which was only too well founded, had declined the offer of 25,000 French auxiliaries under Marmont, while his own general had conducted the war against Russia in such an indolent fashion that the enemy had penetrated as far as Orsowa. Under these circumstances it seemed more prudent to Napoleon to prosecute his designs upon Turkey with Russia as an ally rather than as a foe, and to come to terms with the Czar at the expense of the ungrateful Moslem who had proved so poor an adept in furthering the aims of French diplomacy. If this were the end in view, it would scarcely have been expedient to attempt the destruction of the Russian army. The Emperor frankly told the Turkish ambassador about this time that though he felt bound to the Sultan Selim "like right hand to left," yet if Turkey did not decide within the needful time he would conclude peace with Russia without the Porte.

The probability is that at this juncture Napoleon allowed himself to be guided entirely by strategic considerations.

The fact remains that he sent one portion of his army to the left, northwards, to surround the enemy, and another detachment under Victor against the Prussians, leaving Ney and the Guards to form the rear, whilst he himself with three corps sought to overtake Bennigsen. He came up with him on the evening of June 10th, at Heilsberg, where the enemy were so strongly entrenched that the French were driven back with heavy loss. Fear of being surrounded on the north compelled Bennigsen to draw farther back along the right bank of the Alle. Meanwhile, Napoleon, rendered prudent, recalled Ney and the Guards before following up Bennigsen on the left bank of the river, under the impression that the latter would march westwards from Bartenstein and effect a junction with l'Estocq. In this Napoleon was mistaken. Bennigsen was pushing on through Schippenbeil and Friedland to the Pregel, anxious above all things to meet the Russian reinforcements. On reaching Friedland on June 13th, he drove back Lannes' cavalry, who had been sent there to capture the magazine, and in order to defeat Lannes while still isolated, he collected all his available troops, about 46,000, on the left bank of the Alle. On the morning of the 14th the battle began. But while the action with Lannes was still in progress, Napoleon himself came up, and with him the corps of Ney, Victor, Mortier, and the Guards. Bennigsen, who had hoped to fight a successful engagement against a less powerful opponent, now found himself involved in a battle against overwhelming numbers—78,000 French troops. He was defeated, but only after a valiant resistance. For Ney, who had advanced with his corps against the enemy's left wing, was driven back, and it was only the Emperor's prompt intervention that saved the battle. Recognizing the danger, he had immediately sent forward a division from the reserve corps, who, making their way through the fleeing soldiers, renewed the attack and this time with success. A heavy cannonade broke the Russian line and forced Bennigsen to withdraw his centre and his right wing from Friedland and across the Alle. The French pursued them on all sides and disputed the passage of the river which the Russians

only partially effected. One division, remaining perforce on the left bank of the river, was almost entirely destroyed by the enemy's cannon. On the same day the Prussian corps, while still isolated, was surrounded by the French and driven back to the gates of Königsberg, and it was only with the greatest difficulty, and almost disbanded, that it succeeded in escaping to Tilsit on the Niemen. There, on June 18th, Bennigsen also arrived on his retreat, and after crossing the river destroyed the bridges.

On the day after the victorious battle Napoleon wrote to Josephine: "My children have worthily celebrated the anniversary of Marengo; the whole Russian army in flight; eighty cannon seized; 30,000 men dead or captured; twenty-five of their generals killed, wounded, or prisoners, and the Russian Guard destroyed. Friedland is a worthy sister to Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena." This was slightly exaggerated. Certainly Bennigsen's army after the battle had completely broken up, but by the time Allenburg was reached the troops had succeeded in rallying, and continued the retreat in tolerable order. So heavy were the losses, however, that the commander-in-chief advised the Czar to open negotiations in order to gain time for reinforcements. For in the first place, he was confident of finding the Prussians under l'Estocq, and the Russian reserves under Lobanoff, on the farther side of the Memel, and secondly his army had not been forced away from its line of operations, so that Napoleon could reckon on the probability of another battle being fought, for which indeed he proceeded to make preparations to the west of Tilsit. Nor were these the only arguments laid by Bennigsen before the diplomatists. The determining factor was the profound dissatisfaction pervading the entire army, more especially the officers, who belonged almost without exception to the party led by the Grand Duke Constantine, and who were opposed to fighting for "foreign interests". In this mood they expressed themselves with a frankness that almost amounted to insubordination. The Grand Duke Constantine even went the length of reminding the Czar very pointedly of his father's fate. Prince Czartoryski, an old friend of the

Czar, also advocated concluding the war, and so on June 16th —the King of Prussia being at Memel—the Czar sent Prince Lobanoff to Bennigsen, who was to send him to Napoleon, requesting a truce in his (Bennigsen's) name. Lobanoff also received secret orders that if the French evinced any desire for peace on this occasion, he was to declare that the Czar also cherished that desire, and to show his signed warrant, empowering him to treat.[1] On June 19th, Lobanoff was received by Berthier at the French headquarters with great friendliness, and the same evening Duroc went to the Russian camp to begin negotiations. Here he demanded, as a condition of the truce, the surrender of certain fortresses still held by the Prussians, Kolberg, Pillau, and Graudenz. This condition the Czar refused to sanction, but he sent Lobanoff back to the French camp with full powers to make overtures for a peace. Napoleon now saw his opportunity for solving the problem of an alliance with Russia, which was the more desirable as the recent news from Turkey was even less favourable than before. Hence he now consented to withdraw the offending conditions, and on June 21st a truce was signed for one month, with the Niemen as the demarcation limit. A special article (V) stipulated that, at the earliest possible opportunity, plenipotentiaries from Russia and from France should meet to conclude a peace.

This was certainly a violation on Russia's part of the Bartenstein Treaty of April 26th, and treachery to Prussia, though that consideration did not weigh much with the Czar, for he might have pleaded with some show of justification that that treaty had remained little more than a pious wish. Had he now, as he had thought of doing in 1805, placed himself at the head of the legitimate Monarchs of Europe and marched against the usurper to cast him down from his high place, he could not have failed to see that Europe was not supporting him. Britain had taken up arms in too half-hearted and incomplete a fashion to play an active

[1] The matter is ignored in the Czar's letter to the King of Prussia on the same day. The request for a truce is only notified in a copy of Bennigsen's orders (Bailleu, "Briefweschel," p. 157).

part in the conflict, and now she made difficulties about the money. For when Russia appealed to her for the indispensable subsidy of £6,000,000, she refused to grant it, and soon afterwards offered £2,200,000, which were to be shared by Prussia and Austria. This, too, at a time when Britain's supremacy on sea was bearing hard on Russian shipping, and occasionally with grievous consequences—reason sufficient for the Czar to hate the Island Kingdom. But while Britain had only acceded to the Bartenstein Treaty on certain conditions, Austria, as we saw, had refused it outright. As soon, however, as the Court of Vienna realized the probability of a separate treaty of peace between France and Russia, an envoy was dispatched to the Czar to revive hopes of Austria's co-operation. But he came too late. In view of the neutrality of Austria, Gentz, in a memorandum in April, had advised the Czar to make peace with Napoleon and to save his troops for the future, as at present without Austria's co-operation they would simply be squandered to no purpose. It is said that these arguments produced a deep impression on the young Monarch.[1] With Sweden too there was an obstacle in the path. She had joined forces in the war against Napoleon, but Finland, which was still a Swedish province, lay within the sphere of Russia's "natural expansion". Herein the aims of Russian diplomacy became contradictory, for in fighting for the old order in Europe she was defending a cause which her own interests obliged her to violate, and those who are prone to condemn the character of the young Czar Alexander as vacillating and unreliable should bear in mind that the policy of his Empire was partly responsible for this. He himself was at the bidding of the

[1] Gentz at that time counselled the Czar to induce Austria to fight by sending word to Vienna that if Austria refused, he would divide with France what no one would assist Russia in defending (Martens, "Recueil," VI. p. 419). Alexander appears to have followed this advice, for about the middle of May, through his ambassador at Vienna, Pozzo di Borgo, he represented the possibility of making peace with the enemy without Austria, "whereby she would remain excluded from a system arising from circumstances which she alone had rendered unfavourable" (Vandal, "Alexandre I et Napoléon," p. 39).

peace party, and allowing for all these circumstances it cannot be a matter for surprise that he should have accepted the enemy's proposal of peace. But it is surprising that instead of rejecting Napoleon's overture to form an alliance, he accepted it with enthusiasm.

After learning of the disaster to his army at Friedland the Czar was profoundly depressed, alarmed too for the fate of Prussia, on whose behalf he had taken up arms, and not without anxiety for his own country. In his first instructions Lobanoff was told to maintain intact the integrity of Russia, and throughout the negotiations to support the Prussian envoy in everything concerning that State. But Lobanoff returned with the cheering news that he had been most graciously received, that the victorious Emperor had drunk the Czar's health in foaming champagne, and that though he would not hear of Prussia being included in the negotiations, he was willing to make a special agreement with Russia with the Vistula as boundary (a gain instead of a dreaded loss of territory), and to form a close alliance. That was a matter which required careful consideration, for King Frederick William and Hardenberg, his representative in the negotiations, had previously been assured that their proposals would always receive Russia's support, but the Vistula as boundary would be gained at Prussia's expense, while the alliance would inevitably entail war with England, to the serious detriment of Russia's trade. At Sczawel the young Czar spent some anxious hours with his Minister, Budberg, discussing Napoleon's alluring proposals. With regard to the separate peace he promptly decided to accept it on the following conditions: compensation for the King of Naples and Sardinia, the reinstatement of the Duke of Mecklenburg, for whose loss of territory Russia was responsible, and the restoration of Prussia. In return, Russia was prepared, through France's mediation, to renew the previous treaties with Turkey, and even to renounce a passage for her warships through the Dardanelles. The restoration of all Prussia's lost territory was highly doubtful, as that depended largely on Napoleon; but if it was not to be had in its en-

tirety, at least Russia was willing to try to obtain the Elbe as the western boundary for her ally; for eastern boundary Napoleon proposed the Vistula. Nevertheless it would not have been safe to take so much Prussian territory without offering sufficient compensation—Bohemia, perhaps, to punish Austria for her "duplicity". Should the Vistula boundary prove unattainable, Russia then meant to ask for East Prussian territory as far as the Memel, of course in exchange for suitable compensation.

So much for the peace. As for the alliance, the first idea was not to accept it, but to hold it out as an inducement to Napoleon in the future, while the demand for the exclusion of English shipping from Russian ports was to be met by the proposal of an alliance between the navies of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, so that England would be forced to yield to superior numbers. With Turkey the case was different. Provided Napoleon was prepared to be more explicit, it would be worth while to consider seriously the question of restoring "the old empires of the Orient and the Occident," and the demarcation of their respective spheres.[1]

It is evident, therefore, that Lobanoff's information had inspired fresh courage in the Czar, for though defeated at Austerlitz and Friedland, he was now aspiring to partition Western Europe with the victorious Emperor. To all appearance his breach of faith with regard to the treaty was about to prove a profitable stroke of policy. After the signing of the truce Lobanoff brought the document to his master, and so satisfactory was the account he gave of the proceedings that the Czar forthwith discarded his scruples about the alliance. Lobanoff's report is not known, but it is highly probable that Turkey was the mainspring directing the Czar's

[1] I am here following the Sbornik, vol. 89, p. 35, where a published report is given which I regard, as does Lenz ("Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preuszischen Geschichte," VI. 220), as a later stage of the Russian deliberations than that given by Martens (VI. 421), and Tatistscheff (p. 145) in the draft of the instructions, where no mention is made of an alliance, and the envoy is to support the Prussian representative in every way during the negotiations. The latter circumstance seems to me the decisive factor in determining the sequence of the two documents.

thoughts. In May the Sultan Selim had been driven from his throne by a revolt of the Janissaries, and his successor, Mustapha, was said to be hostile to France. Although Napoleon may not have been cognisant of all the circumstances he certainly knew enough about the situation at Constantinople to be "explicit" in discussing the future of the Ottoman Empire with the Russian envoy. The fact remains that the instructions Lobanoff took with him to Tilsit, whither Napoleon had now gone, differed fundamentally from his previous instructions: "You will inform the Emperor Napoleon" (till then he had been addressed officially as Bonaparte) "how much impressed I am by all that he has communicated to me through you, and how much I desire that the mischief wrought in the past should be repaired by a close alliance between the two nations. A new system should replace the one hitherto in use, and a discussion without any third parties would easily lead to an understanding."

On June 25th Napoleon sent Duroc with a formal invitation to the Czar, and on the following day the interview between the two Monarchs took place at Tilsit.[1] A magnificent tent was erected on a raft moored in the middle of the Niemen, so that the interview might take place without eye-witnesses. The two Emperors were rowed across in small boats amidst the huzzas of the French and Russian Guards drawn up on either bank of the river. The conference lasted for nearly two hours, the respective suites remaining outside all the time.

[1] Lobanoff's despatch of June 21st, in which the proposed alliance is mentioned, further states that Berthier had added "that if the two Sovereigns had the opportunity of discussing matters together, peace could be signed within a very short time". In Bennigsen's memoirs the same assurance is given by Duroc. Napoleon, on the other hand, wrote on June 24th, to Talleyrand (who was no friend to Russia), "The Emperor of Russia has approached within nine miles of this, and I am told he desires a meeting. I am not particularly desirous of one, but would not refuse." This does not ring perfectly sincere, and is not in keeping with all the other evidence. Lobanoff on the same day wrote to Duroc, "A personal discussion by the two Monarchs would greatly facilitate the negotiations," thereby implying that the matter had already been mooted. There is no doubt the Czar followed up Napoleon's hint with the greatest alacrity.

There is no direct evidence as to what was said on either side, though some declared they overheard the opening remarks, and that the Czar began the interview by saying, "I hate the English as much as you do. I will second all you do against them," to which Napoleon replied, "In that case everything can be settled and peace is made". Indeed there was no use in continuing the war if by peaceful means he could now obtain Russia's accession to the continental blockade in the event of England refusing the conditions imposed. In the latter case Napoleon probably meant to resume the old plan of invading India, a scheme that was constantly in his mind and in which he had interested the Czar's father. Concessions were made on both sides; Napoleon agreed to sacrifice the integrity of Turkey, the point on which the two Powers had differed in 1806, he renounced his idea of restoring the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and assigned Finland to Russia. The Czar in return consented to all the changes Napoleon contemplated in Germany and in Italy. There was thus sufficient basis for an agreement such as would satisfy both parties for the time being. It is doubtful if all these topics were mentioned in the first interview, but they certainly were fully and keenly discussed in the almost uninterrupted and confidential intercourse between the two Monarchs during the ensuing weeks. Napoleon also concluded a peace with Prussia, and on June 26th he met King Frederick William, who now appeared merely as a protégé of the Czar, and no longer as a Sovereign of equal rank pleading his own cause. Two weeks were spent thus at Tilsit before the peace was signed. Napoleon exerted all the charm of his personality to captivate the Czar, and so vain a Prince was not insensible to the flattery implied in the fact of the conquering Sovereign offering his vanquished foe the homage of his friendship. Some months later the Czar told Napoleon's ambassador, Savary, that he had previously been absolutely prejudiced against Napoleon, but at their first interview, within the first three-quarters of an hour, all his prejudices had quickly vanished, so just were the proposals advocated by the Emperor. Nowadays we know that the charm of his

new ally did not prevent Alexander keeping his eyes wide open. Napoleon on his part considered the Czar "a handsome young man, of more ability than is generally thought". Long afterwards at St. Helena, Napoleon looked back on the Tilsit days as perhaps the time when he was happiest: "I had had to struggle with adversity and anxiety, especially after Eylau, and now I was conqueror, now I dictated, and Emperor and Kings paid me court". The attitude of the two Monarchs helped forward the possibility of an agreement and facilitated the concessions which were made by both sides, but which nevertheless contained the seeds of future discord. Although Napoleon was no longer anxious for the restoration of Poland, which had set up a national administration under his ægis, he did not wish it to revert to Prussia. He is said to have offered it without any formality to Alexander as "King of Poland". Two years previously, at Czartoryski's instigations the Czar had requested it for himself; now, however, he declined it.[1] He was shrewd enough to see through the skilful move which would have involved Russia in constant friction with her next neighbour and so have rendered her powerless with regard to Napoleon's plans in Turkey. The Emperor then proposed grouping Poland, Prussian Silesia, and Saxony into a kingdom under his brother Jerôme, and suggested the latter should marry the Czar's sister, Katherine. But this project was also opposed, and recognizing that the time was not yet ripe for him to extend his sway to the Vistula, Napoleon formally withdrew his proposal. In a note to the Czar on July 4th he declared that "to call Prince Jerôme to the throne of Saxony and Warsaw might upset in a moment almost all our relationships". As each petty dispute between the two adjoining States would affect it, this political error would only too soon have disturbed their friendship, hence

[1] For Napoleon's offer *vide* Schilder, "Alexander I," I. p. 199, and Schiemann, "Nikolaus I," p. 98, where Prince Kurakin's letter of June 30th, 1807, to the Queen Mother is given in which it is explicitly stated that the Czar Alexander had been offered by Napoleon all the Polish provinces of Prussia and the title of "King of Poland," but was generous enough to decline.

Napoleon declared in a secret article that the marriage of which he had spoken lay outside his policy; his immediate sphere of influence did not extend beyond the Elbe. "The lands between that river and the Niemen shall form the barrier dividing the two great empires and keeping both scatheless from the pin-pricks which between nations generally precede cannon-balls." From this letter it is also evident that it was no longer a question of the Vistula as Russia's frontier. "The Czar's protection allows Prussia to resume possession of the land between the two Haffs and as far up as the sources of the Oder." Also, as the Czar had already predicted, Prussia lost all her territory in the west as far as the Elbe. Her Polish territory was now formed into the Dukedom of Warsaw—probably at the Czar's suggestion—with a special Constitution and administration, and bestowed upon the "King" of Saxony, Fred. Augustus I. Possibly the Czar thought he could carry out his plans for Poland more easily if that country lay in the hands of a petty prince; but Saxony had joined the Confederation of the Rhine in the previous December, and hence Warsaw could not escape Napoleon's sphere of power, which thus actually extended beyond the Elbe.[1] As proof of this Napoleon reserved for himself Polish Crown lands worth 27,000,000 francs for future use in rewarding his generals. To Alexander, as compensation for having renounced the Memel district, he assigned the territory of Bialystok belonging to the duchy of Warsaw, so as to strengthen Russia's frontier on the Polish side.[2]

[1] It is probable that when Alexander refused the throne of Poland he had the duchy of Warsaw in view, cp. Napoleon's remark to the Russian Ambassador in 1810: "Why did the Emperor Alexander at Tilsit reject the first plan I proposed? He would have saved himself all the anxieties the Duchy of Warsaw caused him." In his first instructions to Lobanoff the Czar had strenuously opposed Prussia's inclusion in the Confederation of the Rhine: "Vu que la Prusse, quoique nominativement rétablie, deviendrait alors necessairement vassale de Bonaparte".

[2] *Vide* Alexander's answer of July 6th to Napoleon's note of the 4th, Tatistscheff, p. 166. Although the Czar requested certain territories on the left bank of the Elbe for Prussia, he evidently was not at all sanguine of succeeding with Napoleon.

Compensation was found for Jerôme by uniting the Prussian territories on the right bank of the Elbe with those of Hesse and Brunswick and forming them into the Kingdom of Westphalia.[1]

Napoleon's offer of Poland to the Czar had betrayed the fact that he still cherished designs on Turkey. He constantly dwelt upon the necessity of withdrawing from the Turks their European territory, but he left it to Russia to claim a definite part of it for herself. The Czar had confidently reckoned on receiving Constantinople, but when he happened to express this desire to Napoleon he met with a peremptory refusal. "No, Constantinople, never!" exclaimed Napoleon, "that would be the mastery of the world!"[2] Apart from occasional differences, the friendliness of the two Emperors stood out in sharp contrast to the morose mien of King Frederick William, and the visit ended in a solution acceptable to Napoleon. At last, on July 7th, 1807, the negotiations had made such progress that the two diplomatists, Talleyrand and Kurakin, were able to sign the documents.

There were two of these, one for the peace, the other, an offensive and defensive alliance. In the former, which dealt with the stipulations regarding Prussia, it was stated that "out of consideration for the Czar and as a proof of friendship and confidence," Frederick William was to have restored to him his territories east of the Elbe with the exception of the Kottbus district which went to Saxony and the Polish provinces in South Prussia and new East Prussia which fell to Russia, while the remainder was to form the

[1] Westphalia was to consist of the States of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, the Altmark, the territory of Magdeburg to the left of the Elbe, the territories of Halle, Hildesheim, the town of Goslar, Halberstadt, and Hohenstein, Quedlinburg, the county of Mansfeld, the Eichsfeld, Mulhausen and Nordhausen, the county of Stolberg, Hesse-Cassel, the former Hanoverian principalities of Göttingen and Grubenhagen with Hohenstein and Elbingerode, the bishoprics of Osnabruck and Paderborn, Minden, Ravensberg, and the county of Rittberg-Kaunitz.

[2] *Vide* the "Mémoires of Ménéval," II. 105, who was an eye-witness of the scene.

"duchy of Warsaw". The Czar recognized Joseph as King of Naples, and promised to recognize him also as Lord of Sicily as soon as compensation had been found for the legitimate King; he acknowledged Louis as King of Holland, Jerôme as King of Westphalia, and acquiesced in the Confederation of the Rhine. If on the conclusion of peace with England, Hanover were added to Westphalia, the latter was to cede to Prussia territory on the left of the Elbe with nearly 400,000 subjects. Napoleon received Cattaro and the Ionian Isles and restored Coburg, Mecklenburg, and Oldenburg. He was to act as mediator between Russia and Turkey, while the Czar was to be mediator between France and England. Russia was to evacuate the Danube Principalities, which were not to be occupied by the Sultan's troops till after the Peace.

As to what was to happen should England and Turkey refuse the conditions of the mediating Powers, the treaty of peace had nothing to say. But the second treaty, the secret alliance, answered that question. In this second treaty the contracting parties pledged themselves to offensive and defensive measures against Britain and Turkey. Against the former, if by November 1st, 1807, she had not accepted Russia's proposals requiring Britain to restore to France and her ally all the conquests taken from them since 1805, and to grant the liberty of the seas to ships of all nationalities; on these conditions being complied with Hanover would then be restored to Britain. If France's mediation with the Porte had not proved successful within three months from the Tilsit negotiations, they would then proceed against Turkey. Should Britain refuse, Russia pledged herself to join the Continental blockade, break off all relations with Britain, and combine with France in forcing Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, and Austria to wage war on British trade. Should the Porte refuse, France was to join with Russia in wresting from Turkey her European possessions with the exception of Constantinople and Roumelia. Should Denmark, Portugal, or Sweden oppose the demands of the allies, the country offering such resistance would then be invaded by the armies

of both Powers. Should Sweden alone refuse they would combat her through Denmark.[1] Two days later, on July 9th, 1807, peace was likewise signed with Prussia. In vain the beautiful young Queen Louise, regardless of the insults so often hurled at her in Napoleon's bulletins, pleaded with the conqueror for better terms for her country, or at least the restitution of Magdeburg. She gained nothing but polite speeches and vague promises. "Generosity in politics is folly," Napoleon had once remarked, and he acted on that principle now, and adhered to the conditions as he had settled them with the Czar. Prussia was therefore forced to pledge herself to close her ports against Britain, and in the event of the latter refusing the terms of peace, to join with France and Russia in waging war against her.

Such were the main features of the Tilsit treaty. Some have professed to see in it a division of the mastery of Europe, Napoleon leaving to the Czar the eastern portion, and reserving to himself undisputed rule over the west. But such was not the actual fact. In this document the conqueror and the conquered are clearly distinguishable. Napoleon renounced none of his designs on Turkey, and his alliance with Persia upheld his position in the East. Under certain circumstances he was to join with Russia in taking from Turkey her European territories, but these circumstances and also the disposal of the booty lay largely within Napoleon's control, and moreover nothing was said as to what would constitute the demarcation between the "Orient and the Occident". One thing he made abundantly plain, Russia must renounce her proud hope of seeing the Greek Cross flying from the mosque of St. Sophia.[2] Furthermore by conferring the duchy

[1] *Vide* text of this treaty in the Appendix.

[2] Thiers in his "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire" (VII. 517) mentions a scheme of partition according to which Russia was to receive Bessarabia, Moldavia, Walachia, and Bulgaria as far as the Balkans. It is certain there must have been many conversations on this subject at Napoleon's instigation. It is probable that Alexander discussed a plan, drawn up by Hardenberg (Ranke, "Denkwürdigkeiten des Fürsten Hardenberg," III. 460) the terms of which are quoted by Thiers, and which Napoleon accepted with alacrity so as to make sure of his new ally.

of Warsaw upon one of the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon secured a trump card which he could play out against Russia when it suited him. As for Russia herself, the moment she began to wage war on English commerce, she was at the mercy of France, at least as regarded her industries. Hence in the treaty of July 7th, 1807, there was nothing to indicate that Napoleon had either renounced or modified any part of his policy. His concessions to Russia were merely a halting-place on his path to universal domination. In 1803, when war with England was inevitable, the First Consul had made approaches to the Czar Alexander I and had submitted to him proposals for acting in concert against Great Britain and dividing the mastery of Europe. At that time the Austrian diplomatist Cobenzl, alluding to these signs of Napoleon's policy, had shrewdly observed: "No man has ever before justified the suspicion of aiming at the mastery of the world as Bonaparte has done; he has set about it the right way in beginning by being one of two, so as to end by being the only one".

Article 22 of the treaty concerning the Danube principalities indicates that these might possibly be promised to the Czar, but the matter never got the length of a definite written agreement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

CHAPTER I.—Among the older books dealing with Napoleon's youth, these three—all of them partial to their hero—are specially noteworthy: Coston, "Biographie des premières années de Napoléon Bonaparte" (1840); Libri, "Souvenir de la jeunesse de Napoléon" (1842); Nasica, "Mémoires sur l'enfance et la jeunesse de Napoléon I, jusqu'à l'âge de 23 ans" (1851). To a more recent date belongs Masson's fundamental work in two volumes, "Napoléon inconnu," Paris (1895), correcting and supplementing the earlier publications. Of special value are a number of the hitherto unedited letters of Napoleon and his youthful compositions, edited by Masson and Biagi, which had been the property of Fesch. On the cardinal's death, his vicar, Abbé Lyonnet, took possession of these papers and handed them over to the famous "*bibliomane*," Libri, for some seven or eight thousand francs and the prospect of a bishopric. Libri published a few fragments in the forties in the "Revue des deux mondes," and the "Illustration," and then sold the whole treasure to Lord Ashburnham, whose son sent his father's valuable collection to the hammer. The Italian Government seized the opportunity of obtaining the Napoleon manuscripts, and they are now in the Laurentiana at Florence. They form the groundwork of Masson's book. Relying on it and on wide researches among archives, Chuquet published his three-volume work, "La jeunesse de Napoléon" (up to the capture of Toulon), Paris, 1897, 1898, 1899. It is superior to Masson in its larger treatment and its more impartial and scientific handling of his subject. At present, Chuquet's work is conclusive as regards Napoleon's youth. Marcaggi, "La genèse de Napoléon" (till the flight from Corsica), Paris, 1902, makes some contributions from the Corsican archives. The works of Masson and Chuquet have superseded those of Böthlingk, "Napoleon Bonaparte, sein Jugend und sein Emporkommen bis zum 13 Vendémiaire" (Jena, 1877), and Jung, "Bonaparte et son temps (1769-99) d'après les

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documents inédits," Paris, 1880-1. Jung by his inaccurate references is responsible for spreading abroad many errors. Two bibliographic works very dissimilar in style demand notice, Lumbroso, "Saggio di una bibliografia ragionata per servire alla storia dell' epoca napoleonica," 5 vols., 1894, informative but too ambitious in its scope, and Kircheisen, "Bibliographie Napoleons," 1894, does good service but is far from complete. Among the comprehensive biographies, in addition to those of Lanfrey and Rose, should perhaps be included, Sloane, "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," 4 vols., New York, 1896; and Pflugk-Harttung's compilation, "Napoleon I.," in 2 vols., Berlin, 1900-1.

For Napoleon's genealogy—vide Passerini, "Della origine della famiglia Bonaparte dimostrata con documenti," Firenze, 1856 ("Archivo storico ital." III, IV); Stefani, "L'antichità dei Bonaparte," Venezia, 1857; Reumont, "Beiträge zur italienischen Geschichte," IV; Colle, "Genealogia della famiglia Bonaparte," Firenze, 1898; Colonna de Cesari Rocca, "La vérité sur les Bonapartes avant Napoléon," Paris, 1899.

For Napoleon's childhood—vide Larrey, "Madame Mère," Paris, 1892, and Lætitia's dictates in the appendix. Cf. Napoleon's own remarks as recorded in the Mémoires of Las Cases, Montholon, and Gourgaud, at St. Helena; and in Joseph's Mémoires (éd. Ducasse), those of Mme. de Rémusat (I, 267 ff.) and Antommarchi, "Les derniers moments de Napoléon," (new edition, 1895). Cf. also Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," I (Paris, 1897).

For the date of Napoleon's birth—even during his life-time, it was thought that he made himself a year younger. Cf. the Article "Bonaparte" in Michaud's "Biographie universelle". Recent authors have repeated this without sufficient reasons. Jung, I, 42, was the first to raise serious objections to the date August 15th, 1769. He produced an extract from the Civil Register of Corte, recording the baptism of "Nabulione Buonaparte" on January 8th, 1768. The same document appears almost unchanged but with the un-Italian name of Joseph preceding Nabulione, as the baptismal certificate of Joseph Bonaparte, in the archives at Ajaccio. Jung in conclusion brings forward Napoleon's marriage certificate, in which February 5th, 1768, is given as the date of the bridegroom's birth. With these proofs in his hand he argued that Napoleon was the eldest son of Carlo Bonaparte, that he was born in 1768, and that his father had exchanged his birth cer-

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tificate for that of Joseph in order to show that Napoleon was of the requisite age (not over ten) for admission to the school at Brienne. But there are many things against this. (1) In the archives of the War Office at Paris there is a copy, dated July 21st, 1771, of a record of baptism stating that on August 15th, 1769, a son of Carlo Bonaparte was christened "Napoleone". (2) In 1776, Carlo had applied for free places in the Royal Military School for his two eldest sons. This necessitated accurate information as to the age of the boys, and copies of their baptismal certificates had to be produced. As a matter of fact in the War Office archives there is an entry, registered June 23rd, 1776, giving "August 15th, 1769" as the date of Napoleon's birth. Carlo's application was under consideration for years, the War Office made inquiries, requested proofs of their nobility and such matters. By the year 1779, according to the regulations, only one of the boys—the one born in 1769—could be given a free place. How could the father, while his request and the information accompanying it was still in possession of the authorities, have substituted Napoleon's birth certificate for that of Joseph, i.e. have falsified both documents? Prior to 1776 there was no adequate reason for this substitution. Finally guided by the baptismal certificates the authorities at Paris chose the younger boy, who was alone eligible, and they retained his birth certificate. That boy was Napoleon, and that is why the record of his baptism is preserved among the archives. (3) Chuquet has rightly explained the "Nabulione" in Joseph's baptismal certificate; for Carlo, following earlier precedents, wanted to call his second and third sons Napoleone, a name distinguished in the family records. But the first-born Joseph (born 1765) died after the second son had already been christened Nabulione, and hence the name Joseph was inserted later in the baptismal certificate of the subsequent King of Naples and Spain, and so the name "Napoleon" fell to the son born in the year 1769.

For the time at Autun and at Brienne—vide Harold de Fontenay, "Napoléon, Joseph, et Lucien Bonaparte au Collège d'Autun" (Autun, 1869); and Assier, "Napoléon I, à l'école de Brienne" (Paris, 1874). Both these works are surpassed by Chuquet. In addition *vide* the reminiscences of his fellow-scholars, C. H., "Some account of the early days of Buonaparte at the military school of Brienne," 1797. Also "Traits caractéristiques de la jeunesse de Bonaparte" (Leipsig, 1802), and "Histoire de Bona-

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parte, premier Consul," Paris, an X. Bourrienne, "Mémoires," I, to be treated with reserve.

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For the time spent in garrison—vide, in addition to Masson and Chuquet, Du Teil, "Une famille militaire au 18 siècle (Paris, 1896); de Romain, "Souvenirs d'un officier royaliste"; "Journal d'un bourgeois de Valence"; Léty, "Bonaparte à Valence" (Tournon, 1898); and Bois, "Napoleon Bonaparte, lieutenant d'artillerie à Auxonne" (Paris, 1898). None of these contain fresh material of importance.

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CHAPTER II.—*For the Revolution—vide* Sybel, "Geschichte der Revolutionszeit," I; Sorel, "L'Europe et la révolution française," II; Taine, "Les origines de la France contemporaine," I-IV; Aulard, "Histoire politique de la Révolution," Paris, 1901; Chérest, "La chute de l'ancien régime," 2 vols.; Sciout, "La constitution civile du clergé," 4 vols.; Wahl, "Studien zur Vorgeschichte d. franz. Revolution," as well as numerous special studies mentioned in Lavisse et Rambaud's "Histoire générale," VIII, and in G. Koch, "Beiträge z. Geschichte der politischen Ideen," II. The descriptions of the Revolutionary movement given by Thiers, Mignet, Michelet, Hamel and others have now been surpassed.

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de la Corse, 1881 ff.); Jollivet, "La Revolution française en Corse" (Paris, 1892); Grosjean, "La Mission de Sémonville à Constantinople" (Paris, 1887); the Memoirs of Masseria, to which I had not access, of Joseph and of Lucien, those of the latter not always trustworthy. Chuquet in Vol. II, p. 377, gives a list of the now authenticated letters and writings of Napoleon up till May, 1792, and in Vol. III, p. 324, he continues the list up till the end of 1793.

For the expedition in Sardinia—vide Chuquet, III, and Letteron, "Pièces et documents". The Corsican period was generally ignored during Napoleon's lifetime. In the "Histoire de Bonaparte," which appeared in 1802 and was probably "inspired," there occurs the following (p. 20): "Tout le temps qui s'écoula depuis l'aurore de la révolution jusqu'à l'époque fameuse du siège de Toulon, en décembre, 1793, fut consacré par Bonaparte à s'instruire dans la tactique militaire qu'il cultivait en paix et dans l'obscurité; car jusqu'àu siège de Toulon il vécut pour ainsi dire inconnu."

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CHAPTER III.—*Vide* "Correspondance de Napoléon I," published under the auspices of Napoleon III. It begins with letters written in the autumn of 1793 before the capture of Toulon. It is known that Napoleon's correspondence was subjected to a rigorous revision before publication and that many thousands of letters were left unedited. Subsequently they were partly published by Du Casse in his "Supplément à la Correspondance de Napoléon I," Paris, 1887; Lecestre, "Lettres Inédites," 2 vols., Paris, 1897; Brotonne, "Lettres inédites," Paris, 1898; and "Dernières lettres inédites," 2 vols., Paris, 1903. The gaps in the collection may be partly filled up from the "Mémoires of Joseph Bonaparte" (published by Du Casse), and from the facts communicated by Coston and Jung.

For Napoleon's writings at this time—vide "Le souper de Beaucaire," in Masson's "Napoléon inconnu," II. The following are also worth consulting: the Memoirs of Robespierre's sister, those of Marmont (I, 120, where Dugommier's report on Toulon is given), the Souvenirs of Doulcet Pontécoulant, the Memoirs

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of the Duchess of Abrantés (Junot's wife); those of Barras, where the facts are often maliciously distorted; of Doppet; and of General Thiébault, Vol. I.

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For the 13th Vendémiaire—vide Zivy, "La Journée du 13 vendémiaire," Paris, 1898, in the "Bibliothèque de la faculté des lettres de l'Université de Paris"; the Memoirs of Thibaudeau, Larevellière-Lépaux, Barras, and Thiébault.

For the period following Vendémiaire—vide the Memoirs of Bourrienne and of Joseph Bonaparte, Arnault's "Souvenirs d'un Sexagenaire"; the "Mémoires sur Carnot," published by his son, new edition, 1893; Charavay, "Correspondance générale de Carnot"; Tissot on Carnot; Fain's "Manuscrit de l'an III"; the "Memoirs of Ségur and of Ouvrard"; Babeau, "La France et Paris sous le Directoire," Paris, 1888 (letters of an English traveller); Gourgaud's "Journal inédit de 1815 à 1818," Paris, 1900. The "Correspondance de Mallet du Pan avec la cour de Vienne," 1794-98, in 2 vols., published by André Michel, merely remarks of Bonaparte at this period that he was a "*Corse*

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terroriste," from which it would seem that it was only after the Italian Campaign that his name became widely known.

For social affairs—vide Goncourt, "Histoire de la Société française sous le Directoire"; and the fundamental works, "Tableaux de la révolution française," and "Pariser Zustände wahrend der Revolutionzeit," by the German scholar Adolph Schmidt; also Mme. le Staël's "Considerations sur la révolution française," I.

For Josephine—vide "Napoléon I. et Josephine"; "Lettres authentiques," 2 vols., Paris, 1833, new edition, 1896 (published in English in London, 1901). The most important source is Masson's "Joséphine de Beauharnais," 1763-96, Paris, 1899; also Turquan, "La générale Bonaparte," and Masson's "Napoléon et les femmes," and also his "Napoléon et sa famille," I; the Memoirs of Dufort de Cheverny, of Mme. de Rémusat; and the "Mémoires sur Joséphine et ses contemporains," by Mlle. Ducrest, who has borrowed considerably from the "Mémoires et correspondance de l'impératrice Joséphine," Paris, 1820 and 1827, which are partly spurious. The same remark applies to the third volume of Coston's "Biographie des premières années de Napoléon Bonaparte". Cf. Al. Schulte, "Napoleon I, als Brautwerber um Josephinens Hand.," "Deutsche Revue," 1901. Napoleon's letters complaining of Josephine's infidelity are not in the "Correspondance". The letter to Joseph, quoted in the text, is only published in part by Coston, and in the "Mémoires du Roi Joseph," and was first given in its complete form by Pertz in the treatises of the Berlin Academy, 1861, p. 221, and afterwards by Du Casse in "Les Rois frères de Napoléon," p. 8.

For the episode of Desirée Clary—vide Hochschild's "Desirée, reine de Suède," 1889.

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CHAPTER IV.—*For the history of the campaigns in* 1796-7, Napoleon's correspondence is the principal authority. Rose, "France and the First Coalition before the Campaign of 1796" ("Eng. Hist. Rev.," 1903). Cf. Descoubès, "La correspondance militaire de Napoléon I," in the "Journal des sciences militaires," January, 1878; also the "Correspondance inédite officielle et confidentielle de Napoléon Bonaparte," 1819, containing the letters from the

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"Directory," Vols. I-IV and VII. Hüffer offers a valuable contribution, "Ungedruckte Briefe Napoleons aus dem Jahre 1796 und 1797" ("Archives of Austrian History," Vol. XLIX), further supplemented by Brotonne's Collections; cf. also Napoleon's letters to Barras in the "Miscellanea Napoleonica," V.

For an exhaustive bibliography of the campaign—vide Bouvier, "Bonaparte en Italie, 1796"; and Kuhl, "Bonapartes erster Feldzug 1796, der Ausgangspunkt Moderner Kriegesfährung," Berlin, 1902, which contains a very interesting introduction dealing with the French military methods then practised and with Napoleon's plans of operation. Both terminate at the investiture of Mantua. *Vide* also Vivenot, "Thugut, Clerfayt, and Wurmser" (Vienna, 1869); Eckstorff, "Studien zur ersten Phase des Feldzuges, von 1796" (Berlin, 1901); and Hortig, "Bonaparte vor Mantua" (Rost, 1903); Fabry, "Histoire de l'armée d'Italie, 1796 et 1797," in Vol. III (1901), Napoleon assumes the chief command. *Vide* also Colin, "Etudes sur la campagne de 1796-97 en Italie," Paris, 1898, as well as the older narratives of Koch, the Memoirs of Masséna (Paris, 1848), Jomini, Schels ("Ost. milit. Zeitschr.," 1830), Clausewitz, Rüstow, Schulz, and Yorck, "Napoleon als Feldherr," Vol. I, Berlin, 1885; also Delbrück, "Über den Unterschied der Strategie Friedrichs d. Gr. und Napoleons" ("Hist. und pol. Aufsätze," 1887) and a short treatise by Malachowski, "Über die Entwickelung der leitenden Gedanken zur ersten Kampagne Bonapartes" (Berlin, 1884). As yet there has been no thorough and comprehensive examination of the materials in the War Office records at Vienna dealing with the military events of this year.

For Napoleon's indebtedness to military works—vide Pierron, "Comment s'est formé le génie de Napoléon" ("Journal des Sciences militaires," 1888) and a rejoinder to it by X, Paris, 1889; Montgelas, "Bonaparte und Maillebois" ("Beiheft zum Militärwochenblatt," 1894); Kuhl and others in the Appendix.

For the memoirs of this period—vide those of Miot de Melito, Marmont, Masséna, St. Cyr, Thiébault (2 vols.), Pelleport (Paris, 1857), Roquet (1862), the Piedmontese Costa de Beauregard (Paris, 1877); Stendhal's "Souvenirs de Milan de 1796" ("Revue des deux mondes," 1855); Landrieux' "Mémoires," published by Grasilier, Paris, 1893.

For biographers—vide Pineau, "Le général Dugommier," 1902; Tuetey, "Sérurier" (1899); Chevrier, "Le général Joubert"; Rose,

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"The Despatches of Colonel Thomas Graham on the Italian Campaigns of 1796-97" ("Eng. Hist. Review," 1899); Gachot, "Histoire militaire de Masséna," I (Paris, 1901); Stöckl, "Felzugmeister Gr. Beaulieu im Feldzug in Italien" ("Organ der Militär-wissensch. Vereine," 1900); Angeli, "Erzherzog Karl I" (Wien, 1896); Sorel, "Bonaparte et Hoche" (Paris, 1897); Gachot, "Bonaparte et Kellermann" ("La nouvelle revue," 1901).

For the events in the capital in connexion with the campaigns, cp. the Memoirs of Carnot, Larevellière-Lépaux, the "Souvenirs" and also the "Correspondance" of Mallet du Pan, the Memoirs of Bourrienne, Matthieu Dumas, Hyde de Neuville, Dufort de Cheverny, and Barante; Lacretelle, "Dix ans d'épreuves"; Barbé-Marbois, "Journal d'un déporté"; Creuze-Latouche's "Letter on the Proceedings of 18th fructidor" ("Nouvelle revue retrospective," 1903), the reports of Sandoz and Bayard given in Bailleu's "Preuszen und Frankreich 1795-1807," Vol. I; and the reminiscences in Bray's "Aus dem Leben eines Diplomaten der alten Schule" (Leipzig, 1903).

For official corruption—vide the "Moniteur" and the "Rédacteur" (the organ of the Directory).

For authoritative narratives—vide Sybel, "Gesch. d. Revolutionszeit," IV, corrected in several instances by Hüffer in his "Diplomatische Verhandlungen a. d. Zeit d. franz. Revolution," I, Bonn, 1868; Sorel, "L'Europe et la revolution française," IV et V (Bonaparte et le Directoire), Paris, 1902; also the same themes in the "Revue historique," especially Vols. XVII and XVIII; Guyot et Muret, "Etude critique sur 'Bonaparte et le Directoire, par M. Albert Sorel'" ("Rev. f. hist. mod.," 1904), thorough, but the criticisms are not always justified. Pallain, "Le Ministère de Tallyrand sous le Directoire," Paris, 1894 (including Talleyrand's letters); Sciout, "Le Directoire," 4 vols., Paris, 1897.

For special points—vide Séché, "Les origines du concordat," I, Paris, 1894; Carini, "Nuovi documenti per la storia del trattato di Tolentino" in "Spicilegio Vaticano," I, Rome, 1890; Richemont, "Bonaparte et Caleppi à Tolentino" ("Correspondant," 1897); Maresca, "La pace del 1796 tra le due Sicile e la Francia," Naples, 1887; du Teil, "Rome, Naples, et le Directoire, 1796-97," Paris, 1902; E. Daudet, "La conjuration de Pichegru et les complots royalistes," Paris, 1901; Pingaud, "Un Agent secret sous la Révolution et l'Empire," Paris, 1894; Pierre, le 18

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fructidor," Paris, 1894 (deals with d'Antraigues); Gaffarel, "Napoléon et les républiques italiennes, 1769-99," Paris, 1894; Dufourcq, "Le régime Jacobin en Italie," Paris, 1900; Rodocanachi, "Bonaparte et les îles ioniennes, 1797-1816," Paris, 1899; Belloc, "Bonaparte et les Grecs," Paris, 1826; Antonopulos, "Bonaparte et la Grèce" ("Nouvelle Revue," 1889); Pellet, "Bonaparte en Toscane, 1796" ("Revue bleue," 1887); Sanesi, "Il generalissimo Buonaparte a Firenze, 1796" ("Archivio Stor. it.," 1890); Montecatini, "De rebus in Lucensi regione a Bonaparte gestis anno 1796," "Relazione inedita," Cagliari, 1903; Colucci, "La reppublica di Genova e la Rivoluzione francese," 1904, 4 vols.; Guyot, "Le Directoire et la Republique de Gênes" ("La revolution française," 1903).

With reference to Venice—vide Romanin, "Storia documentata di Venezia; Bonnal, "La chute d'une république," Paris, 1885. The memoirs of Manin, the last Doge, are preserved in the archives at Venice.

Addenda, 1910.—Bouvier, "Bonaparte, Cacauet et la papauté" ("Revue d'hist. dipl.," 1907); Roederer, "Journal," Paris, 1909; Bordereau, "Bonaparte et la route d'Ancône" ("Revue des études hist.," 1909); Honig, "Die Kämpfe um Mantua, August und September, 1796," Vienna, 1908; Hüffer-Luckwaldt, "Die Friede von Campo Formio," Innsbrück, 1907.

CHAPTER V.—*For Napoleon's attitude in the winter of* 1797 *and* 1798 until his departure from Toulon there is still unfortunately a dearth of materials. Barras' "Mémoires" are undoubtedly a rich mine of information and throw much light on the subject, but they are disfigured by his inveterate enmity to Napoleon and are not always absolutely truthful. The reminiscences of Larevellière-Lépaux are in many ways unreliable, while those of Talleyrand are disappointingly thin. There is much to be learned from the letters of Joseph Bonaparte and of Napoleon given by Da Casse in "Les Frères de Napoléon". *Vide* also the memoirs of Lucien, the dispatches of the Prussian ambassador at Paris, Sandoz-Rollin, published by Bailleu; the afore-mentioned correspondence of Mallet du Pan to Vienna; Talleyrand's letters as given by Pallain and others; the memoirs of Miot de Melito and of Thibaudeau; the "Considerations of Mme. de Staël" (Vol. II); the memoirs of

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Thiebault, Marmont, Lavalette, and Bourrienne. The gaps left by these and other works have been filled to a certain extent by the scholarly researches of Sybel, Sorel, Hüffer, "Rastatter Congress"; Sciout, "Directoire"; Aulard, "Histoire politique," and others.

For the attack on Rome—vide Gaffarel and Dufourcq.

For the proceedings in Switzerland—vide Strickler, "Amtliche Sammlung der Akten aus der Zeit der helvetischen Republik," I, Bern, 1886; Dunant, "Relations diplomatiques de la France et de la République hélvetique" (1798-1803); "Quellen zur Schweizer Geschichte," XIX, 1902; Brune's Correspondence in the "Archives of Swiss History," XII and XIV; Oechsli, "Geschichte der Schweiz im 19 Jahrh." I, Leipzig, 1903; Tillier, "Geschichte der helvetischen Republik," I; Dändliker, "Geschichte der Schweiz," III; Erlach, "Zur Bernischen Kriegsgesichte d. j., 1798," Bern, 1881.

For the war with England and the Egyptian expedition the most valuable sources are: the "Correspondance de Napoléon I," Vols. IV and V; the "Correspondance inédite officielle et confidentielle de Napoléon Bonaparte"; the "Letters of Napoleon I, 1794-1807," published by H. A. L. Fisher in the "English Historical Review," 1903, and the "Letters from the Army of Bonaparte in Egypt," London, 1798-99. Napoleon's narrative, written down by Bertrand at St. Helena, "Corr." XXIX and XXX, is largely unreliable, as also the official account of Berthier in his "Relations des campagnes du Général Bonaparte en Egypte," Paris, 1800 (2nd ed. 1826).

For contemporary records the following are recommended: the "Memoirs of Bourrienne" (but only by comparing it with the remarks in D'Aures, "A. B. Bourrienne et ses erreurs"); Marmont, "Savary" (new ed.) Paris, 1900; Lavalette, "Beauharnais" (Napoleon's stepson who took part in the campaign); J. Miot, "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des expéditions en Egypte et en Syrie," Paris, 1814; Desvernois, with good notes by the publisher, Dufourcq, Paris, 1898; also Captain Vertray's notes in Galli's "L'armée française en Egypte," Paris, 1883; Doguereau, "Journal de l'expédition d'Egypte" (ed. Jouquière), 1904; Pélissier, "Un soldat d'Italie et d'Egypte"; "Journal d'Antoine Bonnefour," 1903; Richardot's "Nouveaux Mémoires sur l'armée française en Egypte et en Syrie," Paris, 1848; Pelleport's "Souvenirs," I; Niello-Sargy, "Mémoires secrets sur l'expédition d'Egypte," Paris, 1825; Lacorre, "Journal inédit d'un commissaire aux vivres," Bordeaux, 1852;

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Malus, Agenda, "Souvenirs de l'expédition d'Egypte," Paris, 1892; Vigo-Roussillon, "L'expédition d'Egypte; fragment des Mémoires militaires du Colonel V. R." ("Revue des Deux Mondes," 1890, Vol. C); "Reminiscences of a Staff-Officer," in the "Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1880, published by Gopčevič; Gardiolle, "Quatre lettres sur l'expédition d'Egypte," Paris, 1880; Villiers du Terrage, "Journal et Souvenirs," Paris, 1899; Geffroy Saint-Hilaire, "Lettres écrites aux professeurs du Museum"; Thurman (Capitaine de génie), "Souvenirs," published by le Comte Fleury, Paris, 1902; Le chasseur Pierre Millet, "Souvenirs de la Campagne d'Egypte," Paris, 1903; Le canonier Bricard, "Journal" (given in Larchey's "Mémoires de soldats," Vol. IV); Comm. Durrieu's Letters to his brother, given in the "Carnet historique," III; "Journal d'un dragon d'Egypte," Notes, Paris, 1899; Cap. Krettly, "Souvenirs historiques," Paris, 1838; Denon, "Voyage dans la basse et la haute Egypte pendant les campagnes du Général Bonaparte," Paris, 1802; Norry, Architecte, "Relation de l'expédition d'Egypte," Paris, 1799; "Bonaparte au Caire, par un des savants embarqués sur la flotte française," Paris, 1799; Desgenettes, "Histoire médicale de l'armée d'Orient" (2nd ed.), Paris, 1830; Larrey, "Relation historique et chirurgicale," Paris, 1803.

For Arab reminiscences—vide Djabartis, "Diary" (in French), Paris, 1838 (new ed.), 1884; and the "History of the French Invasion," by Nakul el Turk (in French), Paris, 1840. From English sources the most important are the "Dispatches and Letters of Nelson," published by Nicolas, London, 1844, and later by Laughton, London, 1886.

For Malta—vide the "Correspondance secrète d'un Chevalier de Malte," Paris, 1802; Doublet, "Mémoires historiques sur l'invasion et l'occupation de Malte en 1798," Paris, 1883; and the papers left by Bray, "Aus dem Leben eines Diplomaten," Leipzig, 1903. In the Paris archives, in addition to those already published, there are still a number of unedited reminiscences, the diaries of Generals Dugua and Belliard, of Savary, a cavalry officer, and Détroye an officer in the engineers, notes by Théviotte, a colonel in the engineers and by l'Intendant d'Aure, and letters by Generals Morand, Dupuis, Berthier, Dugua, Caffarelli, Desaix, and others. Jonquière, in his "L'expédition d'Egypte," and Guitry in his "L'armée de Bonaparte en Egypte," have both given extracts from these sources.

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For historical narratives—vide, in addition to some older works now superseded,—such as the "Histoire scientifique et militaire de l'expédition française en Egypte," Vols. III-VIII, Paris, 1830—Thiers, "Bonaparte en Egypte et en Syrie" (new school edition with good notes, published by Mart. Hartmann, Leipzig, 1890); M. Dumas, "Krieg der Franzosen in Aegypten," Hamburg, 1800; Martin, "Histoire de l'expédition en Egypte," Paris, 1815; Wilson, "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," London, 1803, largely compiled from the narratives of captured French officers: frequently inaccurate. Ader (1826), Schneidawind (1830), and the afore-mentioned, Lanfrey, Sybel, and Hüffer are all recommended. De la Jonquière's "L'expédition d'Egypte, 1798-1801," Paris, 1900, Vols. I-III, including the Syrian expedition, is drawn from official sources but has gaps in the narrative.

For the political history of the expedition the principal work is Boulay de la Meurthe's "Le directoire et l'expédition d'Egypte," 1885. Lacroix, "Bonaparte en Egypte," is partial to Bonaparte and undiscriminating; Brehier, "L'Egypte, 1789-1900," Paris, 1900, is based mainly on Vigo Roussillon's work, which is not always reliable, and on Villiers du Terrage; Holland Rose, "Life of Napoleon," Vol. I, makes some contributions from the English archives; Waas, in a critical essay in the "Histor. Vierteljahrschrift," "Bonaparte in Jaffa," deals with the shooting of the 2500 Turks, and offers some pertinent observations from various sources (Part I., 1903; Part II., 1904).

For the maritime enterprises—vide Guérin, "Histoire de la Marine Contemporaine," III; Chevalier, "Hist. de la Marine française," IV; Mahan, "Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," Vol. I; Jurien de la Gravière, "Guerres maritimes," I; and Mahan, "Life of Nelson" (2nd ed.), 1899.

For Malta—vide Toulgoët, "Les responsabilités de la capitulation de Malte en 1798," "Revue des questions historiques," 1900.

For Brueys—vide Loir, "Brueys à Aboukir, 1er. août, 1798," "Revue Maritime".

For Phélipeaux—vide Chuquet, "La jeunesse de Bonaparte," I, and a treatise in the "Révolution française," 1899.

For Kléber—vide the biographies of Pajol, Ernouf, and Klaeber's "Leben und Taten d. Gen. Kleber," Dresden, 1900.

For Dommartin—vide Besancenet, "Le Général Dommartin."

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For Larrey—vide Triaire, "Dom. Larrey et les campagnes de la Révol. et de l'Empire," Tours, 1902.

For Monge—vide Jomard, "Souvenirs sur Gaspard Monge et ses rapports avec Napoléon," Paris, 1853; and Pongerville, "G. Monge et l'expédition d'Egypte," 1860.

For the scientific results of the expedition—vide the many volumed work "La Description d'Egypte" (2nd ed.), 1821-30. Mention has already been made in the text of the Journal, "La decade égyptienne," issued by the Institute, and of the "Courrier d'Egypte" which appeared every four days.

Addenda, 1910.—Bourgeois, "Le Général Bonaparte et la presse de son époque," Paris, 1906; Legrand, "La révolution française en Hollande"; "La république batave," Paris, 1895; "Journal du Capitaine François, dit le Dromadaire," published by Grolleau, Paris, 1903.

CHAPTER VI.—*For French politics in* 1799—*vide* Sybel, "Geschichte der Revolutionszeit," V; Sorel, "L'Europe et la Révolution française," V; Sciout, "Le Directoire," III; Boulay de la Meurthe, "Le Directoire et l'expédition d'Egypte"; Lanfrey, "Histoire de Napoleon I," Vol. II; Hüffer, "Der Rastatter Kongress," II; Vivenot, "Zur Geschichte des Rastatter Kongresses"; the dispatches of Sandoz-Rollin given by Bailleu in "Preuszen und Frankreich," 1795-1807, I; Vivenot, "Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts"; the Letters of the Swedish ambassador, Brinkmann, given in "Léouzon-Leduc's Correspondance diplomatique du Baron de Staël-Holstein et du Baron Brinkmann," Paris, 1881; Hüffer, "Die neapolitanische Republik" (Raumer's "Hist. Taschenbuch," 6, third series); Giglioli, "Naples in 1799," London, 1903; Helfert, "Konigin Maria Karoline v. Neapel"; "Franchetti Storia d'Italia," up to the entry of Championnet; Nelson's "Dispatches and Letters," III; Rousselin de Saint-Albin, "Championnet".

For the murder of the Rastatt envoys—there is a great wealth of material. The older authorities are mentioned in Helfert's "Der Rastatter Gesandtenmord," Vienna, 1874. Since then Sybel's researches have appeared in the "Deutsche Rundschau" of 1876 and in the "Historische Zeitschrift," N. F. 39, but in his suspicions against Lehrbach he was following a false scent. Hüffer initiated a better method in his "Rastatter Kongress," and

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especially in his treatise the "Rastatter Gesandtenmord," Bonn, 1896. The documents brought forward by him were admirably supplemented from the Vienna Archives by Christe in his "Beiträge zur Geschichte des Rastatter Gesandtenmordes" ("War Office Archives," N. F., Vol. XI, Vienna) and in his "Nachträge zum Rastatter Gesandtenmord," Ibid. 1903. Christe's work adopts an apologetic attitude, as does also Helfert's collection of essays, "Zur Lösung der Rastatter Gesandtenmordfrage," Stuttgart u. Wien, 1900. Special attention should be paid to the "Deposition" recently published in Bray's "Aus dem Leben eines Diplomaten," Leipzig, 1903. Cf. also Obser, "Polit. Korrespondenz Karl Friedr. von Baden," III, Heidelberg, 1893; Du Moulin-Eckart, "Bayern unter dem Ministerium Montgelas," I, Munich, 1895; Wertheimer, "Erzherzog Karl und die zweitze Koalition" ("Austrian Archives," Vol. XLVII); Heigel, "Zur Gesch. des Rastatter Gesandtenmordes" ("Hist. Vierteljahrschrift," 1900); Obser, "Bonaparte, Debry und der Rastatter Gesandtendmord" ("Zeitschr. f. d. Gesch. d. Oberrheins," Vol. IX) contests Böthlingk's hypothesis (*vide* his "Napoleon Bonaparte sein Jugend und sein Emporkommen," 2nd ed., Jena, 1883) that Napoleon as the real author of the war of 1799, had also his share in the murder of the envoys. Cf. also Wegele in the "Historische Zeitschrift," 1881, and Hüffer in the concluding remarks in his treatise on the murder.

For the military events in 1799—cf. in addition to the historical narratives already mentioned, the military history of M. Dumas, "Précis des événements militaires, 1799-1814"; Jomini, "Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la révolution"; Schulz-Schütz, "Gesch. der Kriege in Europa seit 1792"; Clausewitz, "Die Feldzüge 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz"; Miljutin, "Geschichte des Krieges von Russland mit Frankreich, 1799"; Gachot, "Les campagnes de 1799, Souvoroff en Italie," Paris, 1903; M. "Étude sur la campagne de 1799" ("Revue d'histoire rédigée à l'Etat major"), 1903. *Vide* also Hüffer, "Der Krieg d. j. 1799 und die zweite Koalition," 1904, 1905, with brief accounts of the Rastatt murders, the internal condition of France during Bonaparte's absence and the *coup d'état* in Brumaire. Hüffer's "Quellen zur Geschichte des Zeitalters der französischen Revolution, 1799-1800," Vol. I, Leipzig, 1901, and his "Zug Suworow's durch die Schweiz" ("Mitt. d. Inst. f. österr. Geschichtsforschung"), 1900, which is superior to Orloff's

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military history of Suvaroff, are specially valuable. Cf. Oechsli, "Gesch. d. Schweiz," I. *Vide* also the memoirs of Macdonald, Thiébault, II, Costa de Beauregard, "Un homme d'autrefois"; Koch, "Masséna".

For the internal condition of France—vide Taine, "Les origines de la France contemporaine," IV; Felix Rocquain, "L'état de la France au 18 brumaire," Paris, 1874; and best of all, Vandal, "L'avènement de Bonaparte," Vol. I, Paris, 1902 (la genèse du consulat; Brumaire; "La constitution de l'an VIII")—in which he contributes much that is valuable both from published works and from unedited manuscripts. *Vide* also the Reminiscences of Cambacérès, Mortier, Grouvelle; Daunou; Lettres from Barante and others; Pierre, "La terreur sous le Directoire"; Aulard, "Paris pendant la réaction thermidorienne," V; also his essays in two vols.—"Etudes sur la Révolution française," and his "Etat de la France, en l'an VIII, et en l'an IX"; Madelin, "Fouché," I; Montier, "Robert Lindet"; Néton, "Sieyès".

For contemporary reminiscences—vide Schmidt, "Tableaux de la Révolution," III; Lescure, "Mémoires sur les journées révolutionaires 1789-99," II; Norvins, "Mémorial"; Mallet du Pan, "La Révolution française vue de l'étranger"; the "Mémoires de Napoleon," Corr. XXX; those of Dufort de Chéverny, Chateaubriand ("Mémoires d'outre-tombe"), Lafayette, Larevellière-Lèpaux, Thibaudeau, Roederer ("Œuvres," III), Joseph Bonaparte, Lucien Bonaparte, Bourrienne, Barante, I, Barras, III, Mme. de Staël, "Considerations" and also her treatise "Des Circonstances actuelles," 1798 ("Revue des deux mondes," Nov., 1899), and Frau Reinhard, "Brief an ihren Vater," 1900, the memoirs of Musnier-Desclozeaux (edited by Réal), Ségur (1894 edition), Thiébault, Marmont, M. Dumas, and Lavalette.

The principal newspapers for this period are—the "Moniteur universel," the "Publiciste," the "Surveillant," and the "Gazetté de France".

For the Coup d'état—vide, in addition to Vandal, who has an instructive note on the more important authorities: Aulard, "Histoire politique de la Révolution," and his "Bonaparte et les poignards des 500" in the "Etudes," II; also his "L'établissement du Consulat". In addition to the memoirs cited above, *vide* Jourdan, "Notice sur le 18 brumaire" ("Carnet historique," 1901), "Un temoinage contemporaine sur la journée du 19 bru-

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maire" (Ibid. 1899); "Mémoires historiques sur le 18 brumaire," Paris, an VIII; Sebastiani's remarks in Vatout's "Histoire du Palais de Saint Cloud"; Arnault, "Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire"; the "Cahiers du Capitaine Coignet," and Savary, "Mon examen de conscience sur le 18 brumaire".

For the period of the Provisional Government—vide Aulard, "Le lendemain du 18 brumaire" in his "Etudes," II; also his "Régistre des déliberations du Consulat provisoire," Paris, 1894, and his "Paris sous le Consulat," Paris, 1903; Stourm, "Les finances du Consulat," Paris, 1902; Poinsard, "Le credit public et les emprunts sous le Consulat" ("Annales de l'Ecole des sciences politiques," 1890); Lecomte, "Napoléon et l'Empire, racontés par le théâtre"; Robiquet, "Le Général Hédouville" ("Revue historique"); Boulay de la Meurthe, "Théorie constitutionelle de Sieyès," Paris, 1836; Taillandier, "Documents biographiques"; Thibaudeau, "Le Consulat et l'Empire," I; Thiers, "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire," I. In addition to the memoirs previously mentioned, *vide* also those of Gaudin, Miot de Melito, Stanislas Girardin, and those published by Lalanne, "Les derniers jours du Consulat," and attributed to the learned Fauriel, Paris, 1886 (the first part, dealing with the events presaging the destruction of the Republic). Lebrun, "Opinions, rapports, et écrits," published by his son, Paris, 1829. At the close of 1799 the "Moniteur universelle" became the official organ of the Consulate.

For the text of the Constitution of the year VIII—vide Hélie, "Les Constitutions de la France".

Addenda, 1910.—Vandal, "L'avènement de Bonaparte," vol. II.

CHAPTER VII.—*For Napoleon's offer of peace—vide* "Correspondance," VI; Du Casse, "Histoire des négociations diplomatiques relatives aux traités de Mortfontaine," etc., II, Paris, 1855; Vivenot, "Vertrauliche Briefe des Freih. von Thugut," II, Vienna, 1872; "Parliamentary History," vol. xxxiv; Bignon's "Histoire de France depuis le 18 brumaire jusqu'à la paix de Tilsit," I (prejudiced); Lefebvre, "Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe, 1800, 1815," I; Bowman, "Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens," Toronto, 1899.

For the war of 1800—*vide* "Correspondance," Vol. VI; "Napoleon's reminiscences at St. Helena," Vol. XXX; Bour-

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rienne's "Memoirs," and those of Generals Kellermann, Victor, Marmont, Soult, Masséna, Savary, and Thiébault; the "Mémoires militaires" of Crossard, and the "Cahiers du Capitaine Coignet," Paris, 1883. The value of these authorities has been lessened by the publication of documents in the French and the Austrian War archives. From the former Capitaine Cugnac has compiled his impartial narrative of the "Campagne de l'armée de reserve, 1800," 2 vols., Paris, 1900-1, and to the latter we owe Hüffer's "Quellen zur Geschichte der Kriege von 1799 und 1880," 2 vols., Leipzig, 1901. Both works contain the valuable evidence of eye-witnesses of the various events, and have thereby superseded Gachot's "La deuxième Campagne d'Italie, 1800," Paris, 1899. Cp. also Günther, "Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1800," the older works of M. Dumas, Jomini, Bülow, and the narrative of Mras in the "Osterr. milit. Zeitschrift" of 1822-3 and 1828.

For Genoa—vide Thiébault, "Journal des opérations militaires de siège et blocus de Gênes," 2nd edition, Paris, 1847.

For the passage of the St. Bernard—vide Cagliani, "Il passagio di Bonaparte per il grande San-Bernardo," Turin, 1892.

For Fort Bard—vide Beekh-Widmannstetter, "Stokmar von Bärnkopf," Vienna, 1900.

For Marengo—vide the introduction to the second volume of Hüffer's "Quellen," the part in which he deals with the growth of the legendary accounts of Napoleon's share in the battle. *Vide* also the article on the eightieth anniversary of Marengo in the "Jahrbücher fur die Deutsche Armee und Marine," Vol. XXXVI. The "Centenario della battaglia di Marengo," 2 vols., Alessandria, 1900, is compiled from Italian sources and contains some new items. Of the older narratives those specially recommended are the pamphlet attributed to Kellermann, "Réfutation du Duc de Rovigo, la vérité sur la bataille de Marengo" (1828), also his "Campagne de 1800," and the French official dispatches in the "Mémorial du dépôt de la guerre," V, 1828. They also throw an instructive light on the French war bulletins, which as Thibaudeau relates gave rise to the Paris witticism, "to lie like a bulletin". *Vide* also Gruyer, "Récit de la bataille de Marengo par Grouchy" ("Carnet historique," 1898); Becker, "Etude sur le général Desaix," contains much that is erroneous. Herrmann in his "Marengo," 1903, gives an exhaustive description of the battle.

For politics during the summer—vide Boulay de la Meurthe,

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"Correspondance de Tallyrand avec le Premier Consul pendant la campagne de Marengo" ("Revue d'hist. dipl.," 1892); Vivenot, "Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts," Vol. II; Du Casse, "Histoire des négotiations diplomatiques, 1800-1802," Vol. II; Fournier, "Die Mission des Grafen S. Julien im Jahre 1800," in "Historische Studien und Skizzen," Leipzig, 1885; Hüffer, "Quellen," Vol. II, p. 125, for Neipperg's comment on this mission; and Bowman's "Preliminary Stages".

For the winter campaign of 1800-1—*vide* Napoleon's memoires in "Corr.," Vol. XXX, which is prejudiced against Moreau; Jomini, "Histoire des guerres," XIV; Carrion-Nisas, "La Campagne des Français en Allemagne, 1800" (in the "Memorial du dépôt de la guerre," V); Richepanse, "La bataille de Hohenlinden" (in the "Spectateur militaire," 1836); Tessier, "Hohenlinden et les premiers démêlés de Bonaparte et de Moreau" ("Revue historique," IX); Schleifer, "Die Schlacht bei Hohenlinden am 3 Dezember, 1800, und die vorausgegangenen Heeresbewegungen," Erding, 1885. *Vide* also a description from the Austrian war records in the "Osterr. milit. Zeitschrift" in 1836. Some important contributions, especially from the archives in Vienna and Munich, are made by Hüffer in his "Quellen," Vol. II.

For the diplomatic records and the conclusion of peace the principal authority is Du Casse, "Histoire des negociations diplomatiques relatives aux traités de Morfontaine, de Lunéville, et Amiens," Paris, 1855, 3 vols. *Vide* also "Correspondance de Napoléon I," Vol. VI and VII; Lecestre, "Lettres inédites de Napoléon I," Vol. I, Paris, 1897; Brotonne, "Lettres inédites de Napoléon I," Paris, 1898, also his "Dernières lettres inédites de Napoléon I," Vol. I, Paris, 1903; Fournier, "Zur Textkritik der Correspondenz Napoleons I" ("Austrian Historical Archives," Vol. XCIII); Vivenot, "Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts," II; Bertrand, "Lettres inédites de Tallyrand à Napoléon, 1800-1809," Paris, 1889; Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich," Vol. II.

For treaties of State—vide De Clercq, "Recueil des traités de la France," Vol. I; and Martens, "Recueil manuel et pratique des traités et conventions," Leipzig, 1866; and the narratives of Lefebre, "Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe pendant le consulat et l'Empire," I; Sybel, Vol. I; Sorel, Vol. VI; Lanfrey, Vol. III; Thibaudeau, "Histoire de la France et de Napoléon Bonaparte," Vol. I; Thiers, Vols. I and III; Bignon, "Histoire diplomatique

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de la France depuis le 18 brumaire" (written according to Napoleon's instructions), Vol. I.

For special items—vide Tatistscheff, "Paul I et Bonaparte" ("Nouvelle Revue," 1887); Tratschewski, "L'Empereur Paul et Bonaparte" ("Revue d'histoire diplomatique," 1889); Tratschewski, "Relations diplomatiques entre la Russie et la France à l'époque de Napoléon I, 1800-1802," in the records of the Russian Historical Society, Vol. LXX; Schliemann, "Die Ermordung Paul I und die Thronbesteigung Nikolaus I," Berlin, 1902; Tatistscheff, "Alexandre I et Napoleon," Paris, 1891; Bernhardi, "Geschichte Ruszlands im 19 Jahrh.," Vol. II; Brückner, "Materialien zur Geschichte Panins," Martens, "Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie," Vol. XIII; E. Paul, "Ein Expeditionsprojekt Ruszlands und Frankreichs nach Indien, im Jahre 1800" (in the "Deutsche Revue," 1888); Buchholz, "Die Napoleonische Weltpolitik" ("Preuss. Jahrb.," 1896); Gaffarel, "Napoléon I, et ses projets sur l'Hindoustan" ("Revue de Géographie," 1894); Driault, "La Question d'Orient," Paris, 1900; E. Daudet, "Les Bourbons et l'emigration pendant le consulat" ("Revue des deux mondes," 1885); Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der französischen Revolution," Vol. I; Grandmaison, "L'ambassade française en Espagne, 1789-1804," Lucien, "Mémoires," edition Jung, Vol. II; Marmottan, "Le royaume d'Etrurie," Paris, 1896; Bowman, "Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens," Toronto, 1900; Philippson, "La paix d'Amiens et la politique générale de Napoléon I" ("Revue historique," 75, 1901); Roberts, "The Negotiations preceding the Peace of Lunéville" ("Transactions of the Royal Historical Society," 1901) (to this I did not have access); Stanhope, "Life of Pitt," Vol. II; Buckingham, "Memoirs of Court and Cabinets of George III," 3 vols.; Hansard, "Parliamentary History," Vol. XXXV; Pellew, "Life and Correspondence of Addington," London, 1847, Vol. I; Malmesbury, "Diaries and Correspondence," London, 1844, III; "Life and Letters of the first Earl of Minto," London, 1874, II; Noorden, "Der Rücktritt des Ministeriums Pitt," 1901 (in "Hist. Zeitschrift," Vol. 40); Ranke, "Hardenberg und Preuszen," 1793-1813. ("Sämtl. Werke," Vol. XL); Massenbach, "Memoiren zur Gesch. des preusz. Staates"; Ulmann, "Die preuszische Politik in der Frage der bewaffneten Meeresneutralität und bei der Besitznahme Hannovers, 1801" ("Deutsch. Zeitschr. fur Geschichtswissenschaft," 1897;

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Larsson, "Sveriges deltagande in den väpnade neutralitäten, 1800-1801," Lund, 1889; Beir, "Zehn Jahre österr. Politik"; Fournier, "Gentz und Cobenzl, Geschichte der österr. Diplomatie in den Jahren 1801-1805"; Wertheimer, "Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns, 1797-1809," Vol. I.

For the Concordat of 1801—the principal authority is Boulay de la Meurthe, "Documents sur la négociation du Concordat et sur les autres rapports de la France avec le Saint-Siège en 1800 et 1801," 5 vols. Paris, 1891. Cf. also Haussonville, "L'église romaine et le premier empire," I; Theiner, "Histoire des deux concordats, 1801 et 1803"; Crétineau-Joly, "Les mémoires du Cardinal Consalvi," Paris, 1864; also his "Bonaparte le concordat de 1801 et le Cardinal Consalvi," Paris, 1869; Champeaux, "Le droit civil ecclésiastique français ancien et moderne," II (a good collection of materials); Portalis, "Discours, rapports, et travaux inédits sur le concordat," Paris, 1845; Debidour, "Histoire des rapports de l'Eglise et de l'état en France de 1789 à 1870," Paris, 1898; Taine, "Les origines de la France contemporaine, le régime moderne," II; Cardinal Mathieu, "Le Concordat," Paris, 1903, contains some new materials from the Roman archives, and gives a comprehensive picture.

Addenda, 1910.—Gachot, "Histoire militaire de Napoleon, 1800," Paris, 1908.

CHAPTER VIII.—*For the reforms in the State.* The protocols of the sittings of the Consuls and of those of the Senate have not yet been published; on the other hand those of the Tribunate have been issued in fifty-nine volumes and those of the Legislative Body in twenty-five volumes. Cf. also Madivai et Laurent, "Archives parlementaires," 2nd series, from 1799 onwards; Duvergier, "Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire," Paris, 1857; Pelet de la Lozère, "Opinions de Napoléon" (in the Council of State), Paris, 1833; Marco de Saint-Hilaire, "Napoleon au Conseil d'Etat"; also the "Correspondance de Napoléon I," vols. VI and VII, with supplements by Lecestre and Brotonne; the "Almanach national" of the years VIII to X; the "Moniteur" as the official journal and the "Publiciste" as independent; Felix Rocquain, "L'état de la France au 18 brumaire" (with the reports of the Council of State for 1800 or 1801); Remacle, "Bonaparte et

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les Bourbons, Relations secrètes des agents de Louis XVIII à Paris, 1802-1803," Paris, 1899; the Memoirs of Thibaudeau, Barante, Pasquier, Chaptal, Lafayette, Bourrienne, Roederer ("Œuvres," Vol. III), Lucien Bonaparte (édition Jung), Carnot, Savary, Lavalette, Staël ("Dix ans d'exil"). Fouché's Memoirs are not his own work but owe their existence to his influential name. Forneron, "Histoire générale des émigrés," Vol. II.

For narratives of this period—vide Thiers, "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire," Vol. III; Lanfrey, "Napoléon I," Vol. II; especially Taine, "Les origines de la France contemporaine, le Régime moderne," I-II, Paris, 1891, 1894 (unfinished); Vandal, "L'avènement de Bonaparte," II; Aulard, "Paris sous la Consulat," I; also his "L'établissement du Consulat à vie" ("Révolution française," 1895); and his "Histoire politique et la révolution française," Paris, 1901. Cf. also the corresponding section on Napoleon in Lavisse and Rambaud's "Histoire générale," IX; Aulard, "L'Etat de la France en l'an VIII et en l'an IX," Paris, 1897; Madelin, "Fouché," I; G. Stenger, "La Société française pendant le Consulat," Paris, 1903 (nothing new); A. E. Blanc, "Napoléon et les institutions civiles et administratives," Paris, 1880, one-sided and full of enthusiasm for Napoleon but lucidly written; Kuscinski, "Les conventionnels fonctionnaires après le 18 brumaire" ("Revolution française," Vol. XXVII); Hélie, "Les constitutions de la France".

For the administrative organisation—vide Aucoc, "Le Conseil d'Etat avant et depuis 1789" (cf. for later developments, Aucoc, "Conférences sur l'administration et le droit administratif," Paris, 1869; Bertrand, "L'organisation française," Paris, 1882, and others); St. Yves et Fournier, "L'évolution du système administratif de Napoléon I" ("Bouches du Rhône") Paris, 1900; Darmstaedter, "Die Verwaltung des Unterelsasz, 1799-1813" ("Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte des Oberrheins," 1903); Monnet, "Histoire de l'administration en France," Paris, 1885; Passy, "Frochot," Paris, 1867. Unfortunately at present there is no history of French industries under the Consulate nor of Napoleon's tariff policy. There is a wide field lying fallow here.

For the reform of the finances—vide Gaudin's Memoirs and his "Notice historique sur les finances de la France, 1800-1814"; Minzès, "Die Nationalguterveräuszerung während der fransözischen Revolution," Jena, 1892; Mollien, "Mémoires d'un

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Ministre du trésor public" (new edition, 1898); Lebrun, "Opinions, rapports, et écrits" (published by his son), Paris, 1829; Ramel, "Les finances de la République," Paris, 1801; Necker, "Dernières vues de politique et de finances," Paris, 1802; Stourm, "Les finances du Consulat," Paris, 1902; Salvandy, "M. Mollien," Paris, 1851; Poinsard, "Le crédit public et les emprunts sous le consulat" ("Annales de l'école des sciences politiques," 1890); Courtois, "Histoire des Banques en France," Paris, 1881; Zablet, "La Banque de France" ("Revue bleue," 1899, XI); Nicolas, "Les Budgets de la France depuis le commencement du 19 siècle". The protocols of the finance department have not yet been published.

For the reform of the laws—vide Duvergier, "Collection complète des lois," etc., in 14 vols., 1789-1804, Paris; Locré, "La legislation civile, commerciale, et criminelle de la France," 31 vols., 1827; also his "Esprit du Code Napoleon," Paris, 1805; Fenet, "Recueil complet des travaux preparatoires du Code civil," Paris, 1836; Portalis, "Discours, rapports, et travaux inédits sur le Code civil" (published by his son), Paris, 1844; Sévin, "Etudes sur les origines revolutionnaires des Codes Napoléon" (new edition, Paris, 1879); Troplong, "De l'esprit démocratique dans le Code civil" (quoted by Sévin). Best of all are Sagnac, "La législation civile de la révolution française," Paris, 1898 (with a bibliography); and Leroy, "Le centenaire du Code civile" ("Revue de Paris," 1903).

For Napoleon's share — vide Madelin, "Le premier Consul législateur," Paris, 1865; Pérouse, "Napoléon I et les lois civiles du Consulat et de l'Empire," Lyons, 1866 (both highly eulogistic); Jac, "Bonaparte et le Code civil," Paris, 1898; Bressolles, "Etudes sur les rédacteurs du Code Napoléon" ("Revue de legislation," 1852); Schäffner, "Geschichte der Rechtsverfassung in Frankreich; Zachariae, "Das französische bürgerliche Recht"; Cruppi, "Napoléon et le Jury," Paris, 1896.

For the reforms in education—vide Beauchamp, "Recueil des lois et réglements sur l'enseignement supérieur"; Duruy, "L'Institution publique et la Révolution"; Liard, "L'enseignement supérieur en France" (depuis 1789), I, Paris, 1888; Hahn, "Das Unterrichtswesen in Frankreich mit eine Geschichte der Pariser Universität," vol. I, Breslau, 1848; Gautier, "La réforme de l'enseignement secondaire sous le Consulat" ("Revue Univer-

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sitaire," 1898); Grimaud, "Histoire de la liberté d'enseignement en France depuis la chute de l'ancien régime," Paris, 1898; Bourgeois, "La liberté d'enseignement" ("La Grande Revue," 1902); Dupuy, "L'école normale" ("Revue intern. de l'enseignement Supérieur," 1883).

For the Legion of Honour—vide Mazas, "La Légion d'Honneur."

For the suppression of parliamentary opposition—vide Thibaudeau, Barante, Pasquier, Camille Jordan ("Landis," XII), Staël, "Considerations," and Laboulaye, "Benjamin Constant".

For the censorship—vide Welschinger, "La censure sous le premier Empire," Paris, 1882; Le Poittevin, "La Liberté de la presse depuis la Révolution, 1789-1815," Paris, 1901; F. A. A., "Un rapport de Portalis sur la presse en l'an XI" ("La Révolution française," 1897).

For the Conspiracies—vide Fescourt, "Histoire de la double conspiration de 1800," Paris, 1819; Desmarest, "Temoinages historiques, quinze ans de haute police sous Napoleon," Paris, 1833; Destrem, "Les déportations du Consulat et de l'Empire," Paris, 1885; E. Daudet, "La police et les chouans sous le Consulat et l'Empire," Paris, 1893; Madelin, "Fouché," I; Guillon, "Les conspirations militaires sous le Consulat et l'Empire," Paris, 1894; Lalanne, "Les derniers jours du Consulat"; Augustin-Thierry, "Conspirateurs et gens de police, le complot des libelles, 1802" ("Revue des deux mondes," 1902).

Addenda, 1910.—Régnier, "Les préfets du Consulat et de l'Empire"; Aulard, "Paris sous le Consulat," I-III, Paris, 1903-6; Lanzac de Laborie, "Les débuts de la Banque de France" ("Revue des questions historiques," 1910); Marion, "La vente des bien nationaux pendant la Révolution," Paris, 1908; Bournisien, "Conséquences économiques et sociales de la vente des biens nationaux" ("Revue des questions historiques," 1910).

CHAPTER IX.—*For the internal condition of France — vide* (*a*) *travellers' description:* K. B. Hase, "Briefe von der Wanderung und aus Paris," written in 1802 and 1803, Hamburg, 1805; A. v. Kotzebue, "Erinnerungen aus Paris im Jahre 1804," Berlin, 1804; J. G. Rist, "Lebenserinnerungen" (published by G. Poel), Gotha, 1880; F. J. L. Meyer, "Briefe aus der Hauptstadt und dem Innern Frankreichs," 1801, two parts, Tübingen, 1802; Miss Berry,

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"Journals and Correspondence, an Extract Dealing with 1802," given in the "Correspondant" 1904; Schlabrendorf, "N. Bonaparte und das franzôsische Volk unter seinem Konsulate," Germanien, 1804; Bray, "Aus dem Leben eines Diplomaten," Leipzig, 1901; Holzhausen, "Der Erste Konsul und seine deutschen Besucher," Bonn, 1900, and Remacle, "Bonaparte et les Bourbons" are both good for other matters also; "Relations secrètes des agents de Louis XVIII, à Paris, 1802, 1803," Paris, 1899 (the collection was not unknown to Thiers); Peltier, "Paris pendant 1799 à 1802," London; Pingaud, "Un agent secret" (2nd Ed.); Alger, "Englishmen in the French Revolution"; Babeau, "Les Anglais en France après la paix d'Amiens," Paris, 1899 (notes of John Carr); Holzhausen, "Bonaparte, Byron und die Briten," Frankfurt, 1904.

(*b*) *French descriptions:* The "Moniteur" (official organ); the "Correspondance de Napoléon I," VII, and the supplements to it; the Memoirs of Fauriel (published by Lalanne, 1886); Bourrienne (of relative utility until 1802); Lucien (unfortunately in Jung's unscholarly edition), Vol. II; Thibaudeau (the best of all these authorities); Rémusat; Chastenay, Vol. II, Maret (in Ernouf's biography of Maret); Pasquier, I; Norvin, I; Chaptal's "Souvenirs," the "Considérations" of Staël; the "Reminiscences" of the Duchesse d'Abrantès; P. L. Courier's "Lettres," 1804, in his collected works.

In addition to these—vide also: Forneron, "Histoire générale des émigrés," III, Paris, 1889; Gaffarel, "L'Opposition militaire sous le Consulat" ("La Révolution française," VI); Guillon, "Les complots militaires sous le Consulat et l'Empire," Paris, 1894; Madelin, "Fouché," I; A. Thierry, "Conspirateurs et gens de police" ("Revue des deux mondes," 1902); also the Memoirs of Thiébault, III, and Macdonald, the correspondence of Davoût (published by Mazade); Debidour, "Le général Fabvier" ("Annales de l'Est," 1887, compiled from his letters); "L'opposition litéraire sous le Consulat ("Nouvelle Revue," 1889, from the reminiscences of Nodier and Estournel); Poittevin, "La liberté de la presse depuis la Révolution (1789-1815)," Paris, 1901; Thiers, "Consulat et Empire," IV; Thibaudeau, "Le Consulat et l'Empire," II; Bertin, "La Société du Consulat"; Stenger, "La société française pendant le Consulat"; Welschinger, "La Censure sous le premier Empire".

For Foreign Relations—vide in general: in addition to the "Correspondance" of Napoleon, the supplements to it by Brotonne

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and Lecestre, the letters of Talleyrand given in Bertrand, De Clercq's treaties, the chapters in Thibaudeau and in Thiers bearing on the subject, and especially Lefebvre, "Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe," and Sorel, "L'Europe et la Révolution française," VI.

With special reference to Italy—vide Botta, "Storia d'Italia dal 1789 al 1814," 3 vols.; Tivaroni, "L'Italia durante il dominio francese," 1889 (Part II der Storia del risargimento italiano); Castro, "Storia politica moderna d'Italia dal 1799-1814," Milan, 1881; Bianchi, "Storia della monarchia piemontese," III; Francesco Melzi d'Eril, "Memorie, documenti e lettere inedite di Napoleone I e Beauarnais," ed. Giov. Melzi, 2 vols., 1865; Bonacossi, "Bourrienne et ses erreurs"; Driault, "Napoleon I et l'Italie" ("Revue hist.," 1905); G. Koch, "Die Enstehung der italienischen Republik, 1801-1802" ("Hist. Z.," Vol. 84); Roberti, "Les Cisalpins à Lyon" ("Minerva," 1902); Malvezzi, "P. Berti alla consulta di Lione" ("Revue napoléonienne," 1902); Zanolini, "Aldini et il suoi tempi," Firenze, 1864; Dejob, "Mme. de Staël et l'Italie," Paris, 1890 (with a bibliography on French influence in Italy).

With reference to Switzerland—vide Strickler, "Amtliche Sammlung der Akten aus der Zeit der helvetischen Republik," Vol. VIII; Dunant, "Relations diplomatiques de la France et de la République hélvétique"; Ney's "Memoirs" (1833); Oechsli, "Geschichte der Schweiz im 19 Jahrhundert"; Muralt, "Hans v. Reinhard," Zürich, 1839; Jahn, "Bonaparte, Talleyrand und Stapfer," Zürich, 1869; Luginbühl, "F. A. Stapfer."

With reference to Germany—vide Häusser, "Deutsche Geschichte II (Gaspari), der französisch-russische Entschädigungsplan," Ratisbon, 1802; also his "Der Deputations-Rezesz mit historischen, geographischen und statistischen Erläuterungen" (2 parts), Hamburg, 1803; Ranke, "Hardenberg und der preuszische Staat," II; Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich von 1795-1807," II; Martens, "Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie," II (Österreich), VI (Preuszen); Ulmann, "Russisch-preuszische Politik unter Alexander I, und Friedrich Wilhelm III bis 1806," Leipzig, 1899; Hüffer, "Die Kabinetsregierung in Preuszen," Leipzig, 1891; Fisher, "Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany," Oxford, 1903; Fournier, "Gentz und Cobenzl, Geschichte der österreichischen Diplomatie von 1801-1805"; Wertheimer, "Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns 1801-1810," I.

With reference to Holland—vide De Bosch-Kemper, "Staats-

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kundige Geschiedenis van Nederland (1795-1814)," Amsterdam, 1867; Vreede, "Geschiedenis der Diplom. v. d. Bataafsche Republiek," 1863.

With reference to Russia—vide Tratschewsky, "France and Russia," in the Sbornik of the Historical Society, Vol. LXXVII; Tatistscheff, "Alexandre et Napoléon I (1801-1812)," Paris, 1891; Martens, "Recueil," XIII; Bernhardi, "Geschichte Ruszlands im 19 Jahrhundert," II.

With reference to Spain and Portugal—vide Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens seit dem Ausbruch der französischen Revolution," I; Bernhardi, "Napoléon I und Spanien" ("Historische Zeitschrift," Vol. XL); Grandmaison, "L'ambassade française en Espagne, 1789-1804"; Lucien, "Mémoires," II; L. Coelho, "Historia de Portugal desde os fins do 18 seculo ate 1814," Lisbon, 1886.

For the Constitutions of the Italian States, Holland and Switzerland—vide De Clercq, "Traités," II; and Pölitz, "Europäische Verfassungen," 3 vols.

For Napoleon's Colonial policy—vide G. Roloff, "Die Kolonialpolitik, Napoleons I," Münich, 1899; Adams, "Napoléon et S. Domingue" ("Revue historique," XXIV); Laujon, "Précis historique de la première expéd. de St. Domingue"; Mosbach, "Der französische Feldzug auf S. D."; "Saint Domingue sous le Consulat, Fragment des souvenirs de la générale Lallemand" ("Nouvelle revue retrospective," 1902); Schoelcher, "Vie de Toussaint Louverture," Paris, 1889; Gauthier-Villars, "Toussaint Louverture au fort de Joux" ("Revue hebdomadaire," 1901); Meunier, "La Mort de Toussaint Louverture" ("La Quinzaine," 1902), also original articles in the "Revue de l'Agenais," 1884. *Vide* also the memoirs of La Croix; Prentout, "L'Ile de France sous Decaen," Paris, 1901; the "Memoirs of Captain Bonnefons," Paris, 1900; Tarbell, "France's relations with North America, 1800-1803" ("McLure's Magazine," 1895) I was unable to procure; Barbé-Marbois, "Histoire de la Louisiane"; Poyen, "La guerre aux Antilles."

For the strained relations with England—vide in addition to the "Correspondance," VIII, and the "Moniteur" of 1802 and 1803, Browning, "England and Napoleon in 1803," London, 1887 ("Whitworth's Dispatches"); Russell, "Memorials and Corresp. of Ch. Fox," Vol. III; Malmesbury, "Diaries and Corresp.," IV; "Letters and Dispatches of Lord Castlereagh," Vol. V; Stanhope,

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"Life of Pitt," IV; "Life and Letters of the First Earl of Minto," III; Pellew, "Life of Viscount Sidmouth," II; The "Annual Register, or a View of the History, etc., for the Year 1803"; Martens, "Recueil," XI; Tratschewsky, "Sbornik," Vol. LXXVII; Ashton, "English Caricature and Satire on Napoleon I," London, 1885; Dorman, "A History of the British Empire in the Nineteenth Century," I (1793-1805); Rose, "Napoleon I"; also his "Napoleon and English Commerce" ("Engl. Hist. Review," VIII); Oechsli, "Geschichte der Schweiz," I; Eckedahl, "The Principal Causes of the Renewal of the War in 1803" ("Transactions of the Royal Hist. Society," 1895). Rose; also Duncker, on the invasion of England, in his "Abhandlungen aus der neuern Geschichte"; Philippson, "La paix d'Amiens et la politique générale de Napoléon" ("Revue historique," 1891); Ulmann, "Zur Würdigung der napoleonischen Frage" ("Deutsche Revue," 1900); and Coquelle, "Napoléon et l'Angletérre, 1803-1813," Paris, 1904, all lay the blame for the renewal of the war on Napoleon; while England is held responsible for it by G. Roloff, "Über Napoleons Landungspläne, 1803-1805" ("Preusz. Jahrb.," Vol. XCIII); also his "Zur Napoleonischen Politik, 1803-1805" ("Historische Vierteljahresschrift," 1902); Lévy, "Napoléon et la paix"; and Potrel, "La Russie et la rupture de la paix d'Amiens" ("Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques," 1897).

For the occupation of Hanover—vide Ompetda, "Die Uberwältigung Hannovers durch die Franzosen," Hanover, 1866; Thimme, "Die inneren Zustände des Kurfürstentums Hannover," I.

For the flotilla in the Channel—the principal work is: Desbrière, "Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux îles britanniques, 1793-1805," II, III; *vide* also: Jurien de la Gravière, "Guerres maritimes," II; Chevalier, "Histoire de la marine française sous le Consulat et l'Empire."

For Spain—vide Gentz, "Authentische Darstellung des Verhältnisses zwischen England und Spanien vor und bei dem Ausbruche des Krieges zwischen beiden Mächten," St. Petersburg, 1806.

For the conspiracy of Georges and his comrades—vide "Procès instruit par la Cour de Justice criminelle contre Georges, Pichegru, Moreau, etc.," 8 volumes, Paris, 1804, also some valuable work among the more recent archives in Caudrillier's "Le Complot

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de l'an XII" ("Revue historique," 1900-1901). Compare also Bailleu, "Napoleons Verhandlungen mit den Bourbons, 1803" ("Historische Zeitschrift," Vol. LXXIV); Picard, "Bonaparte et Moreau," Paris, 1905; Maricourt, "Dans l'intimité de Louis XVIII" ("La Revue," 1903); Pingaud, "Les dernières années de Moreau" ("Revue de Paris," 1899); Desmarest (one of the high officials of the police), "Quinze ans de haute police sous Napoléon"; Madelin, "Fouché," I; Martel, "La conspiration de Georges"; Ernest Daudet, "La police et les chouans sous le Consulat et l'Empire"; Cadoudal, "Georges Cadoudal et la Chouannierie," Paris, 1887 (the two last chapters).

For d'Enghien—vide Boulay de la Meurthe, "Correspondance du Duc d'Enghien et documents sur son enlèvement et sa mort," I, Paris, 1904; and his "Les dernières années du Duc d'Enghien," Paris, 1886; (*vide* also Fournier's note in the "Revue historique," Oct., 1887), De la Faye, "La Pesse Charlotte de Rohan et le Duc D'Enghien," Paris, 1904. Nougarède de Fayet, "Recherches hist. sur le procès du Duc d'Enghien," controverts Broglie, "Le Procès et l'exécution du Duc d'Enghien," Paris, 1888, who seeks to disprove Talleyrand's complicity. *Vide* also Welschinger, "Le Duc d'Enghien," 1888; and his "L'Europe et l'exécution du Duc d'Enghien," 1890; Sorel in his "Lectures historiques"; Pernot, "L'arrestation du Duc d'Enghien" ("Revue d'Alsace," Vol. XLVI); Fay, "The Execution of the Duc d'Enghien" ("American Hist. Review," 1898); Obser, "Politische Korrespondenz K. Friedrichs v. Baden, 1783-1806," V; and his "Aus dem Nachlasz des Herzogs von Dalberg" (in "Vom Rhein," June, 1901); also the Memoirs of Pasquier, Hyde de Neuville, Fauriel, Rémusat, and Méneval (in the edition of 1894).

For the founding of the Empire—vide "Le Senatus Consultum du 18 Mai, 1804," in Hélie, "Les constitutions de la France". Cf. Lanfrey, III; Rocquain, "Notices sur Napoléon I" ("Revue de France," 1880); Thibaudeau, "Empire," I; Aulard, "Histoire politique de la révolution française"; Pelet de la Lozère, "Opinions de Napoléon"; Welschinger, "Tribuns, deputés, sénateurs, 1804-1810" ("Revue hebdomadaire," 1898); Thiers, V; Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," II; Napoleon's conversations at St. Helena in "Gourgaud's Journal," and those with the doctor on the "Northumberland" in Hérisson, "Le Cabinet noir," 1886; the dispatches of Lucchesini in Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich," II; those

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of Dalberg in "Obser, K. Friedrich v. Baden," V; those of the Russian Consul in the "Sbornik," LXXVII; also Fournier, "Gentz und Cobenzl".

For the new Imperial Court—vide the Memoirs of Méneval, Rémusat, Joseph, Miot, Bausset, Lucien, Ségur; also, Masson, "Napoléon chez lui"; and his "Josephine, impératrice et reine"; Maze-Sencier, "Les fournisseurs de Napoléon," Paris, 1893; "Candidats chambellans de Napoléon" (in the "Nouvelle revue retrospective," 1902). The catalogue of Napoleon's reference library is published by Guillois, in his "Napoléon, l'homme, le politique, l'orateur," Paris, 1889. Cf. also D'Arjuzon, "Mme Louis Bonaparte," Paris, 1901; Marmottan, "Elisa Bonaparte," Paris, 1898; Larrey, "Madame Mère," and Fournier's sketch "Napoleon und sein Hof," in Pflugk-Harttung, "Napoleon I," 2nd vol.

Addenda, 1910.—Guillon, "Napoléon et la Suisse, 1803-1815," Paris, 1910. Steiner, "Napoléon I, Politik und Diplomatie in der Schweiz"; Lanzac de Laborie, "Les débuts du régime concordataire, 1802" ("Revue des questions historiques" 1907); Chévamy, "Mémoires de la Georges," to be treated with reserve (cf. "Revue Napoléonienne," July, 1908); Boulay de la Meurthe, "Correspondance du Duc d'Enghien," 2 vols.; Hauterive, "La police secrète du 1er Empire, 1804-1805"; Kremnetzer, "Der Staatsgedanke Napoleons," Taücha, 1907; Driault, "Napoléon et les recès germaniques, 1803" ("Revue historique," 1909); Gazier, "Napoléon au Conseil d'Etat d'après les procès verbaux du Bon Locré" ("Revue de Paris," 1893).

CHAPTER X.—*For Napoleon's army—vide* Blaze, "La Vie militaire sous le premier Empire," surpassed by Morvan in his "Le soldat impérial, 1800-1814," I, Paris, 1904. Also Jähns, "Das französische Heer von der groszen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart"; Schmeisser, "Die Refractärregimenter unter Napoleon I" ("Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt," 1890); "Zur Geschichte des militärischen Lebens in den Armeen Napoleons I" (Ibid., 1889); and Coignet "Cahiers".

For Pope Pius in Paris—vide the "Memoirs of Consalvi" (éd. Crétineau-Joly); Haussonville, "L'église romaine et le premier Empire," I, II; "Paris zur Zeit der Kaiserkrönung, Briefe eines Augenzeugen," Cologne, 1805; Aulard, "Les préparatifs du couronnement de Napoléon I" ("Révolution française," 1897);

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Rodocanachi, "Pie VII à Paris" ("Souvenirs et mémoires," 1900; related by Abbé Cancellieri); and Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," II. In addition to the memoirs mentioned in the previous chapter *vide* also Fontaine et Percier, "Le sacre de Napoléon I"; Thiard, "Souvenirs" (éd. Lex, Paris, 1900); Plancy, "Mémoires," Paris, 1904.

For the period preceding the war of 1805—*vide* "Correspondance," VIII-X; the collections of Lecestre and Brotonne, and Fournier's treatise "Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleons I"; also the reports of State proceedings by De Clercq, Martens, and L. Neumann, "Recueil des traités conclus par l'Autriche"; the correspondence of Markow and Oubril in the "Sbornik," Vols. LXXVII and LXXXII, and the "Archives of Woronzow," *ibid.*, Vols. XIII and XIV; the correspondence of Adam Czartoryski with Alexander I (published by Mazade); the Memoirs of Czartoryski, 1887 (*vide* also Ulmann, "Über die Memoiren des Fürsten Ad. Czartoryski im Vorlesungsverzeichnis der Universität Greifswald," 1898); the diary of Razoumowsky in his biography of Wassiltschikow, 1887; Maistre, "Mémoires et correspondance"; Schilder, "Alexander I," I, II (Russ.); Groszfürst Nikolai Michailowitsch, "Graf Strogonow" (Russ.); Schiemann, "Nikolaus I," I; Bailleu, "Briefwechsel Friedr. Wilhelm III, und der Königin Louise mit Kaiser Alexander," Leipzig, 1900; Hardenberg's "Memoirs" (published by Ranke); Lucchesini's reports (by Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich," II); Ranke, "Hardenberg" (also the criticism by Max Duncker, "Graf Haugwitz und Frh. v. Hardenberg," in the "Abhandlungen aus der neueren Geschichte," and his criticism of Ranke's work in the "Mitteilungen a. d. histor. Litt.," VI); Hüffer, "Die Kabinetsregierung in Preuszen"; Hansing, "Hardenberg und die dritte Koalition," Berlin, 1899; Noack, "Hardenberg und das geheime Kabinett"; and especially Ulmann, "Russisch-preuszische Politik unter Alexander I, und Friedr. Wilhelm III."

For the States of South Germany—vide Perthes, "Politische Zustände und Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit der französischen Herrschaft," 2nd vol.; Rambaud, "La domination française en Allemagne," II; Obser, "Karl Friedrich v. Baden," V; and his "Hessen-Darmstadt vor Ausbruch des Krieges von 1805"; Strippelmann, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Hessen-Kassels," Part I, 1877; J. Baader, "Streiflichter," Nüremberg, 1801-06; Arneth, "Wessenberg," I; Bitterauf, "Geschichte des Rheinbundes," I.

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For English affairs—cf. in addition to the authorities mentioned in a previous section: Cobbett, "Parliamentary debates"; Paget, "Papers," II; Jackson, "Diaries," I, 1872.

For Austria—vide Fournier, "Gentz und Cobenzl"; Wertheimer, "Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns," I; Beer, "Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801-1810," and his "Österreich und Ruszland, 1804-1805" (Archives of Austrian history, Vol. LIII); Gentz, "Tagebücher," I; Montgelas, "Denkwürdigkeiten"; Thiard, "Souvenirs" (éd. Lex.); Beaulieu-Marconnay, "Dalberg," II; Obser, "Ein Tagebuch über die Zusammenkunft Karl Friedrichs von Baden mit Napoleon I in Mainz" ("Zeitschr. f. d. Gesch. d. Oberrheins," XIV).

For the events in Italy—vide in addition to the previously mentioned works, Marmottan, "Bonaparte et la République de Lucques," Paris, 1896; also his "Le royaume d'Etrurie"; "Raccolta dei fatti, documenti e ceremonie, il tutto relativo al cambiamento della Republ. ital." in "Regno d'Italia," Milan, 1805.

For the naval war and the projected landing—vide the "Correspondance," and Desbrière, Vol. IV (an extract from Loir, "La campagne maritime" in the "Revue d'histoire," 1901), also Mahan, "Influence of Sea Power, 1783-1812," and his "The Life of Nelson"; Gravière, "Guerres maritimes"; Rose, "The French plans of invasion of England, 1801-1803" ("Revue napoléonienne," 1902); in addition to the previously mentioned works of Duncker, Ulmann, Roloff, and Coquelle.

For Trafalgar—vide Ferrer de Couto, "Historia del Combate naval de Trafalgar," Madrid, 1881; "La bataille de Trafalgar, Journal du commissaire de la marine à bord du Bucentaure" ("Nouvelle revue retrospective," 1902).

For the war of 1805—*vide* besides the "Correspondance," the Memoirs of Marmont, Rapp, Thiard, Ségur, Savary, Fézensac, Pion des Loches, Laugier, Captain Coignet, the correspondence of Davoût (published by Mazade, 1885, 4 vols., and by La Marquise Blocqueville, 1887, 4 vols.); the Memoirs of Czartoryski and his *Exposé* of April, 1806, in his correspondence with Alexander; the correspondence of de Maistre (published by Blanc, Paris, 1860, cp. Sybel in the "Hist. Zeitschr.," 1859); Hulot's reminiscences (in the "Spectateur Militaire," 1883), Langeron's "Memoirs" (parts of it are given in the "Revue d'histoire diplomatique," 1895, and in the "Nouvelle revue retrospective," 1895); Radetzky's remin-

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iscences in the "Mitteilungen des k. u. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1887; "Memoirs of General Toll" (v. Bernhardi), 2nd Edition, Leipzig, 1865; various details from the papers of the Archduke Charles, given by Wertheimer, "Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns," I; Mack, "Rechtfertigungsschrift in Raumers Historischem Taschenbuch, 1873"; Gentz, "Briefe aus den Jahren 1805-1808," published by A. Stern in "Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung," XXI; Gentz, "Briefe an Starhemberg, 1805 und 1806," in Thürheim's "Biography of Starhemberg," Graz, 1889.

For descriptions of military events—vide (*a*) *from the French point of view*, Math. Dumas, "Précis des événements militaires"; Alombert et Colin, "La Campagne de 1805 en Allemagne," I, II, 1903 (to Ulm); Alombert, "Le corps d'armée du maréchal Mortier".

(*b*) *From the Austrian point of view—vide* Angeli, "Ulm und Austerlitz" ("Streffleur's militär. Zeitschrift," 1877-79); and his "Erzherzog Karl als Feldherr und Heeresorganisator," III; Schönhals, "Der Krieg von 1805 in Deutschland," Vienna, 1874; Criste, "Johann, Fürst zu Liechtenstein," Vienna, 1905.

(*c*) *From the Russian point of view—vide* Michailowski Danilewski, "La Campagne de 1805"; also Rüstow, "Der Feldzug von 1805"; Yorck, "Napoleon als Feldherr," I; Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Kreig von 1806 und 1807," I; Burke, "Campaign of 1805".

For Schulmeister—vide Dieffenbach, "K. L. Schulmeister, der Hauptspion, Parteigänger, etc., Napoleons I.," 1879; P. Müller, "L'espionnage militaire sous Napoléon I," Paris, 1896; L. Ehrhard, "Charles Schulmeister," Straszburg, 1898.

For Austerlitz—vide "Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la bataille d'Austerlitz recueillis par un militaire," 1806; Stutterheim, "La bataille d'Austerlitz par un militaire témoin de la journée du 2 décembre, 1805," Hamburg, 1806; "Die Schlacht bei Austerlitz" ("Streffleur's Zeitschrift," 1890); Janetschek, "Die Schlacht bei Austerlitz," Brünn, 1898; Gallina, "Der Feldzug von Austerlitz" ("Streffleur's Zeitschrift," 1881). The "Relation officielle de la bataille d'Austerlitz, présentée à l'Empereur Alexandre le 26 janvier, 1806," published in Paris in 1901, is only a copy from the "Moniteur" of April, 1806; it is also in the "Correspondance," XII, 10,032.

For Prussia's attitude—vide Lombard, "Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de 1805 à 1807," Frankfurt, 1818; Prussian prepara-

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tions for war and plans of operations in "Kriegsgeschichtlichen Einzelschriften," I, Berlin, 1883; Binder-Krieglstein, "Ein Bericht Crennevilles von 18 November, 1805" (the Prusso-Austrian plan of campaign in "Streffleur's Zeitschrift," Vol. XXXVII); Metternich's dispatches from Berlin in his "Nachgelassene Papiere," II; Bailleu, "Briefwechsel Fr. Wilhelm III"; Ranke, "Hardenberg"; M. Lehmann, "Scharnhorst," I; also his "Stein," I; Bailleu, "Prinz Louis Ferdinand" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1883); also his "Preuszen und Frankreich," II; Hüffer, "Kabinetsregierung"; Ulmann, "Russisch-preuszische Politik"; Kieseritzky, "Die Sendung Haugwitz' nach Wien," Göttingen, 1896 (also M. Lehmann in the "Göttinger Gelehrten Anzeigen," 1896).

For the Peace of Pressburg.—Its history is still to be written. The standard authority for it is the "Correspondance," XI, and the letters of Talleyrand (in Bertrand); various special points from Austrian sources are given in Wertheimer. The text of the document is reproduced by de Clercq, II.

Addenda, 1910.—Welschinger, "Les négociations du sacre de Napoléon" ("La nouvelle revue," 1908); Masson, "Le sacre et le couronnement de Napoléon," Paris, 1908; Kessler, "Beiträge zu Beginn des Krieges 1805 und der Aufmarsch an der Donau," Freiburg, 1907; Veltze, "Das Treffen bei Dürnstein" ("Monatsblatt des Vereins f. Landeskunde von Nieder-Oesterreich," III); Freytag-Loringhoven, "Die Heerführung Napoleons," Berlin, 1910; Rose, "Dumouriez and the Defence of England against Napoleon," London, 1908; Rose, "The French Plans of Invasion of England, 1801-1803" ("Revue napoléonienne," 1904); Broadley, "Napoleon and the Invasion of England"; Gill, "The Relations between England and France, 1802" ("English Hist. Review," 1909); Driault, "Napoléon et l'Italie," Paris, 1905; Guerrini, "La campania del 1805," 1909; Ecksdahl, "Bidrag til tredje Koalition bildningshiztoria, 1803-1805," Lund, 1903.

CHAPTER XI.—*For the state of feeling in France*, 1805 *and* 1806 —*vide* Lucchesini's reports and Hauterive's letters to Talleyrand in Bailleu, "Preuszen and Frankreich," 2nd Vol.; the reports of Russian Agents in Tratschewsky ("Sbornik," LXXXII.); the Memoirs of Mollien, Rémusat, Pasquier, Barante and Mot de Fiévée, "Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte, 1802-1813". (He

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was one of Napoleon's secret reporters, as was also Mme. de Genlis); Faber, "Notices sur l'intérieur de la France, écrites en 1806," Paris, 1807; P. des Essars, "Une crise financière en 1805" ("Bulletin des sciences économiques et sociales," 1898); Broc, "La vie en France sous le premier Empire," Paris, 1894.

For France and Naples—vide Helfert, "Königin Karoline von Neapel"; Coletta, "Geschichte des Königreichs Neapel," 3 vols.; the Memoirs of King Joseph (published by Du Casse) and of Miot de Melito; Auriol, "La France, l'Angleterre et Naples de 1803-1806," Paris, 1904, 2 vols.

For the proceedings against the Pope—vide besides the "Correspondance" de Napoléon I, the Memoirs of Consalvi; Haussonville, "L'église romaine et le premier Empire"; Artaud, "Histoire du Pape Pie VII"; Fischer, "Consalvi." As yet there is no impartial and adequate biography of the great cardinal.

For the foundation of the kingdom of Holland—vide "Documents historiques et réfléxions sur le gouvernement de la Hollande," Paris, 1820; also Alb. Reville, "La Hollande et le Roi Louis" ("Revue des deux mondes," 1870) and Felix Rocquain, "Napoléon I, et le Roi Louis".

For the Confederation of the Rhine—vide Häusser, "Deutsche Geschichte," 2nd vol., and the literature in Dahlmann's "Quellenkunde zur Deutschen Geschichte". *Vide* also Perthes, "Politische Zustände und Personen zur Zeit der französischen Heerschaft," 2nd vol.; J. G. v. Pohl, "Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben und aus meiner Zeit," 1840; "Montgelas' Mémoires"; the letters of an Austrian secret agent in 1806, in Fournier's "Historischen Studien und Skizzen"; Schloszberger, "Briefwechsel der Königin Katharina und des Königs Jérôme I," Stuttgart, 1886; also his "Politische und militärische Korrespondenz Karl Friedrichs von Würtemberg mit Kaiser Napoleon I," 1889 (a great deal of repetition from the above-mentioned works and from the correspondence of Napoleon I); Lucchesini, "Historische Entwicklung der Ursachen und Wirkungen des Rheinbundes," Leipzig, 1822 (unreliable); Bitterauf, "Geschich. des Rheinbundes," I; Du Moulin-Eckart, "München am Vorabend des Rheinbundes" ("Forsch. zur Gesch. Baierns," XXI); Kupke, "Eine Audienz (des Monsignore Arezzo) bei Napoleon I," November, 1806 ("Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte," XXI); Obser, "Karl Friedrich von Baden," V; Fisher, "Studies"; Thimme, "Die inneren Zustände Hannovers," I;

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Usinger, "Napoleon, der rheinische und der nordische Bund" ("Preuszische Jahrbücher," 1865); Witzleben, "Die Verhandlungen über den norddeutschen Bund" ("Archiv für sächsische Geschichte," VI); K. Beck, "Zur Verfassungsgeschichte des Rheinbundes," Mainz, 1890; Goecke, "Das Groszherzogtum Berg unter Joachim Murat," 1877; Beaulieu-Marconnay, "K. F. v. Dalberg." *Vide* also Bailleu, "Fürstenbriefe an Napoleon I" in the "Historischen Zeitschrift," 1887; Strippelmann, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Hessen Kassels," part 2, Marburg, 1878; Baader, "Streiflichter auf die Zeit der tiefsten Erniedrigung Deutschlands, oder die Reichsstadt Nürnberg von 1801 bis 1806," 1878; Mejer, "Zur Geschichte der römisch-deutschen Frage".

For the French army in South Germany—vide Fézensac, "Souvenirs militaires"; and the "Correspondance" of Napoleon I.

For the negotiations with England—vide Thiers, VI; Lefebvre, III; Sorel, VII; Russell's biography of Fox (1859); Cobbett, "Parliamentary Debates," VIII; Jackson, "Diaries and Letters," I; Talleyrand's "Letters to Napoleon" (published by Bertrand) and his "Memoirs," I; Adair, "Historical Memoir of an Embassy to the Viennese Court, 1806," 1846; Coquelle, "Napoléon I et l'Angleterre."

For the negotiations with Russia—vide Bignon, Thiers, Bernhardi, and Martens' "Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie," VI, XI, XIII; Tratschewsky in the "Sbornik," Vol. LXXXII; Groszfürst Nikolaus, "Strogonow"; Schiemann, "Nikolaus I," Vol. I.

For the causes of Franco-Prussian War there is not enough accurate information, for Haugwitz burnt the papers bearing on the subject. But the most important items, as regards documents, are given in the second volume of Bailleu's "Preuszen und Frankreich, 1795-1807". Other good sources of information are: the correspondence and letters of Napoleon in Lecestre, and the correspondence between Friedr. Wilhelm III and Alexander, published by Bailleu; the memoirs of Hardenberg in the edition by Ranke (also the observations of M. Lehmann in the "Historischen Zeitschrift," Neue Folge, Vol. III); Lombard, "Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire des années 1805, 1806, and 1807"; Gentz' "Briefe an Starhemberg," given in Thürheim, "Starhemberg." Compare also Ranke, "Hardenberg und der preuszische Staat"; Häuszer, "Deutsche Geschichte," II; Hüffer, "Die Kabinettsregierung in Preuszen"; Strippelmann, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Hessen-

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Kassels" (Malsburg's reports); Baader, "Streiflichter"; Granier, "Zwölf Blücherbriefe" ("Researches in Brandenburg and Prussian History," 1901, XIII); M. Lehmann, "Scharnhorst," I, and "Stein," I; Bailleu, "Prinz Louis Ferdinand" in the "Deutschen Rundschau," 1883.

For Palm—vide J. Ph. Palm, Nürnberg, 1814; "Eine Biographie von Palm's Sohn," 1842; Du Moulin-Eckart, "München am Vorabend des Rheinbundes," IV (Forsch. 3, Geschichte Baierns, XI, nach Berichten Ottos); Bitterauf, "Rheinbund"; also: Johann Meyer, "Buchhändler Pecht, ein Opfer Napoleons" ("Schriften des Vereins für Geschichte des Bodensees," XVIII).

Addenda, 1910.—Satz, "Die Politik der deutschen Staaten, 1805-1806 im Lichte der gleichzeitigen Publicistik," Diss, Berlin, 1908; "Aus der Berliner Hofgesellschaft, 1805-1806" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1902); Heymann, "Napoleon und die grossen Mächte 1806," Berlin, 1910.

CHAPTER XII.—*For the campaign in Thüringia—vide* the "Correspondance" of Napoleon I and also the supplements; the 183 letters of the Emperor, belonging to the year 1806, published by Masson in Lumbroso's "Miscellanea Napoleonica," 1899; the works on military history by Clausewitz; Lossau (present at Auerstedt), "Charakteristik der Kriege Napoleon I," 2nd vol.; Mathieu Dumas, "Précis des évenements militaires," 18th vol.; Höpfner, "Geschichte des Krieges von 1806 und 1807"; M. P. Foucart, "La campagne de Prusse en 1806," Paris, 1887-90; Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807" (4 vols., 2nd edition, 1891); C. v. d. Goltz, "Roszbach und Jena," 1883; Yorck, "Napoleon als Feldherr I," 1st vol. *Vide* also: Rühle von Lilienstern, "Bericht eines Augenzeugen vom Feldzuge 1806" (under the influence of Massenbach, a staff officer in Hohenlohe's army); Massenbach, "Geschichtliche Denkwürdigkeiten" (confused and unreliable); Müffling, "Der Operationsplan der preuszisch-sächsischen Armee, 1806," Weimar, 1807; Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben, 1851" (unreliable); Ledebur, "Erlebnisse aus den Kriegsjahren 1806 and 1807," Berlin, 1855; Gentz, "Tagebuch im preuszischen Hauptquartier" (in his collected works published by Schlesier); Doerries, "Friedr. v. Gentz"; "Journal de ce qui

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m'est arrivé au quartier de S. M. le roi de Prusse" (Greifswald, 1906, Essay); Tiedemann, "Denkwürdigkeiten"; Gentz und Mayer v. Heldensfeld, "Berichte über die Schlacht bei Jena" ("Mitt. des k. u. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1881); Luck, "Briefe an Joh. v. Müller" ("Beiträge zur vaterländischen Geschichte," 1894); v. Gr., "Einige Briefe" (written before and after the battle of Jena and Auerstedt, 1807); "Fragmente aus dem Tagebuch eines preuszischen Regimentschreibers über die Begebenheiten des 14 Oktober 1806, 1807"; Burckhardt, "Aus den Tagen der Schlacht bei Jena" ("Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte," IV); Vietinghoff, "Kriegstagebuch, 1806, 1807" ("Baltische Monatschrift," 1899); Boyen's reminiscences (badly published by Nippold); Bailleu, "Die Schlacht bei Auerstedt" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1899, the King's dispatch); Davoût's dispatch in the "Revue de Paris," 1896 (it also appeared separately under the title, "Les opérations du 3ième corps, 1806-1807"). *Vide* also his correspondence and that of Montégut on Davoût, also the Memoirs of Ségur III, Fézensac, Grouchy, Berthezène, Szymanowski (French translation, Paris, 1900), Pouget, Pion des Loches, Boulart, Coignet, and Saint Chamans (Paris, 1896).

For narratives—cf. Pertz-Delbrück, "Gneisenau," I; Lehmann, "Scharnhorst," I; Stavenhagen, "Der Operationsentwurf Napoleons und die Versammlung seiner Armee, September und Oktober, 1806" ("Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1893); Freytag-Loringhoven, "Marschanordnungen und Marschleistungen unter Napoleon I" ("Beiheft zur Militär-Wochenblatt," 1893); Lewal, "La veillée de Jéna," Paris, 1899; Bonnal, "La campagne de Jéna," Paris, 1903 (written much earlier); Leydolph, "Die Schlacht bei Jena," 2nd edition, 1901; Keil, "Goethe, Weimar and Jena, 1806".

For Napoleon in Berlin—vide Bray's "Denkwürdigkeiten," Leipzig, 1901; Streckfusz, "Berlin im 19 Jahrhunderte," I; "Die Franzosen in Berlin in den Jahren 1806-1808"; "Napoleon in Berlin" ("Allg. Mil. Zeitung," 1893); also: Lévy, "Napoléon et la paix".

For the war in Poland and East Prussia—vide, in addition to the works already mentioned, Foucart, "La Campagne de Pologne," Paris, 1882; Rob. Wilson, "Brief remarks on the campaigns in Poland" (of little worth); Petre, "Campaign in Poland, 1806-7," London, 1903; Michailowski-Danilewski, "Der zweite Krieg Kaiser Alexanders mit Napoleon, 1806-1807," St. Petersburg, 1846; Leer,

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"Übersicht der Kriege Ruszlands seit Peter dem Groszen," St. Petersburg, 1885 (Russian); Grauert, "Die Operationen an der Weichsel, November und Dezember 1806" ("Beiheft zum Militär-wochenblatt," 1890); the memoirs of Saint Chamans (Paris, 1896) and Paulin (Paris, 1895); also of Barante, Eugen v. Württemberg, Bennigsen (unfortunately only fragmentary, given in the anonymous "Beiträgen zur Geschichte des Krieges von 1806 und 1807," Breslau 1832, and in the history of the war by Danilewski); also, Grolmann, "Tagebuch des Erbgroszherzogs von Baden, 1887"; v. Plotho, "Tagebuch," Berlin, 1811 (from the Russian camp); v. Both, "Relazion der Schlacht bei Preuszisch-Eylau"; Schachtmeyer (an eye-witness), "Die Schlacht bei Preuszisch-Eylau," Berlin, 1857; Dérode, "Nouvelle Relation de la bataille de Friedland"; Grenier, "Etude sur 1807; Manœuvres d'Eylau et Friedland," Paris, 1901.

For Napoleon's policy during the war—vide, in addition to his correspondence in the different editions, the comprehensive narrative of Lefebvre, "Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe," Vol. III, 2nd edition (an admirable exposition of this difficult situation, requiring revision only in details); Sorel, VII; Thiers, VII.

For his attitude towards Prussia—vide Bailleu, "Preuszen und Frankreich," II, and Ranke's edition of Hardenberg's "Memoirs" (especially Vol. V, with the documents). Compare M. Lehmann, "Scharnhorst I, und Stein I"; Ranke, "Hardenberg und Preuszen," III; Bassewitz, "Die Kurmark Brandenburg"; (Schladen) Tagebuch, "Preuszen 1806 und 1807," 1844; Gräfin Voss, "Neunundsechzig Jahre am preuszischen Hofe" (a very defective and incomplete edition).

For the blockade decree—vide Alb. Lumbroso, "Napoleone e l'Inghilterra," Rome, 1897 (with a bibliography of the Continental blockade in the appendix).

For the agreement with Saxony—vide Schiemann, "Zur Geschichte des Posener Friedens" ("Hist. Zeitscher.," N. F., Vol. XXIV); Bonnefons, "Un allié de Napoléon"; "Frédéric Auguste, premier roi de Saxe, grand duc de Varsovie," Paris, 1902.

For the relations with Poland—vide Czartoryski's memoirs and correspondence; Oginski, "Mémoires sur la Pologne, 1788-1815," Paris, 1826, 2nd vol.; Angeberg, "Recueil des traités concernant la Pologne," Paris, 1862; the Memoirs of Rémusat; Ernouf's "Maret," Ménéval's Memoirs, and those of the Countess Potocka;

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Masson, "Napoléon et les femmes"; Prümers, "Napoleon in Posen" ("Zeitschrift der historischen Gesellschaft in Posen," 1896, taken from a South German newspaper of 1806); Rüther, "Napoleon I und Polen 1806 und 1807," Hamburg, 1901; Loreta, "Von Jena nach Tilsit" (Polish in Askenazy's "Monografie," Vol. II, Warsaw, 1902; German extract by Kaindl in the "Göttinger gelehrten Anzeigen," 1903, III); Schiemann, "Nikolaus I," vol. I.

For the relations with Russia.—Much light has been afforded by publications from the "Sbornik," Vols. LXXXVIII and LXXXIX, given by Tatistscheff, "Alexandre I et Napoléon, 1801-1812," Paris, 1891. Cf. also Vol. VI of Martens, "Traités conclus par la Russie". The 13th volume of this work has proved a great disappointment, as it has added scarcely anything new. *Vide* also: Bernhardi, "Geschichte Ruszlands," II; Schilder, "Alexander I," 2nd vol. (Russian); Bernhardi, "Denkwürdigkeiten Tolls"; Savary's Memoirs (which are more trustworthy here than usual).

For the relations with the East—vide Driault, "La politique orientale de Napoléon, 1806-1808," Paris, 1904 (especially Sebastiani's mission to Constantinople and the Finkenstein negotiations); Schlechta, "Die Revolutionen in Konstantinopel 1807 und 1808"; Ghika, "La France et les principautés danubiennes, 1789-1815"; ("Annales de l'Ecole libre des sciences politiques," 1896); Boppe, "La Mission de l'Adjutant-commandant Mériage à Widdin, 1807-1809" (*Ibid.*, 1886). Troidevaux, "La politique coloniale de Napoléon" ("Revue des questions historiques," 1901).

For the relations with Shah Feth-Ali—vide Gardane, "La mission du général Gardane en Perse sous le premier Empire," Paris, 1865; Gaffarel, in the "Revue politique et littéraire," 1878; Méneval, "Mémoires," I.

For the Bartenstein treaty—vide a treatise by Plew in the curriculum of Bartenstein College, 1894.

For the negotiations in Tilsit—vide Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," Vol. I (inadequate); Sorel, VII (better); M. Lenz "Tilsit" (accurate but unfortunately unfinished) ("Researches in Brandenberg and Prussian History," Vol. VI, 1893). *Vide* also the papers of Tolstoi in the "Sbornik," Vol. LXXXIX as supplement to the letters of Napoleon and Talleyrand. Compare also Bailleu, "Briefwechsel Friedrich Wilhelm III mit Alexander".

For Queen Louisa in Tilsit—vide Bailleu in the "Hohenzollern Chronicle" of 1899. Also Napoleon's Memoirs at St. Helena in

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Gourgaud's "Journal inédit," II, 55. Binder's dispatch to Stadion on the Conference at Tilsit, published by Alf. Stern ("Revue napoléonienne," 1902) offers little new. The treaties are given in full in Martens, XIII.

Addenda, 1910—Meusel, "Nachträge zu Maratz, Bericht über der Schlacht bei Jena" ("Researches in Brandenburg History," 1907); V. d. Goltz, "Von Jena bis Preuss; Eylau," Berlin, 1907; Schottmüller, "Der Polenaufstand, 1806-1807" ("Hist. Geschichte v. Posen," IV; H. Rose, "Canning and the Secret Intelligence from Tilsit" ("Revue napol.," 1908); Granier, "Die Franzosen in Berlin, 1806-8" ("Hohenzollern Jahrbuch," 1905); H. Delbürck, "Die Frage der polnischen Krone" ("Studien u. Versuche," 1910); "Das Preuss. Offizierskorps und die Untersuchung der Kriegsereignisse, 1806" (published by the Headquarters-staff, Berlin, 1906); Meinecke, "Das Zeitalter der deutschen Erhebung," Leipzig, 1906; Joachim, "Napoleon in Finckenstein," Berlin, 1906; v. Strauch, "Der erste Zusammenstoss in Jena, 1806"; Marni, "Campaña de Pruhsia en 1806," Madrid, 1906; Petre, "Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia," London, 1907.

APPENDIX.

LETTERS FROM NAPOLEON TO TALLEYRAND.

(These letters are taken from a collection in the Vienna State archives. An account of them is given in Fournier's treatise "Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleons I," in the "Transactions of the Vienna Academy of Science," Austrian Historical Archives, Vol. XCIII.)

1.

28 frimaire an VIII.
(19th December, 1799.) [1]

Note pour le citoyen Talleyrand.

Nous sommes interessés à ce que Vandergraff, directeur général du commerce de la Compagnie Batave aux Indes et désigné gouverneur de Batavia, s'y rende le plutôt possible. Connaître quelles sont les vues du gouvernement batave sur cet objet.

Il nous serait nécessaire d'obtenir du gouvernement batave 200,000 piastres de crédit sur Batavia et autant des Espagnols sur les Manille.

Bonaparte.

2.

Paris, le 10 nivôse an VIII.
(31st December, 1799.)

J'ai la certitude, Citoyen Ministre, que M. Morelet,[2] consul danois à Gênes, est notre ennemi déclaré. Je vous prie de me proposer un moyen de le faire rappeler de ce poste. Je vous salue.

Bonaparte.

[1] Written from Paris.

[2] On July 27th, 1800, a second letter was sent to Talleyrand again demanding his removal.

3.

s. d.

(December, 1799.)[1]

Note pour le Citoyen Talleyrand.

Donner au C. Bacher des instructions pour qu'il provoque, sans trop s'avancer, des ouvertures de la part de l'Electeur de Bavière. Il peut dire à des personnes qui lui seraient attachées que, pendant mon séjour à Rastatt, j'ai été fort content de la manière dont cet électeur s'est conduit, étant alors Duc de Deux-Ponts.[2]

Faire mettre dans le "Moniteur" un article propre à frapper les cabinets étrangers et qui fera connaître la différence de la marche diplomatique des Consuls et de celle de l'ancien Directoire, les appuyant sur l'éxécution donnée au traité fait avec le Grand-maître de Malte et sur la stricte exécution du cartel fait avec les Anglais et en conséquence duquel les Consuls ont fait mettre en liberté Sir Robert Barclay.[3]

Sur la levée de l'embargo sur les vaisseaux danois et les deux consuls danois reçus.

Dire aussi, quoique plus légèrement, que le caractère des envoyés nouveaux nommés pour les pays étrangers, tels que Bourgeois[4] Beurnonville,[5] Alquier,[6] etc., est une garantie des in-

[1] Written from Paris.

[2] That Bacher, who represented France at the Ratisbon Diet and was at this time at Frankfurt, actually received the commission is seen from a report of the Prussian Ambassador Heymann at Munich on January 6th, 1800: "On a même donné l'ordre à l'agent de la République à Francfort d'accueillir avec intérêt et amitié tous ceux de l'Electeur qu'il y rencontrera". That he executed the commission we learn from a second dispatch from Heymann on January 19th. (*Vide* Du Moulin-Eckhart, "Montgelas," I. 232.)

[3] The agreement relating to the prisoners was concluded on September 13th, 1798 (De Clercq, "Recueil des Traités de la France," I. 368). It is dealt with in a consular decree on December 30th, 1899.

[4] Probably a mistake for Bourgoing, who was appointed to Copenhagen in December.

[5] In December, 1799, Beurnonville received his instructions for Berlin, and the Prussian Ambassador, Sandoz, in Paris comments upon them in the following terms: "Les instructions de Beurnonville sont différentes de celles de ses prédécesseurs . . . il doit parler uniquement des intérêts qui lient les deux puissances, et des grands avantages que retirerait la Prusse d'interposer une médiation énergique et armée pour donner la paix à l'Europe. Du temps des gouvernants avocats tous les fonctionaires publics étaient devenus en France des discoureurs . . . (Bailleu, I. 356 and 515)."

[6] In December, 1799, Alquier went to Madrid.

structions qu'ils doivent avoir de suivre les formes reçues dans les pays, en observant tout ce qui peut dépendre d'eux pour maintenir l'harmonie et la paix.

Bonaparte.

4.

Paris, le 12 nivôse an VIII.
(2nd January, 1800.)

Pour le Ministre des Relations Extérieures.

Le Ministre des Relations Extérieures fera connaître au Ministre plénipotentiaire de la République Hélvétique [1] que je ne reçois les ministres étrangers que dans les jours où ils me sont présentés par lui.

Bonaparte.

5.

Paris, le 14 floréal an VIII.
(4th May, 1800.)

Au Ministre des Relations Extérieures.

Vous trouverez ci-joint, Citoyen Ministre, copie d'une lettre que j'écris au général Augereau. Je vous prie d'écrire dans le même sens au C. Sémonville [2] et de lui dire qu'il fasse connaître au gouvernement batave combien je suis mécontent du peu d'empressement qu'il met à monter la cavallerie et équiper les troupes françaises qui sont à son service. Je vous salue.[3]

Bonaparte.

6.

Paris, le 21 messidor an VIII.
(10th July, 1800.)[4]

Vous trouverez ci-joint, Citoyen Ministre, différentes lettres des ministres du gouvernement à Turin et à Milan. Faites leur con-

[1] The letter of August 27th to Augereau, then in command of the French troops in Holland, is given in the "Corresp.," VI. 4734.

[2] French Ambassador at The Hague. Talleyrand executed this commission on the following day, May 5th. (*Vide* Boulay de la Meurthe, "Correspondance de Talleyrand pendant la Campagne de Marengo," "Revue d'hist. dipl.," 1892, p. 251.)

[3] The usual greetings at the end, and the address, "To the Minister," etc., are omitted in the following letters.

[4] Cf. the letter to Masséna, then commanding the army in Italy on June 25th, 1800. ("Corresp.," VI. 4591.)

naître, aussi qu'à celui qui est à Gênes, qu'ils doivent correspondre avec vous.

Ecrivez leur qu'ils doivent faire tous leurs efforts pour procurer au général Masséna les subsistances pour son armée.

Le Piémont pourrait-il procurer 2 millions par mois à la caisse de l'armée ?

Quelles ressources peut offrir Gênes ? Cette République avait autrefois 4 ou 5 mille hommes de troupes soldées ; n'est-il pas juste qu'une partie équivalente de troupes françaises soient habillées, nourries et soldées ?

Bonaparte.

7.

Paris, le 27 messidor an VIII.
(16th July, 1800.)

Vous trouverez ci-joint, Citoyen Ministre, deux lettres du général Masséna que vous me renverrez.

Vous écrirez au général Dupont [1] combien il est indispensable qu'il fournisse 1,500,000 fr. par mois pour la subsistance de l'armée. Il est nécessaire que les 1,500,000 fr. pour messidor soient soldés avant la fin de la première décade de thermidor.

Vous ferez sentir au C. Petiet [2] que j'espérais que les 2 millions pour le mois de messidor, qui cependant j'apprends qu'ils n'ont point encore été versés, qu'ainsi il n'a pas nous été payé pour la solde, vous lui ferez sentir qu'il prenne des mesures pour que ces 2 millions rentrent exactement. Car enfin le plus essentiel est de nourrir l'armée, tant pour l'Italie que pour la France.

Bonaparte.

8.

Paris, le 7 thermidor an VIII.
(26th July, 1800.)

Vous donnerez l'ordre, Citoyen Ministre, au C. Bourgoing par un courrier extraordinaire de se rendre en Danemarc.[3] Le C. Fréville se rendra à Altona comme chargé d'affaires.

Bonaparte.

[1] In command in Piedmont.

[2] French Ambassador in Milan.

[3] Bourgoing had hitherto resided in Hamburg, and was now proceeding, in the second half of August, to his destination, Copenhagen.

9.

Paris, le 7 thermidor an VIII.
(26th July, 1800.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de me remettre un projet de note en réponse à celle de M. Haugwitz ; on y dirait 1° que depuis la mission de Duroc nous voulions marcher avec la Prusse et suivre le même système, mais que, tout en disant "oui," la Prusse a toujours marché dans le sens contraire ; 2° que, contre l'esprit du traité de Bâle, on nous a même fait sentir que l'on nous ferait des difficultés pour la rive gauche du Rhin ; 3° que cela n'avait pas empêché le 1er Consul, qui compte toujours sur le caractère personnel de Sa Majesté, de continuer de mettre sa confiance en lui, l'ayant spécialement prié d'interposer ses bons offices envers l'Empereur de Russie pour rétablir la bonne harmonie entre lui et la République ; que depuis 4 ou 5 mois que cette affaire était commencée, il n'avait pas obtenu une première réponse.

Bonaparte.

10.

Paris, le 9 thermidor an VIII.
(28th July, 1800.)[2]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de me faire connaître quand vous me présenterez le travail pour l'exécution du réglement sur les Relations Extérieures.

Bonaparte.

[1] Quoted in my treatise, "Zur Textkritik," p. 12, where I contrast several sentences of similar import on the same day. Passages from this letter are also given by Lévy in his "Napoléon et la Paix," p. 27, who claims to have discovered the letter in the Paris war archives. Probably it is the original letter, and so my suggestion that possibly the letter had not been sent at all falls to the ground. Talleyrand received in one day two letters on the same topic, both recording the personal instructions of the First Consul.

[2] *Vide* Masson, "Le Département des Affaires Étrangères pendant la Révolution," p. 450.

11.

s. d.
(August, 1800.) [1]

Note pour le Ministre des Relations Extérieures.

Le Ministre des Relations Extérieures enverra au C. Otto la note et le projet ci-joint d'armistice. Ces deux pièces contiennent deux choses : 1° le désir réel du gouvernement français d'arriver à la paix générale, 2° d'en accélérer l'époque en mettant de côté le dégoût naturel que devait avoir le gouvernement à faire la première démarche, en considérant l'avantage que trouve la République à ravitailler Malte, Brest et Alexandrie. 3° Tout armistice qui n'aurait point ce but serait inutile et dès lors inacceptable. 4° Le gouvernement anglais trouve un avantage inappréciable puisque cet armistice le conduit à la paix et dans la position actuelle de l'Europe, l'Autriche ayant signé les préliminaires, il n'y a aucune espèce de doute que la paix ne soit toute à l'avantage de l'Angleterre. Avant donc de rien écrire et d'envoyer la note ci-jointe, il parait nécessaire que le C. Otto se procure une entrevue avec le Duc de Portland [2] et lui fasse connaître que le gouvernement français désire un armistice qui puisse permettre de traiter la paix et garantir le plutôt possible aux deux [nations] [3] puissances les bienfaits d'une cessation d'hostilités et tout de suite fasse donner le tems de répondre. Le C. Otto fera remarquer que cet armistice est avantageux à l'Angleterre puisqu'il la mène à la paix dans un moment où elle est abandonée de ses alliés, que la France, de son côté, retirera de cet armistice l'avantage de rafraîchir Malte et d'approvisionner Malte et Alexandrie à moins de frais. Si M. Portland observe que, par cette même raison, l'armistice est défavorable à l'Angleterre, le C. Otto répondra que, si l'on veut la paix, on doit regarder cela comme rien. La preuve en est que dans l'armistice avec Sa Majesté Impériale les garnisons d'Ingoldstadt, d'Ulm et de Philippsburg reçoivent des approvisionnemens [4] ; que, cependant, on pour-

[1] No date given. Probably it belongs to the first half of August, 1800, as reference is made to Saint Julien's preliminaries, which were not signed until July 28th, and the supplement is dated August 11th. The letter is unsigned.

[2] The Duke of Portland was then Secretary of State.

[3] The word " nations " is scored out.

[4] According to the terms of the truce of Parsdorf on July 15th, the three fortresses were allowed to revictual every ten days.

rait stipuler que Malte ne pourrait point recevoir de renforts d'hommes. La note ci-jointe ne serait remise que lorsque le C. Otto saurait que ces bases conviennent. Cet armistice serait commun à l'Espagne et à la Batavie.

A. Projet d'armistice.

23 thermidor.
(11th August.)

1. Il y aura armistice entre la République française et S. M. le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande.

2. L'armistice commencera au 1er fructidor[1] et ne cessera qu'un mois après la notification qui en sera faite par une puissance à l'autre.

3. La navigation sera libre et les bâtimens des deux puissances se considéreront comme s'ils étaient en paix.

4. La liberté de navigation s'étendra également aux places qui seraient bloquées, telles que Brest, Malte et Alexandrie.

5. Les ordres de l'armirauté aux escadres de la Méditerranée et de l'Océan seraient portés directement par des officiers anglais qui traverseront la France.

6. Ledit armistice devant être un acheminement à la paix entre les deux nations, le gouvernement français autorisera l'exportation de 100,000 quintaux de blé pour l'Angleterre.

B. Note pour Otto.

Le soussigné, spécialement autorisé par son gouvernement, a l'honneur de faire connaître à M. le Duc de Portland que le Premier Consul de la République, désirant étendre le bienfait de l'armistice, qui a lieu entre la République française et S. M. Impériale, aux états de la République française et de S. M. le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne, me charge de proposer un armistice général entre la République française (et la Grande-Bretagne)[2] tant sur mer que sur terre, pour se mettre à même de commencer les négociations et de terminer la guerre qui désole les deux états.

[1] August 19th.

[2] "Et la Grande-Bretagne" is awanting.

12.

Paris, le 25 thermidor an VIII.
(13th August, 1800.)[1]

Le général Alexandre Berthier est muni des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires pour négocier, conclure et signer une convention entre la République française et le Roi d'Espagne, relative à un accroissement d'états à donner en Italie au Duc de Parme.

Bonaparte.

13.

Paris, le 15 fructidor an VIII.
(2nd September, 1800.)

Je désire, Citoyen Ministre, que vous expédiiez un courrier extraordinaire en Espagne pour faire part de l'état de nos négociations avec l'Angleterre.

Bonaparte.

Le Lord Minto[2] a communiqué à la cour de Vienne l'intention de son gouvernement de s'unir à l'Autriche pour entrer en négociation avec la République.

La cour de Vienne a fait déclarer à la France qu'elle ne pourrait traiter que de concert avec l'Angleterre, elle a proposé que la négociation générale fut établie à Schelestadt ou à Lunéville.

Le 1er Consul a accepté Lunéville ; mais il a fait annoncer en même tems que, l'Empereur exigeant l'admission de l'Angleterre dans les négociations sans avoir éxigé préalablement que l'Angleterre accedât à l'armistice existant, cet armistice serait rompu.

D'un autre côté le 1er Consul a fait demander au gouvernement britannique, par l'intermédiaire du C. Otto, des éclaircissemens sur la démarche de Lord Minto et sur l'efficacité des dispositions qu'elle annonçait, et en même tems a fait proposer à l'Angleterre de conclure sur-le-champ un armistice maritime général qui comprendrait les alliés de la France, comme ceux de l'Angleterre, et qui serait l'équivalent de l'armistice continental.

Lord Grenville a répondu que S. M. Britannique approuvait ce qu'avait écrit Lord Minto, qu'Elle enverrait son plenipotentiaire à

[1] *Cf.* "Corresp.," VI. 5010, 5034, and 5070. On October 1st, 1800, Berthier concluded the Treaty of Ildefonso with the Spanish Minister, Urquijo.

[2] English Ambassador at Vienna.

Lunéville, mais qu'Elle ne pouvait consentir à l'armistice. Le 1er Consul a chargé le C. Otto d'insister sur l'armistice, ne pouvant consentir qu'à ce prix que les hostilités ne fussent point reprises contre l'Autriche et que la négociation s'ouvrît en commun pour la paix générale.

On attend les réponses de Vienne et de Londres.

14.

Paris, le 28 fructidor an VIII.
(15th September, 1800.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, d'écrire au C. Sémonville que j'ai été très fâché d'apprendre que les 7. et 22. régiments de chasseurs manquaient des objets les plus indispensables ; qu'il fasse auprès du gouvernement batave toutes les démarches nécessaires pour que ces deux régiments soient, dans le plus court délai, mis en état d'entrer en campagne.

Bonaparte.

15.

Paris, le vendémiaire an IX.
(24th September, 1800.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, 1° de réclamer dans[2] votre seconde lettre à Thugut, avec instance, les Italiens détenus pour opinions publiques, comme l'avait promis M. de Mélas, et spécialement Caprara et Moscati.[3]

2° que, pour que la Toscane continue à jouir de l'armistice, il est indispensable qu'il n'y ait pas de levée en masse et que les habitans restent chez eux.

3° que la convention de Marengo soit exécutée ; il y est stipulé que S. M. I. ne doit conserver à la rive droite du Po que la seule forteresse de Ferrare.

4° que les Napolitains et les troupes impériales évacuent entièrement Rome et l'état du Pape, hormis la ville et la forteresse

[1] Copy.

[2] In the copy " à ".

[3] The fate of the two Italian political prisoners who had been in prison outside Italy before the battle of Marengo was one of the subjects of negotiation between Joseph Bonaparte and Cobenzl at Lunéville. They were only released in July, 1801. Cf. Du Casse, " Négotiations diplomatiques," II. 269, 360, 405, 417.

d'Ancône à défaut de quoi les troupes françaises se trouveraient obligées d'entrer aussi dans les états du Pape.

Bonaparte.

16.

Paris, le 6 vendémiaire an IX.
(28th September, 1800.)[1]

Vous trouverez ci-joint une lettre de l'Archévêque de Milan et vous me présenterez un projet de sauf-conduit conforme à sa demande avec une lettre d'envoi.

Bonaparte.

17.

Paris, le 9 frimaire an IX.
(30th November, 1800.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de me présenter un projet d'arrêté pour nommer le C. Larochefoucauld, préfet de Seine et Marne, chargé d'affaires à une cour d'Allemagne.[2]

Je vous prie de me faire connaître les places dont je puis disposer, soit dans les commissariats de commerce, soit dans les chargés d'affaires ou ministres près des différentes puissances.

Bonaparte.

18.

Paris, le 19 frimaire an IX.
(10th December, 1800.)[1]

Je désire, Citoyen Ministre, qu'en causant avec Schimmelpenningk[3] vous lui demandiez quelques renseignemens sur les cent mille florins dont on paraît toujours poursuivre à La Haye le remboursement.

Bonaparte.

19.

Paris, le 24 frimaire an IX.
(15th December, 1800.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de donner l'ordre aux Citoyens Belleville et Déjean de faire partir dans le courant de nivôse 3

[1] Copy.

[2] Larochefoucauld was appointed to Dresden and later on went to Vienna as successor to Champagny.

[3] Dutch Ambassador in Paris.

bâtimens de Gênes et 3 de Livourne pour Alexandrie en Egypte.[1] Ces bâtimens partiront à 6 jours de distance l'un de l'autre. Ils seront montés par des équipages français et liguriens. On prendra, ou des vaisseaux appartenans aux Français, ou des bâtimens qui avaient été confisqués, ou, s'il est nécessaire, de bons voiliers que l'on achetera.

Il sera embarqué sur chacun de ces bâtimens : 500 fusils avec leurs bayonettes, 250 sabres, 250 paires de pistolets, 3000 boulets de 4, 3000 boulets de 8, 3000 boulets de 12, 300 obus de 6 pouces, une caisse de graines d'Europe, une caisse de médicamens contenant 29 livres de quina et en proportion des mouches cantharides, de l'ipecacuane, de l'émétique.

Les Cs. Belleville et Déjean se concerteront avec les commandans militaires et les autorités de ces deux places pour ce procurer ce qui ne se trouverait pas dans les magasins de l'armée. Ils compteront directement avec vous pour toutes les dépenses qu'occasionneraient ces expéditions.

Vous écrirez aux généraux Brune et Marmont pour les engager à faciliter de tous leurs moyens l'expédition de ces bâtimens.

Bonaparte.[2]

20.

Paris, 16 nivôse an IX.
(6th January, 1801.)[3]

Le Ministre des Relations Extérieures fera connaître au C. Sémonville que je n'approuve pas les démarches qu'il a faites dans cette circonstance. Le gouvernement français n'est pas à 100,000 f.

[1] Belleville and Déjean were the French Consuls at Florence and at Genoa. The former went to Madrid in 1802 in this capacity, the latter became a member of the Council of State.

[2] A week later a similar commission was sent to Lucien Bonaparte at Madrid. Cf. Lecestre, "Lettres inédites de Napoléon I," I. no. 29, "Quoique l'on agisse du côté de l'Italie, en même temps que du côté de l'Espagne, vous ne devez pas moins vous considérer comme si vous étiez le seul qui expédiassiez des bâtimento en Egypte".

[3] Copy. Sémonville wrote Tallyrand from the Hague, December 14th, 1800, that he had made an excuse for borrowing 100,000 florins from the Batavian Government in order to enable the 27th demi-brigade, who were becoming fractious, to replace their baggage which had been lost. The first Consul's decision is written alongside Sémonville's report.

près, et je suis très-mécontent qu'on l'ait mis en jeu pour si peu de chose. Il fallait demander ouvertement une chose juste. Puisque cette demi-brigade avait perdu ses effets, il était d'autant plus raisonnable que le gouvernement batave vînt à son secours qu'il est bien loin d'avoir dépassé ce qu'il doit. Ces petites intrigues ne sont pas dignes du gouvernement.

Le 1er Consul

Bonaparte.

21.

Paris, le 21 nivôse an IX.
(11th January, 1801.)[1]

Le Parlement impérial se réunit le 22 janvier ; il faudrait que ceci parût dans 4 ou 5 jours, afin que cela pût arriver à Londres pour l'ouverture du Parlement.[2]

22.

Paris, le 23 nivôse an IX.
(13th January, 1801.)[3]

Le Viceamiral Bruix se rend, Citoyen Ministre, à La Haye pour s'entendre avec le Directoire éxécutif batave sur un plan de campagne maritime. Je vous prie de lui remettre une lettre pour le C. Sémonville afin qu'il soit appuyé dans toutes les circonstances où il en aurait besoin.

Bonaparte.

23.

Paris, le 28 pluviôse an IX.
(17th February, 1801.)[3]

Vous donnerez l'ordre, Citoyen Ministre, au résident de la République à Parme[4] de se rendre à son poste et de partir de Paris sous 48 heures.

Bonaparte.

[1] Copy. No signature.

[2] The "Moniteur" of January 15th and 16th consists largely of news from the English newspapers. There is no article bearing upon this instruction.

[3] Copy.

[4] Moreau Saint-Méry.

24.

Paris, le 9 ventôse an IX.
(28th February, 1801.)[1]

Donnez l'ordre, Citoyen Ministre, au C. Alquier de se rendre au quartier général du général Murat[2] avec les pouvoirs nécessaires pour conclure la paix avec le plénipotentiaire du Roi des Deux Siciles. Il serait nécessaire que le C. Alquier partît le 11 ventôse.

Bonaparte.

25.

Paris, le 27 ventôse an IX.
(18th March, 1801.)[3]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de m'envoyer copie des instructions que vous avez données au Ministre plénipotentiaire de la République pour l'échange des ratifications sur la convention à signer ou à convenir avant la signature du procès-verbal de l'échange des ratifications.

Bonaparte.

26.

Paris, le 8 germinal an IX.
(29th March, 1801.)[1]

J'ai rappelé au Conseil d'Etat, Citoyen Ministre, les Citoyens Petiet et Déjean. Faites-moi un rapport sur les individus que vous croirez propres à les remplacer. Le général Dessolles me paraîtrait convenir à Gênes. Le général Masséna paraît désirer rester à Paris. Faites-moi connaître par qui on pourrait faire occuper le poste de Copenhague.[4]

Bonaparte.

27.

Paris, le 22 floréal an IX.
(12th May, 1801.)[1]

Le 1er Consul envoie au Ministre des Relations Extérieures la copie d'une lettre de Mr. de Tamara au général Murat et un projet de réponse à y faire.

[1] Copy.

[2] Murat, who was in command of a corps in South Italy, had concluded a truce with Naples on February 19th, 1801.

[3] Copy. Probably refers to the agreement with Spain on March 21st.

[4] Bourgoing had been sent to Stockholm.

28.

Paris, le 12 messidor an IX.
(1st July, 1801.)[1]

Le C. Alquier, Citoyen Ministre, ambassadeur de la République à Naples, demande un chiffre. Je vous prie de lui en faire passer un.

Bonaparte.

29.

Paris, le 18 messidor an IX.
(7th July, 1801.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de m'envoyer le traité conclu à Badajos entre la République et le Portugal, et celui conclu au même lieu entre le Portugal et l'Espagne.

Bonaparte.

30.

Paris, le 17 thermidor an IX.
(5th August, 1801.)[1]

J'ai lu la note à l'ambassadeur d'Espagne, elle me paraît convenable. Je désire que vous la remettiez en invitant l'ambassadeur à expédier un courrier extraordinaire à Madrid.[2]

Bonaparte.

31.

Paris, le 26 thermidor an IX.
(14th August, 1801.)[1]

Je vous envoie quelques idées qui seraient à rédiger en notes pour l'Espagne.[3]

Je vous prie de me faire connaître dans la journée qui est-ce qui a réglé qu'il y aura en Hollande 25,000 français et qu'ils y resteront jusqu'à deux ans après la paix générale. Je n'en vois point de traces dans le traité de la Haye.[4]

Bonaparte.

[1] Copy.

[2] Cf. "Corresp.," VII. 5665. Azara was Spanish Ambassador.

[3] Cf. "Corresp.," VII. 5690.

[4] Cf. the military conventions of July 27th, 1795, April 2nd, 1798, and August 29th, 1801, given by De Clercq, I. 249, 355, 452.

32.

Paris, le 4 fructidor an IX.
(22nd August, 1801.)[1]

Je vous renvoie, Citoyen Ministre, le projet de traité entre la République et l'Electeur de Bavière. Je ne vois pas d'inconvénient à ce que ce traité soit signé.[2]

Bonaparte.

33.

Paris, la 9 vendémiaire an X.
(1st October, 1801.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, d'envoyer au Ministre du Trésor Publique la copie des articles de la convention faite avec la Batavie qui concernent son ministère.[3]

Bonaparte.

34.

Paris, le 10 vendémiaire an X.
(2nd October, 1801.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de me renvoyer la pièce relative au Prince de la Paix, en marge de laquelle j'ai mis une apostille qui ferait connaître mon opinion sur le Prince.[4]

Bonaparte.

35.

Paris, le 26 pluviôse an X.
(15th February, 1802.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de faire connaître au C. Felix Desportes que mon intention est qu'il ne se mêle en rien des affaires de la maison Iranda.[5]

Bonaparte.

[1] Copy.

[2] The treaty was signed two days later. *Vide* De Clercq, I. 449.

[3] Barbé-Marbois had recently become Minister of the Treasury. *Vide* Articles 15 and 16 of the treaty of August 29th, 1801, binding Holland to pay 5,000,000 francs (De Clercq, I. 452).

[4] Refers to the first Consul's opinion of the Prince of Peace. Cf. "Corresp.," VII. 5630, 5691.

[5] Cf. Lecestre, "Lettres Inédites," I. 42, 47.

36.

Paris, le 26 prairial an X.
(15th June, 1802.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de me faire remettre le traité avec l'Espagne relativement à la Louisiane, et les mémoires que vous pourriez avoir sur cette colonie.

Bonaparte.

37.

Paris, le 16 thermidor an X.
(4th August, 1802.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, d'écrire au C. Champagny[2] et de parler ici à M. de Cobenzl, pour que M. de la Fare, ancien évêque de Nancy, qui fomente des intrigues dans son ancien diocèse, soit arrêté ou, au moins, rélégué en Hongrie.

Je vous prie de faire faire la même démarche dans les états de Baden et à Munic, où il y a plusieurs évêques qui ne cessent de nous inquiéter en France, pour que, s'ils entretiennent en France des correspondances tendantes à troubler le concordat, on les fasse arrêter.[3]

Bonaparte.

38.

Paris, le 21 thermidor an X.
(9th August, 1802.)[1]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de me faire un rapport sur notre situation à Corfou, et de me faire connaître s'il a été fait des notifications à notre agent sur la garantie du traité d'Amiens et sur les

[1] Copy.

[2] Champagny was Ambassador in Vienna from 1801 to 1804.

[3] In the copy of a pastoral letter from the *émigré* Bishop de la Farre of Nancy written from Vienna in Easter, 1802, and delivered to Abbé Jacquemin on July 1st, there occurs the following passage: "Il faut que les principes essentiels soient en sûreté, que les droits de l'Episcopat, que nous voulons et que nous devons défendre, demeurent sans atteinte, et que notre jurisdiction, pour laquelle nous faisons toutes réserves necessaires, persévère dans nos mains". The clergy and the faithful were "*provisoirement*" to trust themselves to the Bishops to whom the Pope had granted full powers.

événemens qui ont eu lieu depuis, et dans quelle situation il se trouve dans ce pays.

Il me paraît que les Hollandais veulent prendre à leur solde un corps de 5000 h. composé d'émigrés bataves qui étaient à la solde de l'Angleterre. Cette conduite me paraît devoir fixer notre attention. Je vous prie de me faire un rapport sur cela.

Bonaparte.[1]

39.

St. Cloud, le 13 vendémiaire an XI.
(5th October, 1802.)[2]

Mon intention, Citoyen Ministre, est d'écrire à Gênes que je désire avoir pour ambassadeur ici l'ancien sénateur Spinola, qui a été gouverneur de S. Remi, ou Ferrari d'Alexis. Je ne recevrai aucunes lettres de créance. Si elles avaient été envoyées, vous ne les feriez pas présenter jusqu'à la réponse du Doge. Les présens à faire pour le traité pour Gênes ne doivent pas passer 24,000 frcs. Je vous prie de me faire connaître quelles espèces de présens il serait convenable de donner pour ne pas dépenser une somme plus considérable.

Bonaparte.

40.

Saint-Cloud, le 26 nivôse an XI.
(16th January, 1803.)[3]

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de donner ordre au souscommissaire des relations extérieures à Jersey de correspondre directement avec le Grand-juge pour les objets relatifs à la police et à la sûreté intérieure de l'Etat.

Donnez le même ordre aux commissaires des relations extérieures en Angleterre, en leur recommandant de ne rien écrire par la poste, mais par des occasions sûres, et de tenir un journal de tout ce qui viendrait à leur connaissance pouvant intéresser la police.

Bonaparte.

[1] Remark in the letter: "Le ministre invite le C. Durant à lui répresenter toutes les lettres du C. Marivaus relatives au dernier paragraphe de la lettre du premier Consul".

[2] Copy.

[3] Copy. Official comment: "Le 29 nivôse écrit à l'ambassadeur en Angleterre".

41.

Paris, le 29 pluviôse an XI.
(18th February, 1803.)[1]

Je vous envoie, Citoyen Ministre, l'acte de médiation relatif aux Suisses. Comme il sera communiqué demain aux députés, je vous prie de le transmettre par un courrier extraordinaire au général Ney.

Bonaparte.

42.

Saint-Cloud, le 23 floréal an XI.
(13th May, 1803.)[2]

Le Premier Consul désire, Citoyen Ministre, que vous fassiez continuer par l'imprimerie de la République l'impression de la négociation avec l'Angleterre jusqu'à sa note de ce jour inclusivement. Il pense qu'il convient de joindre à ce recueil les ratifications des Empereurs d'Allemagne et de Russie relatives aux arrangemens de Malte.

Hugues Maret.

Voulez-vous, Citoyen Ministre, que je vous envoie la copie de la dernière note, ou que je la transmette directement à l'imprimerie?

43.

Paris, le 24 floréal an XI.
(14th May, 1803.)[3]

Le Premier Consul désire, Citoyen Ministre, que vous donniez sur-le-champ l'ordre au général Vial de se retirer de Malte, si déjà cet ordre n'a pas été donné par vous.

Hugues Maret.

[1] Copy. The letter bears a registered mark: 2 D 763, 4 Vent., which is also copied.

[2] Copy.

[3] Copy. In May, 1802, General Vial was appointed to represent France in Malta.

44.

Saint-Cloud, le 2 prairial an XI.
(22nd May, 1803.)[1]

Le Ministre des Relations Extérieures chargera l'ambassadeur de la République à La Haye de faire connaître au gouvernement batave le mécontentement qu'éprouve le Premier Consul de ce que l'embargo n'a pas encore été mis sur les vaisseaux anglais dans les ports de Batavie.

Hugues Maret.

45.

Bruxelles, le 8 thermidor an XI.
(27th July, 1803.)[2]

Je désire, Citoyen Ministre, que vous écriviez à M. de Gallo, en lui faisant parvenir les lettres ci-jointes pour le Roi et la Reine de Naples[3] pour leur être remises en mains propres, que j'ai donné ordre que la solde, l'habillement, les remontes, et généralement tout, fût fourni à l'armée française, hormis le logement, le chauffage, les vivres et fourages qu'il est nécessaire que S. M. fasse fournir, sauf à en régler un compte définitif.

Ecrivez au Citoyen Marescalchi qu'il fasse connaître au vice-président qu'il doit faire passer au corps de troupes italiennes qui est dans le royaume de Naples l'habillement, la solde et la remonte, le Roi de Naples ne devant rien fournir.—Ecrivez dans le même sens au ministre ligurien pour les deux bataillons liguriens.

Ecrivez aux ministres Dejean et Berthier pour faire faire la solde au corps de troupes françaises qui est à Tarente, le Roi de Naples ne devant fournir que le logement, la nourriture et le chauffage.

46.

Saint-Cloud, le 18 fructidor an XI.
(5th September, 1803.)[4]

Je vous renvoie, Citoyen Ministre, les numéros de la correspondance d'Espagne. J'imagine que les trois derniers courriers

[1] Copy. Official comment: "Extrait des registres des délibérations du gouvernement de la République".

[2] Copy. Official comment: "fait le 9". Napoleon's signature is awanting.

[3] Cf. the letters in the "Corresp.," VIII. 6950, 6951; also the letters to Dejean of 26th July, *ibid.*, 6943.

[4] Copy.

n'étaient pas encore arrivés. Envoyez-moi une note séparée des renseignemens qu'il y a sur la force de l'armée espagnole.

Bonaparte.

47.

Malmaison, le 28 ventôse an XII.
(19th March, 1804.)[1]

Je vous envoie, Citoyen Ministre, le rapport de l'officier de gendarmerie qui a été envoyé à Carlsruhe.[2] Il y a dans ce rapport

[1] Original. Méneval's handwriting. The letter appears in the "Corresp.," IX. 7630, as the first draft of a longer letter on March 18th. With the exception of the words "que j'entends répéter depuis quinze jours" instead of "qui me font penser" the text is the same.

[2] The enclosure is the report from Capt. Berckheim who had been ordered by Caulaincourt to deliver a letter from Talleyrand on 11th March to the Baden Minister Edelsheim (*vide* Obser, "Karl Friedrich von Baden," v. 5). Here is the original letter with its defective orthography: "D'après les ordres du gén. Caulaincourt je me rendis à Carlsrouhe et fus de suite chez l'envoyé de France, le C. Massias, et lui remis la dépêche dont j'étais porteur. Comme il était malade, il me témoigna le regret qu'il avoit de ne pouvoir aller lui-même chez le Ministre d'Edelsheim et m'engager à la lui porter moi-même. Ayant fait avertir le Ministre d'Edelsheim que j'avois une lettre de M. de Talleyrand à lui remettre, il me reçut. Après avoir lu la lettre du Ministre Talleyrand et m'avoir dit qu'il avait déjà envoyé la première de ce Ministre à S. A. E., il me demanda si le Duc d'Enghien était déjà arrêté? Je lui répondis que je l'ignorais, et là-dessus il ajouta qu'il étoit même déjà à Strasbourg. Il me fit part de l'indignation générale qu'avait produit à la cour le complot que l'on avait ourdi contre le Premier Consul; que S. A. E. avoit souffert que le Duc d'Enghien restait dans ses Etats, y étant déjà depuis longtems très tranquil et le gouvernement français n'ayant jamais fait mention de lui: qu'au reste S. A. E. s'était toujours refusé de recevoir chez elle des émigrés qui pouvaient déplaire à la France.

"D'après les renseignemens que je pris sur l'effet qu'avait produit le passage de nos troupes sur le territoire de Baden, je vis que l'on ignorait partout qu'elles eussent repassé le Rhin dès que l'expédition fut finie et qu'au contraire on les croyait encore sur la rive droite. A la cour l'on ne se communiqua cette nouvelle qu'en secret quoique personne ne l'ignorât. J'appris aussi que M. d'Edelsheim était entièrement prononcé contre la France et conduit par sa femme qui abhorrait tout ce qui est français, lui, à son tour, conduit l'Electeur, vieillard généralement estimé et respecté, mais affaibli par son grand âge. Le Bon de Geling (Gayling),

des choses que j'entends répéter depuis quinze jours que le baron d'Edelsheim n'est pas notre ami. Proposez moi l'envoi d'un agent à Bade sur lequel nous puissions compter et le rappel de celui qui y est.

Bonaparte.

48.

Saint-Cloud, le 10 prairial an XII.
(30th May, 1804.)[1]

S. M. l'Empereur désire savoir si M. Talleyrand a vu l'ambassadeur turc. Il désire aussi que M. Talleyrand fasse faire pour le "Moniteur" une note sur les affaires d'Amérique, contre la neutralité armée.[2]

49.

Saint-Cloud, le 5 brumaire an XIII.
(27th October, 1804.)[3]

Monsieur Talleyrand, Ministre des Relations Extérieures, je vous envoie des passeports qu'un agent prussien a donnés à des matelots français. Voulant conserver tous les procédés avec la Prusse et lui donner constamment des marques d'égards, vous vous bornerez à demander le rappel de cet agent et son remplacement.

Napoléon.

Premier Ministre par son ancienneté, paraît être attaché davantage à la France, mais n'est point en crédit comme le Ministre d'Edelsheim. L'estaffette annonçant les arrestations d'Offenbourg et Ettenheim étoit arrive une heure avant moi.

Sigismond Berckheim
capte au 2e Rég. de carabiniers."

Cf. with this the report from the French Ambassador at Karlsruhe, Massias, on 16th March (Obser, "Karl Friedrich," v. 13). He describes Frau v. Edelsheim "qui dirige son mari et les affaires de l'Electorat," as hostile to France.

[1] Copy. Unsigned.

[2] The article appears in the "Moniteur" of 14th prairial (3rd June) under "Baltimore, 25 Janvier".

[3] Original in Méneval's handwriting. Cf. "Corresp.," x. 8143.

50.

Paris, le 21 frimaire an XIII.
(12th December, 1804.)[1]

S. M. l'Empereur désire que Monsieur le Ministre des Relations Extérieures remette à Monsieur le Maréchal Lannes la lettre ci-jointe adressée à S. A. R. le Prince-Régent de Portugal.[2]

51.

Paris, ce 2 pluviôse an XIII.
(22nd January, 1805.)[3]

Monsieur Talleyrand, mon Ministre des Relations Extérieures, mon intention est que vous passiez dans la journée une note à M. de Lima[4] pour lui faire connaître que le subside que devait payer le Portugal devait l'être à telle époque; que cette inexactitude dans l'éxécution des traités n'est honorable pour aucune puissance, et qu'on désire savoir cathégoriquement quelle est l'intention du Portugal sur cet objet.[5]

Napoléon.

P.S.—Venez ce soir à 8 heures pour concerter l'envoi d'un ministre et faire les démarches nécessaires pour faire décider cette puissance.

52.

Paris, le 15 ventôse an XIII.
(6th March, 1805.)[6]

Monsieur Talleyrand, mon intention est que Mr. François Beauharnais, mon ministre à Florence, parte pour s'y rendre avant lundi prochain.[7]

Napoléon.

[1] Original in Méneval's handwriting. Unsigned.

[2] *Vide* "Corresp.," x. 8208.

[3] Original in Méneval's handwriting.

[4] Portuguese Ambassador.

[5] Cf. the treaty of subsidies of 19th March, 1804, in De Clercq, II. 86.

[6] Original in Méneval's handwriting. Registered mark: "2 D 496, 5 germinal".

[7] Francis Beauharnais, Josephine's brother-in-law, had been appointed Ambassador in Florence on 25th February. Instead of leaving for there on the 11th, as the Emperor wished (cf. Brotonne, "Lettres Inédites," No. 84), he did not arrive at his destination till 10th April (Marmottan, "Le Royaume d'Etrurie," p. 147).

53.

En mon palais royal de Milan, le 3 prairial an XIII.
(23rd May, 1805.)[1]

M. de Talleyrand fera connaître à S. M. le Roi d'Etrurie[2] et aux ambassadeurs de ce prince qui sont à Milan que mon intention est de rectifier les limites de la Principauté de Piombino, qui m'est importante à cause de la Corse et de l'Isle d'Elbe ; que la protection que je dois à ma soeur me fait une loi d'intervenir dans ses affaires et de les terminer d'une manière nette, telle enfin que les usurpations de la Toscane, en divers tems, soient restituées à la Principauté de Piombino. Mon but est de mettre, en même tems, la Toscane hors d'inquiétude pour l'avenir et d'éloigner tout germe de défiance sur l'extension que je voudrai donner à la Principauté de Piombino, jugeant convenable que les limites doivent être fixées comme ci-dessous et ne jamais dépasser les bornes indiquées par cette fixation. M. de Talleyrand fera connaître, en même tems, à S. M. Etrurienne et à ses ambassadeurs que toute prétention ou privilège de haut domaine que la Toscane pourrait vouloir s'arroger à l'avenir sur la Principauté de Piombino doivent cesser et que, pour l'avantage des deux états, un traité de commerce, qui sera négocié ultérieurement, fixera les rapports commerciaux et de douane entr'eux sur des bases d'égalité et de justice. S. M. le Roi d'Etrurie sentira, sans doute, l'importance pour elle d'être juste et équitable dans cette occasion et de ne point m'obliger, en qualité d'Empereur des Français, Roi d'Italie, à agir d'une manière contraire au commerce de Livourne, en accordant toute espèce de faveur à celui de Gênes.[3]

Limites de la Principauté de Piombino. Elles partent de l'embouchure de l'Ombrone dans la mer, comprennent Castiglione della Pescaia, le port et le lac de ce nom, ainsi que Grosseto, suivent le milieu du cours de l'Ombrone jusqu'à l'embouchure du ruisseau ou torrent qui prend son origine vers Succiano ; elles

[1] Original not in Méneval's handwriting but in that of some one else who is also the writer of various other letters. *Vide* Fournier, "Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleons," I.s. 92.

[2] Louis II, for whom the Queen-Mother had acted as Regent since 1802.

[3] For the strained relations between Napoleon and the Queen, cf. Marmottan, "Le Royaume d'Etrurie," p. 144 ff., who, however, seems not to have known about the frontier regulations. Cf. "Corresp.," x. 8777.

suivent le milieu du cours de ce ruisseau et passent ensuite sur la cime des montagnes qu'elles suivent de manière à envelopper la totalité du versant des eaux qui coulent vers la Méditerrannée. Elles comprennent ainsi Rocca Fédérigi, la ville de Massa et Prata, se dirigent vers Cecina Taverna qu'elles renferment s'il est du côté du versant des eaux vers la Méditerranée par la Principauté de Piombino, reviennent, toujours en suivant le sommet des montagnes, sur Badiola après avoir enveloppé Monte Rotondo et les sources de la Cornia. Elles descendent, ensuite, en ligne droite sur Pietra Rossa, puis suivent le cours du ruisseau qui prend son origine vers Pietra Rossa et va droit à la mer, où elles se terminent. (Voyez la carte de Dalbe.)—Au moyen des conditions ci-dessus mentionnées et de la limite qui vient d'être tracée, je consentirai volontiers à céder les Présides et tous mes droits sur ce pays d'une manière absolue et irrévocable à S. M. le Roi d'Etrurie. Je ne me refuserai même pas à rectifier une partie des frontières de mon Royaume d'Italie vers la Toscane, si cela convient au Roi d'Etrurie pour quelque échange et à l'avantage des deux pays.

Napoléon.

54.

Milan, ce lundi, 14 prairial an XIII.
(3rd June, 1805.)[1]

S. M. l'Empereur désire savoir si Monsieur de Talleyrand a quelque mémoire sur une partie du territoire de Parme appellée Bardi, et une carte où ce point serait tracé.[2] Sa Majesté désirerait que Monsieur de Talleyrand pût lui apporter cela ce soir.

55.

Au camp de Boulogne, le 16 thermidor an XIII.
(4th August, 1805.)[3]

Monsieur Talleyrand, je désire que vous fassiez notifier à la diète helvétique que le premier régiment suisse est organisé conformément au traité, qu'il n'est point complet en soldats, que je demande que les cantons le complettent. Vous ferez connaître également que, dans le reste de l'année, j'organiserai le second régiment.

Napoléon.

[1] Original in Méneval's handwriting. Unsigned.
[2] Castle Bardi, near Piacenza.
[3] Original in Méneval's handwriting.

56.

Au camp de Boulogne, le 18 thermidor.
(6th August, 1805.)[1]

Monsieur Talleyrand, cette note, ainsi corrigée, est bonne ; expédiez-la sur-le-champ.

Napoléon.

57.

De mon camp impérial de Boulogne,
le 1er fructidor an XIII.
(19th August, 1805.)[2]

Monsieur Talleyrand, j'ai donnè l'ordre au 18e régiment de ligne et au 1er régiment d'hussards, dont l'un est à Paris et l'autre à Versailles, de se rendre à Strasbourg. Ce mouvement de troupes, quelque peu considérable qu'il soit, ne laissera pas de faire beaucoup de bruit. Je désire qu'en causant vous fassiez connaître que je n'ai ordonné aucun mouvement dans mes camps ; que ce qu'on pourrait dire là-dessus est faux ; que j'attends une explication claire et nette de la Cour de Vienne. Il me tarde beaucoup de recevoir cette déclaration et de savoir à quoi m'en tenir. Je verrai avec plaisir la copie de la circulaire que vous avez écrite à mes agens. Il est réellement convenable de savoir sur quoi je puis compter avec les Princes de Bàde et de Wirtemberg, je ne parle point de celui de Bavière, puisque c'est une affaire terminée, et quel nombre de troupes ils peuvent me fournir. Il faudrait que l'Electeur de Bade me fournît 9000 hommes. Quant à l'Electeur de Wirtemberg, si le père prend une mauvaise direction contre nous, il me semble que le plus simple serait de le chasser et de mettre son fils à sa place. Il faudrait sonder ce jeune prince et savoir s'il voudrait prendre parti avec nous ; on pourrait lui donner un régiment. S'il état assez animé contre son père pour le détrôner, ce serait le plus sûr ; car il n'y a pas de doute qu'en entrant à Stuttgard, et y installant ce prince, toutes les troupes de l'Electeur ne désertassent. Enfin,

[1] Original in Méneval's handwriting. The letter refers to a circular note on the question of Russia's proffered intervention. *Vide* "Corresp.," XI. 9039, and Bertrand, "Lettres de Talleyrand," p. 122.

[2] Original in Méneval's handwriting. Wertheimer, in the "Neue Freie Presse" of July 12th, 1883, gives a German translation, which varies slightly in certain details, and was probably done from the rough draft, as it is dated "August 18th".

faites faire une nomenclature de tous les princes de la rive droite, depuis le Danube jusqu'au Tyrol, afin de savoir ceux que nous pouvons considérer comme amis ou comme ennemis. J'ai besoin dans ce moment d'un ministre en Suisse. Si M. Vial peut y retourner dans 24 heures, à la bonne heure; sans cela j'en nommerai un autre et je donnerai à M. Vial une des places que j'aurai de disponibles. Il me faut en ce moment un homme sûr en Suisse. Voici quel est mon plan, en cas de guerre. Je veux nommer sur-le-champ les colonels des régimens suisses, fournir l'argent nécessaire pour leur armement et leur recrutement, charger ces régimens de garder la Suisse sous les ordres d'un général en chef qui sera celui auquel je destine le commandement des régimens suisses. Ces corps garderaient d'abord la Suisse et viendraient en suite me joindre en Allemagne. Vous sentez que par là je décide les Suisses pour nous par leur intérêt, que j'en fais un foyer de recrutement pour notre parti qui empêchera le recrutement des Anglais. J'ai pour cela besoin d'un homme habile à Berne. Je vous ai écrit pour la levée d'un bataillon de Valaisans. Pressez la conclusion de ce traité.[1] Mon intention est d'envoyer ce bataillon à Gênes pour l'employer à la police de cette ville.

Napoléon.

58.

De mon camp impérial de Boulogne,
le 4 fructidor an XIII.
(22nd August, 1805.)[2]

Monsieur de Talleyrand. Il est convenable de faire à Monsieur l'ambassadeur d'Espagne près de ma personne le présent d'usage tel que celui que j'ai fait à l'ambassadeur de Prusse pour la remise des cordons.

Napoléon.

59.

Louisbourg, le 11 vendémiaire an XIV.
(3rd October, 1805.)[3]

Monsieur de Talleyrand, je vous envoie ci-joint une lettre de M. Otto.[4] Je lui ai fait répondre par le ministre de la guerre qu'il

[1] The Convention was concluded on October 8th, 1805. *Vide* De Clercq, II. 128.

[2] Original not in Méneval's handwriting.

[3] Copy. P.S. : "Sa Majesté l'Empereur est sortie sans signer la présente que j'envoie à S. Exc. M. de Talleyrand comme simple avis afin de ne pas retarder le courier. Mille respects. Clarke."

[4] French Ambassador at Munich.

eût à annoncer au M^al Bernadotte que je me suis proposé d'agir comme si la dernière ligne de neutralité existait.[1] D'ailleurs les troupes bavaroises ont déjà, pour éxécuter leur retraite, traversé les possessions prussiennes en Franconie, et un corps d'Autrichiens, qui s'est montré sur la Rednitz, en a usé de la même manière. Le M^al Bernadotte les traversera à son tour le plus rapidement possible et sans y séjourner.

60.

De mon camp impérial d'Augsbourg,
ce 1^er brumaire an XIV.
(23rd October, 1805.)[2]

Monsieur Talleyrand, rendez-vous à Stuttgard, passez-y une demijournée pour y voir l'Electeur. De là rendez-vous en droit ligne à Augsburg, en passant par Heilbronn, MM. Talleyrand et Pregode (!) peuvent également partir pour venir me joindre.

Napoléon.

61.

Haag, le 6 brumaire an XIV.
(28th October, 1805.)[3]

Monseigneur, j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer un bulletin[4] que l'Empereur désire que vous communiquiez à S. M. l'Impératrice, au Prince Joseph, pour être imprimé dans le " Moniteur," et au Prince Eugène qui le communiquera au Maréchal Masséna, en lui ajoutant que le Maréchal Bernadotte couchera demain soir probablement à Salzbourg.

Méneval.

62.

s. l. e. d.
(December, 1805.)[5]

L'empereur désire que M. de Talleyrand lui envoie l'article que M. de Hardenberg a fait mettre dans la gazette de Berlin ; il n'était pas joint â la dépêche de M. de Laforêt.

[1] The line of demarcation in the last war, Ansbach, was not then included. Cf. the letter to Otto in the " Corresp.," XI. 9319.

[2] Copy. [3] Copy. Official comment : " Fait le 7 ".

[4] Bulletin 13 of the same date, " Corresp.," XI. 9436. Cf. also Napoleon's letter to Talleyrand on 30th October, *ibid.* 9440.

[5] Copy. Unsigned. Cf. Laforêt's report of December 18th on the Berlin newspapers, Hardenberg, " Denkwürdigkeiten," v. 213.

63.

s. l. e. d.
(December, 1805.)[1]

M. de Laforêt ne doit point conférer avec M. de Hardenberg, ni en [2] chez lui, ni en société ; s'il lui indique un repas le décliner sous prétexte de maladie ; dire à M. d'Haugwitz qu'on a toujours supposé que M. de Hardenberg ne retournerait. Dans toutes les suppositions il a insulté la France, que ce fût en guerre ou en paix. Le droit d'être en guerre appartient à chaque couronne. On n'est point insulté par la guerre. Mais il y a de la lâcheté à refuser des audiences à un ministre d'un grand prince. Ni vous ni aucun homme de la légation, ni aucun français, ne doit avoir de communication avec M. de Hardenberg comme ennemi de la France.

Vous mettrez assez de mesure pour que cela n'oblige pas le Roi de Prusse à lui être utile.

64.

Munich, le 14 janvier 1806.[3]

Monsieur Talleyrand, donnez ordre à M. Salicetti de se rendre au quartier général de l'armée de Naples, où il sera à la disposition du Prince Joseph pour être employé comme il le jugera à propos.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy. Unsigned. The actual date is indicated in a letter from Talleyrand to Laforêt on December 20th (*vide* "Bailleu," II. 426) and also in a letter from Talleyrand to Napoleon on December 17th (*vide* "Bertrand," p. 226). In the former, instructions here given are reproduced almost word for word : "Le droit de faire la guerre appartient a chaque couronne. La puissance à qui on la fait, n'est pour cela insultée, mais il y a de la lâcheté à refuser des audiences au ministre d'un grand prince. Ni vous ni personne de votre légation, ni aucun français ne doivent avoir de communication avec ce ministre, qui s'est montré l'ennemi de la France. Vous ne devez pas paraître avec lui, même en société, et s'il vous indiquait un rendez-vous, il faudrait décliner sa proposition sous prétexte de maladie," etc. On December 17th the Minister wrote to the Emperor that he had just received his letter "of yesterday," that he would draft a reply to Laforêt on the road from Brünn to Vienna, and submit it for approval on Thursday (i.e. the 19th) at Schönbrunn. That Laforêt carried out his command we learn from Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," II. 100 : "M. de Laforêt ne voit que M. de Haugwitz ".

[2] "Tête-à-tête," or some similar expression, is awanting here.

[3] Copy. Cf. "Corresp.," XI. 9668, the letter to Joseph on the same day.

65.

Paris, le 3 février 1806.[1]

Monsieur Talleyrand, faites connaître à mon ministre à Stuttgard que j'ai donné les cordons que le Roi de Wurtemberg a mis à ma disposition à M. d'Harville, premier écuyer de l'Impératrice, au général Marmont, colonel-général des chasseurs, à M. Fouché, ministre de la police, et au maréchal Kellermann. Faites également connaître à mon ministre à Carlsruhe que j'ai donné les cordons de Bade à M. Hédouville, mon chambellan et sénateur, à M. Champagny, ministre de l'intérieur, et aux généraux Savary et Bertrand, mes aides de camp.

Napoléon.

66.

Paris, le 18 février 1806.[1]

Monsieur Talleyrand, je ne sais si je vous ai écrit que j'approuvais que tous les officiers français du corps du M^al^ Bernadotte et Ney, auxquels le Roi de Bavière voulait donner l'ordre du lyon, l'obtiennent.

67.

Paris, le 8 mars 1806.[1]

Monsieur Talleyrand, la demande de Bade me parait juste ; ordonnez aux douanes de payer la dépense qu'elle a faite pour le passage des troupes.

Napoléon.

68.

Paris, le 9 mars 1806.[1]

Monsieur de Talleyrand, je nomme le général Beaumont, aide de camp du P^ce^ Murat, mon commissaire pour prendre possession du Duché de Clèves. Donnez-lui tous les pouvoirs nécessaires.[2]

Napoléon.

69.

Paris, le 10 mars 1806.[3]

Monsieur Talleyrand, vous remettrez les lettres ci-jointes au général Rapp qui les prendra aujourdhui à midi ; joignez-y copie

[1] Copy.

[2] Cf. Napoleon's letter to Murat, "Corresp.," XII. 9848, of March 9th, in which Beaumont appears merely as "commissaire pour prendre possession de la place de Wesel".

[3] Copy. It deals with the treaty for the evacuation of Hanover on March 9th, Hardenberg, "Denkwürdigkeiten," II. 517. Cf., in the

de la convention passée entre M. d'Haugwitz et le général Duroc et une lettre de vous au général prussien commandant en Hanovre, qui accrédit le général Barbou comme commissaire pour l'éxécution du traité.

Napoléon.

70.

Ce lundi, 24 mars 1806.[1]

L'Empereur désire que Monsieur de Talleyrand lui apporte à deux heures de l'après midi aujourd'hui le travail sur la démarcation des limites des Etats de Bavière, de Wurtemberg et de Bade et un projet de décret pour terminer enfin toutes les difficultés.

71.

Paris, le 1er avril 1806.[2]

Monsieur Talleyrand, il est urgent que vous me fassiez connaître ce que M. de Vincent[3] vous a dit. Vous ne manquerez pas de faire sentir à ce général que son silence et ses hésitations feront que je n'évacuerai pas Braunau ; que cela est très malheureux pour l'Autriche et pour moi ; qu'il me faut les Bouches de Cattaro, et qu'il ait enfin à traiter quelque chose.

Napoléon.

72.

Malmaison, ce mercredi 2 avril.[4]

L'Empereur désire que des extraits des dépêches que renfermait le portefeuille d'hier le mardi soient mis dans le " Moniteur ".

73.

Malmaison, le 10 avril 1806.[5]

Monsieur Talleyrand, je vous renvoie ces dépêches ; c'est à vous à correspondre sur ces objets de détail avec le Cardinal Fesch.

Napoléon.

" Corresp.," XII. 9949 and 9950, the letters to Rapp and Barbou, also Thimme, " Die inneren Zustände des Kurfürstentums Hannover," p. 140 f.

[1] Copy. Unsigned. Talleyrand thereupon submitted a scheme of Otto's, declined by Napoleon, April 10th, 1806, " Corresp.," XII. 10,071. Cf. Obser, " Karl Friedrich von Baden," L. and 540.

[2] Copy. The letter is partly given by Wertheimer, " Geschichte Osterreichs und Ungarns," II. 115. Cf. " Corresp.," XII. 9968.

[3] Vincent, Ambassador-Extraordinary for Austria. Cf." Corresp.," XII. 9988.

[4] Copy. Unsigned.

[5] Copy. Cf. Haussonville, " L'église Romaine et le Premier Empire," II. 125 ff.

74.

Saint-Cloud, le 3 juin 1806.[1]

Monsieur Talleyrand, je vous envoie des dépêches de M. Larochefoucauld que m'envoie le Maréchal Berthier. Je désire que vous me les rapportiez ce soir à cinq heures et demie avec toutes celles que vous avez écrites à M. Larochefoucauld depuis le dernier mois.

Napoléon.

75.

Saint-Cloud, le 10 août 1806.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, faites connaître au ministre d'Espagne que le général Ferrand, commandant mes troupes à S. Domingo, a envoyé, sur la demande du général Espagnol, capitaine général de la côte ferme, 500 français à la côte ferme pour lui donner appui contre Miranda.[2]

Napoléon.

76.

Rambouillet, le 26 août 1806.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, je désire que vous me fassiez tracer sur une carte les limites de la Confédération du Rhin, et que vous preniez des mesures pour qu'aux limites des états de chaque prince confédéré il soit planté des poteaux portant d'un côté les armes du prince et de l'autre " Confédération du Rhin ".[3]

Napoléon.

77.

Saint-Cloud, le 31 août 1806.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, le Roi de Naples, prendrait volontiers à sa solde trois régimens allemands recrutés dans le territoire de la Confédération du Rhin. Il faudrait savoir si Hesse-Darmstadt, Bavière, Wurtemberg et Bade voudraient donner l'autorisation de recruter, pour le compte du Roi de Naples, dans leurs états.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy.

[2] Ferand was Captain-General of Santo-Domingo, formerly the Spanish portion of Haiti. In May, 1806, the Creole Miranda had undertaken, with English assistance, an expedition against the Spanish colony of Venezuela. He was defeated by the Spaniards, to whom France sent help.

[3] Cp. letter on the same day to Berthier, " Corresp.," XIII. 10,696.

78.

Saint-Cloud, le 21 Septembre 1806.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, vous M. enverrez un état militaire de Hesse Cassel avec les noms des régimens, leur composition, leurs forces, leurs cantonmens et leurs positions actuelles.

Napoléon.

3. Stadion to Metternich.

Hollitsch, le 27 décembre 1805.[2]

Une des suites de la malheureuse bataille d'Austerlitz a été la dispersion des personnes que S. M. consulte et employe dans ses affaires. Les routes très gâtées, et les communications interrompues par les troupes françaises, n'ont pas permis de remédier dans les premiers moments à cet inconvénient. Mr le Cte de Cobenzl n'a pu arriver ici que le 13 avec quelques personnes de la chancellerie d'état. D'autres ne sont venues nous joindre qu'il y a deux jours. Les embarras multipliés, qui ont résulté du déplacement continuel des bureaux, les affaires pressantes qui se succédoient et devoient être expédiées au moment même, enfin l'incertitude que la versatilité du gouvernement français a mise dans la négociation de la paix, qui s'est traitée d'abord à Vienne, puis à Brünn et enfin à Presbourg, voilà les raisons qui ont occasionné le retard des informations que vous deviez recevoir. Entretemps sont arrivés les rapports que vous avez adressés le 7, 11, 13 et 16 décembre à Mr le Cte de Cobenzl. Leur contenu ne peut que donner de nouveaux regrets à l'Empereur, notre maître, de l'étendue des malheurs de la guerre qui ont encore rendu inutiles les ressources que ces démonstrations de bonne volonté de la cour de Berlin nous auroient offertes, si la bataille du 2 et l'armistice qui l'a suivie ne nous avoit mis dans une position à laquelle les secours étrangers ne peuvent plus porter de remèdes.

[1] Copy.

[2] W. St. A. Instructions to Berlin. "Par le valet de chambre Beck." The despatch addressed "Au Comte de Metternich" in Berlin is a copy and not signed. Beer, "Zehn Jahre," p. 205, quotes a passage from it without indicating the writer. It could only be Stadion who sent instructions to ambassadors at this time. On December 24th, Cobenzl's resignation had been accepted and the Archduke Charles wrote to the Duke of Saxony: "Stadion succeeds Cobenzl" (Wertheimer, I. 369).

Mr le général de Stutterheim vous a appris, Mr le Comte, les détails de tout ce qui a rapport à cette journée du 2. L'armistice qui a été conclu vous est également connu et vous pouvez donc juger, vous même, de l'état pénible dans lequel nous nous trouvons. L'ennemi est dans la possession des provinces italiennes et de la très grande partie des pays allemands de S. M. J., il occupe la ligne de Trieste jusqu'à la frontière de la Silésie. Depuis la signature de l'armistice il écrase les sujets de notre maître de requisitions, de contributions, d'impôts de guerre de tout genre qu'il met au taux le plus exorbitant. Il n'y a point de vexations qu'il ne se permette pour obtenir ce qu'il demande du paysan, du bourgeois et de toutes les classes des habitans; il tâche en même temps d'opérer par tous les moyens de séduction sur leur esprit, et si l'attachement inviolable qu'ils témoignent à leur auguste souverain a empêché jusqu'ici l'effet qu'il s'en promettoit, ces pauvres habitans sont les victimes et se voyent traités avec d'autant plus de haine et d'acharnement par une armée qui paroit être constituée sur un sistème de spoliation et de rapine ; enfin on ne voit que trop clairement que Napoléon a l'intention très préméditée d'épuiser les provinces qu'il rendra par la paix, et de ne les remettre à S. M. que dans le dernier état d'épuisement et de foiblesse.

Pour nous opposer à l'arrogance de cet ennemi victorieux, il ne nous reste que des moyens bien incomplets et qu'il seroit très hazardeux de mettre en activité, puisqu'elles composent pour le moment les dernières ressources de la Monarchie. La retraite entière des Russes, qui a été, sinon demandée, du moins provoquée avec sollicitude par l'Empereur Alexandre après la bataille, nous a privés d'un secours bien nécessaire dans le moment où nous devions traiter de la paix. S. M. l'Empereur François a fait faire un essai auprès du général Kutusoff pour l'engager à ralentir du moins sa marche, à ne pas presser la sortie des Russes des frontières de l'Hongrie et à laisser de cette façon du moins un simulacre de secours que nous aurions pu faire valoir vis-à-vis des Français. Mais, malgré sa profession de bonne volonté, il a dû se refuser à cette demande d'après les ordres qu'il avoit reçus de son souverain. Il n'y a donc que l'armée de Mgr l'Archiduc-Charles, belle et bien conservée à la vérité, mais ne passant guère les 60,000 hommes, le corps sous les ordres de Mgr l'Archiduc Ferdinand et les débris de celui qui a assisté à la journée du 2, que nous pourrions présenter au combat. Si nous dussions encore succomber, il n'y auroit plus

aucun moyen de défense, et la dissolution totale de la Monarchie en seroit la suite la plus vraisemblable.

Sans doute, si le débarquement des troupes angloises et russes à Naples s'étoit effectué plutôt, ou d'une manière plus utile aux opérations communes, si les secours de la Prusse avoient pu se porter en avant au moment où nos troupes et les armées russes se réunissoient en Moravie, enfin, si la bataille d'Austerlitz n'avoit pas été donnée, notre position, malgré nos premiers malheurs, auroit encore eu de puissans remèdes. Mais telle que nous voyons la situation des affaires, il n'y en a aucun, et la paix est devenue si nécessaire pour le bonheur, et je dirai même pour l'existence des peuples soumis à S. M. J., qu'Elle a cru devoir se résoudre aux plus grands sacrifices pour y parvenir.

Il seroit impossible de vous donner une idée, Mr le Comte, de la conduite que la France tient dans une négociation qu'on devroit plutôt nommer une capitulation dont les conditions seroient dictées par l'ennemi le plus acharné à la ruine de son antagoniste. Je vous confie les principaux points qui ont déjà été accordés, et qui cependant n'ont pas pu mener encore à une signature, qui est demandée à genoux à notre Maître par des millions de sujets que chaque jour de retard rend plus malheureux ; et je vous fais passer dans l'annexe un court résumé de ce qui forme jusqu'à présent les demandes du cabinet françois et les concessions de notre Souverain. Vous voudrez bien n'en faire d'autre usage que de préparer le ministère, auprès duquel vous résidez, sur les objets qui pourroient le plus exciter son ressentiment ou sa critique, et pour réfuter, si l'occasion se présente, les différents faux bruits que nos ennemis s'empresseront peut-être de faire courir à ce sujet. Vous pouvez être assuré, Mr le Comte, que S. M. J. n'a rien négligé pour obtenir de meilleures conditions, mais l'Empereur des Français, par une habitude contraire à celle observée dans les négociations ordinaires, au lieu d'en diminuer la dureté, les a augmentées à chaque conférence de Mr Talleyrand avec nos plénipotentiaires. Pour essayer enfin tous les moyens de conciliation qui peuvent promettre une issue plus supportable, S. A. R. Mgr l'Archiduc Charles a pris la généreuse résolution de demander une entrevue avec l'Empereur des Français, pour laquelle elle est partie hier, et qui doit avoir lieu aujourd'hui dans la journée près de Stammersdorff.[1]

[1] The meeting did take place on the 27th. Napoleon had himself fixed the date, perhaps because that the treaty signed in the previous night at Pressburg would then be a "fait accompli".

J'ai cru, Mr le Comte, ne pouvoir mieux vous indiquer les principes de la conduite que vous aurez à tenir dans la position embarassante dans laquelle, sans doute, vous vous trouverez à la suite des derniers événemens, qu'en vous mettant d'abord au fait de tout le détail de notre situation, ainsi que de ce qui s'est passé en dernier lieu entre nous et la France.

Sans doute la cour de Berlin trouvera des raisons de se plaindre amèrement et de nous accuser de l'avoir abandonnée et fortement compromise vis-à-vis de Napoléon. Malheureusement vous ne pourrez citer pour notre justification que la nécessité urgente, le dénuement de moyens de résistance dans lequel nous nous trouvons, et la bonne volonté que nous avons témoignée à soutenir la cause de nos alliés jusqu'à l'instant où les derniers revers et le départ des troupes russes nous ont privés de la faculté physique de nous y sacrifier plus longtems. Au reste, je dois avoir l'honneur de vous prévenir que, dans la négociation qui a eue lieu à Vienne, les conditions déjà fixées avec Mr de Talleyrand étoient fort différentes, et surtout celles concernant les alliés tout à leur avantage, mais que la journée du 2 et ses suites y ont causé le changement le plus funeste.

En examinant la conduite de la Prusse depuis la signature des déclarations du 3 novembre, il y auroit certainement bien des reproches fondés à lui faire sur la lenteur qu'elle a mise à ses mouvemens, sur le peu de zèle qu'elle a témoigné à presser ses secours, sur l'état d'incertitude où elle nous a laissé à ce sujet et enfin sur le choix du ministre qu'elle a député vers l'Empereur Napolèon et qui seul suffisoit pour faire naître des doutes sur la sincérité de ses intentions. Je dois à cet égard vous assurer, Mr le Comte, que Mr de Haugwitz, pendant son séjour à Vienne, a tout fait pour persuader le public, ainsi que moi et je suppose de même le gouvernement français, que sa cour étoit et resteroit amie de la France quand même elle se refuseroit à toutes les conditions de paix qu'il avoit à lui proposer, et lesquelles, ce que je vous prie de remarquer, il n'a j'amais articulées pendant tout le tems que je me trouvois avec lui à notre capitale, quoique je l'en eusse sommé à plusieurs reprises. Je vous joins ici, pour vous mettre dans le cas d'apprécier au juste sa conduite, le dernier rapport que j'ai expédié à son sujet à Mr le Cte de Cobenzl, au moment où je quittois Vienne.[1]

[1] Given by Kieseritzky, "Die Sendung von Haugwitz nach Wien," 1805, p. 50 ff.

Si je parle des griefs que nous pourrions reprocher au cabinet de Berlin, je crois nécessaire d'ajouter que l'intention de S. M. notre Maître n'est point du tout que vous en fassiez usage pour récriminer dans le cas qu'on se plaigne de nous. Dans la position, où nous allons nous trouver, l'amitié et la bonne volonté des principales puissances de l'Europe aura trop de valeur pour nous, pour que je ne doive pas vous engager á conserver de toute manière celle de la cour où vous résidez. C'est à ce but que vous voudrez bien employer tous vos soins, en y mettant ce zèle eclairé par lequel vous avez déjà rendu tant de services importans à notre auguste Souverain. Vous saurez au reste, sans que ce soit à moi de vous l'indiquer, tirer de ce que j'ai en l'honneur de vous marquer des résultats lesquels, s'ils ne sont pas suffisans pour écarter toutes les plaintes, justifieront du moins notre sincérité et notre loyauté envers nos alliés. Je vous prie, à cette occasion, d'observer que c'est dans le moment présent qu'il est du plus grand intérêt de nous tenir vis-à-vis de la Prūsse dans les meilleures relations que les circonstances peuvent permettre, puisque la paix n'est pas signée encore, qu'il n'est pas impossible que Napoléon exige outre ce qu'il a déjà demandé des sacrifices ultérieurs que notre auguste Maître ne pourroit point accorder, et qu'alors les secours de la cour de Berlin, ou du moins ses démonstrations, nous deviendroient absolument nécessaires pour soutenir les nouveaux et derniers efforts qu'alors nous serions dans le cas de faire.[1]

Il deviendroit, sans doute, après ce qui s'est passé en dernier lieu, fort difficile d'obtenir dans un tel cas extrême la promesse d'une co-opération quelconque d'un cabinet timide qui déjà ne s'est laissé engager qu'avec peine aux stipulations que vous lui avez arrachées lors du séjour de l'Empereur Alexandre à Potsdam,[2] et qui très vraisemblablement s'en est fortement repenti depuis qu'il connaît toute l'étendue de nos malheurs. Cependant, le danger imminent qui résulteroit pour la Prusse elle-même de la destruction totale de la Monarchie Autrichienne, la probabilité, si non la certitude, que Napoléon tourneroit alors ses vues ambitieuses de son côté, les notions enfin qui doivent être parvenues à Berlin des moyens que la France a déjà rassemblés et en quelque façon organisés pour

[1] In Holitsch. They only learned during the day that peace had been concluded.

[2] *Vide* Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," II. n. 76 ff. for the conclusion of the Potsdam Treaty.

rétablir, dans le cas de la continuation de la guerre, l'ancien royaume de la Pologne, vous pourroient fournir, Mr le Comte, des argumens assez décisifs pour dèmontrer le grand intérêt qu'auroit le roi alors de se joindre à nous et de nous porter de puissans secours, pour prévenir notre ruine totale, laquelle en peu de temps entraineroit la sienne.

La situation de nos affaires ne me permet, Mr le Comte, que de vous transmettre des indications générales, dont vous voudrez faire l'usage qu'exigeront les circonstances. Dès que je pourrai vous faire parvenir des notions plus positives, je m'empresserai de vous les communiquer et de vous faire savoir les ordres ultérieurs de S. M.

Annexe.[1] Les principaux points de la négociation se réduisent :

1°, aux cessions.

S. M. a consenti à céder tout le pays vénitien avec l'Istrie et la Dalmatie au royaume d'Italie, le Tirol à l'Electeur de Bavière, le Vorarlberg avec toutes les possessions de la maison d'Autriche en Souabe aux trois Electeurs. Par contre elle obtiendrait pour elle le pays de Salzbourg et de Berchtoldsgaden et pour Mgr. l'Electeur de Salzbourg le pays de Wirzbourg ; en outre on promet pour Mgr. l'archiduc Antoine un établissement quelconque pris de l'ordere teutonique et de Malte. S. M. met cependant toujours un grand intérêt 1°, à garder l'Istrie vénitienne, 2do à conserver le Tirol à sa maison tel que ç'avait été proposé et convenu à Brünn, 3° dans le cas que cela ne pût avoir lieu, de réunir pour son auguste frère le pays de Bamberg à celui de Wirzbourg. Il est essentiel que le drôit de reversion soit assuré à la Maison pour tout établissement que S. Alt.-Electorale de Salzbourg obtiendra pour le pays de Salzbourg. Il est convenu que les dettes passeront avec les pays cédés.

2°, aux concessiones et engagemens réciproques.

(*a*) Napoléon ne veut renoncer à la couronne d'Italie qu'à la paix générale sous la condition que l'Isle de Corfou et celle de Malte fussent évacuées par les troupes étrangeres, et S. M. notre Maître in casu pessimo y consent.

[1] In Stadion's handwriting. Official comment on the margin: "Remis par S. Exc. à Son Altesse Royale Monseigneur l'Archiduc Charle, les 26 Décembre, 1805". It refers to the instructions to the Archduke for the interview with Napoleon which was to take place on the following day. Attached is the remark : "Annexe à l'expédition au Comte Metternich de Holitsch le 27 Décembre, 1805".

(*b*) Napoléon promet et garantit l'indépendance de la Suisse et de la Hollande.

(*c*) Notre Souverain donne son aveu à ce que les Electeurs de Bavière et de Wirttemberg prennent le titre de roi, et ait (!) les mêmes priviléges en Allemagne que la Prusse.

(*d*) Il insiste, à ce que, à la suite des cessions et concessions susdites, ils renoncent à toute prétention contre la Cour de Vienne, ce qui fait un article d'engagement réciproque.

3°, aux prestations en argent.

Napoléon demande 50 millions de francs en numéraire. On met de la part de S. M. l'Empereur François la plus grande fermeté à les refuser, mais, cependant, est résolu de cèder à la dernière extrémité avec des tempéramens qui allégeroient du moins le mode de payment. S. M. met le plus grand intérêt à diminuer, autant que possible, le fardeau qui de cet article résulterait pour ses sujets.

4°, aux exigences françaises :

1°, d'abandonner, au moins tacitement, le royaume des deux Siciles à la vengeance française.—L'honneur de S. M. notre maître gagneroit infiniment si on pouvait obtenir quelqu'article en faveur de LL. MM. Siciliennes.

2°, d'abandonner l'Allemagne à la rapacité des Electeurs, ses alliés.—Jusqu'ici on ne sait pas qu'il y ait un article proposé à cet effet. Mais il serait bien à désirer qu'on pût mettre des bornes à ce sistème de spoliation en faveur de l'ordre teutonique de Malte et de l'ordre équestre de l'Empire.

5°, au terme de l'évacuation des états héréditaires par les troupes françaises, qui ne pourra pas être trop court d'après ce qui sera possible de statuer à ce sujet.

3. Friedrich Wilhelm III. to Lucchesini.[1]

Berlin, 19 Mai 1806.

(In cipher.) La dernière poste m'a apporté votre dépêche du 9. Il importe que vous soyez au fait de ma manière d'envisager

[1] W. St. A. Copy from the collection of letters from Napoleon to Talleyrand. This letter had evidently passed through the "Black Cabinet," where it had been deciphered, with the exception of a few words. It bears the comment: "Le Roi de Prusse à Lucchesini Nr. 1 Chiffre". Cf. Haugwitz' note of his letter on May 19th (Ranke, "Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenbergs," v. 347 f.), and to Lucchesini on May 26th, 1806 (Bailleu, "Preussen und Frankreich," II. 464).

l'affaire de la clôture des ports au commerce anglais, et je crois devoir tarder d'autant moins de vous en instruire que vous aurez à vous diriger, en conséquence, dans vos entretiens avec le ministre Talleyrand. On a mis, dans mes Etats, plus d'empressement qu'il n'eut été à désirer dans les mesures relatives à cette clôture, et surtout dans la proclamation publiée à ce sujet. Il en est résulté un très grand mal par l'embargo ordonné dans les ports anglais contre mes vaisseaux, qui a mis entre les mains et à la merci de l'Angleterre une partie très considérable des fortunes des sujets prussiens. Certainement, la France n'a pas d'intérêt à leur ruine, et, certainement aussi, l'intention de l'Empereur n'a jamais été d'y donner lieu. Vous aurez vu d'ailleurs que, suivant le traité de Paris, la clôture des ports n'est stipulée que de la même manière qu'elle avait lieu du temps de l'occupation française. Elle existait pour les principales rivières qui se jettent dans la mer du Nord, et 3532 399ation de cette mesure exposera dans tous les cas le commerce prussien à des pertes très considérables, mais le port de Lubeck n'a jamais été fermé, et je n'ai pas la moindre obligation d'aller plus loin que les Français à cet égard. La clôture de ce port attirerait immanquablement une escadre anglaise dans la Baltique pour bloquer 3107. Dès lors c'en sera fait du commerce de mes sujets dans cette mer, qui est pour eux du premier intérêt; c'en sera fait aussi de celui qu'ils font avec la France et qui dépend tout entier de la libre navigation de la Baltique. La Russie, le Danemarc même, qui ne peuvent souffrir qu'elle soit troublée, seront entrainés dès lors à faire cause commune avec l'Angleterre contre moi.

Je dois, à tout prix, éviter un tel état des choses, en m'abstenant de la fermeture du port de Lubeck, et je suis bien assuré aussi que l'Empereur est loin de prétendre donner à mes engagemens envers lui une extension si contraire même à la lettre du traité, et qui anéantirait gratuitement le commerce prussien et, par contrecoup, une grande partie de celui de la France. Donnez, en toute occasion, l'assurance la plus forte et la plus solemnelle que, pour toutes les stipulations qui intéressent véritablement cette puissance, elle trouvera toujours en moi l'ami le plus fidèle, l'observateur le plus religieux de mes engagemens; mais, si le cas l'éxige, exprimez aussi ma conviction intime qu'elle ne peut vouloir y attacher, sur des objets simplement accessoires, un sens qui évidemment tournerait en dernier ressort à notre préjudice commun. Je fais mention ci-

dessus en clair de la note du Sr Laforêt et de ma réponse sur l'avènement du Roi de Naples. C'est à dessin qu'on a mis quelque délai à cette réponse, en faisant entendre au ministre de France que j'avais eu d'abord quelques peines à témoigner, par un nouvel acte, combien je prens part à l'agrandissement des personnes de la famille impériale, au moment même où un Prince de cette maison [1] cherche à s'attribuer des territoires incontestablement non compris dans la cession que je lui ai faite 1995 toute fois, dont je m'étais désisté dans la conviction que ce différend était, ou allait être, incessamment applani. Je m'en remets à vous de 4819 un mot d'observation pareille au Ministre Talleyrand.

L'évacuation de Cattaro par les Russes se confirme de plus en plus. Suivant mes lettres de Vienne du dix le Comte Razoumowsky l'avait annoncée par une note officielle. L'ambassadeur de France, très satisfait de ce résultat,venait de reéxpédier un général français, arrivé peu avant, afin de prévenir l'éxécution de quelques mesures hostiles contre l'Autriche. Cependant, rien n'annonce la moindre disposition de la grande armée française à quitter l'Allemagne. On me mande de Munich, en date du huit, que le gén. Léopold Berthier venait d'arriver de Paris avec des dépêches que le ministre de la guerre a sur-le-champ expédiés à Vienne par un de ses aides de camp. Les suppositions inserées dans ma précédente deviennent donc toujours plus vraisemblables. Cependant, le Sr de la Rochefoucauld doit avoir dit que, d'après la facilité et la bonne grâce que la cour de Russie avait mis au redressement des derniers griefs, il fallat croire qu'elle désirerait un rapprochement avec la France et la paix générale. Il ne reste qu'à désirer que l'Empereur Napoléon envisage la chose de même. Il parait par mes lettres directes que l'Empereur de Russie conserve en effet les dispositions les plus modérées.[2]

Le Sr de Malsbourg [3] va recevoir l'ordre de déclarer au ministre Talleyrand que l'Electeur, son maître, était prêt à entrer dans la proposition d'une alliance avec l'Empire français, de manière, cependant, qu'il n'eût besoin que d'accéder au traité qui subsiste

[1] Murat.

[2] Cf. the letter from Alexander to Friedrich Wilhelm on May 12th ("Bailleu," II. 103), in which the Czar expresses his intention to avoid anything that might disturb the peace of Europe.

[3] Kurhessian Ambassador in Paris.

déjà entre cet Empire et la Prusse.[1] L'Electeur désire en conséquence, et c'est mon intention expresse, que vous appuyiez de vos bons offices la négociation que le S^r de Malsbourg va entamer dans ce sens et dont le succès ne peut que me faire grand plaisir par l'accession d'un Prince, avec lequel je me trouve déjà dans des relations si étroites, au sistème d'union avec la France que j'a embrassé.

Il me reste à vous faire part en peu de mots, simplement pour votre instruction particulière, de la position incertaine où je me trouve vis-à-vis du Roi de Suède. J'ai épuisé la modération envers lui (lui) écrivant par un de mes officiers pour l'inviter à retirer les mesures hostiles que, sans aucun sujet, il avait adopté contre le commerce de mes sujets. Sa réponse n'étant rien moins que satisfaisante, j'allais poursuivre les mesures sérieuses auxquelles il paraissait vouloir m'obliger en retour, lorsque la mission russe à Berlin, connaissant à cet égard les intentions de l'Empereur de Russie, me pria de vouloir les suspendre encore, 3366 à se réunir au ministre de Russie à Stralsund pour amener le Roi de Suède à d'autres principes, ce que j'acceptai sous condition que l'embargo contre les sujets prussiens serait levé 4993, moyennant quoi je ferais de même de celui qu'on a ordonné par respective dans plusieurs de mes ports. J'attends le résultat de cette intervention. Dans l'interval le roi m'a écrit une nouvelle lettre qui toutefois ne répond pas encore entièrement à mon attente, puisqu'il paraît vouloir s'immiscer dans mes discussions avec l'Angleterre et que je ne veux pas entrer avec lui en explication sur d'autres objets que ceux qui touchent directement ses intérêts. Je lui ai répondu, en conséquence, en écartant toutefois sa proposition d'explication sur des objets qui ne le regardent pas, et lui ai fourni, du reste, les renseignemens qu'il pourrait désirer relativement à 2983 du commerce de la Baltique. Il s'agira donc de voir encore comment l'affaire se développera.

(Not in cipher.) Vous trouverez à la suite de celle-ci, pour votre information, copie de la note que le ministre de France a remise, et de la réponse que je me suis plu à lui faire relativement à l'avènement du Prince Joseph au trône de Naples.

[1] *Vide* Strippelmann, "Beiträge z. Geschichte Hessen-Kassels," II. 65, for Malsburg's instructions on May 16th as to the basis for negotiations for the Franco-Prussian treaty.

4. Floret's Journal, 1806.[1]

Le 30 avril. Gravenreuth[2] ne veut plus retourner à Vienne ; il est venu proposer à Cetto[3] un échange, mais sa proposition n'a pas été acceptée. C'est à présent le Chev. de Bray, ministre à Berlin, que Gravenreuth nous destine pour son successeur. Comme M. de Bray est absolument de la même trempe que les deux autres, il est à espérer que notre cour pourra à temps faire des démarches contre ce choix. Des personnes, qui ont tant contribué à nos malheurs, ne sont pas faites pour rétablir les liens d'amitié et les rapports de bon voisinage entre nous et la Bavière.

La députation hollandaise, qui est depuis cinq jours ici, n'a pas encore été admise à l'audience de l'Empereur. Le message dont elle est chargée ne répond pas à l'attente de Napoléon. Les Bataves veulent parler de conditions, ils osent exprimer le désire qu'on les laisse maîtres de se choisir eux-mêmes une constitution. Avec de pareilles propositions ils ne pouvaient pas être bien venus là, où on s'attendait à une soumission entière. Ils ont expédié bien vite un courrier à La Haye pour demander de nouvelles instructions, et on ne doute pas qu'il ne revienne porteur du voeu soi-disant spontané qu'on désire. Avant le retour de ce courrier les pauvres députés ne verront pas l'Empereur.

Le 6 mai. Il est toujours question d'un voyage de l'Empereur, et on croit que ce sera en Dalmatie qu'il ira. La difficulté de trouver dans le commerce des effets sur Constantinople porte à croire que des remises très considérables ont été faites sur cette place, d'où on conclut que le gouvernement a des vues sérieuses sur ce pays.

Le 7 mai. Le courrier envoyé en Hollande par les députés de ce pays est de retour ; il porte, dit-on, soumission entière aux volontés de l'Empereur. Les députés se flattent d'être admis dimanche prochain à l'audience. On dit que le Prince Louis, et

[1] W. St. A. France. Varia. Floret, a member of the Austrian Legation in Paris, kept a diary for the benefit of Count Metternich, the regular ambassador, to whom it was submitted on his arrival. It begins in the end of April, 1806. What is irrelevant has not been reproduced here.

[2] Baron Gravenreuth had been ambassador in Vienna, and at the beginning of the war of 1805 he was at the head of the Administration in Bavaria.

[3] Bavarian Ambassador in Paris.

plus encore la Princesse, ont toujours de la répugnance d'accepter cet établissement. On ajoute que le Prince Murat pourrait bien être substitué, et que les duchés de Clève et Berg, qu'il serait obligé de rendre, seraient donnés en dot à M ell Tascher, autre parente de l'Impératrice, qu'on destinerait à un Prince d'Allemagne, dont on ne m'a pas encore pu dire le nom.[1] Nous verrons sous peu ce qu'il en est de cet " on dit ".

Je sais qu'on a agité plus d'une fois la question : si on pouvait se dispenser de demander l'assentiment de notre cour à une chose qui va peut-être sous peu lui être proposée. L'opinion paraît a la vérité être pour la nécessité de cette démarche, mais une personne employée dans les affaires a dit : " Si la cour de Vienne fait des difficultés, on n'a pas besoin d'elle, puisque par le traité de Presbourg elle a déjà consenti à tous les changements qui doivent être faits en Allemagne ". La demande que je ne fais qu'indiquer ici, parcequ'elle est connue,[2] pourrait bien tôt ou tard être suivie d'une autre plus importante : la couronne impériale d'Allemagne, quoiqu'entourée de tant d'épines, ne laisse que de faire un objet des voeux secrets de Napoléon. Quelqu'un de très initié dans le secret du cabinet a dit : " Si l'Autriche voulait cèder la couronne impériale d'Allemagne, elle pourrait avoir beaucoup de nous, on pourrait même lui rendre le Tirol ". Cette anecdote m'a été racontée par deux personnes parfaitement instruites et dignes de foi. . . .

La nouvelle de l'occupation de Basle par les Français, répandue par quelques maisons de commerce d'ici, a été prématurée. Mais celle des arrestations s'est pleinement confirmée. Les craintes de voir quelques parties de la Suisse détachée, pour être ajoutée à la dot de la P cesse de Bade, ne sont pas encore entièrement dissipées.[3]

Le 12 mai. L'audience diplomatique, qu'a eu lieu hier, n'a offert aucunes de ces scènes qu'on n'est que trop habitué de voir à

[1] An idea which had been mooted in the previous year (*vide* Napoleon to Talleyrand, August 24th, 1805, in " Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleons I," p. 93).

[2] Relinquishing the crown of the Holy Roman Empire.

[3] The Baden Ambassador, Reitzenstein, had hinted at the Swiss territory on the right bank of the Rhine as a desirable accession for Baden, and had afterwards asked the whole country (*vide* Obser, " Karl Friedrich," v. 585, 602, and 631). Early in May the proposal was submitted to Napoleon. Nothing came of it.

ces réunions. La seule chose qui mérite d'être rapportée est la demande de l'Empereur à Lucchesini, si le Roi de Prusse avait déclaré la guerre à l'Angleterre. Cette demande fut accompagnée d'un certain sourire. . . .

Les députés de la Hollande se flattaient d'avoir ce jour-là leur audience de l'Empereur. Mais jusqu'ici ils n'ont pas encore été reçus, et dans ce moment le sort de leur pays n'est pas encore décidé. On m'assure que le Prince Louis, malgré ses infirmités, sera obligé à se soumettre aux volontés de son frère, quoique l'ambitieuse soeur Caroline n'ait pas encore abandonné tout espoir sur ce trône. Les députés Verhuel et Six [1] ont souvent des conférences avec M. de Talleyrand, et on croit que c'est d'un projet d'organisation qu'ils s'occupent. . . .[2]

Le 11 juin. L'affaire de la Hollande étant terminée, il parait que l'Allemagne est à l'ordre du jour et que dans dix jours il paraîtra une décision définitive sur le dernier plan proposé par les ministres de Bade, Bavière et Wurtemberg, et qui d'abord avait été ajourné à un temps indéterminé. On prétend qu'on ne laissera intact que les cercles de la haute et basse Saxe ; tout le reste obtiendra une organisation nouvelle, conforme à l'esprit et aux intérêts de ce gouvernement-ci. On laissera aux petits états quelqu'ombre de souveraineté, mais on les dépouillera de leurs prérogatives les plus essentielles. C'est surtout pour la conscription militaire qu'on veut les rendre dépendants de leurs voisins plus grands. L'Empereur veut de grandes masses, dans lesquelles les petits contingents soient fondus, afin d'avoir par le moyen des puissances nouvelles qu'il a crées, et qui sont dans la dépendance la plus entière, les forces de la majeure partie d'Allemagne à sa disposition.

Les princes allemands, qui se trouvent ici, surtout ceux de la Souabe, flottent entre la crainte et l'espérance, tiennent depuis plusieurs jours des conférences chez le ministre des Villes Anséatiques Abel, où ils délibèrent sur leurs intérêts. Le résultat de ces conférences est un mémoire raisonné à l'Empereur qu'ils veulent présenter aujourdhui à Talleyrand. Dans ce mémoire ils proposent, comme un moyen compatible avec les vues de l'Empereur, d'être maintenus en masse, savoir comme une association fédérative ayant

[1] W. Six was one of the five ambassadors who negotiated and signed the treaty with France.

[2] Gap in the manuscript ; four pages awanting.

pour chef l'Electeur Archichancelier ; elle aurait une organisation commune, une force militaire stable, des ministres aux cours étrangères, enfin tous les caractères d'un petit état fédératif en Allemagne, sans cesser d'être membres du grand corps politique de l'Empire.[1] Le Prince Schwarzenberg et la Princesse de Hohenzollern-Siegmaringen ont refusé de signer ce mémoire. Cette dernière, amie de jeunnesse de l'Impératrice et bien en cour chez Talleyrand, croit plus convenable de séparer sa cause de celle de ses cointeressés.

Le 12 juin. Le Roi et la Reine d'Hollande qui doivent partir aujourdhui, pour prendre possession de leur pays et revenir en six semaines à Paris, ne montrent pas une grande joie de leur élévation. Le P^ce^ Louis a fait à son frère les instances les plus vives pour qu'il le dispense du fardeau de cette couronne, que le climat d'Hollande était contraire à sa santé et ne pouvait qu'avancer son trépas. On prétend que l'Empereur a répondu : " Vous mourrez glorieusement ". On dit que ce prince se trouve effectivement dans le plus triste état ; ses deux mains sont tellement desséchées qu'il n'en peut faire aucun usage ; le mal fait des progrès aux pieds et commence même à se manifester à l'épine du dos.

Les députés bataves se vantent d'avoir fait une excellente affaire pour leur pays ; ils prétendent avoir stipulé : 1. que le nombre de troupes françaises qui pèsent depuis si longtemps sur la pauvre Hollande sera diminué ; 2. la langue du pays conservée dans les affaires ; 3. la religion dominante maintenue ; 4. les places dans l'administration, et même dans le conseil de la régence après la mort du roi, ne seraient occupées que par des nationaux ; 5. que la liste civile serait de 8 millions de florins, dont 200,000 seraient assignés à la reine-régente après la mort du roi.[2] Il y a malheureusement un revers de la médaille dont ces messieurs ne se vantent pas. On prétend que ce pauvre pays, qui est sucé jusqu'à la moëlle des os, sera obligé de donner 16 millions de livres pour former l'établissement de la nouvelle cour, et que les places auprès de la personne du roi et de la reine ne seront données qu'à des Français. Le plus grand sujet de crainte est la perte d'environ 30 millions de florins de rentes que les capitalistes hollandais tirent

[1] *Vide* the note on the Suabian princes and estates of June 11th, 1806 : Bitterauf, " Gesch. d. Rheinbundes," I. 325.

[2] Cf. the treaty and the constitution in Rocquain, "Napoleon et le roi Louis," p. 302 ff.

annuellement de le banque d'Angleterre et que ce gouvernement a continué jusqu'ici de payer. Un voyageur qui arrive de la Hollande a remarqué peu de contentement, et encore moins à Düsseldorf, où le nouveau souverain a commencé son règne par l'organisation du sistème des impositions sur le pied français : le timbre, droit d'enregistrement, la taxe aux fenêtres et toute la séquence sont introduits.

La nouvelle création d'un roi de Hollande, et de Naples, d'un duc de Clèves et Berg, d'un Prince de Bénévent, etc., ne laisse pas que d'embarasser beaucoup les membres du corps diplomatique qui n'ont pas encore reçu des instructions de leurs cours relativement à l'etiquette. . . .

Le 24 juillet. Ayant été par ordre de M. le gén. de Vincent [1] chez Milord Yarmouth, qu'il n'avait pu rejoindre lui-même, pour lui faire part des nouvelles exigences de la France au sujet de titre d' "Empereur d'Allemagne," je lui dis que c'était un nouveau sacrifice qu'on exigeait de nous, comme une suite des arrangements qui venaient d'avoir lieu en Allemagne, que, comme entre alliés tout devait être commun, l'Angleterre pourrait tirer de ce sacrifice un argument pour stipuler quelque chose en notre faveur. Il me répondit : "Votre allié, la Russie, vous a abandonné". "Mais l'Angleterre," repliquai-je, "ne fera pas de même, et je me flatte, Milord, que vous obtiendrez un résultat plus satisfaisant". "Je dois l'espérer, mais peutêtre n'en obtiendrai-je pas du tout." Je fis semblant de m'étonner que dans le traité avec la Russie il n'y avait aucune stipulation en notre faveur. "J'ai lu tout le traité," dit Milord, "vous pouvez me croire ; on mit une grand importance à faire évacuer l'Allemagne par les troupes françaises, on offre sa médiation pour la paix avec l'Angleterre, on garantit la Poméranie à la Suède, voilà tout". "Mais, il y a des articles secrets," répondis-je. "Je les connais tous," réprit il, "ils sont encore bien plus à l'avantage de la France. Mr Adair les connaît aussi." [2]

A l'audience de congé que le Landgrave de Furstenberg a eu aujourdhui, l'Empereur à témoigné la même mauvaise humeur contre nous que le général de Vincent a eu le désagrément d'observer avant-hier. Il a parlé de certains propos qui doivent avoir été tenus à Vienne contre le Cardinal Fesch dont il se trouve extréme-

[1] Austria's representative on a special mission.

[2] *Vide* Adair, "Geschichtl. Denkschrift einer Sendung an den Wiener Hof," appendix, p. 276 ff.; also Oubril's "Treaty in De Clercq," II. 180 ff.

ment blessé ; il est instruit de tout ce qui se passe et qui se dit chez nous. Il paraît qu'il y a des personnes qui se font un plaisir malin de rapporter tout, et il est facile d'envenimer le mot le plus innocent. Au Landgrave il a témoigné qu'il était fâché de ce qu'il n'avait pu faire quelque chose pour lui ; " mais," dit-il, " vous tenez trop à l'Autriche, et je n'ai pu rien laisser dans la ligue de la confédération qui est attaché à cette maison."

Le 26 juillet. Les négociations entre Milord Yarmouth et le général Clarke se continuent avec une grande activité, et on croit qu'avant le mois de septembre la paix avec l'Angleterre sera signée. Celle de la Russie a bien fait hausser les fonds, mais elle n'a pas produit une sensation bien vive dans le public, parcequ'elle n'inspire pas la confiance d'un repos durable et tant désiré. On est étonné de la hâte avec laquelle on a procédé, et on ne peut concevoir comment M. d'Oubril peut avoir eu des pouvoirs assez étendus pour conclure, malgré les nouveaux incidents de la plus haute importance survenus depuis son départ de Pétersbourg ; il y a des personnes qui prétendent que M. d'Oubril s'est laissé terrorifier. On cite une anecdote curieuse qui prouve combien les Français avaient de la supériorité dans cette négociation. Il y avait un article sur lequel les deux négociateurs ne pouvaient pas s'arranger. Clarke en fit part à l'Empereur, en lui observant qu'il ne croyait pas qu'Oubril cedât jamais sur cet article en question. L'Empereur répondit : " Je vais monter une couple d'heures à cheval ; quand je reviendrai, il faut que cette affaire soit finie, on bien M. d'Oubril n'a qu'à s'en aller sur-le-champ ". Cette menace eut l'effet qu'on désirait. . . .

On dit que l'Electeur Archichancelier, depuis le retour de M. de Waricourt,[1] qui lui a porté la nouvelle des changements arrêtés pour l'Allemagne, est dans le plus grand désespoir ; il doit avoir déclaré qu'il n'acceptera pas le rôle qu'on veut le faire jouer dans la nouvelle confédération. Il faut voir s'il persiste dans son refus.

L'Empereur commence déjà à être mécontent de son frère Louis parcequ'il se montre plus hollandais que françois. Le nouveau ministre nommé pour Paris n'est pas encore arrivé. On dit que l'Empereur n'en veut pas et que M. Brantzen restera ici jusqu'à ce que les deux frères soient d'accord sur ce point.

Le 12 août. On dit que Lord Lauderdale a cru trouver, en arrivant le 3 août à Paris, les négociations plus avancées qu'elles ne l'étaient ; on croit que les rapports de Lord Yarmouth on pré-

[1] Varicourt was chamberlain to the Archchancellor Dalberg.

senté la chose trop facile. Peu de jours après son arrivée, à la suite d'une conférence fort chaude, dans laquelle M. de Champagny avait été ajouté au général Clarke, Milord Lauderdale demander des passeports pour s'en retourner. Sa demande répétée à plusieurs reprises sans qu'il obtint une réponse de M. de Talleyrand, hier ce ministre lui fit une communication à la suite de laquelle Basilico fut expédié à Londres. Il fut suivi aujourdhui par un second courrier également envoyé par le négociateur anglais. Les conférences sont, sinon rompues, au moins suspendues. Les voitures de Lauderdale sont chargées.

Le 16 août. L'Empereur n'est pas content de la conduite de son frère Louis. Le ministre de France à la Haye, le général Dupont-Chaumont, qui se trouve par congé à Paris, a dit à l'autre jour en pleine audience à l'Empereur qui demandait des nouvelles de son frère : " Il est déjà devenue tout à fait hollandais, et il ferait bien de passer une quinzaine de jours à Paris pour se rappeler qu'il était français ". " Eh bien," répondit l'Empereur, " il faudra lui aire la guerre un jour." Il est également mécontent du Duc de Clèves, qui commence déjà à se quereller avec tous ses voisins, même avec les Hollandais.

Le 18 août. Le Prince Primat vient d'envoyer son projet de statut pour l'organisation de la nouvelle confédération. Cette pièce, dit-on, n'a pas rencontré l'approbation de ce gouvernement.

Le 21 août. (Conversation with Lauderdale.) Milord commença par exprimer ses regrets de n'avoir pas encore fait la connaissance de Votre Excellence,[1] puis il me demanda si M. l'ambassadeur n'enverrait pas bientôt un courrier à Vienne ; qu'il était bien fâché de n'avoir pas vu plutôt la lettre que M. Adair avait écrite à L. Yarmouth en accompagnement de la dépêche à M. Fox,[2] que Yarmouth lui avait remis cette dépêche hier, mais qu'il ne lui avait communiqué la lettre reçue de M. Adair que ce matin comme une chose indifférente. M. Adair, dit-il, mandait qu'à Vienne on croyait que l'Empereur Alexandre ne ratifierait pas le traité conclu par M. d'Oubril, que M. de Strogonoff à Londres pensait de même, que lui, Lauderdale, croyait aussi comme une chose très probable que la ratification ne suivrait pas, parceque l'Empereur Alexandre avait de nouveau et formellement assuré a L. Grenville, qui était parti le

[1] Metternich had been in Paris since August 4th.

[2] Probably refers to the letter of August 4th in Adair, " Geschichtliche Denkschrift," p. 95.

24 juillet de Pétersbourg, qu'il ne ferait rien sans l'Angleterre, que le gouvernement anglais avait trouvé moyen de se procurer le traité russe et de le faire passer à son ministre à Pétersbourg, et que, d'après le calcul tiré du jour que le courrier anglais avait passé Helsingör, il croyait qu'il pourrait être arrivé deux jours avant M. d'Oubril à Pétersbourg. Si la ratification, comme il le croyait, était refusée, il lui paraissait important d'instruire M. Adair de l'état de ses négociations, afin qu'on ne se laissat pas induire en erreur là-dessus à Vienne. . . . Milord parla encore longuement sur la paix de la Russie, sur la honte de l'article où il est stipulé "de pouvoir à l'existence du roi de Naples" par une pension,[1] sur la conduite inconcevable de M. d'Oubril qui, dans plusieurs lettres particulières écrites à M. de Razoumoffsky et à Strogonoff, et dont-il me montra des extraits, s'exprima ainsi : "Je sais que j'ai outrepassé les ordres de l'Empereur et je dois penser à travailler à ma justification. Je pars pour Pétersbourg pour présenter mon ouvrage, et ma tête si j'ai mal fait".

Le 21 août. Le secrétaire russe, que M. d'Oubril a laissé ici, attend vers le commencement du mois prochain des nouvelles de Pétersbourg. Il dit être persuadé que le traité sera ratifié parceque les raisons qui ont engagé M. d'Oubril de signer étaient trop majeures. "Si nous ne faisions pas la paix," dit-il, "on s'en serait vengé sur d'autres, ce qu'il nous importe d'éviter."

La note que le cabinet de Berlin a remise à Laforêt au sujet des armements qui se font en Prusse[2] fait une grande sensation ici, et surtout parmi les confédérés qui craignent déjà de se voir sommés à faire marcher leurs contingents. Dans cette note écrite avec beaucoup de modération on proteste qu'on n'a aucune vue hostile dirigée contre qui que ce soit, mais depuis que les armées françaises s'étendent en Allemagne, tandisque tout est arrangé et terminé dans ce pays, et que surtout elles s'approchent de différents côtés vers les états de Prusse, il est du devoir du roi de rassembler également des troupes pour ne pas être pris au dépourvu. On s'imagine que la Prusse n'aurait jamais eu le courage de montrer cette contenance, si elle n'était entendue avec la Russie, et quoique M. de Lucchesini assure que, d'après des lettres de Krusemark, on ne

[1] Cf. Coquelle, "Napoleon I et l'Angleterre," p. 113. Instructions to Lauderdale.

[2] Cf. Bailleu, "Preussen und Frankreich," II. 520, and "Corresp.," XIII. 10,683.

saurait douter de la ratification du traité conclu avec la France, on n'est pas tout à fait rassuré sur cet article.

Le 25 août. On assure que l'Empereur incline beaucoup à se rendre à Francfort pour voir venir les princes confédérés lui rendre hommage en personne et présider ensuite à la diète. Des personnes de l'intérieur disent que sa tête est tellement échauffée par le travail, les veilles et le trop grand usage du caffé, qu'on a trouvé nécessaire de l'engager de passer quelques jours à Rambouillet pour se reposer et se distraire.

Le 27 août. Hier, le 26, l'Empereur revint de Rambouillet, où il avait passé 10 jours.[1] Talleyrand fut appelé aussitôt à St. Cloud et y travailla jusqu'en bien tard du soir. Le ministre de l'Intérieur y fut appelé la nuit. Talleyrand y passa encore la plus grande partie de la journée du lendemain. Cette grande activité du cabinet est supposée avoir rapport au courrier anglais arrivé le 25.[2]

On parla beaucoup d'un voyage très-prochain de l'Empereur, sur le but duquel les opinions varient. On nomme l'Italie, Bruxelles, Mayence, Francfort, Boulogne et Fontainebleau. Ces différentes versions établissent une grande probabilité qu'il est sérieusement question d'un voyage. On nomme toujours beaucoup d'endroits pour ne pas être deviné, et on sait rarement où l'Empereur va que quand il monte en voiture. . . .

Le 29 août. . . . Quoique les conférences entre les négociateurs anglais et le ministère français soient fréquentes, et que les premiers dînent très souvent chez M. de Champagny, l'ouvrage de la pacification n'est guères plus avancée qu'il ne le fût le premier jour de l'arrivée de L. Lauderdale. L'article du commerce, la Sicile, et le cap de Bonne Espérance font les principales pierres d'achoppement. Le premier article a été, à ce qu'on assure, débattu hier au conseil d'état qui doit avoir opiné qu'il était impossible d'accorder à l'Angleterre ce qu'elle prétend à cet égard.

Il doit y avoir cet automne trois camps dans les environs de Paris. . . .

Le 31 août. (Admiral Vincent with English troops in Lisbon.) On croit que le Prince-Régent,[3] instruit des dangers qu'on lui prépare, a demandé des secours à l'Angleterre, non pour défendre son pays, mais pour l'embarquer avec sa famille, ses plus fidéles

[1] From August 17th to 26th.

[2] Cf. Coquelle, "Napoléon I et l'Angleterre," p. 133.

[3] Cf. Portugal.

serviteurs et ses trésors et le conduire au Brésil avec des forces suffisantes pour se venger de l'Espagne dans l'Amérique méridionale.

(Absence of any news from St. Petersburg. Anxiety about the Treaty of Peace.) On veut trouver aussi dans les mouvements des Prussiens une probabilité qu'à Berlin on soit sûr de la Russie. Mais les personnes bien instruites assurent que ces mouvements sont uniquement causés par la certitude qu'on a acquise à Berlin des desseins de la France contre la Prusse. On apprit à Berlin par M. de Jacobi qu'au même moment, où le cabinet des Thuilleries avait rassuré la cour de Berlin sur le Hanovre, il consentit sans difficulté à la restitution de ce pays à l'Angleterre. Le ministère anglais avait communiqué à M. de Jacobi le rapport de Yarmouth relatif à cet objet. Un autre motif desdits mouvements fut une lettre de l'Electeur de Hesse dans laquelle il fit part au roi que le ministre français Bignon avait cherché à l'enrôler pour la Confédération du Rhin, en lui promettant pour prix de son accession quelqu'accroissement en Westphalie au dépens de la Prusse. Ces deux causes réunies ont fait juger au cabinet de Berlin qu'il était urgent de se mettre en mesure. Il est douloureux de voir qu'il fallait tant pour convaincre cette cour de ce que l'Europe a à attendre de la France.

Le 18 septembre. (Preparations for the journey of the Emperor and Talleyrand.)

Le 20 septembre. Les grenadiers de la garde, partis aujourdhui, vont à pied jusqu'à deux postes d'ici, où ils trouveront des voitures qui les transporteront en quatre jours à Mayence. On dit que les chevaux de post coutent au gouvernement 120,000 Frcs.

Le 21 septembre. On a vu partir encore aujourdhui des gardes, l'artillerie volante et l'ambulance de campagnes. Les dragons montent la garde au château des Thuilleries et aux autres postes occupés d'ordinaire par les gardes. On emballe aujourdhui l'argenterie à la cour. Le camp de Meudon est levé. On y tient enfermé depuis des nouveaux conscrits pour les dresser au metier des armes. Ils n'osent sortir du camp, n'y même y voir leurs parents. Le magazin du marchand-géographe Piquet ne désemplit pas de généraux et d'officiers qui demandent des cartes de la Prusse, Saxe, Hesse, etc. Tout ce qu'on avait tiré d'Artaria de Mannheim est déjà vendu; on attend un second envoi pour satisfaire aux demandes. Un domestique du grand-écuyer Caulaincourt présenta une longue liste de cartes à fournir sur-le-champ à son

maître. C'était la Prusse par Sozmann, la Marche de Brandenbourg, les postes de Hanovre, la Poméranie suédoise et prussiènne, la Saxe, le Mecklembourg, la Silésie, la Pologne, la Russie, la Hongrie.[1]

Le 24 septembre. (Murat arrived and after a long conversation with Napoleon, left at 5 A.M. for Düsseldorf.)

Le 25 septembre. . . . On dit que pendant le court sejour qu'a fait ici le duc de Clèves il y a eu une scène des plus violentes entre lui et l'Empereur. Le duc avait eu l'imprudence de s'opposer à l'occupation de Wesel, que c'était la seule forteresse qu'il avait contre la France, qu'il ne la pouvait donc pas abandonner. On dit que l'Empereur dans sa fureur l'a menacé de la chasser de son pays et de lui assigner une autre forteresse qui lui suffirait.

Le 27 septembre. Un plaisant, voyant l'exposition des objets d'industrie aux portiques sur la Place des Invalides, dit: "L'on voit bien ici les suites de la guerre car l'industrie nationale est aux invalides".

Le 29 septembre. L'Empereur a pris avec lui deux chambellans non militaires, le C^te^ de Mercy et M. de Tournon ; ils sont désignés fesant le service d'officiers d'ordonnance auprès de la personne de l'Empereur, et ils portent l'uniforme de la garde impériale. . . . Le secrétaire d'état pour le Royaume d'Italie, M. Aldini . . . trouva l'Empereur de très mauvaise humeur. . . . Il parla de la guerre, exprima quelque méfiance sur l'Autriche et qu'il ferait rassembler un corps d'observation en Italie. Lorsqu'avant le départ de l'Empereur Aldini fut une seconde fois chez lui, il le trouva très gai et content. Il doit lui avoir dit qu'il espérait que l'affaire avec la Prusse s'arrangerait, mais que, si la guerre avait lieu, il était déjà sûr qu'il la finirait comme celle de l'année dernière, que tout était déjà préparé.

Le 1^er^ octobre. Un aide de camp de l'Empereur a dit que les ordres étaient donnés qu'au premier mouvement de l'Autriche propre à donner de l'ombrage, l'armée de Naples forte de 60.000 h., et celle de la Dalmatie de 30,000 h., evacueraient ces pays et se rassembleraient en Italie pour tenir l'Autriche en respect. "Je (les) reprendrai," dit l'Empereur, "quand je voudrai, et que les Napoli-

[1] In Hungary at this time there were a great many French emissaries, and although they were on intimate terms with various families they did not make much impression on the people who were influenced by the clergy in favour of the reigning family.

tains prennent garde à eux, s'ils ne se tiennent pas tranquilles je les punirai d'une manière qu'ils s'en souviendront".

Le 6 octobre. On commence ici à avoir l'oeil sur l'Espagne. Un militaire y a été envoyé pour observer les mouvements qui ont eu lieu dans ce pays; le sénateur Beauharnais qui devait y aller comme ambassadeur a eu l'ordre de différer son départ. L'empereur est très mécontent de ce que l'Espagne n'a pas encore reconnu le nouveau roi de Naples. On prétend qu'il a dit: "Si le roi ne veut pas le reconnaître ce sera son successeur qui le reconnaîtra".

Le 20 décembre. (Excitement over the continental blockade in England.) On a vu circuler des adresses où on proposait spontanément de mettre la moitié des biens de la nation anglaise à la disposition du roi, pour continuer la guerre à toute extrémité, parcequ'on devait être convaincu que la paix n'était pas dans les voeux de l'Empereur Napoléon et qu'il ne poserait les armes que lorsque l'une des deux, ou la France, ou l'Angleterre, serait perdue. Sur les théatres des fauxbourgs on joue des farces relatives au décret français. "Le blocus de l'Angleterre sans vaisseaux," a, entre autres, le plus grand succès à Sailersweals. (We are hoping for some amelioration, as France would not risk having 27,000 prisoners of war in England while there were only 4,000 Englishmen detained in France.)

5. The Tilsit Treaty of Alliance.[1]

S. M. l'Empereur des Français, Roi d'Italie, Protecteur de la Confédération du Rhin, et S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, ayant spécialement à cœur de rétablir la paix générale en Europe sur des bases solides et, s'il se peut, inébranlables, ont à cet effet

[1] In 1888, when Vol. II of this work (1st edition) appeared, the text of this important document was unknown. Owing to the courtesy of Girard de Rialle, the head of the Foreign Office archives in Paris, Fournier was allowed to reproduce the treaty. Since then it has been repeatedly published, among others, by Tatistcheff, "Alexandre et Napoléon I," p. 615; Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre I," I. 505 f.; "Sbornik," 89, 60, and "Martens," XIII. 322 ff. The remark of Schiemann in the "Histor. Zeitschr." 91520, that there is a portion awanting in the text, is due to a misapprehension. He is referring to the separate Articles of the Treaty of Peace, which Fournier purposely refrained from publishing.

résolu de conclure une alliance offensive et défensive et nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

S. M. l'Empereur des Français, Roi d'Italie, Protecteur de la Confédération du Rhin: M. Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Prince de Bénévent, son Grand-Chambellan et Ministre des Relations Extérieures, grand-cordon de la Légion d'honneur, chevalier grand' croix des ordres de l'Aigle-Noir et de l'Aigle-Rouge de Prusse et de S^{t} Hubert:

Et S. M. l'Empereur de toutes Russies: M. le Prince Alexandre Kourakin, son Conseiller privé actuel, membre du Conseil d'Etat, Sénateur, Chancelier de tous les ordres de l'Empire, Chambellan actuel, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies près S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, et chevalier des ordres de Russie: de S^{t} André, de S^{t} Alexandre, de S^{te} Anne de la première classe et de S^{t} Wolodimir de la première classe, de l'Aigle-Noir et de l'Aigle-Rouge de Prusse, de S^{t} Hubert de Bavière, du Danebrog et de l'Union parfaite de Danemarck, et bailli-grand' croix de l'ordre souverain de S^{t} Jean de Jérusalem.

Et M. le Prince Dmitri Labanoff de Rostow, Lieutenant-General des armées de S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, chevalier des ordres de S^{te} Anne de la première classe, de l'ordre militaire de S^{t} Georges et de l'ordre de S^{t} Wolodimir de la troisième classe.

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs, sont convenus des articles suivants:

Article Premier:

S. M. l'Empereur des Français, Roi d'Italie et S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies s'engagent à faire cause commune, soit par terre, soit par mer, soit enfin par terre et par mer, dans toute guerre que la France ou la Russie serait dans la nécessité d'entreprendre ou de soutenir contre toute Puissance Européenne.

Article Second:

Le cas de l'alliance survenant, et chaque fois qu'il surviendra, les Hautes Parties Contractantes régleront, par une convention spéciale, les forces que chacune d'elles devra employer contre l'ennemi commun, et les points où ces forces devront agir; mais dès à présent elles s'engagent à employer, si les circonstances l'exigent, la totalité de leurs forces de terre et de mer.

Article Troisième :

Toutes les opérations des guerres communes seront faites de concert, et ni l'une ni l'autre des Parties Contractantes ne pourra, dans aucun cas, traiter de la paix sans le concours ou le consentement de l'autre Partie.

Article Quatriéme :

Si l'Angleterre n'accepte pas la médiation de la Russie ou si, l'ayant acceptée, elle n'a point au premier Novembre prochain consenti à conclure la paix, en reconnaissant que les pavillons de toutes les Puissances doivent jouir d'une égale et parfaite indépendance sur les mers et en restituant les conquêtes par elle faites sur la France et ses Alliés depuis l'année dix huit cent cinq, où la Russie a fait cause commune avec elle, une note sera dans le courant dudit mois de Novembre remise au Cabinet de S^{t} James par l'Ambassadeur de S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies. Cette note, exprimant l'intérêt que Sadite Majesté Imperiale prend au repos du monde et l'intention où elle est d'employer toutes les forces de son Empire pour procurer à l'humanité le bienfait de la paix, contiendra la déclaration positive et explicite que, sur le refus de l'Angleterre de conclure la paix aux conditions susdites, S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies fera cause commune avec la France, et pour le cas où le Cabinet de S^{t} James n'aurait pas donné au 1er Décembre prochain une réponse catégorique et satisfaisante, l'Ambassadeur de Russie recevra l'ordre éventuel de demander ses passeports ledit jour et de quitter immédiatement l'Angleterre.

Article Cinquième :

Arrivant le cas prévu par l'article précédent, les Hautes Parties Contractantes feront de concert et au même moment sommer les trois Cours de Copenhague, de Stockholm et de Lisbonne, de fermer leurs ports aux Anglais, de rappeler de Londres leurs Ambassadeurs et de déclarer la guerre à l'Angleterre. Celle des trois Cours qui s'y refusera, sera traitée comme ennemie par les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, et la Suède s'y refusant, le Danemarck sera contraint de lui déclarer la guerre.

Article Sixième :

Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes agiront pareillement de concert et insisteront avec force auprès de la Cour de Vienne

pour qu'elle adopte les principes exposés dans l'article quatre ci-dessus, qu'elle ferme ses ports aux Anglais, rappelle de Londres son Ambassadeur et déclare la guerre à l'Angleterre.

Article Septième :

Si, au contraire, l'Angleterre, dans le délai spécifié ci-dessus, fait la paix aux conditions susdites [et S. M. l'Empéreur de toutes les Russies emploiera toute son influence pour l'y amener], le Hanovre sera restitué au Roi d'Angleterre en compensation des colonies françaises, espagnoles et hollandaises.

Article Huitième :

Pareillement, si par une suite des changements qui viennent de se faire à Constantinople, la Porte n'acceptait point la médiation de la France, ou si après qu'elle l'aura acceptée, il arrivait que, dans le délai de trois mois après l'ouverture des négociations, elles n'eussent pas conduit à un résultat satisfaisant, la France fera cause commune avec la Russie contre la Porte Ottomane, et les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes s'entendront pour soustraire toutes les provinces de l'Empire Ottoman en Europe, la ville de Constantinople et la Province de Roumélie exceptées, au joug et aux vexations des Turcs.

Article Neuvième :

Le présent traité restera secret et ne pourra être rendu public ni communiqué à aucun Cabinet par l'une des Parties Contractantes sans le consentement de l'autre.

Il sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Tilsit dans le délai de quatre jours.

Fait à Tilsit, le sept Juillet 1807 (vingt cinq juin mil huit cent sept).

Signé : Ch. Maurice Talleyrand, P^ce^ de Bénévent. L. S.

Signé : Le Prince Alexandre Kourakin. L. S.

Signé : Le Prince Dmitri Labanoff de Rostow. L. S.

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